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SUMMARY
Seven potential safety concerns for D-T fusion reactors were
examined and the influence of blanket material choice determined.
This influence was quantified in terms of Relative Consequence
Indices (RCI) according to prescribed consequence criteria. The safety
concerns included:
1) continued plasma heating after a loss-of-coolant,
2) afterheat after loss-of-coolant,
3) plasma disruption effects,
4) transients due to rapid chemical combustion or leakage of
pressurized fluids,
5) rapid structural oxidation and volatilization,
6) corrosion, and
7) public health consequences of unit volume amounts of
released radioactivity.
Selected combinations of structural material (316 SS, HT-9, V-alloy,
or TZM), primary coolant (pressurized water, helium; lithium, or flibe),
and tritium breeder (LiAlO2, lithium, or Li 7Pb83) were examined.
The analyses and indices were structured to focus on the specific
material properties that influence the results, which allows for
comparison of materials not included in the present study.
Major advances in this work include estimation of the rapid
oxidation rates of vanadium and molybdenum, modeling of corrosion
product formation and behavior for the coolant/structure combinations,
and development of a fusion accident consequence code entitled
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FUSECRAC and its data base to calculate public health effects from
fusion-specific radioisotope releases.
The safety concerns that were found to be relatively insensitive
(differing by less than an order of magnitude) to material choice are:
the rate of temperature increase from continied plasma heating
following a loss of coolant and electromagnetic effects of plasma
disruptions. The range of the RCI's was about an order of magnitude
for problems concerning afterheat removal, corrosion, and the thermal
effects of disruptions. The severity of the following problems were
found to range over several orders of magnitude according to material
choice: potential public health effects from radioactivity release,
rapid structural oxidation, blanket chemical combustion and coolant
pressurization.
When combustion, rapid structural oxidation, and the thermal
effects of plasma disruptions are assumed solvable by identified
design approaches, the Relative Consequence Indices relating to the
most important safety problems illustrate the advantages of vanadium,
liquid metals, and flibe.
In summary, it is possible to quantify the relative merits of
various materials from a safety perspective. However, due to
conflicting preferences from individual safety problems, the overal
material choice is tempered by the ability of the design to render
certain accidents improbable.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Accident safety considerations should be included in fusion reactor
research, development, and design decisions. The primary goal of this
work is to discuss and quantify the relative influence of blanket material
(structural material, coolant and tritium breeder) on fusion reactor acci-
dent consequences. This requires development of new safety assessment
methodology and also allows some discussion of design recommendations to
minimize accident consequence and frequency. The choice of the materials
and specific safety issues is fairly broad; the analysis is intended to
define a consistent framework to view the trade-offs among materials as
well as quantify the comparison.
1.1 Purpose
1.1.1 Problem
Considerable effort has been spent on identification of proper blan-
ket materials for fusion reactors. Each reactor design study has had to
select some combination of materials for use in the blanket surrounding
the plasma. Past studies have focused on the relative engineering and
economic merits of various blanket materials and design concepts (see for
example [1.1], [1.2]).
Other work has examined some aspects of safety and/or environmental
considerations [1.3 -1.6], although serious issues were either not ad-
dressed-or not quantified. Furthermore, a consistent overview of how
material selection influences reactor safety has been lacking.
Many factors have and will be included in material selection deci-
sions. These include engineering feasibility, economics, environment
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(normal operation), and safety (accidents). Current paper design studies
influence the experimental program by helping to raise important issues,
focusing attention on critical problems, and providing a framework to view
the state-of-knowledge. Current experiments determine the future data
base required in future design studies and experiments. If certain mater-
ials are improperly excluded from current research and development in
favor of less appropriate ones, it will become progressively more diffi-
cult in the future to find errors and correct the development path. Ob-
viously, research time, manpower, and money are limited; thus, the problem
is to focus on the most appropriate materials.
It would be inappropriate for safety considerations to be the sole
determining factor in materials choice. In the extreme, a fusion reactor
could be made perfectly safe by making it so expensive that none are
built. On the other hand, if safety is examined at the proper time and
to the proper degree, solutions to problems can be found beforehand and
woven into the fusion technology and alloy development. This offers the
possibility that the future product will be substantially improved and
that fusion's potential safety advantages over other energy sources will
become reality.
The worst thing that could happen is if incomplete safety considera-
tions lead to material selections that not only worsen economic and en-
gineering feasibility, but actually decrease the overall safety of the
product. This is why a consistent framework is needed to examine a
variety of safety issues. Further discussion of safety (risk assessment)
issues is given in Section 1.3 and Chapter 9. The three most obvious
accident/safety issues have been the stored chemical energy in elemental
lithium, the induced structural radioactivity, and the amount
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and behavior of tritium. The attention given to lithium fires has
directed development away from liquid lithium breeders. Because of the
coupling between material choice (compatibility is a function of structural
materials, coolants, and tritium breeders) and safety issues, this
development direction may make other problems worse, indeed worsening
the overall safety picture. These issues were the motivation for the
present study.
1.1.2 Hypothesis
Explicitly stated, the hypothesis is that blanket material selec-
tion can significantly influence fusion safety; furthermore, that it is
possible at this ti'me to analyze the various problems and quaritify the
differences among materials.
In fission, the fundamental hazard source is the radioactivity
caused by the fissioning process. The material selection and design does
very significantly influence the possible accident scenarios and overall
risk. However, the radioactive fission products and actinides are sources
of hazards largely independent of the structure or coolant.
In fusion, it appears that material choice is more important.
The fundamental hazard sources are the presence of a radioactive fuel
(e.g., tritium, a fuel cycle and breeder question) and induced structural
radioactivity (function of material choice and fuel cycle).
1.1.3 Goal
The goal is to analyze and compare a variety of important safety
areas as a function of material. This must begin with the selection of
the safety areas themselves and the materials of interest. In most(0"""
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safety areas, improved analytical tools are needed to determine the
severity of the problem. Development of new tools and use of old ones
then allows comparison of potential hazard for the selected materials.
If done in a consistent manner, this provides a basis for an overall
examination of how material choice influences accident safety. Finally,
the process should identify some specific design ideas to help minimize
safety problems.
1.1.4 Scope of Work
The risk associated with a fusion reactor can be quantified as
risk = E accident consequence x accident frequency (1.1)
events
The data base is inadequate and the design stage insufficient to perform
a probablistic risk assessment of a fusion reactor. However, some of the
contribution to accident probability is independent of the specific
blanket design and material choice-external events (seismic, wind, flood,
etc.) and some internal events (magnet malfunctions, plasma disruption).
The study is basically limited to the relative consequences. For example,
although the frequency of plasma disruptions is not studied, the relative
consequences to various structural materials are. Although not a com-
plete picture of fusion accident risk, it is intended that this study
provide adequate insight into the relative impact of selecting different
materials.
Only blanket materials are examined. Of these, analysis is pri-
marily focused on the structural material, primary circuit coolant, and
,l -1 I v
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tritium breeder. Other blanket materials such as neutron multiplier
(if needed), first wall coatings (if needed), divertor/limiter struc-
ture, and reflectors are not generally considered. The combination of
structure, coolant, and breeder is likely to strongly influence both
design and safety, with other materials being secondary influences.
Although the safety areas considered here are generally present
(qualitatively if not quantitatively) in fusion reactors of different
fuel cycles and physics confinement schemes, the analysis will be based
(where relevant) on one fuel cycle (D-T) and one physics scheme (steady
state tokamak). The selection of a D-T tokamak and some differing
aspects of alternatives are discussed in Chapter 2.
A total of seven safety problems were selected for study (see
Sectioni 1.3). This does ndt include a1l safety areb ems
however, those aspects which appeared most important are addressed.
Eleven combinations of four structural materials, four coolants, and
three tritium breeders were selected. While other materials have been
mentioned, those selected are generally representative of the possibi-
lities discussed in the fusion community. Furthermore, where possible,
the precise scaling of the consequence with specific material properties
is identified. Thus, it is hoped that other materials can be examined
and compared, as desired, in the future. The range of materials (and
their properties) selected assisted in identifying the severi-ty of prob-
lems and the material property dependence.
1.2 Reference Material Selection
The problem of selecting materials for fusion reactors is quite
complex. Besides the narrow problem here of blanket materials (primary
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coolant, tritium breeder, and structure), proper materials are needed
for vacuum seals, magnet shield, reflector region, limiter/divertor,
and magnetic coils. Furthermore, a first wall coating and neutron
multiplier may be needed. These problems are not specifically addressed
in this study.
1.2.1 Selection Criteria
For this study, the criteria that were used to select specific
materials and their combinations for analysis are as follows:
1) Representative of materials proposed within the fusion
community.
2) Represent a fairly broad range of alternatives. For
example, selection of multiple versions of austenitic
steel would not have contributed much to the understanding
of the material impact.
3) Nt& have obvious major engineering or safety
problems. For example, water and elemental lithium were
not used in the same combination due to the very serious
potential for chemical combustion.
4) Have an adequate data base.
1.2.2 Coolant Selection
Proposed primary loop coolants fall into four categories: water,
gas, liquid metals, and molten salts. Among water options (pressurized
water, boiling water, and steam), pressurized water is selected due to
the greater experience and fewer tritium problems. As discussed in
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Chapter 8, tritium leakage through the coolant pathway is a serious
problem. A one loop design such as boiling water appears to cause sig-
nificantly higher problems in this regard than a two loop (primary,
steam cycle) pressurized water design.
Helium is the preferred gas coolant, although others like CO2 are
possible. As helium seems the preferred gas in fission technology,
there is no reason to suspect that another would be preferred for fusion.
Liquid metal coolants include Li, Na, K, and Li-Pb. Lithium and
Li-Pb have the significant advantage of possible use as both coolant and
tritium breeder, simplifying blanket design. The selected case, lithium,
has been given far more attention in the fusion community and an exten-
sive data base exists. Li-Pb is retained as a breeder option.
A large number of molten salts have been examined [1.7] for use
as fusion reactor coolants, although few design studies have included
them. None have as extensive a data base as the other coolants selected.
However, molten salts appear to offer significant advantages and disad-
vantages compared to the alternatives; hence, they are'an interesting case.
The LiF-BeF2 compound, flibe, was selected due to its good heat transfer
properties and larger data base. In addition, flibe has some tritium
breeding potential.
1.2.3 Breeder Selection
Since the D-T fuel cycle was selected, some form of lithium is re-
quired to breed tritium. The possible forms include pure liquid lithium,
high temperature ceramic, liquid alloy, and solid alloy. The problems
and required technology with liquid lithium are generally.well known.
The potential advantages of and significant attention to lithium require
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its inclusidn in the study.
The ceramic compounds (Li2O, LiAlO 2 , Li2SiO 3, etc.) are generally
alike in physical properties and behavior. The STARFIRE study [1.8]
selected LiAlO 2 due to such advantages (perceived, at the time of this
study) as lower tritium inventory and chemica'l activity. Although
LiAlO. requires a neutron multiplier for adequate tritium breeding, it
was selected for this study.
Proposed alloys include Li-Pb and Li-Al compounds, although the
Li-Pb series is better known and has received more attention. The lead
rich alloys would be used in the liquid form. Li17Pb83 melts at 2350C.
They exhibit lower chemical reactivity (see Chapter 5). The lithium
rich alloys would be used in a solid form, e.g. Li7Pb2 , but have some
of the same chemical reactivity problems of liquid lithium (see Chapter
5) without the advantages of being liquid and being used as a coolant.
Li17Pb83 was selected for this study.
Tritium can be recovered from the breeder and used as fuel by
either in-situ or batch processing. Continuous in-situ recovery has
numerous advantages over batch processing (periodic removal of tritiated
breeder). As virtually all design studies have used in-situ recovery,
it is adopted here. This is straightforward for the liquid breeders
by simply diverting a small fraction to a tritium recovery unit. Solid
breeders necessitate a purge stream (typically helium) flowing through
the blanket breeding zone to carry tritium out of the blanket after it
diffuses out of the solid.
1.2.4 Structural Material Selection
The selection of structural materials proved to be more difficult
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than the coolant or breeder because 1) they do not tend to fall into
different categories so that one could be selected from each, 2) a
broader variety of materials have been proposed, and 3) all options
have some serious drawbacks in either performance or data base. Some
of these options are listed in Table 1.1.
The low possible operating temperatures of aluminum alloys severely
limit their usefulness in a commercial reactor. High temperature super-
alloys based on cobalt and nickel generally have better high temperature
performance than do steels and have been proposed for blanket use,
generally with helium coolant. However, the activation and radiation
damage seems more severe than for steels. To limit the size of the
study, these were eliminated in favor of the steels. The major differ-
ence between austenitic and ferritic steels is nickel content. The
analysis in this study indicated that nickel is an unfavorable compo-
nent. Hence nickel-based super alloys would tend to be less favorable
than austenitic steels due to higher nickel content. Cobalt-based
alloys would have excessive 60 Co activity.
Steels are generally compatible with a variety of coolants, have
extensive data bases, and have been included in numerous design studies.
The two steels selected are 316 SS and HT-9. The properties and compo-
sitions are described in Appendix B. 316 SS is an austenitic steel with
a FCC crystal structure due to the presence of nickel. HT-9 is a fer-
ritic steel with a tempered martensitic structure (forming some ferrite).
Because it is a BCC, the ductile-brittle transition temperature (DBTT)
is fairly distinct, unlike FCC metals. Unfortunately, there is evidence
that the DBTT would rise above room temperature for HT-9 due to radia-
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TABLE 1.1
Possible Structural Materials
Material
Aluminum alloys
Cobalt alloys
Nickel alloys
Austenitic
steels
Ferritic steels
Copper alloys
Titanium alloys
Vanadium alloys
Niobium alloys
Molybdenum
Key Relative Advantage
Low long-term activation
Commercial alloys available
Very good thermo-physical
properties
Commercial alloys available
Very good thermo-physical
properties
Large data base and exper-
ience
Commercial alloys available
Good thermo-physical pro-
perties
Good thermal conductivity
Commercial alloys available
Lower radioactivity,
Very good thermo-physical
properties
Low radioactivity
Very good thermo-physical
properties
Excellent thermo-physical
properties and high
temperature performance
Ceramics Low radioactivity
(C, SiC)
Key Relative Disadvantage
Low operating tempera-
tures
Very high radioactivity
High radioactivity
Radiation damage
Poor thermo-physical
properties
High ductile-brittle
transition temperature
Poor ductility and corro-
sion resistance
High tritium solubility
High oxidation potential
and tritium permea-
bility
High long-term radioac-
tivity and tritium
permeability
Need for superconductors
High oxidation potential
and long-term radio-
activity
High ductile-brittle
transition temperature
Least developed design
concepts
0
0~
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tion [1.8, 1.9]. Thus proper design would have to solve the problem of
HT-9 becoming brittle after shutdown as the temperature falls below its
DBTT.
Titanium has a variety of good qualities, but the tritium solubility
is very high. Hence a titanium first wall and blanket would likely have
very high tritium inventories [1.10] which would be both an economic
(fuel wasted in structure) and safety problem. Also, low thermal conduc-
tivity, poor high temperature creep resistance, and poor ductility appear
to make it unattractive [1.11]. Copper alloys have also been mentioned
but do not appear to have superior performance relative to other options
which are more typical of fusion designs [1.11], hence there is little
incentive to include them.
Vanadium and niobium alloys have very good high temperature thermo-
physical properties but high tritium permeability (Chapter 8). These
two group VB elements are fairly similar except that niobium has slightly
better thermo-physical properties and oxidation resistance, and vanadium
has superior (low) radioactivity and afterheat. Because of their simi-
larities, it was decided to select only one for this study. Since vana-
dium offers the potential for a relatively low activation blanket, it
appeared more interesting for this study. The reference vanadium alloy
is V-15Cr-5Ti.
Of the group VIB metals, attention has focused on molybdenum. The
high temperature thermophysical properties are excellent. Unfortunately,
the DBTT of -molybdenum and TZM may rise as high as 10000C [1.11, 1.14].
Further data may be required to clarify or reduce this problem. If the
DBTT is not reduced, the design problems
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are formidable and high temperature operation (to stay above the DBTT)
is forced. To include a very high temperature option with superb
thermo-physical properties (e.g., the TZM alloy has five times the thermal
conductivity of 316 SS), the molybdenum alloy TZM was selected.
Recent attention has been given to ceramic structures such as
graphite and SiC. These offer some significant advantages for the long
term due to very low radioactivity and afterheat. However, there is
fairly little understanding of how these brittle materials would be
realistically used in a blanket concept, especially at the time this
study started. The blanket concepts with the previously mentioned metals
are somewhat interchangeable; it would have been extremely difficult to
directly include ceramic structure in the comparative analysis-particu-
larly since the design and construction of such a large brittle structure
is so undetermined.
A recent comparative study of structural metals with respect to
design properties [1.11] determined that HT-9 and vanadium-alloy were
the most promising. TZM would have been so determined except for the
DBTT problem which might be solvable. All three have been included in
this study along with 316 SS which has been selected in many designs
largely due to its extensive data base. Although only 316 SS is presently
understood sufficiently to build a large fusion machine today, e.g., a
Fusion Energy Device, other materials should be considered for develop-
ment of future commercial reactors.
1.2.5 Other Materials
Although the prime materials of interest have been discussed, other
materials had to be used in the analysis. The breeder LiAlO 2 requires
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a neutron multiplier to provide adequate tritium breeding. The STARFIRE
study [1.8] focused on beryllium and Zr5Pb3, and selected Zr 5Pb3 largely
due to resource considerations. In matters where the multiplier enters
the current analysis, beryllium is superior due to far lower radioactivity
and afterheat. It was decided not to bias results against LiAIO2 by
selecting Zr5Pb3. Although beryllium is included where necessary in
this study, the reader should note that selection of LiAlO 2 as a breeder
does necessitate a multiplier which may add to associated safety problems.
Where a reflector at the back of the blanket was needed in thermal
analysis, a simple block of graphite was specified. See Chapter 2 and
Appendix C for specific designs.
The analysis in this study assumes a bare metal wall facing the
plasma; to specify otherwise would have either added another
dimension to the study (choice of first wall coating) or biased the
results to a single first wall coating. A variety of possible materials
could be used to help isolate the structural wall from the plasma [1.1,
1.8]. In Chapter 6, beryllium and graphite are discussed in this regard
to see if they suffer from rapid gas-solid reaction and would offer pro-
tection of the underlying structure in such an accident. In Chapter 9,
some aspects of how first wall coating choice would impact safety are
briefly summarized.
1.2.6 Compatibility
If all combinations of the selected materials were included, there
would be 48 cases. Compatibility and practicality considerations reduce
this number to 11.
First, the compatibility between coolant and breeder can be examined
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(Table 1.2). The lithium/water case is unacceptable due to chemical
combustion. If lithium is used as a coolant, then there is no incentive
to use anything else for a breeder. The converse is not true: selection
of lithium as a breeder does not force its use as a coolant. The two
possible reasons are the MHD pumping power requirements necessary to
force lithium across magnetic field lines as a coolant and the higher
vulnerability of a lithium coolant system to accident than a breeder-only
system.
Although Lil 7Pb83 could be used with helium and flibe coolants,
there is relatively little to be learned by examining both lithium and
Lil 7Pb33 with these coolants. The main difference between lithium and
Li17Pb83 in this analysis occurs where the coolant and structure are
not included-combustion (Chapter 5) and tritium (Chapter 8). Hence
the analysis was simplified by not explicitly including the helium/Li17Pb83
and flibe/Li17Pb83 cases. The operating temperatures of flibe and LiA1O2
do not match well. LiAlO 2 is used between 500 and 850'C [1.8], while
flibe (melts at 4590C) may be used at higher temperatures (especially
with TZM structure). Little additional would be learned if a flibe/LiA102
case were included with the other cases. Furthermore, there may not be
a metal which is compatible with both flibe and LiA10 2 '
Thus the twelve possible coolant/breeder combinations can be reduced
to six cases with little loss of information. These six cases must then
be compared with the four possible metals (Table 1.3). With the excep-
tion of the flibe/lithium case, two metals were included with each of
the coolant breeder cases, leaving eleven overall combinations. The
refractory metal alloys, V-15Cr-5Ti and TZM are generally not considered
t m
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TABLE 1.2
Coolant and Breeder Compatibility*
Lithium
Unacceptable
Good**
Good**
Good**
iLtg 7L83
Fa i r**
Good
No Reason
Good
LiAlO
2
Good**
Good**
No Reason
Temperature
Problems
*Water and lithium have an unacceptably high combustion potential. If
lithium is already selected as the coolant with associated disadvantages,
there is no reason to use any other breeder.
**Included in this study.
Breeder:
Coolant
Water
Helium
Lithium
Flibe
I . . . 1 - - . .... ... .... .....
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TABLE 1.3
Metal Compatibility with Coolants and Breeders
Water/LiAl 02
Water/Li Pb
Hel ium/Li thium
Helium/LiAlO 2
Lithium/Lithium
Flibe/Lithium
316 SS
Good*
Fair*
Fai r*
Good*
Fair*
Poor
HT-9
Good*
Fair*
Fai r*
Good*
Fair
Poor
V-alloy
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Good*
Unknown
TZM
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Good
Good*
*Included in this study.
0
0
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compatible with water and helium (see Chapter 7). The steels may not
be very compatible with the liquid metals, but design studies have
included these cases.
Among the lithium/lithium options, 316 SS and V-alloy were selected
for their differences. Finally, TZM is most resistant to flibe. Since
flibe must operate well above its melting point (4594C), and the steels
do not seem usable above 500*C, those cases were eliminated. The compa-
tibility of flibe with vanadium is unknown; furthermore, there.may not
be an acceptable operating temperature window and little additional would
be learned by including the flibe/lithium/V-alloy case.
1.2.7 Reference Combinations
The eleven reference material combinations are listed in Table 1.4.
Most of the present analysis was structured to separate the effects of
coolant, breeder, and structure from each other. This allows direct
comparison of the options for each. Many of the safety comparisons
proved to be only dependent on one of the components. The major exception
was the area of corrosion where the fluid and structure are inherently
coupled.
1.3 Selection of Reference Safety Comparison Bases
Having selected the materials to be studied, the bases of comparison
must be established. Some examination of the relevant subsystems and
their interactions is included in Appendix A. Here the reasons for the
selection of the seven specific safety problems are discussed.
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Reference
TABLE 1. 4
Material Combinations
Breeder
LiAlO
2
LiAlO
2
Li17Pb83
Li17Pb83
LiAlO 
2
LiAl02
Lithium
Lithium
Lithium
Lithium
Lithium
Structure
316 SS
HT-9
316 SS
HT-9
316 SS
HT-9
316 SS
HT-9
316 SS
V-alloy
TZM
Coolant
Water
Water
Water
Water
Helium
Helium
Hel ium
Helium
Lithium
Lithium
Flibe
0
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1.3.1 The Ideal Future Comparison
Since probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques were first
applied to fission reactor assessments in the Reactor Safety Study [1.12],
they have become a major factor in safety analysis and regulatory actions
in the fission industry. Today the study of 'risk has become very com-
plex, including the so-called level 2 definition of risk [1.13] which
incorporates the degree of certainty of the estimate (see Figures 1.1,
1.2). The level 1 definition of risk is more simply the estimated acci-
dent frequency and consequence.
Eventually, a detailed, optimized, design will exist for a specific
fusion reactor design. With adequate data, money, time, and manpower,
a PRA could be done on each material combination in this study. This
technique automatically sums over "all" accident scenarios. Then, the
"safest" combination could be chosen. (See Chapter 9.)
Such an effort is well beyond our needs as well as our abilities in
the fusion community. The early stage of fusion development and the
limited data, money, time, and manpower eliminate the option of performing
one full PRA analysis, let alone eleven. Thus, a far more modest approach
is sought-hopefully one that results in as much information as required.
1.3.2 Consistent Consequence Framework
Throughout the analysis, a series of Relative Consequence Indices
are defined as functions of material safety comparison base (e.g., plasma
disruption) and consequence criterion (e.g., time to material melting):
RCIX = f (material properties) (1.2)RCI
I
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X = consequence criterion
Y = safety comparison base
f = some implicit or explicit function of materials
These RCI's are consistently defined such that low values are preferred.
Note that the same criterion may be used for different safety comparisons.
For example, the inverse of the time to reach melting criterion is used
for the bases of plasma disruption, loss-of-coolant with continued plasma
heating, and loss-of-coolant with only afterheat. Since this is a com-
parative study, and the absolute magnitude of the problem is sometimes
unknown or unimportant, the indices defined are relative (or normalized).
Generally, the RCI's are normalized such that the individual best case is
given the value 1.0. In some cases, the best value for the criterion
is either zero or very uncertain. In those cases, a somewhat arbitrary
normalization value is selected with the aim that an RCI of 1.0 repre-
sents an "acceptable" level of a problem or the most realistic best
estimate. Therefore an RCI less then one is possible. An example is the
oxidation rate of structural materials. The best case is zero; however,
for the accident transient problem of mobilizing radioactive structural
material, a normalization value of 1 mm of metal per day was deemed an
appropriate normalization value.
Although this methodology does not contain as much information as
a PRA, especially probabilities, it does represent a first order attempt
to quantify the various safety differences among materials.
1.3.3 Hazard Identification
The fundamental hazard to the public is the release of radioactivity
to the plant surroundings in quantities above negligible fractions of
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natural radioactivity. As indicated in Table 1.5, both normal continuous
release and accident releases are of concern. The radioactive fuel
tritium is a major concern. The neutrons from the D-T reaction activate
the blanket materials and even the building atmosphere. As the structure
corrodes, activated corrosion products become mobile. The activation of
the building atmosphere is insignificant in accidents, although suffi-
ciently important under normal operation that the STARFIRE study used
a CO2 atmosphere to avoid nitrogen activation to 14C.
The foci of this study are the contributions to accidental releases
of tritium, corrosion products, and activated structure. Continuous
releases, maintenance problems, and waste disposal/material recycling
issues are not addressed. One exception is that some examination of
tritium normal releases through the coolant pathway is included in
Chapter 8.
Chemical toxicity is another fundamental hazard (for example, see
Ref. [1.6]). These problems are not explicitly addressed in this study,
although all the measures of merit concerning release of radioactive
material are equally relevant to release of toxic material. The missing
aspect is a thorough comparison of chemical and radiological toxicity
of all the materials present. Unfortunately, the understanding of chemi-:
cal toxicity is inadequate to quantify the hazard, especially compared
to radioactivity. With some possible exceptions, as beryllium, the radio-
active hazards appear to dominate over chemical toxicity from fusion
accidents.
Other hazards to the public from fusion accidents do not appear
important. For example, in principle, a fire could start somewhere at
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TABLE 1.5
Radioactivity and Fusion
Radioactive Species
Tritium
Activated Corro-
sion Products
Activated Structure
Activated Building
Atmosphere
Continuous Release
Major concern
Minor concern
(major maintenance
concern)
Unknown level of
concern (solid wastes)
Significant concern
Accidental Release
Easier to release,
lower consequence
Easy to release,
modest consequence
Difficult to release,
higher consequence
Easiest to release,
lowest consequences
0
0
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a reactor site which could be directly hazardous to the public. Except
insofar as such a fire releases toxic agents, the exclusion zone around
a reactor would tend to eliminate fire spreading to the public. In any
case, such external fires would seem independent of blanket materials
enclosed in the containment building (any blanket fire would be more
important in terms of radioactivity release).
1.3.4 Energy Sources/Mechanisms
As other studies have indicated, there are large amounts of stored
energy present in a reactor. The relevant question is whether there is
a possible mechanism to actually couple this stored energy to the reactor
components in such a way as to mobilize and release radioactivity. There
is the auxiliary question of whether there is a mechanism that causes
reactor component damage which could in turn lead to later radioactivity
release and/or severe economic consequences (not directly considered
in this safety study). Table 1.6 shows the possible release modes with
further discussion in Appendix A.
The important issues are thus 1) the mechanisms that may produce
high stresses or temperatures, 2) the oxidation and volatization rate of
structure materials, and 3), the consequence of the radioactivity if it
were released.
The possible mechanisms that may produce high stresses or tempera-
tures are listed in Table 1.7. Those mechanisms external to the blanket
were not considered. In a sense, the relative influence to accident safety
of materials from these external events is covered by the oxidation rate
and radioactivity consequence measures.
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TABLE 1.6
Possible Accidental Release Modes
Release Species.
Tritium
Activated Corro-
sion Products
Activated Structural
Radioactivity
Release Mode
Breeder or coolant
system integrity
breached
Coolant line integrity
breached
1) Melting
2) Rapid Metal Oxida-
tion and volatili-
zation
Possible Causes
-high stresses or
temperatures
-component failure
-high stresses or
temperatures
-component failure
-very high temperatures
-high temperatures and
oxidant available
0
0
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TABLE 1.7
Possible Mechanisms that Couple Stored Energy
to Systems Resulting in Accidental Releases
High temperatures due to plasma operation with loss-of-cooling
High temperatures due to radioactive afterheat with loss-of-cooling
High temperatures and/or stresses due to a plasma disruption
High temperatures or pressures due to chemical combustion
High temperatures or stresses due to a magnet quench/failure or auxiliary
plasma system (not considered in this study)
External events (seismic, wind, flood, etc.) (not considered in this study)
rO"
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The remaining four mechanisms were adopted as safety comparison
bases. The first three are thermo-mechanical considerations. Since the
relative scaling of materials differs between plasma heating and afterheat
with loss-of-cooling, these mechanisms are separated as discussed in
Chapter 3.
The area of chemical reactions involved more than combustion (Table
1.8). For present purposes, combustion is defined to include fluid-fluid
rapid chemical reactions and fluid-LiAlO 2 chemical reactions. The com-
bustion chapter (5) also includes pressurization problems from pressurized
water and helium. Fluids include the liquid coolants and breeders, air
and CO2 (possible building atmospheres), helium and steam (from coolants),
and LiA10 2 (which fits best into this category).
Structural oxidation refers to rapid gas-metal reactions which can
oxidize (damage) and volatilize structural radioactivity if temperatures
are sufficiently high (from whatever mechanism) and oxidants (air, C02'
steam) are present. The Zircaloy-steam reaction is a fission example.
Corrosion products are slowly evolved due to fluid-metal reactions
(neutron sputtering is also included) and thus represent mobilized radio-
activity. Solid-solid reactions are possible in principle, like the
Zircaloy-UO2 interaction in fission reactors; however, these were not
examined. In general, solid-solid reactions do not appear to offer sig-
nificant (relative to the alternative mechanisms) potential for severe
accident safety problems.
1.3.5 Reference Safety Comparison Bases
The four accident'mechanisms internal to the blanket (Table 1.7) are
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TABLE 1.8
Possible Classes of Chemical Reactions*
Gas
Combusion
(5)
Liquid
Solid
Included
Materials
Air (02
Steam
He ium
(C0 2 )
Liquid
(and LiAlO 2)
Combustion
(5)
Combustion
(5)
N2) WaterLithium
Li17Pb83
Flibe
LiAlO
2
Structural
Metal
Structural
Oxidation
(6)
Corrosion
Products
(7)
Not included
in this study
3.6 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
(Be, C)**
*Chapter numbers are indicated in parentheses.
**Possible first wall coatings of
indicate the widespread nature of
beryllium and graphite were discussed to
the structural oxidation problem.
Gas
r
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four of the safety issues. Rapid structural oxidation is a prime mecha-
nism for actual radioactivity mobilization given elevated temperatures
and an oxidant. Another mobilization mechanism is corrosion so that at
any given time a certain (small) fraction of the reactor radioactivity
is in the form of corrosion products which may be fairly mobile. These
two mobilization pathways are additional safety issues. The final safety
concern is the actual public consequence from released radioactivity,
both short- (acute) and long-term (latent cancers). The seven safety
issues are listed in Table 1.9.
It is important to note that non-accident issues were excluded.
Hence selection criteria for materials on the bases of such issues as
material resource, waste generation and disposal, material recycling,
and reactor decommissioning were not addressed.
1.3.6 Task Organization
The organization of the various tasks in this study is shown in
Figure 1.3. The selection of safety issues and material combinations
was discussed in this chapter with some additional examination in Appendix
A. The values of material properties used are indicated in Appendix B.
The selection of reference design parameters and blanket concepts re-
quired for the specific individual analyses is discussed in Chapter 2
with some details in Appendix C. Chapters 3 through 8 contain analyses
in the various safety areas and are generally independent of each other.
The two LOCA-related issues are grouped into Chapter 3; the other five
chapters are devoted to the other five safety issues. The results of
the analyses are briefly summarized in Chapter 9 along with a detailed
discussion of the results and implications for material selection.
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TABLE 1.9
Reference Safety Comparison Bases
LP - LOCA-Plasma Heating: Thermal transients from continued plasma heating
after loss-of-coolant
LA - LOCA-Afterheat: Thermal transients from afterheat after loss-of-
coolant
PD - Plasma Disruption: Effects from plasma disruption
TP - Temperature and Pressure: Transients due to rapid chemical combustion
and leakage of pressurized fluids
SO - Structural Oxidation: Rate of structural oxidation and mobilization
from rapid gas-structural-metal reaction
CP - Corrosion Products: Amount and associated problems of corrosion
products
RC - Radioactivity Consequences: Public health consequences of unit
amounts of released radioactivity
I I
-
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CHAPTER 2. REFERENCE REACTOR DESIGNS
A consistent reactor design basis is required to compare the
material effects on accident safety. Yet, the choice of coolant,
breeder, and structural material forces significant design differen-
ces. Ideally, one would compare materials on the basis of a fully
optimized design for each combination. The state-of-knowledge in
fusion reactor design does not permit this; furthermore, the meaning
of "optimized" for a fusion design is not itself determined. A
secondary goal of this work is to provide some design guidelines and
suggestions to aid in factoring safety into future designs.
The approach taken here is to fix some plant parameters for all
material combinations, these include overall size, confinement scheme,
wall loading, and (within the variation of blanket energy multipli-
cation) the reactor power output. This is discussed in section 2.1
For each material combination case, some blanket parameters are
needed. These parameters are established by appropriate scaling and
modification of representative blanket design concepts already avail-
able in the literature. The safety analysis does not generally focus
on very detailed aspects of design; rather, the emphasis is on pro-
ducing a general result. Although the parameters and blanket con-
cepts are not fully optimized, the values used are intended to be
typical and representative of current design concepts.
2.1 Reference Size Reactor
Initial analyses of the safety problems indicated that a variety
I I
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of design parameters were required to complete the calculations. Un-
fortunately, some of these parameters are not directly calculated in
previous design studies. The most detailed design studies currently
available are based on tokamaks. The most detailed tokamak design
study is STARFIRE [2.1].
2.1.1 Plasma Confinement Scheme
At the current stage of fusion research, the plasma confinement
scheme and fuel cycle are uncertain. However, it is generally agreed that
the first generation pure fusion reactor will utilize a D-T fuel cycle,
which is adopted here. Selection of a more advanced fuel cycle would
significantly alter some safety conclusions. The amount of tritium,
lithium compound, wall loadings, and induced radioactivity can all change.
Similarly, a fission/fusion hybrid would have some significantly different
safety problems. Depending on the amount of fissioning allowed, the af-
terheat and radioactivity of the fission zone could be more important than
that of the other materials. Although the current study is limited to a
D-T cycle, some problems associated with materials are generic, e.g.,
highly pressurized water, rapid gas-metal reactions, and some corrosion
aspects.
Recently some studies [2.14 - 2.16] have examined the difference be-
tween various fusion fuel cycles, primarily D-D versus D-T. The result
appears that D-D is not necessarily better than D-T even though the D-D
cycle has half the amount of energy leaving the plasma as neutrons, lower
energy neutrons (2.45 MeV versus 14.1 MeV), and does not have to breed
tritium. The fundamental problems include a lower power density which
greatly increases the volume of material required (which can then become
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activated) and a higher number of neutrons (although at lower energy).
Although the absolute severity of the various safety problems may differ
from D-T to D-D, many of the relative comparisons appear not to, includ-
ing corrosion, rapid structural oxidation, LOCA-plasma heating, and
plasma disruptions. Chemical combustion would be altered due to the eli-
mination of lithium compounds. Since the specific isotope mix for the
different isotopes may change, the relative comparison among materials in
the areas of radioactivity and afterheat may be altered. However, the
biological hazard potential in air (BHP air ) did not change very signifi-
cantly from D-T to D-D for the materials 316 SS, V-15Cr-5Ti, and Ti4381
[2.15], suggesting that the relative rank ordering in radioactivity and
afterheat may not be affected.
A wealth of plasma confinement schemes is being considered by the
fusion community. These range from light ion particle beam (inertial
confinement) to tokamaks (magnetic confinement). The various physics
schemes result in some differences in the blanket zone which would affect
safety. These include 1) the presence, strength, orientation, and off-
normal behavior of the magnetic fields; 2) the geometry of the blanket;
3) first wall design and constraints; and 4) over power/transient plasma
problems (e.g., plasma disruptions in tokamaks). The most detailed and
understood blanket engineering and designs have been done for the tokamak
confinement concept. Furthermore, there are some safety-related aspects
of tokamak blankets that are not as severe in other physics concepts,
e.g., plasma disruptions. The present analysis is based on a steady state
tokamak design concept.
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2.1.2 Selection of STARFIRE Design
The analysis was limited to one generic reactor design, STARFIRE
[2.1]. Some of the variables fixed (and their values) by this selection
are listed in Table 2.1. The most significant of these for the current
study are the neutron wall loading (q'n'), surface heat flux (q'w'), major
radius (rM), and average minor wall radius (r ). The current trend in
tokamak designs is toward neutron wall loadings in the 3-4 Mw/m2 range
with corresponding heat flux. There has also been some convergence of
reactor size. In these respects, the STARFIRE design parameters are
representative.
Although current physics seems to indicate better plasma performance
for elongated plasmas (PE = b/a ^ 1.6), the analysis will be primarily
based on a simplified circular cross section torus. Thus, the poloidal
variation in wall radius and neutron and heat wall loadings will be ig-
nored in favor of analysis based on average values.
Steady state operation is common for the alternative physics con-
finement schemes of torsatron/stellerators, EBT's, and mirrors. The
STARFIRE design is the first steady state tokamak design. For the pre-
sent purpose, the primary impact of steady state operation will be to
relax first wall design constraints and allow longer module lifetimes.
2.2 Blanket Parameter Selection Approach
A variety of blanket parameters are used in some safety analysis.
A list of the major parameters is shown in Table 2.2. The coolant and
breeder volumes refer to the entire volume in the circuit, in or out of
the blanket. Some values were not calculated in past design studies,
for example the wetted coolant tube wall areas, and had to be calculated
-69-
TABLE 2.1
Reference Machine Parameters
(from STARFIRE L2.l1)
Neutron Wall Loading
Surface Heat Flux
Major Radius
Plasma Half-width
Average Wall Radius*
Plasma Elongation
Plasma Current
Average Toroidal Beta
Toroidal Field on Axis
Maximum Toroidal Field
Number of Toroidal Field Coils
Base Thermal Power Output
First Wall Area
Reactor Building Volume
Stored Energy in Toroidal Coils
*wall radius giving same total first
for a circular cross section.
3.6 MW/m2
0.9 MW/m 2
7.0 m
1.94 m
2.8 m
1.6
10.1 MAmp
6.7%
5.8 T
11.1 T
12
4000 MW
780 m2
2.5 x 105 m3
4.17 x 109 J/coil
wall area as STARFIRE
(4" ,
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Table 2.2
Some Required Blanket Design Parameters
First Wall Thickness, dfw
Temperature Drop Across the First Wall, ATfW
First Wall Tube Radius, rfw
Structural Operating Temperature, T0
Blanket Depth, Z
Coolant Pressure, P
Coolant Mass Flow Rate, Q
Coolant Volume, Vc
Wetted Surface Area, In-blanket, Ai
Wetted Surface Area, Out-blanket, A0
Coolant Temperatures
Breeder Volume, Vb
Breeder Zone Temperature, Tb
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here. Some specifics of the calculations are discussed in Appendix C.
2.2.1 Selection Criteria
The parameters and blanket concepts choices were guided by three
criteria. First, the conceptual design and parameterg'should be repre-
sentative of current thinking. Second, designs with the same coolant
should be as similar as practical to make comparisons easier. Third,
the designs should have a minimum of serious flaws. No attempt was
made to fully optimize each base case, although the reference design
parameters should represent a fair example of a representative design
for each material combination.
An alternative approach would have been to use one blanket con-
cept for all material combinations, as has been done by some past
blanket trade-off studies. The selection of materials for a fusion
blanket is inherently three-dimensional - structure, coolant, breeder.
Selection of first wall coatings and neutron multipliers, if needed,
would further complicate the issue. Blankets utilizing different
materials may look significantly different; for example, the selection
of the coolant naturally guides the designer to different blanket
concepts.
Whereas specific designs for various combinations may differ
from the parameters used here, it is hoped that the representative na-
ture of the values leads to a general result. Furthermore, the influ-
ence of design parameters is indicated throughout the analysis. Final-
ly, in many cases, the relative comparison among materials is indepen-
dent of design specifics.
w ' 4111,414 Ill 4."k,1'. I.,, ,16 ;'-
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For each material combination, the first step is the adoption of a
conceptual blanket design. This is strongly driven by the coolant char-
acteristics, especially the operating pressure. Specific design para-
maters are then determined, partially influenced by structural material
design limits.
2.2.2 Coolant Pressure Influence
The operating pressures of fusion reactor coolants range from
15 MPa (helium) to under 1 MPa (flibe), with helium (5 MPa) and
lithium (1 MPa) intermediate. A primary design question, relevant
to accident analysis, is whether the entire module is designed to
withstand full coolant pressure or only coolant tubes contain the
pressure. The latter case may lead to high pressure coolant entering
the low pressure breeding zone and causing structural damage as the
module fails (see Chapter 5). Since the general maintenance approach is
to remove and replace failed blanket modules, an accident that could
sufficiently deform a module to prevent removal would be extremely
economically serious.
Flibe operates at such low pressures that accidental pressuriza-
tion of a breeder zone is not a serious concern. The same holds true
for lithium, especially when used as both coolant and breeder. Helium
and water would be used at high pressures.
There are two general approaches to helium design. First, the
entire module may be designed to withstand full 5 MPa pressurization.
This reduces the accidental breeder zone pressurization problem.
Second, only discrete coolant tubes are designed to the helium coolant
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pressure. Since the breeder zone structure is not built to withstand
coolant pressure, a leakage of helium to the breeder zone results in
module failure. The first approach is used for helium in this study.
The higher operating Pressure for water (about 15MPa) appears to force
the second (coolant tube) design approach for pressurized water.
2.2.3 Determination of First Wall Thickness
The appropriate structural design of a fusion first wall/blanket
is an immensely complicated problem. As usual, the worse difficulties
arise at the first wall. The fundamental approach here will be to
examine appropriate stress constraints and select first wall thickness.
The required data on material properties irradiated in a fusion
environment does not exist for any material.. More is thought to
be known about stainless steel, largely through extrapolation from
fission data. Data on vanadium and molybdenum alloys are poor; there
are even severe gaps in the unirradiated data base. Thus, the present
study will use unirradiated metal properties as indicated in Appendix B.
Irradiation tends to alter material properties such as strength,
ductility, and swelling. The values of these properties for materials
in a fusion environment is not known. Neither is the precise alloy com-
position which also influences these properties. Early recognition of
this problem led to structuring the analysis to focus on those properties
which are relatively independent of irradiation and alloying effects:
thermal conductivity, heat capacity, density, and electrical conductivity.
Thus the uncertainty due to irradiation and alloy development is minimized
in this study. The major uncertainty in this study from alloy composition
is radioactivity/afterheat: relatively small changes in alloy compositi.on
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could significantly change radioactivity and afterheat values.
Design limits were established to be about 105 hrs (11 years) and
103 cycles (1 cycle/week for a steady state machine). The lifetime
design value is more conservative than that expected in design
studies, for example 6 yr. for STARFIRE [2.1] modules and 2 yr for
Westinghouse/ORNL modules [2.2], which partially offsets the use of
unirradiated properties. The low number of cycles essentially removes
the fatigue constraint, as one would expect for steady state operation.
The relevant stress criteria for fusion have been studied else-
where [2.2 - 2.6], sometimes based on the relevant section of the
ASME code [2.7]. The ASME code requires that the primary stress be
less than the time dependent stress intensity value, Smt. For a
cylinder we obtain the pressure stress, sp, as
r0
= rfw (2.1)p fw
where rfw = cylinder radius (first wall coolant tube radius)
dfw = cylinder wall thickness
Therefore the minimum first wall thickness is given by
dfwl = Prfw/Smt(10 5 hrs) (2.2)
The values for Smt were obtained from Yu [2.4], see Appendix B.
The maximum thickness is largely determined by thermal stress, sT'
considerations. The thermal stress of a cylinder unconstrained in
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the axial direction is given by
sT 2k(l-v) (2.3)
The problem can become quite complex as indicated in previous stress
analyses [2.2 - 2.6]. However, assumption of steady state simplifies
the analysis. These constraints are considered here. First, the effec-
tive combined stress should be less than the yield stress. Second, the
corresponding temperature drop across the first wall is limited for
each conceptual design by temperature constraints (maximize coolant
temperature, minimize the maximum structural temperatures). Third,
the fatigue limit is addressed.
The total stress from pressure and thermal affects should be less
than yield- for purely elastic behavior:
sp + ST < Sy (2.4)
Substituting expressions for sp and sT, we have
E q"
Prfw/dfw + 2-N-~v) dfw <sy (2.5)
where q" = wall heat flux= 0.9 MW/m2
The minimum total stress is then given by
2Prfwk(l-v) 1/2
dfw(minimum stress) o ESq" (2.6)
w J(10"
I -_
-76-
The maximum practical temperature drop across the first wall
leads to an upper limit on wall thickness
kdfwm 1 AT (2.7)
fwmax, q 'wmax
The fatigue limit on cyclic thermal stresses is given by
[2.4,2.5],
fatigue = 2k(l-v) 3
dfwI = q 11 - T (310 cycles) (2.8)
max w
where ET (103 cycles) = maximum strain for 103 cycles (values from
reference 2.4).
It should be noted that other design limits are possible (see for
example reference 2.6), however these first order guidelines will be
seen to lead to values similar to those resulting from detailed design
studies.
2.2.4 Neutronics Constraints
Neutronics plays a major role in fusion reactor blanket design.
The tritium breeding ratio must be greater than one to close the fuel
cycle. The blanket thickness must be sufficient to obtain a good
breeding ratio and limit the neutron flux to the magnet shield and
magnet. The amount of energy multiplication in the blanket also
determines the total thermal output. This output is given for the
reference size machine approximately by
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Power (MWe) n 700 + 2800 x M (2.9)
where M = Blanket multiplication energy factor
700 = Heat incident on first wall
2800 = Neutron energy deposited in blanket.
Additional energy is deposited in the limiter.
The exact values for the blanket depth and energy multiplication
can be determined by detailed neutronics calculation. It was deemed
beyond the scope of this study to perform such calculations for each
material combination. To first approximation, the choice of breeder
determines these parameters. Thus, approximate values were used for
this study (Table 2.3) based on previous design study values (see
Appendices B, C).
2.3 Water-Cooled Designs
The major features of a pressurized water design are the accomoda-
tion of high pressures (15.2 MPa) but lower coolant temperatures
(% 300'C). The high pressures make it impractical to design the module
interior to withstand full coolant pressure [2.5]. The result is a
tube design, keeping the water within discrete tubes and allowing the
breeder material to operate near atmospheric pressure.
The reference design study for water-cooled designs is STARFIRE
[2.1]. All of the necessary information is thus available for the
LAlO2 / 316 SS case. The problem is then to rescale the design for
the other three water cases. Two adjustments must be made - change of
breeder material and structural material.
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Table 2.3
Approximate Neutronics Values Used
for Reference Designs*
Blanket Depth, Z (m).
0.45
(with 0.05 mul tiplier)
0.60
0.50
Energy Multiplication, M
1.15
1.20
1.25
*see Appendices B, C
0
0
Breeder
LiAI0 2
Lithium
Li17Pb83
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2.3.1 Breeder Change
Use of Li17Pb83 breeder rather than LiA0 2 causes a variety of
changes. The higher energy multiplication causes slighty higher
coolant flow rates. The neutron multiplier is removed, as well as the
second wall in the STARFIRE design which cool's it. Finally, since the
thermal conductivity of Li 1 7 Pb 8 3 is more than 10-fold that of LiAlO2 '
there would be need for fewer coolant tubes in the breeder zone (fewer
tubes with more coolant). The average wall heat flux through the cool-
ant tubes in the LiAl;02 breeder is 0.38 MW/m2. The higher conductivity
of Li17Pb83 could result in use of a 50% higher coolant wall heat flux
with a corresponding 50% decrease in tube wall area.
2.3.2 Metal Change
The change in structural material requires examination of the
stresses involved. The maximum structural temperature in STARFIRE is
450'C for 316 SS. Examination of Smt values in reference 2.4 lead to
adoption of the same temperature for HT-9. Using Eqs. (2.1) and (2.3),
the pressure and thermal stresses for 316 SS are seen to be 100 MPa
and 194 MPa respectively. These meet the stress limitations as
follows
S = 100 MPa < 108 = Smt(10 5 hr) (2.10)
s + sp = 294 MPa < 520 = sy (2.11)
The more detailed analysis in the STARFIRE study showed a total stress of
I
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about 207 MPa for much of the first wall panel, but 560 MPa for the
worst constrained junction.
For HT-9, the stresses are given by
s (MPa) = (mm) (2.12)
fw
sT (MPa) = 54 x dfw(mm) (2.13)
The minimum wall thickness given by Eq. (2.2) is then 0.94 mm. The
maximum stress from the yield criterion(Eq. (2.4)) is 6 mm. To keep the
first wall temperature drop below 100*C implies a maximum thickness of
3 mm. The minimum total stress (Eq. (2.6)) occurs at about 1.6 mm. For
the present study a value of 1.5 mm. is adopted, the same as for 316 SS.
A summary of parameters occurs in Table 2.4; calculation details are in
Appendix C. The blanket concepts are shown in Figs. 2.1, 2.2.
2.4 Helium-Cooled Desiqins-.
In contrast to water, there have been many more helium designs,
with large differences in design philosophy (e.g., pressurized cannister,
breeder block, see reference 2.5). The pressure problem has already
been mentioned. The other major problem is first wall design.
2.4.1 Reference Design Concept
A variety of attempts have been made to design an acceptable
helium-cooled blanket module. Providing adequate cooling of the struc-
ture, especially the first wall, is quite difficult. One of the most
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Table 2.4
Blanket Parameters for Water-Cooled Designs
Structure 316 SS
Breeder LiA102
Neutron Multiplier Be
First Wall Thickness (mm) 1.5
Breeder Depth (m) 0.45
Multiplier Depth (m) 0.05
In-Blanket Wetted Area (m2) 11,600
Out-Blanket Wetted Area(m2 ) 48,000
Breeder Volume (m3)* 340
Coolant Volume (m3)* 550
Mass Flow Rate (m3/s) 24
Coolant Pressure (MPa) 15.2
First Wall Temperature 450
Coolant Inlet Temperature 280
Coolant Outlet Temperature 320
Breeder Temperature 650
First Wall Temperature drop 68
Number of modules 240
*Includes out of blanket volumes
HT-9
LiA102
Be
1.5
0.45
0.05
11,600
48,000
340
550
24
15.2
450
280
320
650
48
240
316 SS
LiI 7Pb83
1.5
0.5
9,300
48,000
%5 00
550
25.5
15.2
450
280
320
500
68
240
HT- 9
Li1Pb83
1.5
0.5
9,300
48,000
500
550
25.5
15.2
450
280
320
500
48
240
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recent and detailed design studies was conducted by Westinghouse/ORNL
[2.2, 2.3]. This is the reference concept adopted for the present
work, shown in Figs. 2.3 and 2.4 for the breeders of interest. The
pressurized cannister approach is more forgiving since a small leak
from coolant to breeder zone does not result in module rupture (see
Chapter 5).
The ANL blanket comparison design study [2.5] also suggested a
pressurized cylinder approach, but with a floating (unconstrained)
tube bank as the first wall, shown in Fig. 2.5. This approach seper-
ates the first wall design from the pressurized cannister portion,
hopefully improving both. If this approach had been adopted, however,
helium designs would have looked worse from the accident safety stand-
point, due to more metal next to the plasma and lower thermal contact
between first wall and blanket. The former would worsen problems of
sputtering into the helium (Chapter 7), induced structural radio-
activity (Chapter 8), and afterheat removal (Chapter 3). The latter
would worsen accidental heat removal from the first wall (Chapter 3).
Another alternative would be the breeder block/discrete tube
approach, such as that analyzed by Bickford [2.8], for coolant sputter-
ing problems. This concept (Fig. 2.6) has less metal near the first
wall but more coolant surfaces normal to the neutron flux. As shown
in Chapter 7, the two effects tend to cancel in terms of contamination
of the helium coolant loop by sputtered radioactive species. On the
other hand, accidental pressurization of the breeder zone would be a
problem.
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Although there is a considerable range of helium-cooled designs,
the adopted reference design concept is as representative as any and
most alternatives have obvious safety disadvantages. It is beyond the
scope of this study to judge the engineering feasiblity and expected
lifetimes of all the alternatives.
2.4.2 Metal Change
The effect of different metals again centers on the first wall
thickness. Here, the first wall is a hemisphere, so the pressure
stress is given by
s = Prfw/ 2dfw (2.14)
rather than equation 2.1. In the manner of section 2.2.3, the relevant
criteria can be used to calculate limits on first wall thickness. The
results are shown in Table 2.5. As is the case for water designs, the
better thermal conductivity of HT-9 gives more flexibility in selecting
a design thickness. Note that for 316 SS, the total of pressure and
thermal stress is minimized at a thickness which violates the pressure
stress. The 316 SS thickness used in the Westinghouse/ORNL design
[2.21 was 1.6 mm. The same value, which minimizes first wall stresses,
is adopted for HT-9.
The thermal/hydraulics analysis for the Westinghouse/ORNL design
shows a maximum first wall temperature drop of 90'C. If this is
scaled from 1.0 MW/m 2 heat loading to the present case of 0.9 MW/m 2,
the value would be 81*C, in good agreement with the simple calculationr
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Table 2.5
Limits on First Wall Thickness in
Helium Designs (mm)
316 SS HT-9
Minimum Thickness
Due to Pressure Stress
(Equation 2.14) 1.3 0.9
Maximum Thickness Due
to Yielding
(Equation 2.5) 3.7 6.0
Maximum Thickness to Keep
First Wall Temperature
Drop Below 1000C
(Equation 2.7) 2.1 3.0
Maximum Thickness Due
to Fatigue 8.9 23.0
(Equation 2.8)
Thickness to Produce
Minimum Total Stress
(Equation 2.6) 1.1 1.6
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used here (Eq. (2.7) gives a value of 720C). Note that the coolant
outlet temperature is 4350C compared to the maximum structural tempera-
ture of 450'C at the first wall. This is only possible by having the
low temperature inlet helium flow directly to the first wall, then
continue back to cool the module interior. In the water case, the
temperature drop around the loop was only 40C, compared to 235*C here,
and at lower temperatures, so there is less need for water to be directed
immediately to the first wall without absorbing any heat in transit.
This aspect of helium designs tends to "waste" coolant wall area. In
the reference design, 75% of the coolant area is not an interface
between the module interior and coolant. Thus most of the heat transfer
from module to coolant occurs through 25% of the wall area.
The use of HT-9 does allow (Table 2.5) reduction in first wall
thickness compared to 316 SS. However, as in the water-cooled case,
the total stress can be minimized by keeping the same design thickness.
2.4.3 Breeder Change
The use of LiAiO 2, rather than the lithium breeder used in the
Westinghouse/ORNL design [2.3, 2.4], causes three changes - 1) addition
of a neutron multiplier to the front of the module, 2) shortening of
the cannister, and 3) use of coolant tubes in the module interior.
The addition of the multiplier would entail a very difficult
engineering problem due to cooling requirements. Furthermore, the low
thermal conductivity of LiA10 2 necessitates additional cooling within
the breeding zone. A rough solution to this problem would be to direct
some of the return helium flow through the multiplier and LiAi02 at
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about a 20 mm spacing. The STARFIRE study [2.1] found this spacing
required to keep LiAl:02 cool for their water design. In fact the
Westinghouse/ORNL design study [2.3] suggested a return tube through
the center of the lithium breeding zone if a larger radius cylinder
were used. The exact design details are very difficult, requiring
extensive thermal/hydraulic analysis which is beyond the scope of
this study. There would also need to be seperate helium purge streams
through the breeder for tritium removal.
The details of calculations are discussed in Appendix C. The
reference design parameters for helium are shown in Table 2.6.
2.5 Lithium-Cooled Designs
2.5.1 Reference Design Concept
The pressure in water and helium systems is determined by the need
to maintain the liquid state and obtain adequate heat transfer. The
lithium system pressure is determined by the pressure drop through the
loop such that flow is maintained. Thus the maximum pressure is given
by
P(MPa) - 0.1 + AP (2.15)
The lowest pressure in the loop would be atmospheric (0.1 MPa). One
would like to minimize the blanket pressure drop to lower operating
pressures and lower pumping power. Unfortunately, use of lithium entails
MHD pressure losses as the conducting fluid crosses the magnetic field.
The reference conceptual design for the lithium case is that
q
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Helium Desigr
Table 2.6
Reference Parameters
Structure
Breeder
Neutron Multiplier
First Wall Thickness (mm)
First Wall Cap Radius,
Cylinder Radius (mm)
Breeder Depth (m)
Multiplier Depth (m)
In-Blanket Wetted Area (m 2
Out-Blanket Wetted Area (m2)
Breeder Volume (m3)*
Coolant Volume (m3)*
Mass Flow Rate (m3 /s)
Coolant Pressure (MPa)
First Wall Temperature
Coolant Inlet Temperature
Coolant Outlet Temperature
Breeder Temperature
First Wall Temperature Drop
*Includes out-of-blanket volume
316 SS
LiAlO 
2
Be
1.6
50
0.45
0.05
48,000
300
600
696
5.5
450
200
435
650
72
HT-9
LiA102
Be
1.6
50
316 SS
Li
1.6
50
0.45 0.6
0.05
48,000 54,000
undetermined -
300 600
600 600
696 721
5.5 5.5
450 450
200 200
435 435
650 500
52 72
HT-9
Li
1.6
50
0.6
54,000
600
600
721
5.5
450
200
435
500
52
r
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recommended in the ANL blanket design study [2.5], which is similar to
that in UWMAK I [2.9] and UWMAK-III [2.10]. The concept is illustrated
in Fig. 2.7. This concept has also been used in a blanket decommissioning
study [2.11]. A relatively high pressure for lithium of 2.8 MPa is used
to allow for MHD pressure drops. The primary design questions are the
module width and first wall thickness.
An alternative concept for a liquid metal blanket is that of a
cauldron [2.8] or large sector-sized tank, shown in Fig. 2.8. The
concept has some potential advantages. Some of these concepts are dis-
cussed in Chapters 3 and 9. They include lower wetted surface wall area
and lower complexity. However, detailed thermal-hydraulics-magnetic
calculations have not been performed to examine the feasibility of the
concept as a pure lithium blanket.
2.5.2 Metal Change
The decomissioning study [2.11] used a module width of 0.6 m
which indicates a first wall radius of 0.15 m (see Fig. 2.7) for a
V-alloy design. Decreasing the module width, hence first wall radius,
increases the wetted surface area and structural percentage of the
blanket but reduces the stress. Module widths of 0.6, 0.4, 0.3 m
were considered for 316 SS and V-alloy. It is not possible to design
an acceptable 316 SS module with a width of 0.6 m and the 0.4 case
was marginal (see Appendix C). Thus the reference 316 SS module width
was selected to be 0.3 m compared to 0.6 for V-alloy. Reduction of
lithium pressure would allow larger steel modules. The reference
lithium design parameters are listed in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7
Reference Blanket Design Parameters for
Lithium-Cooled Designs
Structure 316 SS V-alloy
Breeder Li Li
First Wall Thickness (mm) 2.0 3.8
First Wall Radius (mm) 75 150
Breeder Depth (m) 0.6 0.6
2In-blanket Area (m ) 11,800 9,000
Out-blanket Area (m2) 20,000 20,000
Breeder/Coolant Loop Volume (m3)* 800 800
Mass Flow Rate (m3/s) 8.4 7.6
Coolant Pressure (MPa) 2.8 2.8
First Wall Temperature 450 600
Coolant Inlet Temperature 230 300
Coolant Outlet Temperature 450 550
Breeder Temperature 500 600
First Wall Temperature Drop 90 110
Number of Modules 1440 720
* Includes out of module volume
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2.6 Flibe-Cooled Design
Molten salt blankets have not been extensively studied for fusion
designs. Flibe's coolant properties are somewhat similar to water
except for its high melting point (4594C) and far lower pressure.
Like lithium, the operating pressure is determined by pressure drop
alone. Unlike lithium, the MHD pressure losses are quite modest. Of
the material combinations studies, the TZM/Li/flibe case proved to
allow the most design flexibility. If a lower melting temperature
salt were found which was sufficiently compatable with structural ma-
terials, it could be very promising. The high melting point of flibe
and its compatability problems (see Chapter 7) seem to limit its use
to a molybdenum-based alloy.
The reference concept is shown in Fig. 2.9 which is similar to
previous flibe concepts [2.131 except the first wall design is
based on STARFIRE. The design approach is that developed by
McManamy [2.13] with details shown in Appendix C. The resulting refer-
ence design parameters are listed in Table 2.8. As seen in the table,
the result is a design with low stresses and low wall temperature
drops due to the low operating pressure of the flibe (% atmospheric)
and the high thermal conductivity of TZM (over 100 W/m*C). When the
design parameters were established, a thin first wall was selected,
minimizing metal near the plasma which reduces afterheat and activa-
tion. Analysis in the course of this study indicated that perhaps a
thicker wall would be better from various safety viewpoints, notably
plasma disruption effects and rapid structural oxidation. If desired,
First Wall,
Headers not shown
Constant
Tube
Through
Breeder
(others
not shown)
Lithium
Breeder
Flibe
Outlet
Fig. 2.9: Reference Flibe/Lithium Blanket Concept
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Table 2.8
Reference Blanket Design Parameters for
Flibe-Cooled Design
Structure TZM
Breeder Li
First Wall Thickness (mm) 1
First Wall Radius (mm) 5
Breeder Depth (m) 0.6
In-blanket Area (m2) 8,500
Out-Blanket Area 20,000
Breeder Volume (m3)* 600
Coolant Volume (m3)* 200
Mass Flow Rate (m3/s) 9.1
Coolant Pressure (MPa) 0.2
First Wall Temperature 900
Coolant Inlet Temperature 700
Coolant Outlet Temperature 800
Breeder Temperature 900
First Wall Temperature Drop 10
Number of Modules 240
*Includes out-of-blanket volumes
-101-
a TZM/flibe first wall could be significantly thicker (up to 10 mm),
with corresponding penalties in afterheat and radioactivity.
2.7 Summary
Based on calculations whose details appear in Appendix C, reference
design parameters were established for the eleven material combinations.
These parameters are listed in Tables 2.4, 2.6. 2.7, and 2.8. Whereas
these are not fully optimized, the parameters and blanket concepts are
somewhat representative of those in the literature. Some general comments
are relevant:
1) The high pressure required for water prohibits designing a
module to withstand full coolant pressure
2) Helium system pressures may allow a module to be designed to
withstand accidental pressurization
3) The higher thermal conductivity of the liquid breeders allows
use of fewer coolant tubes with resulting savings in complexity
and wetted wall area
4) High thermal stresses for 316 SS first wall narrows design
options and lead to highly stressed modules
5) Although the thermal conductivity is higher for HT-9, one
tends to use similar wall thicknesses as for 316 SS. However,
the design flexibility is higher.
6) A TZM/Li/flibe combination appears to tend to have highest
design flexibility.
C0"
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CHAPTER 3. LOSS-OF-COOLANT-INDUCED THERMAL TRANSIENTS
If cooling.is perturbed, the blanket faces the potential for
damage and loss of structural integrity. The question arises as to how
serious this threat is and how the choice of material/coolant/breeder
may influence it. The heat source of concern may be either the plasma
(plasma remains on) or decay afterheat (plasma off).
3.1 Problem Identification
Cooling disruption accidents may include loss-of-coolant (LOCA) due
to a leak or rupture, loss-of-flow (LOFA) due to tube plugging or pump
loss, or loss-of-heat removal (LOHR) at the primary loop heat exchanger.
The spatial scale may range from individual tube plugging to loss of
the entire coolant inventory. The time scale may range from sub-second
temperature rise from continued plasma heating to days/weeks heating
from decay heat after the plasma terminates. Finally, if the breeder is
a liquid, it too may drain, altering heat transport and thermal response.
3.1.1 Accident Type
All of the above accidents are potential concerns. Additional heat-
related accidents include over-power transients (TOP) and disruptions
which exhibit extremely short time scales and are discussed in Chapter 4.
Most of the few studies in this area have focussed on LOFA's. Chan [3.1]
has discussed some of the problems associated with LOCA, LOFA, LOHR, and
TOP accidents (plasma heating only). His analys/is focuses on how fast
coolant heat transfer is lost. His results are discussed in Section 3.3.
As Chan notes, the LOCA is generally the most severe, greater and faster
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loss of heat transfer. A typical assumption of previous works is that
the coolant loss time rate may be scaled directly from fission. Unfortu-
nately, some types of geometries for fusion reactors allow coolant losses
at the blanket level with a greater break area/coolant volume ratio
(section 3.2.3), implying faster coolant losses. Hence, faster LOCA's
are possible than Chan analyzed. The present study will be limited
to the more severe LOCA's as these largely determine design criteria-
e.g., is an auxiliary cooling system needed? The base scenarios and
maximum coolant loss rates are discussed in section 3.2.
3.1.2 Spatial Scale
A great variety of heat-removal accidents may be examined. The
least serious, but perhaps the most probable, is individual tube plugging.
This causes a local temperature rise. An example of this analysis is
found in the STARFIRE study [3.2]. Adjacent tubes assist heat removal
and limit temperature problems. The basic cause, corrosion and mass
transfer, is discussed in Chapter 7. A key problem will be instrumentation
and detection.
The next spatial scale would be loss of cooling for an entire module.
Then, other modules would still operate, providing cooling. If the leak/
rupture were at a module side, the release of coolant to the plasma
chamber automatically terminates the plasma, resulting in a pure afterheat
problem.
The worst case would be a loss-of-coolant to all modules. The
STARFIRE design aims to minimize this by specifying two independent coolant
loops, so that only half the cooling may be lost. This case is the easiest
to treat since all modules experience the same transient. It is also the
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least design-dependent since the thermal connection (highly specific
to individual designs) between modules is ignored. As the primary
purpose of the present study is to focus on material effects, the design
dependence should not dominate.
The total cooling loss case limits the wbrst result. As will be
seen in section 3.4, the afterheat problem is sufficiently minor (for
most material combinations) that less complete cooling losses (one
module or an individual tube) do not represent important afterheat
concerns. Thus, the worst case analysis can best examine relevant
material effects.
3.1.3 Time Scale
From the onset of the accident there are two heat sources of concern.
First, the plasma will continue to heat the blanket by neutron and surface
heating until it is terminated by either 1) the cause of the accident
itself, e.g., magnet quench, 2) the entry of blanket coolant or breeder
into the plasma chamber, 3) an active shutdown mechanism, or 4) a
passive shutdown,e.g., Be first wall coating vaporization in STARFIRE.
After plasma termination, the heat source is the decay afterheat due to
the induced structural radioactivity. In all cases the first wall is
the key point due to high surface heating (20% of all heat directly to the
first wall) and, later, to afterheat (highest specific radioactivity
is induced in the first wall). Thus the critical question is how fast the
first wall gets into trouble.
As will be seen, the plasma heat time scale is of the order of seconds.
One way or another the plasma will terminate quickly (a TZM structure may
be a special case). If nothing else works, eventually the first wall
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would melt, leading to material entering the plasma zone and stopping
the plasma.
The afterheat time scale stretches from hours to years.. Ideally,
one would like a structure that literally allowed one to walk away
without a serious meltdown or structural damage occuring. As will be
seen, this appears possible.
Actually, of course, the two problems merge. The longer the
plasma stays on, the higher the temperatures are (and closer to overall
melting). Merrill's [3.3] LOFA analysis handles this most graphically
by allowing first wall temperatures (following LOFA) to reach melting
before assuming plasma termination.
3.1.4 Present Problem
The chief goal is the identification of the impact of material choice
on the potential relative temperature rise problems. Absolute answers
and design effects are secondary concerns. This implies establishing
the problem so as to be able to directly focus on the key effect of
the individual blanket materials. For reasons outlined above, the present
study will be limited to analysis of a LOCA, where all modules -lose
coolant. Furthermore, the analysis will be divided into two separate
pieces - plasma and afterheat. The afterheat problem will generally
be started at t =0, i.e., no heat-up from continued plasma heating. This
allows separation of the problem and direct identification of material
behavior. This case corresponds to accidents where the plasma is
immediately terminated by some aspect of the accident itself. It also
removes a variable from the problem, namely how long the plasma
continues. Nevertheless, some analysis is discussed in section 3.4.2
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which indicates how the two pieces relate.
3.2 Input, Assumptions, and Cri teria
Having identified the problem to be solved, the method of solution
must be outlined.
3.2.1 Model and Assumptions
3.2.1.1 Boundary Conditions
The basic geometry for the analysis is shown in Figure 3.1. Because
all modules are assumed to experience the same transient, the front and
side faces have adiabatic boundaries (except for the incoming plasma
surface heat flux). In reality, the back of the module has a variety
of thermal connections including structural support, inlet/outlet for
coolant, and inlet/outlet for breeder or breeder purge stream. These
connections (and radiation heat transport) allow heat to flow to other
parts of the reactor and ultimat ely to the building. These parts of
the building generally serve as massive heat sinks. Unfortunately,
these aspects are highly design dependent and fairly independent of
blanket material choice. Thus, the back wall is taken to be insulated
from the rest of the reactor. Whereas this has no effect on plasma
heat rates, it has a definite effect on long-term afterheat results.
This is discussed in section 3.4. However, isolation of the back wall
(hence, the entire module) produces a conservative result. At long
times, the loss of heat from the blanket would serve to reduce blanket
temperatures.
( 0
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3.2.1.2 Heat Transfer Mechanisms
There are three heat transfer mechanisms. First, conduction is
allowed between any materials in contact. Second, where the coolant
is still present, forced convection heat coefficients are relevant.
Third, for cases with voids (coolant or liqui'd breeder gone),
radiation heat transfer plays a vital role in transferring heat from
the first wall to the reflector and back wall. Free convection is
ignored. For coolants, a LOCA indicates that only forced convection
is important, unlike a LOFA where a non-flowing coolant may experience
free convection. For liquid breeders (Li, Li 7Pb83), Gierszewski
[3.4, 3.5] has examined free convection versus conduction under normal
conditions. The strong MHD force is found to severely limit free
convection such that it is insignificant for Li, and reduced for
Li 7Pb83. For the latter case of Li 7Pb83, the temperature drop across
the breeding zone is so low (section 3.4) anyway from afterheat, that
ignoring free convection has a small effect.
3.2.1.3 Computer Code
The finite difference heat transfer code HEATING3 [3.6] was modified
for the analysis. The code handles 1, 2, or 3 dimensions in either
cartesian or cylindrical geometry. Temperature dependent conductivity,
density, and heat capacity are allowed. Time dependent boundary
temperatures, and heat generation (also spatially dependent) can be
user specified. Radiation heat transfer between opposing surfaces is
allowed.
The major drawback to the code is the limited capacity to model
coolant behavior. Convection heat coefficients must be user supplied
;I Hill i
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rather than determined by code-calculated conditions. The code was
modified for this study to allow time and spatially varying coefficients.
Similarly, the boundary temperatures (including convection boundary)
must be user specified. These matters are further discussed in section
3.3.3.
A minor limit was specification of heat flux boundary conditions.
The code was modified to allow time dependent specified heat flux,
necessary for plasma shut-off and disruption modeling.
.Another problem was a geometrical limit on radiation heat transfer.
The code allows radiation heat transfer only between opposing nodes
on two specified surfaces as in Figure 3.2a. In reality the picture
would look more like Figure 3.2b. As discussed in section 3.4, most of
the analysis could be done in one-dimension, eliminating the node
problem. For 2-D cases, this code limitation limits the geometries
than can be studied.
3.2.2 Input
A large amount of input was necessary for the analysis. Unfortunately,
the data base often had significant uncertainties.
3.2.2.1 Material Properties
The material properties (thermal conductivity, density, and specific
heat capacity) had to be specified for all the structural metals
(316 SS, HT-9, V-alloy, and TZM), reflector (assumed to be graphite)
solid breeder (LiAlO 2, 60% dense), liquid breeders (Li, Lil 7Pb83), coolants
(He, water, Li, flibe), and neutron multiplier (Be,70% dense). The values
used and their sources are found in Appendix B.
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To limit the analysis, only one reflector material was used. For
the present purpose, the reflector serves only as a pure heat sink and
graphite is a representative substance for a reflector.
Only beryllium was considered as a neutron multiplier (needed for
LiAlO 2). Others are possible (e.g., Zr5Pb3 in STARFIRE) but most are
themselves a source of afterheat. In the case of Zr-Pb, half the decay
heat in the STARFIRE design for short times (< day) came from the
multiplier. For the present purpose of comparing structural/coolant/
breeder hazards, it was deemed inappropriate to bias the LiA10 2 case
by adding Zr-Pb afterheat, since a better (from afterheat considerations
at least) multiplier is available, namely Be. In this sense, the Be/
LiAlO 2 combination is the best case for comparing LiAlO 2 to Li and
Li 7Pb83. As is seen, even the best LiAlO 2 case is worse than either of
the liquid breeders. Using Zr-Pb would only worsen the comparison.
3.2.2.2 Boundary Conditions
The only external conditions are 1) adiabatic-isolated boundary,
and 2) plasma surface heat flux. The base case for all the analysis is
q" = 9 x10 5 W/m2 corresponding to a neutron wall loading of q" = 3.6x 106w n
W/m2 - same values used in STARFIRE. One should note that other
non D-T Tokamak devices may have a differing ratio between surface
and neutron heat loads. For plasma heating, the surface heat flux
strongly dominates. For D-D devices, this component (relative to same
power output) would be worse. On the other hand, any device with a lower
surface heat load would experience a lower plasma heat-up rate (see
Section 3.3 for scaling) from a LOCA.
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3.2.2.3 Heat Generation Rates
The volumetric heat generation rate must be specified for both
plasma neutron flux and afterheat. Chao [3.7] modeled the neutron heating
as
q"' (r) = q" x QP x exp (-Ba x Ar) (3.1)
where Ar =
Ba =
QP =
radial depth into blanket (m)
attraction of neutrons into blanket (m~)
plasma heating coefficient.
The plasma heating coefficient is defined as
q=q"' (Ar= 0)
QP = n , 1
q n
such that the volumetric heating scales with the wall loading. Chao
found that this model was an adequate representation for thermal-
mechanics purposes of the nuclear heating rate.
In this present study, this is extended for afterheat as
q"' (r,t) = q' x QP x exp(-Ba xAr) x QD x DE(t)
where DE(t) = decay heat time function
(DE(t=O)= 1.0)
QD = initial decay heat fraction
(3.2)
(3.3)
------------- T7, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i i I I
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Parameters, QP, QD, Ba, and DE(t) are all functions of materials
selected. A full detailed neutronics calculation for each case was
beyond the scope of this study. Equations (3.1) and (3.3) allow.an
approximation of the heat rates based on previous neutronic calculations.
Implicit in Equation (3.3) is the separation of space and time.
The neutron energy spectrum changes as a function of position and this
leads to a differing mix of induced isotopes, hence a varying of
afterheat rates. Analysis of the data for cases with 316 SS [3.3]
shows that the de-coupling of space and time is good within about 10%
(t <l day). The agreement is best near the first wall for short times -
where it is most important. Due to the lack of detailed space and time
afterheat results for all the material combinations of interest, the
Equations (3.1) and (3.3) are taken to adequately represent volumetric
heat generation.
The model has the advantage that material relevant behavior is
separated into easily identifiable parts. This allows comparison of
heating results from previous works.
The parameter Ba is primarily a function of blanket coolant and
breeder. Table 3.1 lists the values used. These are based on fitting
Eq. (3.1) to heating rates found in the literature (Appendix B). The
agreement among studies for same material was generally good.
The definition for QD has some subtle aspects. Typically one quotes
the afterheat rate as some percentage of the reactor operating power.
The initial fractional total afterheat is given by
total FP =,initial total afterheat (3.4)total operating power
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TABLE 3.1
Values of Blanket Attenuation Factor*
Coolant Breeder Ba (m 1
water LiAlO2  9.0
water Li-Pb 8.0
He Li 8.0
He Li 3.7
Li Li 4.0
flibe Li 4.5
*See Appendix B
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Since the operating power is being placed in structure, coolant, and
breeder and afterheat is primarily generated in structure alone, the
volumetric fractional afterheat is different. This is given by
volumetric FP = QD x exp(-Ba x Ar) (3.5)
thus the initial total fractional afterheat is given by
f QDj x exp(-Ba x Ar) dr x QP(total FP (3.6)
f exp(-Ba x Ar) dr x QP1
where the integral is over the entire blanket volume and QD varies as
a function of material (metal, coolant, breeder). Thus, although the
total afterheat at shutdown for fusion systems is about 1% of operating
power, this heat source is concentrated in the structural metal. The
first wall afterheat generation rate is about 4% of the first wall
operating power (QD %,4%). The volumetric heat source, rather than
the total, controls heat transfer and thermal response. The values
for QD and QP are listed in Table 3.2. The product QD x QP determines
the initial afterheat scaling (see Eq. (3.3)). Determination of the
values is discussed in Appendix B.
The decrease in afterheat as a function of time, DE(t), was
obtained by examining the time behavior of materials in various previous
studies (see Appendix B). There is some variance among studies, sometimes
due to differing alloy compositions. The values used roughly correspond
to two years of operation. For longer times, the variance increases.
Figure 3.3 shows the functions used. The definition of DE(t) in
Eq. (313) implies that DE(t=0) = 1.0 so that the function is strictly
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TABLE 3.2
Values of NeUtron and Afterheat Parameters*
QD
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.006
0.062
0.019
QP(m~.) QDx QP(m 1 )
10
9.5
6.0
6.5
0.40
0.38
0.30
0.39
4
8
9
0.024
0.50
0.17
10
%0O
0.005
low
18
9 0.045
*See Appendix B
Material
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
Li
flibe
LiAO
2
Li17Pb83
He
water
Be
i I I -
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related to time behavior.
3.2.2.4 Surface Emissivity and View Factors
The radiation heat flux from surface 1 to 2 is given by
q= R VF12 ( T4 - £2 T4) (3.7)
where temperatures are in absolute degrees ('K). Both the view factor (VF)
and emissivity (c) range from zero to one and represent deviations from
maximum heat radiation due to 1) the fact that surface two may be only
a part of the area enclosing surface one and 2) the surface conditions
may decrease emission.
The model of Eq. (3.7) incorporates the assumption that surfaces
acting as gray, diffuse emitters and reflectors. This means that emission
and reflection are angle (diffuse) and wavelength (gray) independent;
otherwise the factors would have to be summed over angle and wavelength.
The gray, diffuse approximation is a common one for engineering applica-
tion and is forced here due to the lack of more specific data.
For surfaces i (i= 2,....) enclosing surface one, we have
Ei VF1  = 1 (3.8)
For present purpose, heat is being transferred only between opposing
surfaces, and VF12 = 1.0 (no heat to other surfaces). Furthermore heat
is only transferred between surfaces of similar material. Since (as
discussed below) the emissivity is not highly temperature dependent,
Eq. (3.7) becomes
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q"1= -(T T ) (3.8)
The emissivity in general is temperature, material, and surface-
condition dependent. In the present analysis, the relevant surfaces are
all internal within the module and are exposed to either a coolant or
breeder fluid. As discussed in Chapter 7, all these surfaces will be
oxidized to some degree. This results in a very high emissivity (see
Appendix B, Table 3.3) that is fairly constant with temperature. Exterior
surfaces, those repeatedly heated and cooled (un-oxidized), would show
significantly lower emissivity, Even worse would be new, clean, polished
surfaces where emissivities of these metals would fall near 0.1.
3.2.2.5 Initial Temperature
The initial temperatures of components materials were established,
based on Chapter 2 and Appendix C.. The values used, are listed in Table
3.4
3.2.3 Coolant Loss Rates
A critical question is how fast a blanket fluid, coolant or breeder,
may empty.
3.2.3.1 Basic Geometry
The various scale lengths of various accidents were discussed in
Section 3.1. The basic geometry of blanket modules influences emptying
rates. Two of the basic approaches to blanket design are shown in
Fig. 3.4. The most common design of a Tokamak blanket is divided into
toroidal sectors so that individual units may be moved between toroidal
field coils for replacement. One approach (more common) is to subdivide
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TABLE 3.3
Surface Emissivities*
Metal
Steel
V-all oy
TZM
Emissivity
0.88
0.85 (estimated)
0.82
*See Appendix B for discussion of values
Condition
Oxidized
Oxidized
Oxidized
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TABLE 3.4
Initial Temperatures for LOCA Analysis
Material Temperature (*C) Use
316 SS 450 structure
HT-9 450 structure
V-alloy 600 structure
TZM 900 structure
LiA1O 2  650 Breeder
Be 500 Multiplier
Li17Pb83  500 Breeder
Li 500 Breeder with SS
structure
Li 600 Breeder with V
structure
Li 900 Breeder with Mo
structure
Li 450 Coolant with SS
structure
Li 550 Coolant with V
structure
He 435 Coolant
Water 320 Coolant
Flibe 800 Coolant
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these sectors into modules (Figure 3.4a). This approach is followed,
for instance, by the STARFIRE [3.2] and Westinghouse/ORNL [3.11] designs.
The high number of individual units (240 for STARFIRE, 66,000 for
Westinghouse/ORNL) combined with the placement of much of the manifolding
coolant volume external to the module unit decreases the ratio of
coolant volume/potential break area (V/Ab) relative to sector-size
tanks or fission geometries.
The time to empty will be seen to scale as V/Ab so that the more
common small module could experience rapid depressurization. Classic
LOCA analysis assumes the worst case to be a single large pipe break.
For such a case the relevant volume is the entire coolant inventory
which must empty through the single break.
With small modules, the inlet and outlet pipes (indeed all connec-
tions) are within about two meters or less of each other. The close
proximity reduces the independence of failure between them. A variety
of common cause failures (seismic events, magnetic forces, etc.) can
be envisioned that can break both inlet and outlet pipes. For this
case the relevant coolant volume is only that which is contained within
an individual module. For example, the entire coolant volume in STARFIRE
is about 550 m3 , but the total volume in the modules alone is only 20 m3
Thus, if small modules are employed and a double break occurs, the
coolant loss rate would be significantly higher than for a single break
system.
Furthermore, if such a geometry were used, the vulnerability of
the design (common cause failure) increases the difficulty of designing
a credible emergency auxiliary cooling system. How does one cool a
module if it is possible for all connections (placed close together)
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are severed? There are two possible solutions. First, make it impossible
for module/support severing to occur. The analysis for this is beyond the
scope of this study. Second, design the module and select materials so
that auxiliary cooling is not required.
There is an additional problem. If sectors are subdivided into
modules around the minor radius (Figure 3.5), there will be a variance
in the orientations of each module. For coolants whose loss rates are
gravity dominated (liquid metal or salt) rather than those forced out
by pressure (helium, water), this differing orientation causes differing
transients. The best case is a module positioned above the plasma
since the pipe breaks will not allow the liquid to drain and any remaining
liquid will be in contact with the first wall. The worst case is a
module below the plasma. Then a pipe break allows complete draining
and any drainage will tend to result in a void between cooling liquid
and first wall. Again, sectioning of sectors into small units imposes
a LOCA-safety penalty. The overall trade-offs on this question are
discussed in Chapter 9.
The exact coolant loss rates are difficult to determine and design
dependent, but it is possible to determine estimates of the time scales
involved.
3.2.3.2 Water-Cooled Loss Rates
Of the coolants under study, water would operate at the highest
pressure (%15.2 MPa). There is also a large body of analysis of LOCA
events in a PWR. There are two fundamental differences between fission
and fusion water-LOCA's. The first, already explained, is the relatively
lower volume of water to empty in fusion designs, resulting in less time
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needed to empty for the case of small units. Second, the power density
(and accident heat-up rates) are lower in fusion, reducing the relevance
of what happens in the initial time period. Thus, overall, a fusion
blanket takes less time to empty and less heat-up may occur per unit
time. Both effects combine to reduce the contribution of cooling during
the depressurization for a fusion design.
PWR-LOCA analysis is very complex, but one can note the basic
time scale. A sensitivity analysis by Green and Lawther [3.12] showed
that dryout heat transfer regime was reached between 0.01 - 0.08 seconds
with film boiling I0.5 sec. Figs. 3.6, 3.7 show a smoothed out time
history of the transient pressure and heat transfer coefficient.
Whereas these time scales are very relevant to fission analysis, we shall
see that only about a 50 *C temperature rise is possible (first wall,
plasma heating, adiabatic case) in this time frame. Thus, the most
the depressurizing water could do for a fusion design is to delay a 50 OC
temperature rise by a half second.
With such a high module pressure, the flow out the break will be
a choked flow virtually instantaneously. A common expression for the
flow rate is
/A= 0.61 T2(P - Pb)p (3.10)
where 
-/A = flow rate (kg/m2sec) through break
p = fluid density
I ___ I
------ 7
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P0  internal fluid pressure
Pb= containment (external) pressure
for conditions of interest a conservative estimate of external pressure
is 0.1 x P . Thus,
m = 0. 82 Ab v/P~ kg/sec (3.11)
Conservation of mass in the blanket volume gives the equation
V d= - 0.82 A /T/7~dt (3.12)
(3.13)4 )p 1
This is not easily solvable since P is a function of p. However one can
estimate the time to empty by making the following assumptions. Fix
P P 8 MPa and set Ab/V for a water design as : 0.25 m (see Appendix
C). Then
= 580 p (3.14)
and the time to empty is given by
te (water) v ( )8 <0.1 sec (3.15)
An alternative approach is to assume choked flow within the tubing.
0
Then 0
_1=0.2A
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te (water) -L/v (3.16)
where L = length of tube pass through module
v = choked flow velocity,
Since v ,,- = 0.82 Y/mP.r/sec , 100 m/sec (3.17)APPpp
then one obtains
te (water) \ 0.01 sec (3.18)
In either case, the time scale to empty is at least as short as for a PWR.
As an estimate of the cooling provided, the heat transfer coefficient in
Figure 3.7 was used based on results in Reference 3.12.
3.2.3.3 Helium-Cooling Loss Rates
The analysis for helium is simpler and less uncertain due to the
one-phase behavior. There is also a different behavior at long times.
Since a helium loop is designed for high-speed gas-phase, then the
blower/pump may continue operating as depressurization occurs if unaffected
by the accident itself. Depending on the ultimate pressure of the
building, and the placement of the break relative to the pump, the loop
will still provide some cooling. A water pump would cavitate.
Depending on design and size, a fission gas-cooled reactor has
depressurization time constants between 30 sec [3.13] and 60 sec [3.14]
with an exponential decay. The mass flow of an ideal gas through a
break is given by (see reference 3.15 for example)
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/2cT 0 (P) 2/y
where P 0 = initial internal pressure
P = exit pressure
T = internal absolute temperatOre
R = 2079 J/kg OK for helium
y = 1.667 for helium
Choked flow results in P/P0 reaching a maximum of
P/P =0 i 
For helium, this leads to
=Ab o
maximum 
-T
0
x 0.0159 sec (*K)
m
Using the ideal gas law and conservation of mass, one obtains
dP b R
dt
Again the factor Ab/V appears. For the reference design (Appendix C),
a typical value is 0.25m~. Equation 3.22 is solvable for the isothermal
case. Then
P = P0 e-t
AP 
0
m=RT 0
(3.19) 0
(3.20)
0
(3.21)
(3.22)
(3.23)
0
-
p
/T x 0. 0159 x P
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relates to the absorption of heat due to melting. The maximum
depth of melting as tpd is varied is given by
dm 1 (E/A ) (4.8)
at a plasma disruption time given by
(tpd)max W p(C - T) 2
melting
The neglect of the heat of melting can be eliminated by using
finite difference methods. Furthermore, vaporization can be included.
Fraas and Thompson [4.7] performed such calculations,assuming the
vaporized material does not move,using dimensionless variables. Again,
the geometry was a semi-infinite flat plate subjected to a step heat
flux. Calculations were performed for INTOR [4.3] for 316 SS and
aluminum which included transport of the vapor phase.
In their analysis, Fraas and Thompson defined several dimensionless
variables to produce more general results. Dimensionless heat of melting
and vaporization were defined as the ratio of the heat of phase change
to the margin of sensible heat before melting:
'm= Hf/Cp(Tm -TO) (4.10)
T1 = H /cp(Tm -To) (4.11)
For a variety of metals, these values are fairly constant with Tim % 0.42
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TABLE 4.7
Minimum Disruption Time (msec) to
Avoid Melting and Vaporization*
Minimum to
Avoid Melting
160
92
97
19
Minimum to
Avoid Vaporization
28
16
19
3.7
*Low values preferred, Eqs. (4.5), (4.6) used
316 SS
HT-9
V
TZM
-227-
t = 44E6)
v (T ATOV pck (4.6)
where AT = Tm - T0
AT = T - To
Ideally, these should include the variance of material properties due to
temperature and latent heat of melting and vaporization. In fact, there
is considerable uncertainty in the heat of melting and vaporization,
especially for V-alloy and TZM. To first approximation, the minimum
disruption times to produce melting and vaporization can be calculated
using Eqs. (4.5) and (4.6) and material properties at 800'C (see Appendix
B). The results are presented in Table 4.7.
A simple analytical expression for the depth of melting is
possible if the latent heat of melting is ignored. Fraas and Thompson
[4.7] examined the depth of melting for a uniform semi-infinite plate
with a step heat flux profile. For the case where material properties
are independent of temperature (average values used) and the latent heat
of melting is ignored, they obtain the depth of melting, dm, as a
function of disruption time and material properties:
d ( = 2 (a '12 PC p(Tm -TO)(a(47
dm(tpd) = (atd/' - T/A (a/tpd) (4.7)
This is plotted for the reference materials in Fig. 4.3 (material proper-
ties evaluated at 8000 C). The first term, which controls at very short
times, relates to the penetration of the temperature wave. The second
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TABLE 4.6
STARFIRE Maximum Temperatures**
From Plasma Disruptions
Location
Beryllium
Coating
tpd = 25 msec tpd
1325*
= 100 msec
1020
316 SS First
Wall 795 790
*Beryllium would have melted, ignored in analysis
**From reference 4.4
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TABLE 4.5
Safety Margin Against Melting
Absolute Values
Relative 1 pd = 25 msec
Value** Eq. (4.3) Code
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
2.86
2.17
2.23
1.00
2.53
1.92
1.97
0.88
2.69
2.02
2.16
0.88
tpd = 100 msec
Eq. (4.3) Code
1.27
0.96
0.98
0.44
1.40
1.05
1.18
0.42
*SMm = AT rise /(T - T ), low values preferred
**Relative to TZMC
C
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so that SM = 1 implies the onset of melting; low values are preferred.
This factors in an additional material property: Tmelt - Toperation
( =T ). The relative values are shown in Table 4.5. The absolute
values at tpd = 25 msec, 100 msec from computer run results are also
listed.
It is instructive to note the- results of the STARFIRE analysis for
their 316 SS structure (1.5 mm) with a 1.0 mm Be coating (Table 4.6).
The coating takes the main impact of the disruption. The coating has
several effects: 1) keeps AT rise for structure k5 3500C, 2) de-couples
material suffering the worst temperature rise (coating) from material
providing structural support (316 SS), 3) decreases time dependence, and
4) allows for the possibility of easier repair if needed since the
coating may be repaired in-situ. The ability of the two materials to
stay in contact was not addressed in reference 4.4 and could be a
problem.
4.2.1.3 Short Time Scale
As seen above, if the disruption time is short enough, surface
melting will occur. At even shorter times, surface vaporization may
occur. Equation (4.3) can be re-written and solved for the disruption
time that results in the onset of melting or vaporization (latent heats
ignored),
t 4 E 2 1
m T ) AA om p)k (4.5)
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TABLE 4.4
Relative First Wall Temperature Rise*
Basic
Scaling
(Eq. 4.3)
316 SS,
HT- 9
V-alloy
TZM
1.64
1.23
1.69
1.00
Normalized Temperature
Risefrom Code Calculations
tpd = 25 msec tpd = 100 msec
1.75
1.30
1.86
1.00
1.89
1.40
2.11
1.00
*Relative to TZM, low values preferredC,
C
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the maximum temperatures. This is expected since the ramp-down model
has an initially higher heat flux, resulting in faster heat-up. The
ramp-down model results in maximum temperatures being reached before
the end of the disruption. The TZM case shows less variation, possibly
because the variation from Eq. (4.3) (high Fourier number) is cancel-
ling the effect of surface heat flux modeling.
In any case, the impact of the exact time profile for the heat
flux is relatively small as compared to uncertainties in E/A and tpd'
Onega, et. al. [4.1] used two different heat flux profile models (at
one time, t pd- 24 msec; one material, 316 SS) and similarly found
less than a 10% temperature variation.
The code runs also verified the non-influence of first wall thick-
ness. The six references cases of Chapter 3 (dfw from 1 mm to 3.8 mm)
were used and the first wall thickness had less than a %l% impact on
maximum temperatures. The thermal wave did not penetrate through the
first wall in this time. Of course, varying wall thickness and coolant
performance would alter the rate of first wall cool-down.
The relative first wall. temperature rise for the four materials is
listed in Table 4.4. This is simply the relative value of (pC k)-1/2
p
(properties evaluated at 8000C, see Appendix B) - the material property
dependence, from Eq. (4.3). The relative temperature rise from code
runs is also presented. V-alloy and 316 SS are seen about the same
with TZM significantly better.
The safety margin against melting was defined as
SM = AT rise /(Tm - T ) (4.4)
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TABLE 4.3
Disruption Maximum Temperature Rises,*
Comparison Between Unit Step and Ramp-down Models
Structure 3
tpd= 25 msec
Unit Step, Eq. (4.3) 2
Ramp-down, Code 2
% difference
tpd= 100 msec
Unit Step, Eq. (4.3) 1
Ramp-down, Code 1
% difference -
*Surface melting is ignored
V_ TZM
2560
2811
-10%
16-SS
480
640
-6%
240
370
10%
1514
1508
+1%
HT-9
1860
1960
-6%
930
1020
-10%C
1280
1530
-20%
757
723
+5%
C
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= 2E
Atpd
= E
Atpd
Ramp-down heat fluxa
Units
~-------------- 
------
model
step heat flux
t pdt=0
Fig 4.2: Comparison of Unit Step
and Ramp-down Heat Flux
Models
77 F-777-7 T -- - I i fi
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case where the heat flux rises instantaneously to a fixed value for the
duration of the disruption, the temperature rise can be solved analytical-
ly. Jakob [4.8] gives the temperature at the surface of a semi-infinite
thick plate as
q
T(t) =T + 2 - (4.2)
Given that q"t = E/Aw pd
E = total thermal energy of the plasma
A = incident area
the final temperature at the end of the disruption (maximum temperature)
is given by
ATrise = E/A (pc k)-1/ 2 (4 1/2 (4.3)
riep KlTtpd)
As indicated in section 4.14, E/A is set as 3.8 MJ/m 2 ,
The analytical expressions for temperature rise, Eqs. (4.2), (4.3),
are based on a step heat flux to the surface, see Fig. 4.2. Calculations
were performed with the code HEATING3, also used in Chapter 3 (details of
geometry in Appendix C) to compare the step shape results with a ramp-
down profile (Fig. 4.2), assumed in the STARFIRE study. Disruption times
of 25 msec and 100 msec were used, as in STARFIRE. The integrated energy
deposition, E/A, is the same for both cases. As seen in Table 4.3, the
calculated maximum temperatures are similar between the two time pro-
file models. For 316 SS, HT-9, and V-alloy, the step model underpredicts
C
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TABLE 4.2
Disruption Times Controlling
Temperature Rise Scaling with dfw = 2 mm
Temperature
Rise Scaling
Long
(Eq.
Fourier Number
Criteria
Times
4.1)
F >> 1
Intermediate,
Short Times
(Eq. 4.2)
Disruption Time which qualifies (msec)
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
>> 700
>> 900
>> 400
>> 100
F0 < 0.3
240
310
130
TZM 34
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thermal conduction in the first wall to bring the gradient to equi-
librium. In the limit of long times (really possible only for an
over-power transient) the new temperature drop across the first
wall can be expressed in terms of the previous conditions and the
percentage increase in heat flux. Chan [4.5]'writes
ATw = ATfw(l + ) (4.1)
where ATfw = initial temperature drop across first wall
ATfw = new gradient due to increased power level
X = percent increase in power level.
The dimensionless time relevant in these problems is given by
the Fourier number, F0 , with
F atpd0 d2
fw
where tpd = disruption time
a = thermal diffusivity = k/pc
dfw = first wall thickness.
The power increase equation, 4.1, appears valid for F0 >> 1. For
conditions of interest, this implies tpd > 1 sec, which is quite
long - more than would be implied by disruption time scaling.
4.2.1.2 Intermediate Time Scale
For Fe A 0.3, the thermal diffusion becomes important [4.6]. For
conditions of interest, this is satisfied (see Table 4.2). For the
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vaporization, dmv, are relevant.
The scaling of thermal stresses with material properties indicates
how material choice influences resulting stresses. Although the appro-
priate failure criterion to judge stresses among materials is unknown, a
representative value is the generated stress relative to the yield
stress.
The temperature rise due to induced currents is calculated and
shown to be minor compared to the surface heat flux. The magnetic
stresses relative to material choice are important. Again, a represen-
tative criterion to judge the impact of stresses is comparison to
the yield stress.
4.2 Surface Heat Flux Effects
The effects of the particle flux on the first wall are analyzed,
ignoring the magnetic field.
4.2.1 First Wall Temperature Rise
Of all the effects generated by a disruption, the resulting first
wall temperature rise and possible melting and vaporization have been
the most studied. There are good reasons for this. The phenomena
(heat flux, thermal conduction, etc.) are understood enough for reasona-
bly accurate results to be obtained. The analysis itself is relatively
straight-forward. Finally, the blanket design is fairly unimportant.
These aspects are not true for the other disruption effects.
4.2.1.1 Long Time Scale - Over Power Transients
If the disruption scale is long enough, there is adequate time for
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TABLE 4.1
Quantitative Measures
Conterning Plasma Disruption Effects
Thermal Effects - Temperature Rise
1. First Wall Temperature Rise, ATrise = T(t, surface) 
-To
2. Safety Margin Against Melting, SMm = ATrise/(Tm - TO)
3. Minimum Disruption Time to Avoid Melting, tm
4. Maximum Depth of Melting, dm
5. Minimum Disruption Time to Avoid Vaporization, tv
6. Maximum Depth of Vaporization, dmv
Thermal Effects - Thermal Stresses
1. Relative Thermal Stress, sT
2. Safety Margin Against Yielding, SMY = sT/Sy
Magentic Effect - Eddy Current Resistance Heating
1. Temperature Rise, ATrise
Magnetic Effect - Magnetic Stresses
1. First Wall Magnetic Stress, swm
2. Blanket (Breeder Zone) Magnetic Stress, sbm
3. Safety Margin Against Wall Yielding, SMY = wm /y
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the STARFIRE case would have lead to a reference energy deposition of
225.36 MJ/m2 rather than 3.8 MJ/m 2. Present numerical results are based
on a single deposition value of 3.8 MJ/m2 (with possible range of
0.0 to 5.39 MJ/m 2 ), although comparison among materials is independent
of the value used.
4.1.5 Failure Criteria
The variety of effects generated by disruptions leads to a large
number of criteria to judge material selection. The uncertainty in
time scale causes uncertainly in the thermal and magnetic effects and
the scaling with material properties. The uncertainty in expected
frequency causes uncertainty in failure criteria and the relative
ability of materials to withstand calculated stresses. Nonetheless,
some quantitative measures are possible and appropriate.
These measures are listed in Table 4.1. Both the absolute tempera-
ture rise and temperature rise compared to melting are important
scaling measures. Melting of the surface, even for a short time, is to
be avoided. The melted material may be lost, causing severe wall
erosion [4.3]. Even if the material were to remain in place, the
microstructure resulting from the melting and re-freezing would likely
be different than that of the previous alloy, with potentially unfor-
tunate consequences in wall behavior. Thus the minimum disruption time,
tm, that causes melting and the maximum depth of melting, dmm, are rele-
vant. Vaporization of material is worse than melting - material is lost
from the wall and radioactivity mobilized. Thus the minimum disruption
time that causes surface vaporization, tv, and maximum depth of
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combination is beyond the scope of the study. As discussed in Chapter
2, only the basic parameters are established to allow general exami-
nation of safety problems for typical design concepts. Precise details
such as the placement of structure supports are not provided. This
is appropriate since the intended comparison 'in this study is not
among specific designs but rather among generic safety problems
imposed by the selection of certain material combinations. The relative
impact of selecting one material over another should not be tied to
a specific detailed design. This limits the analysis of precise
thermal and magnetic effects, but allows determination of the general
scaling of those effects among materials. Since the first wall thick-
ness for a given structural material varies among the reference cases
as a function of coolant, a constant first wall thickness of 2 mm was
assumed in this analysis to decouple design specifics from relative
structural material behavior. Unfortunately, appropriate failure
criteria are uncertain.
For the present study, values of plasma energy, E, and incident
area, A, were taken from the STARFIRE study (reference size plasma).
Thus E = 920 MJ and A = 30% of total (800 m2 -= 240 m2. Thus the
energy deposition is 3.8 MJ/m 2
For the smaller INTOR [4.3], the assumption was that 70% of the
total energy (200 MJ) would be deposited in 30% of the area, leading to
a deposition of 1.45 MJ/m 2. However, the reference INTOR case was to
allow a localizing peaking faction of 2.0, with energy deposition
of 2.89 MJ/m 2. Applying the INTOR assumption and peaking factor to
0
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effect of fusion radiation environment on materials is poorly known,
particularly for materials like vanadium and molybdenum.
The ideal solution would be use of plasma physics predictions and
detailed reactor design to calculate stresses and temperatures. These
would be compared to appropriate failure criteria, depending on the
expected frequency of the disruptions.
4.1.4 Scope of Present Study
Unfortunately, disruptions and the somewhat similar problems of
other confinement schemes are poorly understood. The precise behavior
over time and the time scale itself are unknown. The expected frequency
in a commercial reactor is uncertain. The materials properties in an
irradiated state are poorly estimated. The ideal solution is not yet
possible.
The purpose of the current analysis is to explore disruption effects
sufficiently to identify the important material properties which influ-
ence the severity of the effect. As noted above, these properties and
their relative impact are a function of time scale. The scaling of the
effects with properties allows determination of the impact of material
selection.
As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, current knowledge of irradiated
material properties, principally material strength (yield, fracture
toughness, ductility),for the reference materials does not allow use
of irradiated property values. This work incorporates only unirradiated
property values.
Furthermore, establishing a full detailed design for each material
-------------
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design would allow precise examination of localized effects and the
complex flow of currents induced in the structure. The total result
would be calculation of stresses and temperatures in a design.
Identification of the expected frequency of disruptions is needed
to know the appropriate failure criteria. A variety are outlined here
to demonstrate the uncertainty involved.
If disruptions in commercial reactors are very rare, unexpected
in a typical blanket lifetime, the survival goal would be to avoid
gross structural failure. Thus material properties like the fracture
toughness and ultimate tensile stress, sUTS, are relevant.
If disruptions might be likely a few times over the lifetime, the
survival goal would need to include the ability to replace damaged
parts. Since the general maintenance scheme appears to be removal and
replacement of individual failed modules, it is vital that structural
deformation be minimal to allow modules to be free to be pulled out.
The relevant material properties would be elongation and the yield
stress, s
If designers are faced with the likelihood of frequent disruptions,
an even more stringent criteria would be needed. Multiple bursts of
heat flux make material resistance to fatigue relevant.
Since the frequency of disruptions in a commercial reactor is
unknown, then, the relevant material properties which control failure
is unknown. The scaling among materials is thus somewhat dependent
on what constitutes failure. Additionally, short term heating might
alter finely-tuned microstructure within an alloy. Finally, the
1 0 no _ _ -
-
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reactor size tokamak is unknown. Consequently, the appropriate effects
were determined for differing time scales. As presented later, the
temperature rise and thermal stresses show differing material property
behavior scaling at different time scales. Thus the relative comparison
among materials differs with the disruption time scale. The question
of whether an effect is even relevant for a given material depends on
the disruption time. The relative consequence comparison is meaning-
less if the effect itself is too small to be significant.
Current size devices have submillisecond disruption times [4.1-
4.3], tpd < 1 msec. Although uncertain, the disruption time is expected
to scale upwards as devices increase in size, density, etc., to com-
mercial reactor size. Directly applying the scaling of reference 4.1
to the STARFIRE plasma (reference case for this study) results in
tpd , 55 msec (see Appendix C). The STARFIRE design team [4.4]
examined disruption effects for that design for two cases: tpd = 100 msec
(reference case) and tpd = 25 msec (alternate). Differences in current
and density profiles increase the scaling uncertainties. The expected
INTOR time scale is 20 msec [4.3]. For all cases, a longer disruption
time scale (other parameters held constant) reduces all effects.
4.1.3 Ideal Solution
Ideally, the plasma physics of disruptions would be sufficiently
known to allow prediction of the time scale, tpd; energy, E; target
surface area, A; and the temporal and spatial profile of the flux as
well as induced currents and forces. Perhaps a range of values, with
some probability density, would be expected. Furthermore, a detailed
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The stresses (thermal and magnetic) act on the first wall and sur-
rounding structure at the same time that structural temperatures may
have risen due to the heat flux and resistence heating. The elevated
temperatures can severely reduce structural yield stress. Thus the
coupling of effects is worse than either alone.
Of all parts of the current study of material impact, this is the
portion most tied to the tokamak plasma confinement scheme. Tokamaks
have disruptions and the relative structural influence on their effects
must be determined.
Other magnetic confinement schemes (e.g., torsatron, stellerators,
EBT's, and mirrors) and the inertial confinement approaches (driven by
light ion particle beams or lasers) are basically disruption free.
However, at least some of these may suffer some disruption-type effects.
Any rapid destruction of magnetic confinement could, in principle, lead
to first wall heat flux due to particles and magnetic forces generated
by transient currents and magnetic fields. Abnormal auxiliary heating
behavior, such as a neutral beam mis-aim, is another potential source
of increased surface heat flux. A mis-aim of an inertial confinement
driver may cause a short-term lead load on a first wall structure.
Thus, although the present analysis is limited to tokamak disruption
modeling, various pieces of the work (and resulting implications and
conclusions) may be relevant to other confinement devices.
4.1.2 Time Scale
The disruption time, tpdis critically important in determining the
effects. Unfortunately, the time scale for disruptions in a commercial
C
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CHAPTER 4. PLASMA DISRUPTION EFFECTS
Misbehavior of the fusion plasma may cause problems within the
blanket, offering the potential for reactor damage and public-health
consequences.
4.1 Problem Description
This chapter contains the analysis of consequences of plasma
misbehavior. The primary effects to surrounding blanket structure
can be divided into thermal and magnetic. Although the specific mis-
behavior discussed is plasma disruption, the resulting analysis and
some safety criteria have a more general application.
4.1.1 General Problem
Present day experimental tokamak devices have experienced a very
rapid (sometimes very violent) loss of plasma confinement due to collec-
tive behavior of the particles. The process results in the plasma parti-
cles striking some fraction of the first wall (generally the inboard side
of the torus), the plasma currents being displaced into surrounding struc-
ture,and the magnetic fields being perturbed.
The particle flux causes a burst of heat load on the first wall
as do the induced structural currents. These constitute the thermal
effect - temperature rise and thermal stresses due to non-uniform
temperature rise. The currents and magenetic fields combine to pro-
duce magnetic forces on structural members. This constitutes the
magnetic field effect.
A general diagram, illustrating both effects, is given in Fig. 4.1.
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TABLE 3.32
Time Required for Worse Cases to Suffer
Damage or Melting
Damage
2.5 secPlasma Heating
Afterheat 1 hr
Melting
10 sec
10 hr
C
C
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consequence relative to a material selection. For both cases there are
two criteria: 1) the reciprocal of the time required for damage, and
2) the reciprocal of the time required for melting. Thus, a low RCI is
preferred. The values for RCILP are relative to the most realistic TZM
case. The selection of breeder has only a mi'nor effect.
The values for RCILA for the metals are relative to the V-alloy case
with coolant and breeder held fixed. The values for RCILA for breeders
are relative to Li17Pb83 for the 316 SS metal (used with all breeders).
The coolant choice has only a minor direct effect.
Finally, the overall time scales are listed in Table 3.32 for the
worst case scenarios.
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TABLE 3.31
Relative Consequence Index for
LOCA-Afterheat (Breeders)*
(Time to Damage) relative to Li17Pb83
(316 SS metal) (RCI )LA
fluid breeders
drain
LiAl 02/Be
Li
Li17Pb83
2.7
fluid breeders
do not drain
300
I 5
11
Criterion: (Time to Melting)~ relative to
(316 SS metal) (RCIMA
fluid breeders
drain
1-5
fluid breeders
do not drain
150
51
1 1
Rank Ordering: Best to Worst
Li17Pb83 > Li > LiA102/Be
*Based on reference design parameters,
Tables 3.23, 3.24.
low values preferred.
C
results from
Criterion:
C Li 1 Pb83
LiA10 2/Be
Li
Li17Pb83
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TABLE 3.30
Relative Consequente Indices for
LOCA-Afterheat (Metals)*
Criterion: (Time to Damage)~f relative to V-alloy
d(coolant, breeder held fixed)(RCILA)
316 SS 6-11
HT-9 3-8
V-alloy 1
TZM 5-9
(Time to Melting)~
(coolant, breeder
316 SS
HT- 9
V-alloy
TZM
1 relative to V-alloy
held fixed) (RCImA
7-12
3-8
1
3-8
Rank Ordering: best to worst
V >>HT-9 TZM 316 SS
*based on reference design parameters, and results from Tables 3.23-3.27
low values preferred
Criterion:
W 'I
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TABLE 3.29
Relative Consequence Indices for
LOCA-Plasma Heating*
Criterion: (Time to Damage) 1
realistic TZM/Flibe
Water, Helium
relative to most
case (RCIL)
Coolant
Lithium
2.0 - (2.3)
1.5 - (1.6)
0.7 - (2.0)
0.6 - (1.4)
1.0 - (4.0)
Criterion:C, (Time to Melting)
1
realistic TZM/Flibe
relative to most
case (RCI m
Water, Helium
10.2 - (13.5)
5.8 - (9.0)
1.9 - (12.6)
1.3 - (6.2)
(0.4) - 1.0
*Based on reference design parameters, results from Tables 3.14, 3.15
Low'\Values preferred; Breeder dependence is low
Numbers outside parentheses are for maximum loss rate case
(for lithium this may not be conservative since lithium is assumed
not to drain in this time period)
Numbers inside parentheses are for case where coolant is assumed
to disappear instantaneously at t = 0.
Rank Ordering: TZM(best) > HT-9 > V-alloy > 316 SS
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
Flibe 1
Coolant
Lithium
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
Flibe
C
'
i limp 11 1 1 M. , M-0 - " - - - , -. , -- - - - -- - - - - - - -, - --- , ---- I
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3.5.3 Consequence Index
The most critical overall design parameter is the first wall
thickness, but the two aspects of the problem (plasma, afterheat) result
in conflicting directions. Plasma heat rates go as %1/dfw so a thick
first wall is best. Opposite scaling is true for afterheat. Therefore,
any afterheat generating mass near the first wall (highest specific
afterheat area) should be used as effectively as possible. From the
plasma heat perspective this means a thicker first wall, rather than flow
gap connectors, second walls, etc.
Among structural materials, there is less than a factor of two
difference in behavior with two exceptions. A TZM first wall is an order
of magnitude better from the plasma heat perspective. A V-alloy structure
is an order of magnitude better from the afterheat perspective.
Among breeders, there is very little impact on the plasma heating
case. For afterheat Li17Pb83 is slightly better than Li, although both
may drain. LiAlO 2, even with the best case neutron multiplier, is
significantly worse.
Among coolants, the pressurized coolants (water, helium) may exper-
ience very rapid rates of coolant loss (<0.1 sec). For these the only
important impacts are those indirect through design (first wall thickness,
restriction of breeder and structure choice). The other coolants only
drain by gravity, and thus may assist the plasma heat case. In all cases
the primary coolant may disappear before significant afterheat assistance.
Relative Consequence Indices (RCI) are defined for the cases of LOCA-
plasma heating only (RCILP) and LOCA-afterheat (RCILA) (see Tables 3.29-
3.31). This allows a (imperfect) quantification of the potential
r -------- 7r-= ----------- 7-17- -
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where the spatial integrals are over the blanket radially.
Since the first wall (Ar= 0) has the highest specific activity/
afterheat, a thin first wall is preferred. Flow gap connectors and
module edges contribute more mass (heat source) and do little in assisting
heat transfer from the first wall. Since any'additional mass near the
first wall contributes to afterheat, it should be as effective as possible
in reducing plasma heat trouble. Thus flow gap connectors and extra module
edge thickness (if made of the same structural material) are bad ideas
(little help for plasma heating, significant harm for afterheat). The
most effective design variable is first wall thickness. Thick first walls
reduce temperature rise due to plasma heating while worsening afterheat.
A first wall coating with low afterheat provides a good means of reducing
plasma heat troubles (more heat sink) without worsening afterheat concerns.
The simple scaling Eq. (3.51) fails for the LiAlO 2 case since the
low thermal conductivity thermally isolates the first wall and causes
a large temperature drop across the blanket. A Be neutron multiplier does
assist, (while Zr-Pb would hinder) but the Be/LiA10 2 case is still
significantly worse than other cases. The liquid breeders (Li, Li17Pb83)
greatly reduce temperature rises, if they have not drained. Even if they
have, radiation heat transfer across the empty breeder zone is still
preferable to LiAlO 2
A V-alloy structure offers a potentially significant improvement over
the other structural materials; possibly an ofder of magnitude better.
Coolants can only directly influence afterheat for the maximum LOCA
case. There is an indirect influence through the design.
The worst case for afterheat is 316 SS/LiA10 2 , whereas the best is
V/Li or V/Lil 7Pb83'
-197-
reference cases are shown in Tables 3.23 -3.27.
To first order the above expressions, give a conservative estimate
of required shutdown times and safety margin for structural material
comparisons. The generally strongest influenece of coolants and breeders
is through the impact on design, e.g., first Wall thickness. Non-
pressurized coolants, because they require more time to leave, have a
greater potential to hold down temperatures (increase safety margins).
The safety margin is directly proportional to dfw, so that a
thicker first wall is preferred. Flow gap connectors and module edges
provide some benefit, but do not appear very effective - especially
since they make afterheat worse.
3.5.2 Afterheat
For the cases studied, the decay afterheat will not cause structural
damage before an hour, even in the worst case of 316 SS/LiAlO 2. At least
10 hours is required for melting. Since the present model thermally
isolates the blanket module from the surrounding reactor structure
(potential heat sink), actual times would be expected to be longer,
providing more of a safety margin. This latter impact is likely to be
design dependent (supports, arrangement, etc.). The potential clearly
exists for a design that would not melt. It may also be possible to
design (and choose materials) that could not experience damage due to
afterheat; thus one could "walk away" from an accident.
To first order the expected temperature rise for time t can be
simply calculated from
J dx e-Ba x Ax
AT = QDxQP DE(t) dt q (3.51)
rise pdx
111114 1 id 4N l III' IMIO]d 11 14,11'.
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effectively thermally isolated from the rest of the blanket, a safety
margin against damage was defined (SMd<l implies damage likely) as:
pc d pc k(AT )
SM = f (300 C) = f (300 *C) (3.59)
d q w tsd (q")2 t
w tsd
The safety margin against melting was defined (SMm< 1 implies melting
likely) as:
PC p d f pcp k ATfw AT mSMm P df o (AT OM) = (3.60)
w tsd (q")2 tsd
This can also be expressed in terms of the required shutdown time for
damage or melting
pc df pc k ATf
t = PC (300 *C) = 2 w (300 0C) (3.48,
d qw (q")2  3.50)
PC d P Pc k ATfw (AT (3.48,
tm m(ATO) 02 M
w
For maximum coolant loss rates (worse case LOCA's), the reference
case values do not greatly vary from the above (for damage evaluate
material properties at operation temperature; for melting evaluate
material properties at, %1/? (Tmelt + Toperation)*
The exception is TZM5 where the time scale increases by over an order
of magnitude (for the case of melting). The best estimates for
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variation (heat capacity shows an increase with temperature, especially
for HT-9, which decreases the temperature rise), the 316 SS and HT-9
results are in good agreement. The V-alloy cases are not in good agreement.
The afterheat rates used in the General Atomic analysis was significantly
different from other V-cases discussed in Appbndix B. Since the dis-
agreement was largest at about t = 1 hour, the adiabatic case results
differed significantly. The difference in afterheat rates may be due to
a variance in alloy composition. The variance in afterheat rates would
be expected to have a lesser impact for the more important non-adiabatic
cases since the overall afterheat rates (over a longer range in time)
do not vary as much as they do at one hour.
Sze [3.19] examined non-adiabatic afterheat effects for the UWMAK-I
design. As mentioned in section 3.1, his model allows for radiation
heat transfer from the back of the module to an isothermal magnet shield
(whereas the module was considered isolated in the present study). In
this case the maximum temperature (n 570 *C) was reached 2-3 hours after
shutdown, temperatures falling thereafter.
3.5 Conclusions and Summary
The effects of a loss-of-coolant accident have been examined,
focusing on the influence of material selection. This divides into the
cases of plasma heating and afterheat.
3.5.1 Plasma Heating
If the plasma is not otherwise terminated, first wall damage will
typically occur in about 2.5 s and melting will begin at about 10 s for
the cases studied. Tables 3.14 and 3.15 give the specific results for
various material combinations. For the simple case of a first wall
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TABLE 3.28
Comparison of Adiabatic Time to Melt (hours)
Adiabatic Melt
Down Time*
Time to Melt
(Adiabatic) **
Present Study
Time to Melt
(Reference Case)***
Present Study
CO
00
15.0
1.9
Material
C
SiC
V-Alloy
HT-9
316 SS
Ti-Alloy
Inconel
Al-alloy
>130
>10
>101.2
*scaled from references 3.21, 3.22
**Adiabatic case - no heat flow from first wall
***Reference case geometries, Fig. 3.11
6>
e
6>
K
1.7
1.1
0.8
0.8
0.3
0.2
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of the presence of the breeder tends to be greater than the indirect
design influence.
The 316 SS tables have more entries due to more 316 SS reference
designs.
The worse case is still that of a LiAlO2'breeder. However, the
addition of the Be neutron multiplier (heat sink, little heat generation)
causes a significant improvement. For damage, the proximity of the Be
increases the time to damage by a factor of about 3. For melting, the
Be adds a factor of %2.5. When the breeder is present, the influence of
reflector (grapite) thickness is small.
3.4.5 Comparison to Previous Works
The earliest examination of afterheat was simply an assessment of the
level of decay heat due to the induced radioactivity. The first examina-
tion of the effects was to calculate the initial temperature rise for the
adiabatic case. For example, the UWMAK-I 316 SS first wall was calculated
to have an initial temperature rise of 0.1 *C/s (at q" = 1.25 MW/im)
[3.20] which scales linearly to 0.29 *C/s at q"=3.6 MW/m2 (the value of
the current study). This is in good agreement with the value of 0.32 'C/s
found in the present study.
The next most sophisticated study continued the adiabatic
analysis further in time by simple time integration of the afterheat rate.
A series of General Atomic reports [3.21, 3.22] examined the time to melt
for a variety of materials. Those results (scaled to the current study
value of 3.6 MW/m2) are repeated in Table 3.28. Considering that the GA
study kept material properties constant while the present study allowed
-192-
TABLE 3.27
Time to Damage and Melting for V-Alloy
from Afterheat (days)
Geometry
Base
Reference
Base
Reference
Empty
Breeder
With 20 mm
Coolant Breeder Breeder Reflector
Li
LiLi
Li
LiLi
18
15
80
87
0.92
Empty
Breeder
100 mm
Reflector
4.2
3.5
20
5.5 16.5
Times greater than 24 hours estimated from temperature rise rate at the
end of the first day.
C,
Designs
Damage
Melting
-191-
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TABLE 3.24
Time to Melt for 316 SS Designs from Afterheat (hours)
Geometry Cool ant
Base
Reference
Reference
Base
Reference
Reference
Base
Reference
Water
Hel ium
Helium
Lithium
Water
Breeder
LiAlO 
2
LiAlO 
2
LiAlO 
2
Li
Li
Li
Li1 7Pb83
Li1 7Pb83
With
Breeder
3.75
10
9.4
216
240
264
1779
1395
Empty*
Breeder
(20 mm)-
Reflector
(20)
(33)
11
Empty*
Breeder
(100 mm)
Reflector
(48)
(45)
(69)
48
54
12.3
48
459.8
*Unphysical for a LiAlO 2completeness.
breeder cavity to be empty included for
Times greater than 24 hours estimated
the end of the first day.
from temperature rise rate at
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TABLE 3.23
Time to Damage for 316 SS Designs from Afterheat
(hours)
Geometry
Base
Reference,
Reference
Base
Reference
Reference
Base
Reference
C 
Coolant
Water
Helium
Helium
Lithium
Water
Breeder
LiA102
LiAlO
2
LiA1O
2
Li
Li
Li
Li17Pb83
Li17Pb83
With
Breeder
0.3
1.0
1.0
42
46
55
391
300
Empty*
Breeder
(20 mm)
Ref 1ector
(3.0)
(4.5)
2.0
2.3
1.76
Empty*
Breeder
(100 mm)
Reflector
(6.5)
(5.8)
(9.0)
6.5
7.5
6.5
6.1
*Unphysical for a LiA10 2 breeder cavity to be empty, included for
completeness.
Times greater than 24 hours estimated from temperature rise rate
the end of the first day.
C"
C
at
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LiAlO 2  -1
Li - 9.3
Lil 7Pb83  -14.7
and indeed the time to damage and melt show at least this much variance
among breeders. For comparison, the relative value of pc k for graphite
(the heat sink/reflector) is 18.4. However, there is less of it than
there is any of the breeder.
A rough comparison of the time required for melting among the
various breeders can be given as
tLi7Pb83 n (4- 6) tLi A,(50 -200) tLiAlO2 (3.58)
for the cases studied.
3.4.5 Coolant Effect-Reference Cases
As discussed in section 3.2.3, the loss rates of coolants under
severe LOCA's are sufficiently high that there will be no direct effect
on cooling of the blanket for afterheat time scales. There is, however,
the indirect effect caused by design parameters forced by coolant selection.
The six reference geometries were used to examine the overall effect of
representative designs for the six coolant/breeder combinations.
The results are shown in Tables 3.23-3.27. The effect of coolant
in design is seen as less than that of the breeder (if present). If
the breeder zone is empty, the design impact of coolants is about that
of the breeders. That is, both coolant and breeder choice influence
afterheat results to a similar degree. However, the direct influence
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V structure are so slow that the LiAlO2 handicap extends further in time
for the V/LiAMO2- case. The present model for LiA10 2 (pure LiAlO 2, 60%
uniform density) may not adequately represent heat transfer across the
zone. Other mechanisms (radiation at the grain scale?) may improve it,
so that these estimates may be too low. On the other hand, the gap
conductance was ignored, assuming good contact between metal and
LiAl0 2. This assumption tends to balance the above over-conservatism.
Another limitation is time. As discussed in section 3.1, computer
runs were stopped at t =1 day. The results in the table are linear
extrapolations from the temperature rise rate found at t= 1 day. Since
additional decay occurs after that time, the results greater than 1 day
are too conservative; actual time to melt or damage would be longer. In
all cases it must be remembered that the blanket was considered isolated
from the rest of the reactor structure. Thus actual times would be
significantly longer, and damage or melting less likely. The current
results demonstrate the basic behavior.
Only V exhibits a highly significant difference (over a factor of 2)
behavior among metals, almost an order of magnitude improvement.
Both Li and Li17Pb83 show good thermal sink performance. The effec-
tiveness of a breeder in this respect seems to vary as
(pc pk)X (x> 1) (3.57)
since both the heat capacity and conductivity are necessary. The relative
values of Pc k for the 3 breeders are
-185-
TABLE 3.22
Effect of Breeder Choice on Time to Damage and Melting
From Afterheat
Damage (hrs)
Breeder
Adiabatic
First Wall
Empty Breeder
LiAIO
2
Li
Li17Pb83
Melt (Days)
Adiabatic
First Wall
Empty Breeder
LiAlO 
2
Li
Lil 7Pb83
( ) LiAlO not temperature
compl teness.
compatible with V, TZM but cases were for
t suspect extrapolation to long times since computer CPU time limitations
resulted in extrapolation from 16 hr rate rather than 24.
tt No multiplier with LiAlO 2. These results compare generic problems
with a ceramic breeder. Section 4.4.4 includes the beneficial Be
multiplier.
316 HT
0.25
6.5
0.3
42
391
0.05
2.0
0.2
9
72
'V
1.25
100.0
(1.0)
436
1722
0.63
20
(0.4)
80
317
0.36
8.1
0.3
99
560
0.08
4
0.2
23
99
TZM
0.18
11.0
(2.2)
44
262
0.03
3.4
(0.9)
11
42 tt
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to the opposing edge (mirror image) as shown in Figure 3.2a. In
actuality, all surfaces in an empty breeder cavity would interact
(Fig. 3.2b), and both second wall and wdge would radiate to the sink
(back wall) -- unlike the current modeling. If the edge walls are
fairly thin (% no thicker than tbe first/second wall zones), one would
expect the basic scaling (Eq. (3.51)) to be maintained, and blanket
temperature gradients minimized.
3.4.4 Breeder Effect
The base case one dimensional geometry was used to examine the
breeder effect. The geometry was held constant. The results are shown
in Table 3.22 along with the adiabatic first wall case. A variety of
conclusions are seen from these results.
LiAlO 2 acts as a very good thermal insulator. The basic scaling
Eq. (3.51) is completely irrelevant and the temperature drops (ATb)
across the LiAlO 2 zone increase with time rather than decrease. All
other cases (except TZM/Lil 7Pb83 ) show maximum ATb by one hour. For
the TZM/Lil 7Pb83 case, the maximum ATb occurs later due to the high
conductivity by TZM and low (relative to Li and TZM) conductivity of
Li17Pb83. A LiA10 2 breeder effectively thermally isolates the first wall
from the heat sink. The low density and conductivity of LiAlO 2 combine to
reduce the effectiveness of LiA10 2 as a heat sink. Furthermore, LiA10 2 has
an initial temperature of %650*C, higher than the initial temperature of
316 SS, HT-9, and V. Thus, heat flows initially from the breeder to the
first wall for those cases. Hence the LiA10 2 case is worse than adiabatic
from the damage standpoint. Although a 650*C breeder with a 9006C TZM
structure is non-physical (allowing LiA10 2 to assist TZM for shorter
times), the case was run for completeness. The temperature rises in a
-183-
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Thus, for example, if shutdown were to occur just before damage
(ATrise (fw) A 300 *C), then the equivalent blanket temperature rise
would be < 50 *C. Thus, if shutdown occurs before damage, the blanket
temperature rises are approximated well by the pure afterheat case.
3.4.3 Two Dimensional Effects
The effects of module edges and connectors across the first wall
flow gap were addressed. Basically, while both assist in heat transfer,
the additional heat sources due to more mass dominate and increase
the temperature rises. Since the temperature gradients were low in the
one dimension case, especially at times of interest, the potential benefit
is low. A connector or edge made of the same structural material
experiences heat generation itself, adding significantly to the heat
load.
Table 3.21 shows the increase in blanket temperatures caused by
the reference set of flow gap connectors. The additional mass (heat
source) and increased temperatures tend to reduce the time to damage
scale to short enough times that blanket temperature gradients are
significant -- hence the simple ATrise scaling Eq. (3.51) is no longer
valid.
Edges are similarly poor. This suggests that for the scenarios
addressed in this study initial failure would occur at the first wall
edges (directly opposite from the plasma heat case). The modeling
of edges was poor, however, and numerical results inaccurate. The code
only allows radiation heat transfer to nodes direct opposite on an
opposing surface. Thus, second wall to back region transfer is
fairly represented. However, radiation from the edge is only allowed
I
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TABLE 3.20
Effect of Varying the Plasma
Shutdown Time (tsd) on Time to Damage and Melting. (dfw = 10 mm) *
Time to
Damage (seconds)
= Co (pure plasma)
= 15 sec
= 5 sec
= 0 (pure afterheat)
Time to
Melting (minutes)
= co (pure
= 15 sec
plasma)
tsd = 5 sec
= 0 (pure afterheat)
*Adiabatic first wall
tsd
tsd
tsd
tsd
316 SS
6.4
6.4
590
900
HT-9
10.1
10.1
1140
1260
V
6.2
6.2
1740
4500
TZM
7.3
7.3
290
660
tsd
tsd
0.55
40
60
72tsd
0.62
490
760
0.83
67
104
114
0.75
61
89
900 108
-180-
wall temperatures fall after plasma termination until an afterheat
temperature distribution is reached. Then a fairly uniform (over the
blanket) temperature rise follows.
In the present study, a limited number of combined cases were run
for the adiabatic first wall (dfw =10 mm) case. During the plasma
heat phase, a large temperature gradient (into the first wall) arises;
i.e., most of the heat goes into rising the temperature at the first
wall surface. By the time the first wall surface begins to melt, the
average first wall temperature has not risen much. After plasma
termination, the gradient relaxes, lowering the first wall surface
temperature. Once relaxation occurs, the entire wall continues to rise
at the afterheat rate.. Thus the combined case can be viewed as causing
the afterheat case to start at a higher operating temperature.
A number of runs examining this coupling were done. The results
are shown in Table 2.30. The range is from a pure plasma heat case
(plasma stays on long enough to produce damage/melting) to a pure
afterheat case (plasma terminates at t =0).
If the plasma shutdown is before damage occurs, the first wall
temperature drops until the heat added by the plasma between t =0 and
t = tsd is distributed throughout the blanket. The equivalent blanket
temperature rise corresponding to the first wall temperature rise
caused by plasma heating is approximated by
AT . (blanket) % AT . (fw) x fW (3.56)
rise rise fdx
blanket
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d + e-Ba x Ax d
ATrise dfw +d bw (3.53)
where e-Ba x Ax represents the lower specific heating at the back of the
blanket. Thus, unlike the plasma heating case, a thinner first wall
is desired since for
dbw > d (3.54)
and e-b(Ax) small
the expression reaches a limit of
ATrise w d /dbw (3.55)
3.4.2 Combined Plasma and Decay Heat
Before proceeding with more detailed afterheat analysis, the
connection between plasma and decay heating is discussed.
In reality the plasma and afterheat cases are not separate. Under
accident conditions, the continued plasma heating dumps additional heat
into the structure, reducing the margin for afterheat temperature rise.
Thus, the quicker the plasma is terminated, the greater an afterheat
temperature rise can be withstood. It should be noted that there are
numerous loss-of-coolant accidents which automatically cause plasma
termination, resulting in a pure afterheat case.
Merrill [3.3] examined the combined case assuming plasma termination
when the first wall melts. Analysis of his results indicates that first
-178-
To better identify material dependence Eq. (3.51) can be rearranged as
t dx eBaAx
ATs DxQP DE(t) dt q dx (3.52)
The first two terms are structural material dependent; the third, design.
The first term contains material thermal properties and simply 'measures
the volumetric ability of a material to absorb heat.
The second term is the neutronic heating behavoir of the material.
Whereas the values of QD xQP do not vary significantly among materials,
the rapid decay for V-alloy reduces the value of the integral for that metal.
The third term is the design component. A higher operating neutron
flux leads to higher specific activity. The two spatial integrals
represent the distribution and relative strengths of the heat source
and heat sink.
It is important to note the time dependence. Unlike the plasma
heating case, the basic scaling with time is not' linear. Thus, while
materials can be easily compared in terms of ATris for any given time
(e.g.,% 1/pc scaling). There is no simple expression for the time to
p
melt or time to damage (which would be the inversion of this equation).
Thus, for an initial time frame of a few hours, an improvement in design
for a V-alloy could have a strong (non-linear) improvement in the time
criteria because of the fairly rapid decay (decline of DE(t)) over that
time frame. A similar improvement would have less effect on other
materials due to the lesser change in DE(t).
For the simple geometry involved, the design term can be re-written
as
-177-
TABLE 3.19
Time to Damage and Melting from Afterheat
in the.Simple Plate Geometry (hours)
First wall =
Back wall =
4 mm
100 mm
Damage
316 SS
S10 mm
100 mm
2.20
3.75
26
2.01
12.1
28
86
17.7 3.8
4.08
6.95
34.1
3.41
22.9
45
122.6
HT- 9
V
TZM
10 mm
10 mm
0.58
0.85
4.9
0.44
Melting
316 SS
HT-9
v
2.48
4.4
32
26.7TZM
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TABLE 3.18
Temperature Difference across Blanket at One Hour
for Afterheat-LOCA Case*
Back
Wall
(mm)
100
100
100
100
316 SS
12.8
23.1
41.7
86.7
HT- 9
11.7
21.7
29.9
85.7
V- alloy TZM
0.9
1.7
3.2
7.7
C
*Simple two parallel geometry used
First
Wall
(mm)
2
4
10
2.2
4.1
7.5
16.2
-175-
3.4 Afterheat Results
The temperature rise due to afterheat was examined for the cases
previously described. Somewhat surprisingly, the scaling proved to be
relatively simple due to the low temperature gradients across the blanket.
3.4.1 Geometry and Metal Scaling
The adiabatic and plate geometry cases were used to examine the basic
scaling among metals and geometrical arrangements. The first wall
thickness varied from 1 mm to 10 mm while the back wall and reflector
thickness was varied from 0 to 500 mm (with dfw = 100 mm). In all cases
the temperature drop across the blanket, ATb = Tfw - Tbw, was under
100 'C for times greater than one hour. In most cases, the temperature
gradient was even lower, see Table 3.18. Reducing the back wall/
reflector thickness decreased ATb, while increasing it increased ATb
since the effectiveness of the back heat sink in absorbing first wall
heat determined ATb. For the cases studied, the low temperature
differentials at times of interest (melting and damage) resulted in
a simple scaling for the first wall temperature rise:
q"'(volume)dt q x QD x QPJ dx e -BaAx DE(t)dt
rise P p(volume) = (3.51)
where the spatial integrals are taken over the radial arrangement of
materials. The actual times to damage and melting are shown in Table 3.19.
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Sze [3.19] examined the UWMAK-I design for a lithium LOFA with 316 SS
structure. He expected damage to occur between 10 and'60 seconds after
flow began to stop. The closest case to this in the present study is the
static lithium coolant (316 SS) case where damage is predicted at %7
seconds into the accident. This is good agreement since a LOFA would be
expected to allow longer times than an immediate flow stoppage.
Chan [3.1] analyzed a variety of coolant transients. His only cases
similar to the present study were lithium and helium coolant loss-of-flow.
For a 0.36 MW/m2 wall loading (maximum studied) the time to melt was 25
and 26 seconds respectively. If this is a surface heat flux value
(0.9 MW/m 2 in the present study) his values would extrapolate to 10 and
10.4 seconds, in good agreement with the present study.
His study identified three parameter groups for LOFA's
qm first wall heat flux
PCp
h
PCp d first wall heat 
transfer
h = first wall coolant heat transfer coefficient.
Kv0  fluid dynamic
K = effective flow resistance
v 0= effective flow velocity
where K = AP/2L = pressure drop through loop/
twice the loop length
Although these LOFA groups differ from the worse case LOCA case studied
here, the same linear scaling of p, cp q, and dfw is evident.
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TABLE 3.17
Loss-of-Flow Results
[Ref. 3.3]
2 3
316 SS 316 SS Ti-6242 316 SS 316 SSFirst Wall
Structure
First Wall
Coolant
Blanket
Structure
Helium Water Helium
316 SS 316 SS 316 SS
LiBlanket
Breeder
Blanket
Coolant
Time to
Structural
Yield
Time to
Structural
Melt
He
2.8
Li
He
5.5
Li
He
2.6
Helium Water
316 SS 316 SS
LiAlU 2  LiA1O2
He Water
2.8 7.0
27.2
Case: 1 4 5
T-777777777-7777-1
4 llo I 4411,h0m,41I -h;,IHIW 1141 1 , ",
8.1 9.0 5.0 8.0
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The reference case for flibe was chosen similar to that of water because
the heat transfer properties (normal operation) are similar. This
resulted in a thin first wall (less TZM required than 316 SS). However,
if one desired a thicker first wall, the TZM/flibe combination offers as
good a potential as any, especially consideri'ng the high thermal
conductivity of TZM (reducing ATfw and thermal stress worries). Of course,
any such design change affects other safety areas. For example, a thicker
first wall results in more induced radioactivity. The values presented
for TZM/flibe in the tables should be viewed with this perspective.
3.3.3 Comparison of Previous Work
A variety of studies have touched on the plasma heat problem; those
results can be compared to those of the present study.
The UCLA study [3.18] examined a helium LOCA (UWMAK-II design).
The firstmelting of 316 SS occurs at %80 sec., not at the first wall.
Considering the differences in design geometry the slower helium loss
rate, and the lower wall loading, this is not significantly different
than the ,13 sec. calculated in this study for the reference 316 SS cases.
Merrill [3.3] examined 5 blanket material combinations with constant
geometry (but varying thicknesses) under LOFA conditions. (Neutron
wall loading = 4.0 versus 3.6 MW/m2 assumed here). Table 3.17 shows
his cases and results. These are seen to be very similar to present
results (Damage %2.5 s; melting 13 s for 316 SS). More precise
comparisons (e.g., function of first wall thickness) is difficult
because his model of first wall was a uniform metal/coolant mixture.
C ')
-171-
acting as a heat sink, and allowing some convection transfer. At longer
times, the role of flibe as a heat sink is less important (small volume
compared to that available in the blanket), and the conductivity of flibe
(% 1/100 x TZM) limits heat transfer across the first wall flow channel --
causing faster temperature rises.
The present model for handling flibe has two off-setting errors.
First, the free convection within the channel (assists transfer from first
wall to second wall) is not included. Gierszweskis[3.4, 3.5] work implies
that the B-field supression of free convection still allows significant
heat transfer by convection (unlike the Li case). This modeling neglect
acts to overpredict temperatures. Second, although the forced convection
transfer has been modeled as a function of time (section 3.2.3), the
material properties are only a function of time. Hence the code does not
allow the filbe to disappear as was the case for water and helium. However,
the effect of this neglect is stronger for flibe. This effect acts
to underpredict temperatures at moderate times (>%2.5 sec) because the
flibe is incorrectly still present as a heat sink. It acts to overprEdict
temperatures at long times (>minute) as the flibe presence prevents
radiation heat transfer. In all cases, correction of these modeling
inaccuracies would reduce the effect of flibe, moving the values closer
to the "empty coolant" case.
There is one additional aspect of the TZM/flibe/Li case. Of all
the coolants studied, unpressurized, low-MHD flibe potentially offers
the widest range of designs (see Chapter 2). The pressurized coolants
result in relatively thin, small radius (%tubes) first walls. Lithium
is the opposite, tending toward thicker first walls, larger modules.
The properties of flibe do not tend to so strongly force the design.
I AH lk,41 014,414 411141
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Although the modeling of the water and helium was poor, the net effect
was to overpredict the impact of having either present. Since this still
resulted in a very minor effect, the true effect would be nil. Thus,
complete loss of either at t =0 can be assumed.
For lithium as a coolant, it may not be possible for drainage to occur
in a several second time frame (section 3.2.3). Therefore, the maximum
LOCA case presented here is simply a constant, static (conduction into
lithium only, no convection) lithium coolant. The computer modeling was
not as complex as in the previous cases, water and helium. The presence
of Li (and its good conductivity) makes even static lithium a good heat
sink for the first wall. (Li17Pb83 as a coolant could be expected to be
at least as good). However, one should note that if rapid drainage were
possible, the maximum (worse case) LOCA case would approach the empty
coolant limit. On the other hand, lithium-cooled designs tend to have
thicker first walls, which significantly improve performance over water
and helium designs, even without lithium being present in the first wall
flow channel.
The TZM/flibe/Li combination is perhaps the most interesting. A
distinguishing factor is that the thermal conductivity of TZM is higher
than all other materials in the study (including coolants and breeders).
Thus, basically whenever non-TZM substances are added, the situation
gets worse and the strong advantage of TZM slightly reduced at long times.
At short times this is not necessarily true.
As the tables show, addition of Li to the breeder chamber has no
effect at short times (damage) but reduces the TZM advantage at long
CI times (melting). The addition of flibe to the flow gap helps initially,
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could not be handled. Neglect of such heat transfer resulted in 10-30%
higher temperatures at longer times. Incorporation of radiation heat
transfer at all times, however, would underpredict temperature rises.
The values in the Tables 3.14, 3.15 correspond to the best estimates
given the significant modeling limitations. The values for the coolant
case probably overestimate the time allowable before damage or melting)
because of the neglect of heat generation in the water and the inaccurate
handling of transient water material properties (only temperature
dependence allowed, pressure dependence ignored). The conclusion is,
therefore, that the presence of water in the extreme LOCA case does not
significantly affect the result. The indirect design affect of choosing
water as a coolant, thinner first walls, is the dominant coolant-dependent
effect.
Helium is more easily modeled. The dependences of heat generation and
radiation heat transfer are far less. An insignificant amount of heat is
directly generated in the helium under full pressure and density. Further,
helium is more transparent under normal conditions; hence radiation heat
transfer was allowed in all cases.
Material properties could be more accurately modeled. The only major
inaccuracy was the inability to account for the time dependence of
material properties due to pressure loss. Therefore the maximum LOCA
case overpredicts the beneficial impact of the helium since heat capacity
(pc p) is included even after depressurization is assumed to have occurred.
As with the case of water, even the overpredicted maximum LOCA case
indicates that the direct effect of helium (under maximum loss rate
conditions) is small. The design impact is again more important,
especially at longer times.
11:411111 -Iol I A 4 11 N, I h k 4 [1 loild ,41 yiql 1-4 141
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TABLE 3.16
Complexities in Modeling
of Water-Cooled LOCA's
Variable
Density
Heat Capacity
Thermal Conductivity
Volumetric
Nuclear Heating
Convection Heat
Transfer
Radiation Heat Transfer
Dependence
temperature and
pressure (phase)
temperature and
pressure (phase)
temperature and
pressure (phase)
water density,
plasma condition
water density,
conductivity,
velocity,
temperature, pressure
wall surface temp.
water density,
temperature,
wall surface temp.
C>
(7>
C7
-167-
TABLE 3.15
Time to Melting (sec) for LOCA
(Plasma Heating On)
Empty Breeder
Material Coolant Breeder Empty Coolant
Static Breeder
'Empty Coolant
Static
Breeder
Maximum LOCA*
water LiAlO 2
water Li17Pb83
He
He
Li
LiAlO 2
Li
Li
water LiAlO 2
water Li17Pb83
316 SS
316 SS
316 SS
316 SS
316 SS
HT-9
HT-9
HT-9
HT-9
V
LiAlO
2
Li
Li
flibe Li
*See text for discussion of the limitation of the modeling for the
presence of water.
He
He
Li
12.7
12.5
9.9
9.8
10.5
20.5
20.3
14.9
14.6
21.2
300.0
12.7
12.8
9.9
9.9
10.5
20.5
21.0
14.9
15.0
29.6
143.0
(12.9)
(12.9)
12.0
12.0
68.3
(22.1)
(22.7)
18.7
18.8
104.7
132.0TZM
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TABLE 3.14
Time to Damage (sec) for LOCA
(Plasma Heating On)
Empty Breeder.
Material Coolant Breeder Empty Coolant
Static Breeder
Empty Coolant
. Static
Breeder
Maximum LOCA*
water LiA102
water Li 17Pb83
He
He
Li
LiAlO
2
Li
Li
water LiAi02
water Li Pb83
He
He
Li
LiA1O
2
Li
Li
flibe Li
*See text for discussion of limitation of the modeling for the presence
of water.
C>
316 SS
316 SS
316 SS
316 SS
316 SS
C>
2.28
2.28
2.23
2.24
2.60
3.26
3.26
3.13
3.13
3.59
1.27
2.28
2.28
2.23
2.23
2.59
3.26
3.26
3.13
3.13
3.56
1.26
HT-9
HT-9
HT-9
HT-9
V
TZM
(2.51)
(2.51)
2.42
2.41
7.07
(3.47)
(3.47)
3.39
3.38
8.97
5.11
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3.3.2.3 Coolant Impact
The inclusion of the coolant to the combinations completes the
analysis. The six reference geometries representing the six combinations
of coolant/breeder were used to examine the effect of coolant. Besides
the direct effect of providing some cooling d'uring the LOCA transients,
there is the indirect effect through design influences (mainly through
the determination of first wall thickness). Table 3.14, 3.15 show the
time to damage and melting for the reference geometries.
There proved to be a modeling difficulty for the water case. The
two phase nature of water during a LOCA results in the need to vary
nuclear heating and radiation heat transfer with the change in phase.
For an empty water channel, there is no nuclear heating, no material
properties (p, c, k),.and unrestricted radiation heat transfer across
the flow gap. With water present, there is a high nuclear heating
input directly to the water, varying material properties (p, cp, k) and
a varying film transfer coefficient. Table 3.16 summarizes the relevant
variable dependencies.
The most critical difficulties arose from the variance of volumetric
nuclear heating and radiation heat transfer. The time and space
dependence of heat generation in the code must be user input. Using a
constant volumetric rate as the density drops to the steam phase results
in extreme non-physical heating of the steam resulting in incorrectly
high steam temperatures. The results presented here neglect heat gener-
ated in the water.
The convection film coefficient was estimated (section 3.2.3) which
allowed estimation of the cooling assistance due to the water during
depressurization. The time dependence of the radiation heat transfer
-164-
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3.3.2.2 Geometry: Edge and Connectors
Module edges have a very slight effect on temperature rises. Using
the two-dimensional base case, the edge thickness was varied from 1 mm
to 50 mm (dfw = 2 mm). For all cases except TZM, this had <2% effect
on temperature rises for the first wall away 'from the edge. The first
wall in front of the edge had a lower rise, but the distance laterally
along the first wall and the limited conductivity prevents the presence
of the edge from influencing the overall first wall temperature. Failure
would thus be expected to occur near the mid-point of the module first
wall, not at the edge.
Again, TZM proved to be the exception; however, the effect is still
limited. For a 10 mm edge, the temperature 40 mm from the edge is
lowered by less than 10%. Damage in a typical size module would still
be virtually unaffected. Melting would appear to be affected: the
additional thermal mass offers the potential to further lengthen the
time required before melting could occur for a TZM blanket.
Connectors across the flow gap allow thermal conductivity to assist
radiation transfer in cooling the first wall. For the arrangement
and spacing in the base case geometry, there is a significant
improvement. Table 3.13 shows the time to damage and melt for the
cases with (and without) flow gap connectors. For TZM, connectors
do relatively less to help prevent melting since the temperature drop
across the flow gap is held low at long times by radiation heat transfer
at those high temperatures.
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first regime (0 -300 *C) is dominated by the thermal inertia of the
first wall itself, thus there is little variation.
The second regime (%300 - %900) is dominated by radiation transfer
to the second wall and that wall's thermal inertia. Here the breeder
(or lack of it) makes no difference, but there is a difference from the
isolated case. The other structural materials do not progress beyond
this point due to lower melting poinsts. Further, the transition tem-
peratures for other materials is higher due to lower thermal conductivity.
The third regime (r900) is controlled by what is behind the second
TZM wall. Where the breeder is present (and in direct contact with the
second wall), the temperature rises are slower. The high volumetric
heat capacity of Li17Pb83 keeps temperatures lower than a Li breeder.
The fourth regime (varies) is controlled by the graphite reflector
heat sink (higher conductivity than Li or Li-Pb). Eventually, the Li
and Li17Pb83 insulate the first wall from the heat sink. That is, at
these temperatures and distance, radiation heat transfer is better than
thermal conduction.
The net result is that the time scale for melting in a TZM structure
is minutes rather than %10 seconds, representing over an order of
magnitude improvement. A thicker first wall would slow the adiabatic
case temperature rise (% 1/dfw) but also reduce the heat flux through
the walls, damping the change of thermal control mechanisms. These
results are conservative since the heat of vaporization in the lithium
breeder is not taken into account.
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TABLE /3.12
Effect of Radiation Heat Transfer
Across Flow Gap*
(dfw 2 mm)
Isolated
First Wall
2.55
3.56
1.92
1.86
9.44
13.81
9.04
11.1
Radiate across
Flow Gap
2.56
3.58
1.95
1.92
10.23
15.32
12.4,
269.0
Percent
Improvement(%)
<1
1
2
3
8
11
37
2423
*Plasma heating only, parallel plate geometry
Material
316
HT
V
TZM
time to
damage
(seconds)
time to
melting
(seconds)
C 316
HT
V
TZM
C>
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3.3.2.1 Breeder and Reflector
Using the plate and base case geometries, the impact of different
breeders and reflectors was examined. In all of these cases, the
first wall can only lose heat to the rest of the module by radiation
heat transfer across the voided flow gap.
Varying the breeder and depth of the reflector had N 2% effect for
all cases except TZM (discussed later). There was, however, a difference
between all of these cases and the isolated first wall case. That is,
any material which the first wall can radiate to provides some help;
however, the details of what is behind the first wall (with an empty
flow gap) do not matter. Table 3.12 shows the time to damage and
melting for the base case geometry (dfw = 2 mm, empty breeder zone)
versus the isolated case. In terms of damage avoidance, there is little
effect. However, the longer time to melt (and higher temperatures)
allows a significant impact by radiation heat transfer, especially for
TZM.
TZM is a special case due to its very high conductivity, (permitting
more heat through the first wall), high melting point and operating
temperature (radiation heat transfer goes as T 4). The temperature rise
is determined by different mechanisms at different temperature
regimes. -
Figure 3.12 shows the temperature rise for a TZM first wall
(dfw = 2 mm, base case geometry) for isolated first wall, empty breeder,
and Li, Li-Pb breeder. The behavior shown would exist for the other
materials (and does in computer runs) except that the strong deviations
occur above the material melting points and are thus irrelevant. The
I I .I .I -1 1 - - --- 
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TABLE 3.11
Safety Margin for LOCA's*
(Plasma Remains On)
Safety Mar-lin against Damage:
300 C .pP dfw PC k(ATfW)SMd = 30 0C f (300 0C) = 2 k ts (300 *C)
ATrise w sd (q")2 t
Safety Margin against Melting:
AT
SM = 7T
m ATse
PcP dffw (Tmelt - Toperations) = PCpk(ATfw)(AT m)
q" tsd (q")2 tsd
e
*Where tsd is the time to plasma shutdown, high values of safety
margin are preferred,.
CI
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TABLE 3.10
Relative Values of Beneficial
Material Properties for Isolated First Wall*
316 SS
Damage
holding dfw fixed**
holding ATfw fixed
% PC pk
Melting
holding dfw fixed
Q pC ATom
holding ATfw fixed
1
1
1
1
HT-9
1.30
1.81
1.50
1.76
%pcpk AT0
*relative to 316 SS.
**holding dfw fixed = viewing
material
d fw as a fixed paramater independent of
holding ATfw fixed = viewing ATfw as a fixed parameter independent of
material
V
0.71
1.10
0.93
1.25
TZM
0.68
3.62
1.08
4.71
dl IH44!4,14W4 "likkilh.40,kcil I I i , I
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Instead of viewing dfw as a scaling parameter, one can note that
dfw qkAf (3.49)
so that the time to melting or damage is giveh by
PC kAT AT.
t p 2 fw 1(3.50)
(q11)w
where AT (operating first wall temperature drop) is the fundamental
design value and pcpk reveals the material property dependence.
For damage, AT is a constant 300 'C. For melting AT2 = AT ,m which
is itself .a material property. Table 3.10 gives the relative values
of these material scaling values. The numbers show that unless one takes
advantage of TZM's high conductivity to have a very thick first wall,
material choice can not impact necessary response times by more than
80%. The analysis shows that if the maximum first wall thickness is
limited by something other than maximum temperature drop, then thermal
conductivity is less important in protecting the response of an isolated
first wall.
In summary, scaling parameters for the simple isolated first wall
have been defined. This allows a direct comparison among structural
materials. A safety margin can be defined as the allowable temperature
rise divided by the actual caused by a continuation of plasma heating
after LOCA for a time, tsd, (see Table 3.11).
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q "q " q II
T(xt) o - x + 2k 2 + pcpd t(3.45)2 fw Ppdfw
and
q"
ATfw % d (constant) (3.46)
after an initial transient.
Computer runs indicate that the transient behavior settles into the
second mode after a few seconds.
Thus the basic time scale for plasma heat up of an isolated first
wall is given by
T = t (3. 47)rise pcpdfw
and the time to reach melting or damage is given by
pc d
t= AT. (3.48)
where AT1 = 300 *C (damage)
AT = AT2 om
This equation slightly underpredicts the time for damage and melting
because of the beneficial relaxation of the first wall temperature
Q"1 q"
drop (Tfw) from Y dfw to w. For example, for a 2 mm first wall,V dw W fw*
Eq. (3.48) is accurate within 15% (highest deviation for lowest
conductivity material, 316 SS).
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3.3 Plasma Heating
The results of computer runs for cases involving only plasma heating
(surface and neutronic) will be discussed.
3.3.1 Isolated First Wall
The simplest case is that of a thermally isolated (adiabatic) first
wall with only -the plasma heat soruces. The volumetric nuclear heating
has only a very minor effect with the material temperature response
dominated by the surface heat flux. The ratio of volume/surface ratio
heating for the first wall is given by
q" - dfw q"-QP-df, ("
q1 = q1 = QP x dfW q11 (3.42)
w w w
QP ranges from 6 to 10 (m- for alloys studied and dfW ranges from
1 to 4 mm. Thus, at most, volumetric heating isl6% of the first wall
heat input.
Under operating conditions, the steady state temperature distribution
through the first wall is approximately
q"
T(x) = T0 - x (3.43)
q"
and ATfw= d (3.44)
Under accident conditions where the back of the first wall is thermally
isolated, the temperature is approximated by
C71
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lies behind the first wall, it is relevant to know if connections
across the gap, forming discrete channels, assists in heat transfer.
The one-dimension case was used to examine (in a constant,
representative geometry) void (no breeder due to leakage), LiAlO2, Li,
and Li17Pb83 '
3.2.5.4 Reference Cases
The six reference case geometries (Appendix C) correspond to the
six combinations of coolant and breeder. These represent the reference
designs for these combinations from Chapter 2. Thus, these cases allow
the design influence of material choice to be added to the material
properties in examination of the material impact. As such, these are
the most accurate and appropriate in terms of determining the actual
time scales.
metal
first
wall
(2 mm)
Plasma
Heat Flux
(if used)
C>
/
6 mm
1f' wYmmJ
-. -~ -~ *~ x -%~ -~ ~
flow gap
connectors
(2 mm thick)
flow channels
(void)
(10 mm x 6 mm)
edge
(thickness
varies)
Fig. 3.11: Two Dimensional Base Case Geometry for LOCA Analysis
C
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metal
back
plate(10 mm)
metal
(2 mm) graphite
reflector
(100 mm)
--h
N. U,
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
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first wall
coolant flow
gap (void)
(6 mm)
breeder zone
(500 mm)
Plasma
Heat Flux
(if used)
I,
Fig. 3.10: One Dimensional Base Case Geometry
for LOCA Analysis
metal
(2 mm)
metal first
wall (2 mm)
graphite
reflector
(100 mm)
metal
back plate
(10 mm)
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3.2.5.1 Adiabatic Case
Several studies have mentioned initial temperature rise (*C/sec)
rates from either afterheat or plasma heat. It was decided to first
repeat the adiabatic calculation for the materials in this study to com-
pare with previous works. Furthermore, this simple case allows direct
comparison among structural materials.
For afterheat, the size of the volume input to the code is unimpor-
tant, (if q''' is uniform over the volume). For plasma heating, as will
be seen, the thickness of the first wall is important. Two cases were
analyzed dfw = 2 mm, 10 mm.
3.2.5.2 Plates
The next level case analyzed was that of parallel plates, correspond-
ing to a one-dimensional version of an empty module. This consists of a
first wall (front plate) and a back wall. Radiation heat transfer is
allowed between them. This was used to examine the effect of radiation
heat transfer in keeping front and back of the module in thermal contact
as well as allow examination of the scaling effects of varying dfw and dbw
The first wall was varied from 1 mm to 10 mm and the back wall (dbw)
(including reflector) was varied from 10 mm to 500 mm. No breeder or
coolant materials were used.
3.2.4.3 Base Cases
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the one and two dimension base case geome-
try. The two dimension case allows examination of edge and connector ef-
fects. The question arises as to whether the edge of the module assists
in transferring heat from front to back of the module. Since a coolant gap
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of the module of the module to fall to 300 'C. Furthermore, freezing is
less of a safety problem since it implies that temperatures (hence radio-
activity mobilization) are low. The entire problem is heavily dependent
on the design of the start-up/shutdown procedure and the thermal coupling
between modules and surrounding material. To some degree, however,
those cases with less damage potential (less heating) may have a higher
freezing concern. Although beyond the scope of the present analysis,
the problem of undesired freezing is an area of future work.
The blanket modules contribute to neutron attenuation, minimizing
neutron flux (hence nuclear heating) to the magnet and magnet shield.
A rapid change in the attenuation characteristics in the blanket is of
potential concern. The worst would be the loss of a liquid breeder
(Li or Li17Pb83). The loss of a liquid coolant (water, flibe, Li)
represents less blanket volume. Helium has a very small neutronic effect.
The loss would have to occur before the plasma terminates for a problem
to occur. The time scale of breeder loss indicates that it is not likely
to be a problem in this regard. The worst case may be a water coolant,
the only case with sub-second loss time scale (other than helium).
3.2.5 Geometries
Several geometries were used to explore structural material, breeder,
and coolant effects. These range from a simple adiabatic box to 2-D
reference cases for each coolant/breeder combination. The motivation and
details are now described. Detailed descriptions of the geometries
appear in Appendix C.
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TABLE 3.9
Temperature Margins Against Melting (0C)
Tmel t
2620
1900
1420
1430
Topera.tion
900
600
450
450
Metal
TZM
vanadium
HT-9
316 SS
AT om
1720
1300
970
980
Co
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This value (AT rise 300 *C) is adopted as the criterion for determining
the time required for damage. Although imperfect, it is a representative
criterion.
Ideally, a detailed temperature-stress transient analysis would
determine likely locations of damage. This it beyond the scope of the
present study. Furthermore, the element of time needs to be addressed.
A short period of temperature rise (if then cooled) may be associated
with higher temperatures (for short time) than prolonged exbosure
to a lower elevated temperature (although the generated thermal stress
are even lower in the latter case).
The second criterion is the onset of melting (always occurs first at
the first wall for the. materials studied).- Besides representing a
higher temperature rise than for the onset of structural damage, the time
to melt introduces an additional material property, ATom, where
ATom = Tmelting - Toperating (3.41)
The refractory metals with their higher melting temperatures have higher
ATom even though their operating temperatures are also higher (Table 3.9).
Preventing damage from freezing is part of the general question of
how to start and shut down a fusion reactor with a liquid metal or salt
fluid which is solid at room temperatures. The specific concern here is
that the normal shutdown procedure/equipment would not be available after
an accident, leading to freezing for long times after an accident. Sze
[3.19] found this not to be a problem. His analysis treated the magnet
shield as an isothermal sink. Even so, it took 50 hrs. for the back wall
I I I klioi,;V! mk*, I I A I i
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3.2.4 Relative Hazard Criteria
To compare the various structural materials, breeders, and coolants,
there must be a consistent set of criteria. The primary concern with
LOCA's is the rise in temperatures due to inadequate cooling. This
concern consists of two parts, 1) damage due to thermal stresses and
weakening material strength of elevated temperatures, and 2) melting.
Either results in economic and safety problems, e.g., mobilization of
radioactivity, reactor damage. There are two secondary concerns. First,
Sze [3.19] mentions the potential for reactor damage due to freezing of
liquid metals as the structure eventually cools. Second, the UCLA
safety study [3.18] discusses the problem of an increased neutron flux
to the magnets if a liquid metal breeder were to empty and create a void.
Each of these concerns will be examined.
The most probable problem from a LOCA (or similar accident) is
likely to be reactor damage because 1) required temperature rises are
less than melting, and the other two concerns (freezing and voiding) look
manageable. Because of the desire for good thermal efficiciency,
operating structural temperatures will be as high as practical. As
temperatures rise in an accident, the metal strength decreases as the
same time that additional thermal stresses (non-uniform heating) are
generated. Sze [3.19] suggested that a UWMAK-I 316 SS first wall could
survive short times at 600 *C (ATrisef 125 'C) but would likely undergo
damage by 800 *C (ATris 325 *C).
Analysis of metal strength curves versus temperature would indicate
that all metals have significant reduction of material properties by a
300'C temperature rise from the assumed maximum operation point (see Appen-
dix B.) Also the microstructure of the alloy would be degraded (Appendix B.)
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Li coolant to empty is several minutes, but the time scale for a Li-breeder
to empty (breeder only, hence a small tube size) is days. For a Li-Pb
breeder, the time scale is a few hours. These MHD numbers are too
uncertain (with the exception of flibe) and there is too much variance
between MHD and'non-MHD to base specific LOCA'scenario-results on them.
They do demonstrate that Li or Li-Pb is likely to remain in place and
provide heat sink for a significant amount of time. One may bracket
this effect by two cases - 1) no fluid, 2) fluid remains through accident
but only stagnant. For flibe the reference case is for the coolant to
empty in about 2.5 sec.
3.2.3.5 Loss-of-Coolant Rates Conclusion
Given the time scales involved, the effects of fluids can be estimated.
The minimum for coolants is no effect. For afterheat time regimes, the
coolant in all cases (even Li) can be assumed to have emptied and there
is no coolant effect for the present LOCA analysis. For the plasma heating
time scale, the maximum can be estimated by approximate heat transfer
values as function of time for water, He, and flibe. For lithium, the
lithium is assumed to stop flowing but not drain (to find maximum effect).
For fluid breeders, the minimum is unknown. For afterheat, the
effect again approaches zero (non-MHD). The maximum effect for afterheat
is approximated by retention of stagnant breeder (no contact with first
wall). For plasma heating, the time scales appear to suggest that the
breeder can not drain significantly before plasma termination (by whichever
method). However, as seen in section 3.3, the presence of the breeder has
only a slight effect anyway.
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TABLE 3.8
Time to Drain for MHD Conditions
Metal
Fluid
Case 1
fluid as
coolant (min)
fluid as
breeder (hr)
Case 2
fluid as
coolant (min)
Steel
Li
3.1
35'
8.3
V
Li
TZM
Li
5.7
63
TZM Steel
flibe Li 17Pb83
0.003
116
15.0
1.7
0.008
C
C
C
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TABLE 3.7
Maximum Flow Rates under MHD Conditions*
Fluid
Li
Li
Li
flibe
Metal
Steel
TZM
TZM
Steel
Vmax (m/s)
0.0020
0.0011
0.0006
2.06**
0.0410
*for relevant operating temperatures, B%5T, d = 1 mm, r = 10 mm
note that vmax scales as r W
**for flibe the scaling with r is different
15.7
max%0 r(in cm) 1 +14.7 r (in cm)
Li 1 7 Pb8 3
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fluid level
AO 0.
MHD
0
B
force
retards
flow (a)
MHD force
retards flow (b)
fluid level
Fig. 3.9: Blanket Geometries for Cases where MHD
Force Inhibits Gravity Drain of Fluid
Breeder, Worst Case Module Located under
the Plasma
C
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d = pipe thickness
rw = pipe wall conductivity
a = fluid conductivity
Then, the maximum velocity due to gravity perpendicular to the field
(see Figure 3.9a,b) is given by [3-.18]
pr2
v (m/sec) = pgr (3.38)
max[Ha + Ha (T)]
Table 3.7 lists the result for conditions (operating temperature,
B %5T,dl\l mm) of interest. With the exception of flibe, these velocities
are very low and Li-Pb is less restricted than Li.
This may be a factor in two different ways. For case 1, the
restriction is at a break which is perpendicular to the field. Then,
the time to empty is given by
t AbV1(3.39)
1 Ab vmax
For case 2, the restriction is assumed to be at some pipe bend in the
blanket, then
L2 ~vwhere L% r (pipe radius) (3.40)
max
The results are shown in Table 3.8. Compared to the gravity-only case,
one sees that flibe is not MHD limited. The time scale for the
H-11 !1111 4,4 1 q0 1 §14 1 41i I 10 '1 !-4 .l 111"11 4 1 141 1 , , -
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TABLE 3.6
Time to Drain for Liquid-Metals
and Molten-Salts (Non-MHD)
As Co'lant
3.9 s
3.9 s
As Breeder
4.9 m
4.9 m
4.9 m
2.4 s
Metal
Steel
V
TZM
TZ
Steel
Fluid
Li
Li
5.3 m
Li
flibe
Li17Pb83
C
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or
- 1/2 -~-1/2
t(time to empty) =- 1  L/(3.34)
0.5 (A 2/A2_-1)
and t %0.45 ( - A >> A2  (3.35)
however V=z0Al, then A/A 2 =(V/Ab) z
0
and
t\0. 45(A, z-1/2o(3.36)
and once again V/Ab is seen as a primary scale factor. Interestinply,
the time is independent of density, only on design parameters. Table 3.6
lists the results for the reference designs. The difference between
coolant and breeder use is due to the difference in volume (volume of
breeder >volume of coolant), and in tube area (Abreeder < Acoolant
because a slower rate is required).
If MHD forces are present, the rate may be restricted. Carlson
[3.17] gives the pressure drop through a pipe perpendicular to a magnetic
field as
PV 2
dP/dx - Ha + Ha(C (3.37)
where r = pipe radius
Ha = Hartman number = Br
c = adw/cr
,1 1 i7 111 7'
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L_ V2
fluid
Fig. 3.8: Blanket Geometry for Case
where Fluid Breeder Drains
Due to Gravity
0
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TABLE 3.5
Liquid-Metal and Molten-Salt Fluids
Fluid Use
cool ant
breeder
coolant
breeder
breeder
coolant
breederLi17Pb83 steel
Fluid Metal
steel
steel
Li
Li
Li
Li
Li
vanadium
vanadium
flibe
TZM
TZM
11 1,116AHq, I 41414 ' H I d4holo] I I 11,41
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be pressure driven, but rather only drained by Qravity.
Even if MHD pumping requires about MPa pressures for lithium, the low
compressibility will result in a rapid pressure drop to that of the
building with little drainage. Furthermore, depending on the geometry
involved, MHD forces will restrict the rate of drainage. Since the time
scale for toroidal fields to decay may be long, the toroidal field
MHD forces will likely be present at least through the plasma heating
removal stage.
Table 3.5 shows the combinations of materials which must be examined.
First, the non-MHD simple gravity drain will be calculated. Second,
two MHD calculations are presented.
Without MHD forces and negligible pressure drops, the energy
equation is
2 2pv1  pv2
2 +pgz = 2 (see Figure 3.8) (3.32)
where
z = depth of fluid
v = internal velocity
v2 = exit velocity
since v = -dz/dt and vIA 1 = v2A2 (conservation of mass), one obtains
z/dt =2g 2 (3.33)
;(A/A2 1)
or
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For conditions of interest the final heat transfer coefficient after
(Re <3000) depressurization is about 1000 W/m2 -oK. Thus, a rough estimate
of the film coefficient behavior is given by
h(t) = 10,000 - 90,000t 0'<t<0.1 (3.30)
h(t) = 1,000 t >0.1 (3.31)
The details (as in the case of water) are not particularly important
since (as seen in section 3.3) the depressurizing coolant has a very
slight effect.
A helium purge stream in a solid breeder which is at low pressure
also may remove some heat from the blanket. Under normal operation the
system is not designed for this, but if it continued operation, some
transfer might be expected to occur during a thermal transient. For
the present analysis, this cooling credit is ignored because 1) the
purge stream connections would likely fail if a double coolant break
had occurred for small module sizes and 2) the low thermal conductivity
of the solid breeders reduces the potential benefit.
3.2.3.4 Liquid-Metal and Molten-Salt Cooled
In the previous cases of the highly pressurized coolants (water and
helium), the time scales indicate that the coolants will not have any
effect on afterheat removal and have (at best) a slight effect on plasma
heating removal, for the most severe LOCA's. The high internal pressure
drives the coolant out with only choking at-the orifice as
resistence. The other fluids (Li, flibe, Lil 7Pb 83 ) will not
1  , .i d 1h i -.- -F . ' 1 .7-7- --
,Ili l 14 11. A I! 14 1 N; li 14 -H i I I iq i 14 III ki ILI A 111
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p = p e- (3.24)p 0 e
W = A/v-R-,/T x 0.0159 sec (OK) 2  (3.25)
For the reference case, en200 Hz and the expbnential decay time
(/w '" 0.01 sec) is very short. The time for depressurization is
approximately
t (helium) 0 final (3.26)
e W
Since P0 = 5.5 MPa and P fina 0.1 MPa, we obtain
te (helium) % 0.02 sec (3.27)
The high value of Ab/V results in depressurization in less than 0.1 sec.
An estimate of the heat transfer coefficient is given by [3.16]. Due to
the uncertainty in coolant time scales, a value of 0.1 sec is adopted
for the end of the depressurizing period.
h = 0.021 Re 0.8 Pr0. 6  k x FF Re> 6000 (3.28)De
h = 8.23 k/De Re <3000 (3.29)
where D e = hydraulic diameter
FF = surface roughness factor heat transfer
--- -------
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and n x, 7.0 [4.7]. Absolute values for the depth of melting and
vaporization can be obtained from their dimensionless results using
the definitions of the dimensionless variables:
d = 6m E/A (4.12)
m m p(Tm 
-To)
dv = 6V p - (4.13)
t =E/A ] (4.14)
pd P p p(Tm 
-TO)
where 6 m, 6v = dimensionless depth of melting, vaporization
$ = dimensionless time
E/A = 3.83 MJ/m2 reference value
Use of Fraas and Thompson's model results in Fig. 4.4, with extra-
polation (dotted lines) to zero disruption time. In the limit of an
instantaneous disruption (tpd -+ 0), only a thin layer of material will be
vaporized so that the temperature versus depth profile is a simple step
function. In this limit, the conservation of energy gives
E/A = dv (cp(Tm -To) + Hf + P p(TV: Tm) + Hg) (4.15)
Then, to first order we obtain
dv(td + 0) o 1/9.4 (pc -E/ ) (4.16)V pd PC p(T m-T )
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using the values for the dimensionless parameters nm and rni. This allows
extrapolation of the depth of vaporization curves to zero disruption
times.
The results of the finite difference calculation with latent heats
and stationary vapor phase are compared to the simple analytical calcu-
lations in Table 4.8. The simple analytical model (Eqs. (4.5) - (4.7))
does not allow estimation of the maximum depth of vaporization which
occurs for instantaneous disruptions. The two models produce similar
results for the disruption time which starts melting and the maximum
depth of melting. When latent heats are included, however, shorter
disruption times are required to produce either vaporization and the
maximum depth of melting. It is interesting, though, that for those
two parameters the ratio between models is fairly constant among
materials. Hence, the relative comparison among materials is basically
unaffected.
As noted above, the assumption of a static vapor phase can be
relaxed, although at a high cost of complexity. The INTOR [4.3] study
examined the depth of melting and vaporization for 316 SS at a 20 msec
disruption time for different energy deposition values. For the reference
value of E/A = 3.8 MJ/m 2, a comparison among all three models is possible,
shown in Table 4.9. Incorporation of latent heat of melting reduces
the amount melted as expected and discussed above. Incorporation of
vapor phase transport reduces the amount vaporized [4.3], but increases
the depth of melting.
The maximum amounts of material melted or vaporized do not appear
to be significantly different among materials (see Table 4.8). However,
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TABLE 4.8
Comparison of ResultsFrom
Models With and Without Latent Heats*
Disruption Time to
Cause Melting, tm, msec
With Latent Heat
Without Latent Heat
Disruption Time to
Cause Vaporization, txv, msec
With Latent Heat
Without Latent Heat
Maximum Depth of
Melting, dm, mm
With Latent Heat
Without Latent Heat
Time Which Produces Maximum
Melting, msec
With Latent Heat
Without Latent Heat
Maximum Depth of
Vaporization, dmv, mm
With Latent Heat
316 SS
156
160
80
28
0.28
0.25
69
40
%0. 084
HT-9
87
92
46
16
0.19
0.17
39
23
V-alloy
92
97
49
19
0.30
0.27
41
24
TZM
19
19
9.8
3.7 0
0.26
0.23
8.2
4.9
%0.056 %0.091 %0.077
*Calculations with latent heats based on model in reference 4.7 0
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TABLE 4.9
Comparison of Heat Transfer Models 2For 20 msec Disruption tpd) and 3.8 MJ/m
Energy Deposition (E/A) For 316 SS
Depth of Depth of
Melting Vaporization
(mm) (mm)
Analytical Model
No Latent Heats
No Vapor Phase 0.23
Finite Difference*
Latent Heats Included
Static Vapor Phase 0.15 0.03
Finite Difference**
Latent Heats Included
Vapor Phase Transport %0.20 %0.008
*Adapted for 316 SS from reference 4.7
**Adapted for 3.8 MJ/m 2 from reference 4.3
r
!I I 114 11 -141 dv 4 1 4i I! d 111 m41111 k*Pdd, I III ] 14 , , "
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the disruption time that produces maximum melting, or the onset of
melting or vaporization, does differ among materials. As seen in
Table 4.10 (based on Table 4.8), significantly shorter disruptions may
cause such effects as the onset of melting, the maximum depth of melting,
and the onset of vaporization. The relative disruption times (defined
relative to the best case of TZM) are very similar for the above three
effects. Thus, a natural relative consequence index from phase change
due to plasma disruption is defined as follows (see Table 4.10)
(tpd)max
RCIPc tm tv melt (4.17)Rm(TZM) ' t( (tpd)max (TZM)
melt
Thus, a plasma disruption will cause similar effects for 316 SS as one
8.2 times shorter for TZM. In other words, a disruption would have to
be 8.2 times more severe (shorter time, higher heat flux) for TZM
phase changes to be as severe as for 316 SS.
4.2.2 First Wall Thermal Stresses
The increase in temperature is non-uniform through the first wall.
This non-uniformity leads to thermal stresses. Fraas and Thompson [4.7]
summarize the relationship for the maximum thermal stress in the first
wall as
= Kn ( jAT (4.18)
where = linear coefficient of expansion
E = Young's modulus
-237-
TABLE 4.10
Relative Disruption Times That Produce
Undesired Thermal Effects*
316 SS HT-9 V-alloy TZM
Relative Time to
Cause Melting
(tm/tm(TZM)) 8.2 4.6 4.8 1.0
Relative Time to
Cause Vaporization
(t /tV(TZM)) 8.2 4.7 5.0 1.0
Relative Time to
Cause Maximum
Melting 8.4 4.8 5.0 1.0
Relative Consequence
Index for Phase Change
from Distruptions, RCIPC 8.3 4.7 4.9 1.0PD
*Low values are preferred
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a,n = factors dependent on the number of geometrical
constraints
K = stress concentration factor
ATfw = temperature drop across the first wall
The stress concentration factor is generally greater than one and is
higher at notches, corners, and existing cracks. The factor n is in
the range 0 < n < 1 and depends on the number of dimensions constrained
and the surface orientation. For present purposes, the factor Kn is
unimportant since the focus is on relative material effects. Present
modeling will focus on the general case of a flat plate unconstrained
in thickness (z), but constrained in the plane (x, y). For this case
Kn -* 1.
The factor a is the number of constrained dimensions minus one.
For the present case, the; thermal stress is approximately given
by
s= Tfw (4.19)
There are four relevant time scales in determining thermal stress.
4.2.2.1 Long-Time Heat Flux
For a heat flux applied for long time scales (tpd I 1 sec), the
temperature rise is given by Eq. (4.1):
ATw = ATfw (1 +1 (4.1)
0~
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where ATfw = design value
Thus the stress scaling goes as
ST = (+ ) ATfw = k-T (1 + ) q"dfy (4.20)
The relative value among materials is given in Table 4.11. As noted
in Section 4.1, a representative scaling is to include the yield stress
as a material property. The effect of this property is also shown
in Table 4.11. See Appendix B for the values of material properties
and yield stresses. 20% cold work is assumed for 316 SS. Since the
time scale (R 1 sec) is so long compared to the likely disruption time
scale, 20 - 100 msec, further analysis is needed.
4.2.2.2 Intermediate Time Scale
Delessandro [4.6] has examined the thermal stress in more detail,
using a calculation with a constant heat flux (step function) for a
finite thickness (dfw) plate. The minimum compressive and tensile
stress are given approximately by [4.6]
(s )max ~0 ((fw k )(42
max 1 ) kE v) (4.22)
Equation (4.21) is accurate within about 20% for fourier, F0 , numbers
between 0.01 to about 0.15. Equation (4.22) is accurate within 20% for
-240-
TABLE 4.11
Relative Impact of Thermal Stress for
Very Long Time Scales*
Material Property
Scaling
316 SS
HT- 9
V - alloy
TZM
y AT(1-\) fw
2.3
1.1
0.7
1.0
*Relative to TZM properties, low values preferred
0"
0
C
Ey
kW( -v)
(E
10.0
4.1
2.3
1.0
Tfw
s
y
2.7
1.9
1.2
1.0
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fourier numbers between about 0.03 to about 0.15. The maximum
compressive stress occurs at the surface while tensile stresses are
maximum in the wall.
These results (dfw = 2 mm) indicate that the relevant material
E y
scaling is k(l-v) for fourier numbers between about 0.02 and 0.10.
The relative values are shown in Table 4.12. Any surface melting is
ignored. The deviation from this scaling due to differing disruption
times and melting are discussed later.
4.2.2.3 Short Time Scale
For short time scales with fourier numbers under 0.001,
Delessandro [4.6] has shown that the surface compressive stress is
given well by
( tpd 1/2 ( ) (pcpk 1 2  (4.23)
which is simply the result of substituting the expression for ATfw
(Eq. (4.3)) into Eq. (4.19). This is the regime where the semi-infinite
plate model is valid. The heat flux burst heats up and expands the
surface causing compressive stresses. Unlike the previous case,
however, the interior tensile stresses are minimal [4.6], since the
heat flux is so rapid. The relative scaling among the reference
materials is shown in Table 4.13. The disruption time limit for which
this is valid (Fourier number < 0.001) is very short. Expected disrup-
tion times are at least an order of magnitude longer.
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TABLE 4.12
Relative Thermal Stress Scaling
For Intermediate Time Scales
Disruption Time
F = 0.02
16
21
8.4
2.3
Range (msec)*
F = 0.15
120
156
63
18
*Actual disruption time range for which this scaling is most valid,
d fw = 2 mm, Sy evaluated at operating temperatures.
Material
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
Stress
Scal ing
Ey
k (l - v)y
10.0
4.0
2.3
1.0
Yield
Scal ing
E y
yk(lv)
11.6
6.9
3.9
1.0
0
0
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TABLE 4.13
Relative Material Thermal Stress
Scaling for Short Time Scales*
Disruption Time
for Short Time
Scaling
(F0 < 0.001) msec
0.8
1.0
0.4
0.1
Stress Scaling
Ey(PC -1/2
(l-v) p
3.8
1.3
1.2
1.0
Yield Scaling
E 1 -1/ 2 1Y-(PC k) -1-V s y
4.4
2.3
2.1
1.0
*Relative to TZM, low values preferred, independent of first wall
thickness
316 SS
HT- 9
V-alloy
TZM
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4.2.2.4 Maximum Surface Stress With Melting
For an instantaneous disruption, the surface material is ablated.
The maximum temperature drop in the load carrying solid wall is simply
Tm - T [4.71. The maximum surface stress (compressive) is then
given by [4.7],
S= ( Y)(T - T0) (4.24)C 1-V 0
The relative stress values for the reference materials and relative
stress divided by yield stress is given in Table 4.14.
4.2.2.5 Combined Time Scales
The equations for stress at intermediate and short time scales
(melting ignored) can be rewritten in terms of fourier number. The
upper limit on the maximum (surface) compressive stress is given by
either
E E Sa
S = IdF ~ 0.02 F ( 0.15 (4.25)c A k (II-A dfw 10 0 0
or by
S = EE Eya 2-] F -1/2 F < 0.001 (4.26)c Ak (1 -A d, 0 0
depending on the value of F0. By converting Delessandro's [4.61 results
to this format, Fig. 4.5 is obtained. For expected disruption times of
20 - 100 msec, the corresponding fourier numbers (dfw = 2 mm) range
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TABLE 4.14
Relative Material Maximum Surface
Thermal Stress for Instantaneous Disruption*
Stress Scaling
(Tm
1.3
0.6
0.5
1.0
- TO)
Yield
tE A
Scal ing
(Tm - To)
m 0sy
1.5
1.1
0.9
1.0
*Relative to TZM, low values preferred
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
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between 0.02 and about 0.8. The solid line indicates the normalized
compressive stress if no surface melting were to occur (from reference
4.6). The figure illustrates that the intermediate time scaling is
limiting for disruption times of interest. The short time scaling is
not controlling.
In similar fashion, the intermediate time scaling for the maximum
tensile stress can be rewritten as
[E E ,3iaSt L E k 0.04 F (4.27)
t 'k~-v~dfw0
Delessandro's actual results are compared to the simple scaling law
in Fig. 4.6. For the disrup ion times of interest, Eq. (4.27) is a
good rough approximation.
Surface melting caused by the disruption complicates stress
analysis. In Section 4.2.2.;, the maximum possible compressive stress
was obtained. This is graphed in Fig. 4.5. It is seen that melting
may limit the maximum possible stresses for disruption times of
interest.
The maximum compressive stress is then limited by the minimum
of Eqs. (4.21) (intermediate time) and (4.24) (maximum possible if
surface melting). This maximum possible stress is indicated for
the reference materials in Fig. 4.7. In reality for disruption times
that produce melting, the maximum compressive stress would be no
higher than that shown in Fig. 4.7 due to the elimination of stress
in the melt zone. Furthermore, the progression of the melt zone into
q I N112 I I AW I 11-4 *t I I OH 1, Q, 606111 -4 1 M
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the wall erases some material flaws produced in the solid. For the
range of disruption time of most interest the maximum tensile stresses
tend to be 2.5 lower than compressive stress and show the same
material property scaling, that of intermediate times (Eqs. (4.21),
(4.22)).
4.2.2.6 Relative Stress
The thermal stress scaling with material properties has been
seen to vary with the disruption time scale. The range of thermal
stresses relative to that of TZM is given in Table 4.15 as well as
the most appropriate value, that for the intermediate time scale. If
one considers the yield stress as an appropriate means to compare
thermal stresses among materials, the figure of merit is sT/S y The
range for the materials for various time scales is given in Table 4.15
along with the value for the intermediate time scale.
4.5 Electromagnetic Effects
Disruptions may cause a variety of electromagnetic effects. Al-
though considerable effort has been spent in analyzing these effects, the
state-of-knowledge is still poor. The most important question is which
natural properties influence the result. Although the absolute severity
of these problems is not yet known, the following discussion of (pri-
marily) previous work is presented to indicate that the basic material
property is electrical conductivity. However, the disruption time and
geometrical design parameters appear even more critical and appear to
overshadow the material impact. The effects discussed here are eddy
current heating and magnetic forces. Other potential problems like
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TABLE 4.15
Comparison of Thermal Stresses in Materials
Subjected to a Heat Pulse From a Disruption*
Range of
Relative
Stresses
1.3 - 10
0.6 - 4.0
0.5 - 2.3
1.0
Intermediate
Time Relative
Stresses
10
4
2
1.0
Range of
Relative
Stress/Yield**
1.5 - 11.6
1.1 - 6.9
0.9 - 3.9
1.0
Intermediate
Time Relative
Stress/Yield**
11.6
6.9
3.9
1.0
*Relative to TZM, low values preferred
**Yield stress evaluated at operating temperature
316 SS
HT- 9
V-alloy
TZM
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electrical arcing across gaps are very poorly understood and are not
discussed. It is not believed that these effects show dependence on
variables other than electrical conductivity and design specifics.
4.3.1 Single Component Model
When the disruption takes place, the plasma current is transferred
to the surrounding structure. The exact design and potential electrical
breakdown paths will determine where the currents will flow. The precise
location and time behavior of these currents determines eddy current
heating and magnetic forces. Detailed examination of the placement of
eddy'currents and forces is underway by other researchers [4.9]. The
INTOR study used a two component model where the current is assumed to
transfer to either the first wall or a seperate blanket circuit,
equivalent to 20 mm of 316 SS [4.3].
For present purposes, a single component model is generally ade-
quate. Here, the current is confined to one toroidal circuit. This is
conservative since the actual current would be lower due to some current
being transferred to other components.
4.3.1.1 Wall Time Constant
A very important parameter is the wall electrical time constant,
tw, which is given by
tw = L/Rw (4.28)
where L = Inductance
Rw = Wall Resistance.
For a toroidal shell, the inductance is material independent and given
-253-
by [4.4]
L = o rm[ln(8r M/r w)-2 = 9.0H (4.29)
where rM = major wall radius = 7 m (reference value)
rw = equivalent minor radius = 2.7 (reference value)
'P= magnetic permeability to toroidally flowing currents.
The wall resistance to toroidally flowing currents in a smooth surface
is given by [4.4]:
Rw = da (4.30)
w dc ) wd
where dc = cross section poloidal perimeter = 18.6 m
Ow = wall material electrical conductivity
d = cross section thickness
Thus the time constant for the reference size design can be expressed
as
tw = (3.81H)daw (4.31)
Thus, for a smooth surface, the thickness and electrical conductivity
determine the time constant. Values of the time constant for relevant
components is given in Table 4.16.
In an actual design, the first wall is generally not expected
to be continuous around the torus. Thus jumpers would be needed between
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TABLE 4.16
Electrical Time Constants for
Single Components
Component Component
Thickness
d(mm)
Wall Time
Constant
t, (msec)
First Wall
First Wall
First Wall
First Wall
Multiplier
Multiplier
Material
C
316 SS
HT- 9
V
TZM
Be
Zr 5Pb 3
2
2
2
2
35
70
7.6
8.0
14.1
27.7
300
240
C
Cm
-255-
modules. The presence of these jumpers will raise the resistance of
the breakdown path and lower the wall time constant. For example,
the STARFIRE design considered a continuous beryllium multiplier which
had a time constant of 300 msec. When jumpers were included the time
constant decreased to 40 msec [4.4]. For a single component model,
effects are always sharply reduced for lower wall time constants
(higher resistance). Thus, for present purposes, the effect of
intermodule jumpers is conservatively ignored.
4.3.1.2 Currents
The current in the component as a function of time after the start
of the disruption is given by [4.4]
I -t/t -t/t
I w(t) = (1-t /t (e W- e -p (4.32)(tpd/tw)
where IP = plasma current.
The reference value of Ip = 10 MAmp is used in these calculations.
4.3.2 Eddy Current Heating
The heat input to the wall due to the resistance is simply
00
E = dt I(t)Rw (4.33)
0
Performing the integration using the expression (Eq. (4.32)) for the
wall current, one obtains
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E I= L 12 t wtd(4. 34)
The only material ~dependence occurs in the wall time constraint. For
the cases of an instantaneous disruption (tpd.+ 0), the input energy
reaches a maximum. The current density is approximately uniform through
the wall thickness. The wall temperature increase can then be written
as
E L2 tw/tw + tpdAT .e=w 
--- (4.35)rise PcpdfWA 2A \ Pcpdfw
The temperature rise for first walls (dfw = 2 mm) of the four reference
materials as a function of plasma disruption time is shown in Fig. 4.8.
The temperature rises are very modest compared to that resulting from the
particle heat flux and can be ignored. Furthermore, the eddy current
heating is fairly uniform through the wall and thus does not contribute
to thermal stresses. Thus, although eddy current heating does depend
on material choice, the effect is always small compared to the particle
heat flux.
Onega, et. al. [4.1] modeled a non-uniform 316 SS wall and
discovered that, in like manner, less than 10% of the temperature rise
came from eddy current heating. They note that it may cause difficulties
for extreme geometries. If the current density in an intermodule jumper
were significantly higher than in the wall, the eddy current part of
temperature rise might be important.
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4.3.3 First Wall Stresses
The force on the wall is due to the interaction of the wall
current with the poloidal field, both varying in time. Using the one
component model again, one obtains the pressure (normal to the
surface) on the first wall as [4.4]
P(t,t tpd x Lexp(
exp (-t
2t)
+(w p)I]~ (4.36)2t 22tpd exp -fd 2 t
B 2
For the reference plasma, the constant equals 0.4 MPa. The
maximum pressure during or after the disruption can not
analytically since Eq. (4.36) is too complex.
For the worst case of an instantaneous disruption,
be determined
Eq. (4.36)
becomes
P(t~tw 5tpd = 0) = 0.4 exp(-2t/t ) MPa (4.37)
The maximum pressure is always 0.4 MPa for an instantaneous disruption
of the reference plasma.
The maximum pressure was solved for numerically using Eq. 4.36 for
two disruption times, 25 msec and 100 msec. The results are shown in
Fig. 4.9 as a function of wall time constant. The maximum magnetic
pressures for first walls of the four reference materials can be
determined from the figure and are listed in Table 4.17. The scaling
among materials is seen to be slower than the electrical conductivity C
C>
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TABLE 4.17
Maximum Magnetic Pressures
Generated in 2 mm First Wall
25 msec Disruption
316 SS
HT-9
Actual
(MPa)
0.11
0.11
V-alloy 0.15
0.19
Relative*
1.0
1.0
1.4
1.8
100 msec Disruption
Actual
(MPa)
0.042
0.044
0.066
0.101
Rel ati ve*
1.0
1.0
1.6
2.4
Rel ati ve*
Conductivity
1.00
1.05
1.85
3.64
*Relative to 316 SS, low values preferred
0
TZM
C
0
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scaling. Again, higher resistance (lower conductivity) is preferred.
The INTOR study [4.3] included a two-component analysis of the
maximum magnetic forces. The first wall was either aluminum or 316 SS;
the blanket was modeled as a 20 mm thick slab of 316 SS. The wall elec-
trical time constant was assumed the same for' both designs, being fixed
from plasma physics considerations. Although the conductivity of aluminum
is 11-20 times higher, the forces are 5 times higher (less than linear
scaling). For an 18 mm 0.D. steel tube, the maximum force per unit length
was found to be 2.35 kN/m._ If this were evenly distributed over the tube,
it would compare to a uniform 0.13 MPa outward pressure. This result is
similar to the 0.4 MPa uniform pressure for the present reactor size.
It is interesting to note that MHD forces are also generated in a
surface melt layer [4.3]. For the INTOR design, a maximum pressure of
275 N/m2 was found on a uniform melt layer. If surface tension is
lower, this provides a mechanism for the melted surface layer to be
seperated from the first wall [4.3].
4.3.2 Blanket Magnetic Stresses
A blanket contains more than the first wall and currents (hence
forces) may be generated elsewhere. The temperature rise from generated
currents has been shown to be insignificant for the case where currents
are confined to the first wall. Since the current density is lower if
more of the structures is involved, temperature rise from currents can
be neglected. Stresses, however, can not be.
4.3.4.1 Solid Breeder
Solid breeder materials have a high resistance, and little current
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would be expected to be induced. However, except for Li20, the solid
breeders require a neutron multiplier. For the present study, two
neutron multipliers, Zr5Pb3 and Be, were considered with the breeder,
LiAlO 2. The time constants (see Table 4.16) for such structures are
much higher than that of a bare first wall. This is primarily due to
the lower resistance cuased by a thicker (-Q 50 mm versus 2 mm first
wall) cross section available to carry the current. The uniform
outward pressures thus tend to reach the maximum of 0.4 MPa indepen-
dent of choice of neutron multiplier.
4.3.4.2 Liquid Breeders
The liquid breeders (Li, Lil 7Pb83) and low resistance coolants
(Li) will also experience induced currents and forces. The liquid
nature, greater radial thicknesses, and non-simple, non-symmetric
geometries make analysis very difficult.
If one viewed the fluids as solid conductors with depths similar
to aneutron multiplier, the time constant and resulting pressure are
not greatly different from the multiplier. Unfortunately, this is
not a valid treatment.
Walker and Wells [4.10] have analyzed the forces in a liquid
lithium cylindrical module resulting from a changing poloidal field
as is the case with a disruption. The system (Fig. 4.10) is a
cylinder perpendicular to a constant toroidal field with BP varying.
Two cases were studied, 1) Bp transverse to the cylinder axis and
2) By parallel to the axis. The work was part of the Westinghouse/
ORNL demonstration study [4.11].
-263-
(poloidal
field, B )
B P
x
(poloidal
field, B )
Bz P
z
z
B Transverse
t
to Cylinder
B Parallel
to Cylinder
Cylinder Lies on Z-axis
Toroidal Field on Y-axis
Fig. 4.10: Different Orientations of Cylinder
Geometries for Walker and Wells
Model [4.101
4
Q /
B
y(toroidal
field)
/
B
y(toroidal
field)
L
-264-
The geometry modeled corresponds to the Westinghouse/ORNL
blanket design, which is the basis of the He/Li reference design in
the current study. However, the geometry of the other present reference
designs (water/Li-Pb, Li/Li, flibe/Li) look much different (see Chapter
2) and represent even more difficult cases to analyze due to the lack
of even cylindrical symmetry. The validity of the model was expressed
in terms of four dimensionless variables as listed in Table 4.18. For
the present study, the variables were evaluated at 500'C with a 2 mm
wall thickness and 0.5 m fluid characteristic distance, typical of the
reference designs. The values obtained are shown in Table 4.19 for
disruption times of 25 and 100 msec and fluids lithium and Lil 7Pb83.
As seen in the table, all the criteria are met except that of the
magnetic Reynolds number. Indeed, for their study [4.10], the magnetic
Reynolds number for their 24 msec disruption case was marginal. The
situation is worse here since a larger module is being considered.
The resulting stress laws are listed in Table 4.20. Walker and
Wells point out the strong scaling with module size (df), which implies
that large Li modules may not be possible. However, the increase in
df makes the small Rem assumption invalid. This is why it was valid
for their study (small radius cylinders, df % 5-10 cm) but invalid for
the current case (df u 50 cm).
Gierszewski [4.12] notes that the magnetic Reynolds number is a
ratio of the effects of the induced magnetic field to the applied
field. Thus the effects of induced fields appears important in large
size modules.
A full detailed treatment of geometries different from the small
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TABLE 4.18
Dimensionless Variables Indicating
Validity of Walker and Wells L4.1O] Model
Interaction Parameter, de'sire N >> 1
N = BT2af tpd/Pf
Hartman Number, desire Ha >> 1
Ha = BTdf 1- (c') 1 /2
Magnetic Reynolds Number, desire Re m <
Rem =mfdf 2/tpd
MHD Parameter, desire c << 1, Ha- << c
where
c = cwdw Ia fdf
BT = toroidal field
af,aw = electrical
11 f
conductivity of fluid, wall
= fluid viscosity
= magnetic permeability
df = characteristic fluid distance
wall thickness
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TABLE 4.19
Tests for Validity of Walker and Wells [4.10] Model
25 msec Disruption
lithium
5,250
2.8 x 10 5
35.6
1.4 x 10- 3
Li17Pb83
75
100 msec Dis
Lithium
21,000
7.3 x 104 2.8 x 10 5
10 8.9
5. 2 x 10-3 1.4 x 10- 3
ruption Desire f
Model
Li17Pb83 Validity
300
7.3 x 104
2.4
5.2 x 10-3
>> 1
>1
<< 1
H< 1
Ha- 1-<l
Variable
N
Ha
Rem
C
0
0
or
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TABLE 4.20
Magnetic Stresses Due to Liquid
Breeders (from reference 4.10) in Cylindrical Geometry
Transverse B
AP = + I G d 2 B 2/tmax 8 ff p pd
Tre length = dfawBTBp/tpd
As 5 f B 2e ~4 d fBp /tpd
Maximum Change in Fluid
Pressure on Inside Wall
Maximum Shear Stress in
Wall due to Body Forces
in Wall
Maximum Change in Hoop
Stress
sb = (1.023)af
d 2
-/td Ring-bending Stress
Parallel B
p
AP + 1 d d B 2 /t
max 4 f w w p pd
A'1 3fdw a B /t
ASz/length 4 w BTB/pd
Ase = - d 2wB 2/tAe = 4 f wp pd
Maximum Change in Fluid
Pressure
Tension Stress
Change in Hoop Stress
I ------------------- 7 ------------- 777- 1 1 ; I I 1 1, li; ;
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cylinder, taking account of the induced fields is well beyond the scope
of the present study. However, those results do provide some idea of
the scaling involved. The only material properties are the conductivity
of fluid and wall. As in previous sections, low conductivity, high
resistance is desired.
The resulting forces are listed in Table 4.21 (df = 0.50 m,
dw = 2 mm). Walker and Wells found similar high values (e.g., ring-
bending sress) for submillisecond disruptions and smaller size modules
(in which case Rem << l is again violated), and believe these to be
very overestimated due to the violation of model assumptions. The
induced field in the fluid will tend to reduce the total field, reducing
the effect. The most worrisome stresses are the transverse case which
are fluid dependent, material independent.
Further analysis would be necessary to determine how severe the
stresses actually are. The strong scaling with design parameters
dominates over material properties. The worst stresses scale with
breeder conductivity, rather than structural wall conductivity, thus
structural choice is somewhat unimportant.
4.4 Summary and Conclusions
In spite of the uncertainties involved in understanding disruption
effects, there is sufficient evidence to determine the chief material
influences.
4.4.1 Thermal Effects
The strong particle heat flux results in rapid first wall temperature
rise. There is significant potential for structural damage from thermal
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TABLE 4.21
Conservative Estimate of Magnetic Forces
On Cylindrical Liquid Breeders, df = 0.5 m, d 2 mm*
Transverse B
Pmax (MPa)
S (MPa)
Sb (MPa)
Transverse B
cr /length
(MPa/m)
Parellel B
AP max (M1Pa)
AS z/length
Z(MPa/m)
AS (MPa)
Li
25 msec Disruption
Li Pb17-83
3.5
1.5 x 103
1.8 x 106
316 SS HT-9
120 126
316 SS HT-9
0.96
400
4.9 x 10 5
V TZM
222 430
V TZM
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
90. 95 167 320
7.5 7.9 13.9 27.0
100 msec Disruption
.Li
' 0.88
370
4.5 x 10 5
LI 1 Pb
0.24
100
1.2 x 105
316 SS HT-9 V TZM
30 32 56 108
316 SS HT-9 V TZM
23 24 42 81
1.9 2.0 3.5 6.8
TABLE 4.22
Relative Consequence Indices for
Plasma Disruptions**
Phase
Change
RCIPcPD
8.3
4.7
4.9
1.0
*Based on model in Ref.
**Low values preferred
[4.101
316 SS
HT- 9
V-alloy
TZM
Magnetic
Stress
RCI D
Thermal
Stress
RCI tsPD
10.0
4.0
2.3
1.0
1.0
1.0-1.1
1.0 - 1.9
1.0-3.6
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stresses and/or material surface melting and vaporization. Even without
any localized hot spots, the analysis shows that a significant fraction
of the first wall (% 0.25 mm) may melt, reducing the stress-carrying
capability at the worst time. Possible solutions are 1) a first wall
coating, 2) no disruptions (non-tokamak?), or 3) long time scale
disruptions spread over large fraction of first wall area.
The exact scaling of temperature rises, melting, and thermal stresses
among the structural materials depends to some degree on the time scale of
the disruption. One relative consequence index for plasma disruptions from
phase change was defined largely independent of the time scale:
D tv (tpd)max
RCIpc m v melting (4.17)
PD tm(TZM) t (TZM) (tpd)max (TZM)
melting
Thus the relative disruption times which produce initial melting,
maximum depth of melting, and initial vaporization scale with RCIPc
PD#
TZM is the best case due to its superior thermal-mechanical properties.
In terms of material properties, the RCIPc is given by
RCIPC [pc Pk (Tm - T0) 2 TZM (4.38)PD [PC k(T T )2
p (m - 07
as indicated in Eqs. (4.5), (4.6), and (4.9) for the quantities tm'
tv, (tpd max The RCIfD also tends to indicate the relative time scale
melt
among materials.
The range of thermal stress scaling among materials varies with
disruption time, as indicated in Table 4.15. However, the most relevant
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time scale regime is the intermediate case where maximum stresses are
given by Eqs. (4.21) and (4.22), which do not account for surface melting
and thus conservatively predict maximum stresses. A relative consequence
index for thermal stresses from plasma disruptions is defined as
RCIts - T)max for intermediate times (4.39)PD [(ST~a]ZT max TTZM
In terms of materials properties this becomes
ts [E /k(l-v)]
RCIts -Y (4.40)
D [Ey/k(l-v)lTZM
where again TZM is the best choice. The values for RCIPC and RCIts
are shown in Table 4.22.
The actual failure criteria from these stresses are unknown, but are
needed to compare the severity of stresses among materials. One repre-
senta.tive criterion is the material yield stress. The relative yield
scaling was compared to the direct stress scaling in Tables 4.12, 4.15,
or the intermediate time scale, the basis for RCItsD The use of yield
stress in the comparison has the primary effect of increasing the
advantage of TZM.
The choice of coolant and breeder have only secondary influence
on the plasma disruption thermal effects, principally through influence
on design, especially the first wall thickness, dfw* Thicker walls are
preferred. To result in the same time scaling, the fourier number must
be constant. Thus, the required shorter disruption time to produce the
same fourier number for an increase in first wall thickness, d , goes
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as
td tpd 2(4.41)
This influences the thermal stress scaling. .The onset of surface
melting or vaporization is largely independent of first wall thickness.
4.4.2 Electromagnetic Effects
The absolute severity of the electromagnetic effects of disruptions
is quite unknown. However, there is sufficient knowledge to suggest that
the fundamental material property which determines the relative impact
among materials is electrical conductivity.
Eddy current heating is a minor contributor to the first wall tem-
perature, but not to thermal stress. Although properties other than
electrical conductivity determine the eddy current heating, the scaling is
unimportant to material choice since the direct thermal flux scaling
dominates first wall temperature rise.
Previous work on magnetic forces in both structural walls and liquid
metals was examined. The only material property influencing the result
was the electrical conductivity. The absolute magnitude of the problem
is highly uncertain, especially for forces resulting from liquid metal
breeders. The specifics of designs are seen to have a very strong
influence on the problem, given the state-of-knowledge. Some magnetic
force components show no scaling with conductivity; the maximum scaling
was linear with conductivity.
The relative consequence index for magnetic stress for structures
materials due to plasma disruptions is therefore defined to be given by
-273-
1< RCIms w (4.42)PD 
- c316 SS
The low end, material independent, reflects the fact that some stresses
are independent of wall material (section 4.3.4). The high end is the
upper bound on increasing magnetic stresses, with 316 SS being the best
case (lowest electrical conductivity). The values for RCIMD for the
reference structural materials is listed in Table 4.22.
The scaling of stresses due to the presence of breeders again
seems to range between none and linear. In this regard it appears that
Li17Pb83 is somewhat better than lithium since its electrical conductivity
is 3.7 times lower. LiA10 2 is essentially non-conductive, so no liquid
metal breeder effects are possible; however, this means that the currents
leaving the plasma that would have been transferred to the liquid breeder
are now confined to the metal structure (unless arcing occurs), poten-
tially worsening those effects. The present state of knowledge is insuf-
ficient to know how breeder choice influences the overall electromagnetic
impact on the blanket.
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CHAPTER 5. FLUID CHEMICAL AND PRESSURE HAZARDS
Several potential energy sources exist in the blanket in addition
to nuclear heating and external inputs. Specifically, the stored
potential energy in the form of chemical or mechanical (pressurized
fluids) may result in reactor damage and/or radioactivity mobilization.
As other researchers are presently advancing the experimental and
analytical understanding of these problems [5.12, 5.16, 5.17], the present
discussion is primarily limited to comparing existing results and their
implications, rather than developing new analyses.
5.1 Problem Matrix
The first task is an examination of the overall problem. Several
chemical reactions are possible. Many of these, however, fall under
the category of corrosion-slow reactions between structural materials
and either coolants or breeders. These are discussed in Chapter 7.
Another group includes rapid structural oxidation-a prime method of
radioactivity mobilization due to rapid reaction between structural
materials and gases. These are discussed in Chapter 6. The concerns
in this chapter are potentially rapid reactions liberating chemical
or mechanical energy.
Historically, fusion researchers have been primarily concerned with
reactions with lithium. Table 5.1 shows the possible reactive materials.
While several combinations are not typically considered in fusion reactor
design, they are included here for completeness.
Water and flibe are unlikely to be both present since both are
-276-
TABLE 5.1
Possible Combinations of Reactive Fluids*
Li
Air
/
/
Li 17 Pb83
V/
LiA1O
2
vi
V indicates potential combination of fluids in fusion reactor.
*Solid LiA10 2 is included with the liquid lithium compounds for complete-
ness.
0
C
C
H20
Concrete
Flibe
CO
2
Li
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coolants. As discussed in Chapter 1, a Li/LiAlO 2 combination has no
obvious motivation. Air may be present due to an accident that allows
containment building atmosphere to enter the blanket or a blanket coolant
or breeder spilling into the building. CO2 has been proposed as an
alternative building atmosphere [5.1]. Concrete reactions- could be
possible if a spill allowed contact between fluid and concrete floor.
LiAlO2, although not a fluid, is considered here for completeness since
it is an alternative breeder.
Alternative substances, e.g. Li20, are also possible, but the
problem was limited to the reference lithium compounds of this study,
However, some comments on alternative substances are included where
appropriate.
Even if there is no chemical reaction to drive an accident (resulting
in elevated temperatures and/or pressures), a problem due to pressurized
fluids exists. In addition to the reactions in Table 5.1, there is the
potential for accidental pressurization of the blanket or building due to
ejection of the pressurized coolants, water and helium. Finally, the
possible building pressurization needs to be placed in perspective by
examination of the possible pressurization due to the release of helium
from superconducting coils.
5.2 Chemical Reactions
A variety of chemical reactions may be possible due to the various
materials present. Many of these can be eliminated from consideration on
the basis of thermodynamic calculations. For the remaining cases,
further information is obtained from either previous experimental studies,
static calculations, or dynamic calculations. The focus is on what
|||| 0 .it i il. -. ! I o| .Il I i .11 '
I Ili I * C; 14 I id 111*411'1" "Ill Ili
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temperatures and pressures can realistically result from combustion.
5.2.1 Thermodynamics
Thermodynamics serves to eliminate many possible reactions. Endo-
thermic reactions are not an important safety concern. Exothermic ones
may be dependent on the dynamics involved. Values of AH (heat of
reaction) and AG (free energy) are taken from References 5.2, 5.3,
unless otherwise stated.
5.2.1 Lithium Reactions
Pure liquid lithium reacts exothermically with air (02, N2), H20s
CO2 , and constituents of concrete. Concrete is discussed separately.
The heat of reaction and free energy change are shown in Table 5.2.
Some other reaction products are possible, but these are the major ones
(see References 5.4, 5.5, 5.6).
The N2 reaction is unimportant above %100 0'C since free energy con-
siderations lead to dissociation of Li3N [5.5]. Above %1100'C, Li2CO3
dissociates into Li20 + CO2. The water reaction is particularly worrisome
because of the highly corrosive nature of LiOH and the flammability of H2.
5.2.1.1 Li-Pb Reactions
The Li-Pb alloys have been proposed as alternatives to pure Li.
The central thermodynamic question is how tightly bound the lithium is,
i.e., what is the heat of reaction and free energy change for the
reaction
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TABLE 5.2
Major Lithium Reactions (kcal/g-mole-Li)*
1Li + 6 N 2 + Li3N
1 1Li + T 02 -* -yLi'2 0
Li + H20 -+ 1LiOH + -z- H 2
Li + CO2 -+ 1 Li2CO3 + C
Free energy change, AG
254C 500 0C l0004C
-12.2 -6,07 + 0.3
-66.9 -59.3 -51.1
-48.9 -38.8 -30.8
-64.7 -47.3 -30.8
Heat of reaction, .AH
250C 500* 1000*C
-15.7 -16.4 -15.1
-71.3 -72.2 -71.4
-48.3 -52.8 -49.0
-74.9 -76.1 -68.4
*Based on data in Ref. 5.2, 5.3.
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aLi + bPb-+ LiaPbb (5.1)
Fortunately the activity of lithium has been measured [5.71 at some tem-
peratures (see Figure 5.1). This allows estimation of partial AG, AH
for the reaction
Li + Lim-Pb n+Li m+lPbn (5.2)
This is the incremental heat of reaction for lithium addition. The equa-
tions are
AGL = RT ln aLi (5.3)
AHLi = -RT ln aLi = -RT1T2 (l5 ln a.4)
where aLi activity of lithium
R = gas constant
The results are shown in Table 5.3. As one would expect, the severity of
the reaction decreases to zero as the lithium content of LiaPbb increases.
There is one experiment [5.8] that allows a check on these estimated
values and the estimated value of heat capacity. Two moles of LiPb
(13.88 g Li, 414.4 g Pb) were prepared. Using the atomic percent inter-
polation (see Appendix B) for heat capacity, one obtains
cp (LiPb) n 2190 J/kg*C (5.5)
0
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TABLE 5.3
Calculated Values for Heat of Reaction and Free
Energy Change for'Lithiun Addition to
Li -Pb alloy (%500OC) (k cal /g-mol e-Li)*
Atomic
Percent
Li of Alloy
0.95
0.78
0.50
0.17
0.05
Al 1oy
Li1 9Pb
Li7Pb2
Li Pb
Li 17Pb83
Li Pb19
Free Energy
Change, AG
- 0.3
- 5.7
- 9.5
-13.7
-16.1
Heat of
Reaction, AH
% 8.4
1-12
n -13
%-13
*From data in Reference 5.7
0
0
0
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The partial heat of reaction is not really sufficient since we are con-
cerned with the total reaction from 0% Li to 50% Li. However, an esti-
mate would be to use a value of 13 kcal/g-mole-Li as this appears to be
an average over the range of lithium composition. Then the expected
temperature rise would be
(13 k cal/g-atom-Li)(4.1868x 103 J/kcal)(2 moles Li)
AT = (5.6)
(2190 J/kgoC)([13.88+414.4]xlO 3 kg)
= %116 0 C
When the lithium and lead were added and heated above the melting point
of Pb (327 0C), there was an immediate exothermic reaction with a
temperature rise of 193*C [5.8]. Given the uncertainty involved (esti-
mated heat capacity and heat of reaction at one temperature), the
agreement is satisfactory.
Thus the thermodynamic matrix can include Li 17Pb83 as follows
AHLi 17Pb83 %AHLi - 13 k cal/g-mole-Li (5.7)
AGLi 17Pb83 %AGLi - 14 k cal/g-mole-Li (5.8)
Comparing these values with Table 5.2, one sees that based on thermo-
dynamics alone, Li 7Pb83 (indeed any Li-Pb alloy) would be expected to
react exothermically with the substances of interest that Li reacts
with. However, the Li 7Pb83 reaction with N2 is not favored from the
free energy standpoint. As is discussed later, the dynamics of air-
Lil 7Pb83 is likely to allow N2 reaction due to the 02 reaction. A mixture
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of Li with Li1 7Pb83 is a potential problem.
5.2.1.3 LiAlO2 Reactions
One advantage of solid lithium compound breeders is the lower chemi-
cal activity. LiAlO 2 does not react exothermically with 02' N2, H20,
or C02. Concrete is discussed in the next section. It should be noted
that the more reactive solid breeder, Li20, can react exothermically
with H20 and C02 (below %O1100C):
Li2 0 + H20 LiOH AH500*C = -10.0 kcal/g-mole-Li
(5.9)
'Li 0+1 1 L O AH-oeL2i20 + CO2 + Li2C 3  H5000C = -27.3 k cal/g-mole-Li
(5.10)
Furthermore, the endothermic reaction
LiAO 2 + 1 0O Al 0 + Li2CO3  (5.11)
has a favorable AG, so that economic damage (degradation of breeder
material) upon exposure to C02 at elevated temperatures could occur.
However, this would not be a safety concern.
5.2.1.4 Flibe reactions
Thermodynamic considerations easily show that the lithium in flibe
(Li2BeF 4) is tightly bound and normal Li-type reactions are impossible.
However, flourine-exchange may occur. Flibe is basically a mixture of
LiF with BeF2 which are somewhat loosely bound (AH < 2 kcal/mole of F).
Some reactions of interest are included in Table 5.4. All of these are
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TABLE 5.4
Possible FLIBE Reactions
0 + - BeF 22 + 2
1 - BeF2A02 2+
02
102
+ LiF
+ LiF
H20 + 1 BeF2
H20 + LiF
C + 1 BeF2Co2 + 2
1o ~ - BeF 2AC2 +
+ }OF 2 + BeO
+-F2 + $BeO
+ OF2 + Li2 0
+ F2 + 1Li20
HF + BeO
SHF + 1 Li2 0
1 2
+ -COP 2 + 1BeO
1 C F4~ C 4 + 1 BeO
+ - COF2 + 1 Li 20
+ ? CF4 + - Li 2 0
CO2
CO
+ LiF
+ LiF
i 1011111 A 4 11 ki 4 14 114 N ii, I! I,[ %iji I W I
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endothermic. Hence there is no safety problem with H20, 02, N2, or CO2.
This is not surprising from the viewpoint of the periodic table. Regions
of relative electro-negativity indicate which oxides might react with
LiF-BeF2. A UCLA study [5.9] examined various oxides (concrete consti-
tuents). The situation is summarized in Figure 5.2.
There is a potential problem with flibe reactions with liquid metals.
Li, Na, and K will all displace Be. Thus mixture of a flibe primary
coolant with a Li breeder or Li, Na, or K secondary coolant allows an
exothermic reaction.
5.2.1.5 Concrete Reactions
From the thermodynamic viewpoint, concrete is a mixture of various
oxides-a mixture, however, that varies considerably. Table 5.5 shows
some compositions along with the magnetite concrete used in lithium-
concrete tests [5.10]. Thermodynamically, one expects Li to react with
most of these, while the stable LiAl02 appears inert. The UCLA study
[5.9] examined reactivity with flibe and found that oxides of Si, Fe,
Ti and H were inert with flibe, oxides of Mg, Ca, Al reacted with BeF 2
but not LiF, and the oxides of Na and K reacted exothermically with both.
Thus most of concrete (especially the typical magnetite concrete) is
unreactive with flibe.
Thus from the thermodynamic viewpoint, one expects LiA10 2 to be
inert, flibe a low problem,and Li and Li17Pb83 a potentially serious
problem with concrete. Based partly on experiment, a value of AH of
-150 kcal/mole-Li [5.5] for the Li plus concrete reaction is included
for completeness.
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Possible Reactions with LiF
Na
Possible Reactions with BeF 2
//
Li BG
Na Mg Al Si
K Ca
Fe, Ti
Fe, Ti
- unreactive
Fig. 5.2: Regions of the Periodic Table whose Oxides
May React Exothermically with Flibe Consti-
tuents, Based on Calculations in this Study
and Ref. [5.9]
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TABLE 5.5
Concrete Constituents (Weight Percent)*
of Some Different Concretes
CaO
Al203
Fe203
FeO
Sio2
So3/SO4
S
TiO
2
Na20
K20
CO
2
MgO
Magnetite
Concrete
8.6
1.4
39.9
23.9
5.9
0.70
0.05
10.1
0.14
0.07
3.39
1.6
.Portland
Cement
64.1
5.5
3.0
22
2.1
1.4
*Excluding water.
0
0
Hi gh
Al umina
37.7
38.5
12.7
3.9
5.3
0.1
0.1
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5.2.1.6 Thermodynamic Matrix
Thermodynamic considerations allow screening of possible combustion
hazards. The results are shown in Table 5.6.
5.2.2 Experimental Results and Other Literature Review
Having narrowed the potential problem reactions, further examination
can be made by examination of the literature.
5.2.2.1 Flibe/Concrete
No experiments with flibe were found. One study [5.9] did analy-
tically examine the concrete-flibe reaction. A very conservative upper
limit on temperatures and pressures was obtained by assuming a patho-
logical case where only the exothermic reactions with concrete constitu-
ents are allowed while the endothermic reactions of flibe with the major-
ity of concrete constituents were assumed to be kinetically limited.
Even then, the maximum temperatures (1200*C) and over-pressures (0.1
MPa) [5.11] are fairly modest. The maximum temperature and pressure
could not occur simultaneously. Since each maximum value was obtained
for a different scenario [5.11], given the very conservative nature of
the analysis, the flibe-concrete reaction seems relatively unimportant.
5.2.2.2 Liquid Metal/Concrete
Both concrete oxide constituents and entrained water in the concrete
react with lithium. In one test [5.10], a sample of lithium ignited
five hours after contact. The lithium initially reacted with water and
evolved hydrogen which allowed temperatures to rise to allow reaction
with the other concrete constituents. Lithium-concrete reactions appear
quite serious.
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TABLE 5.6
Thermodynamic Results:
Heat ofReaction at 500*C (k cal/g-mole-Li)*
L i
02
N2
H20
C0 2
Concrete**
- 72.2
- 16.4
- 52.8
- 76.1
-150
1 7 Pb83
- 59
-3
- 40
- 63
-137
LiA1O2
?('% 0)
- 13
C
FLIBE
?(1ow)
-25
*Blanks indicate absence of exothermic reaction.
**Uncertain, value dependent on type of concrete. 0
Li
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In a recent test [5.12], small pieces of basalt concrete were added
to a Lil 7Pb83 pool already at 5000C. Some of the water in the concrete
reacted with the alloy to form a thin crust (LiOH with 9% Li, 66% Pb,
400 ppm Ca) and hydrogen gas (1/2 mole H2 per H20 reacted). The absence
of significant amounts of other products indicates that the only reaction
4as [5.12].
Li + H20 -+ LiOH + H2 + (5.12)
Unlike the lithium/concrete case, there was only a mild reaction with no
significant temperature rise. The main concern would appear to be con-
trol of evolved hydrogen gas.
5.2.2.3 Lithium Compounds/Water
In scoping tests [5.13], LiA10 2 was found not to react with
water as expected. Li20 did react. In the same test series,
Li17Pb83 reacted modestly with water while lithium reacted violently (see
Table 5.7). Kinetics apparently limit the Li 7Pb83/water reaction,
although more experiments are needed. The lithium/water reaction is so
explosive that it is highly unlikely and unwise that lithium and water
would be allowed to come into contact in the reactor. In practice, this
means that water should not be present in a reactor design which includes
lithium. Further experiments are planned to better define the Li17Pb83/
water reaction. It should be noted that even if a solid breeder (e.g.,
LiAlO 2 ) is unreactive with water, it is typically hundreds of degrees
hotter than a water coolant. In STARFIRE [5.1], water is at an average
temperature of 300*C, while the LiA10 2 ranges between 500 and 850*C.
, f I I I ill I I A lild I I I l, I 14 I I i 4 lik III I 1.I ill 1 4 1 Plil [ " ,
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TABLE 5.7
Water Reactions-Experimental Results
Unreactive:
LiAl0 2, Li2SiO 2 , Li2ZrO3
Reactive [5.13]:
Compound
Li
Li7Pb2
Li17Pb83
Li20
Unreactive
gH 2 0 / 9breeder
3.0/20
2.8/40
3.0/50
3.0/50
3.0/50
(initial temperature = 600*C)
Peak
Temperature Time to Peak
900
770
630
625
600
10 s
20 s
60 s
50 s
Descriptions [5.14, 5.13]:
Li, Li7Pb2* vigorous, much heat evolved.
Li20, Li17Pb83 slow, mild.
*ANL test used solid sample of Li7Pb2 which was fairly unreactive.
HEDL test used a fine powder of Li7Pb2 which reacted vigorously.
Blanket design studies have utilized solid breeders in a fine
powder, small grain size, form.
0
0
i
1 1 4 1 1 11 j I, IwI1 1 -14 , ,
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Thus, a large amount of thermal energy exists to heat up and increase
pressure if water enters the breeder zone. Pressure problems are
addressed in section 5.3.
5.2.2.4 Lithium/Gases
Lithium-air reactons have been experimentally studied. A variety
of lithium loop experiments for corrosion studies have experienced lithium
spills resulting in fires. For example, one loop spill had a
fire with about 10000C temperatures [5.15].
A series of lithium tests with air, N2 and C02 have been performed
at HEDL [5.10, 5.12, 5.16]. As discussed in section 5.2.4, a computer
code has been developed at MIT [5.4-5.6] which appears to reasonably
predict the experimental result. Peak temperatures of about 11000C
for the flame and 950C for the lithium pool have been obtained for
lithium-air tests. Judging from the lower temperatures and pressures
obtained in Pure N2, the less exothermic nitrogen reaction (see Table
5.2) tends to surpress the oxygen reaction in air relative to pure
oxygen.
Pure CO2 is more reactive than air with lithium. 540C lithium
was exposed to C02 [5.12]. The lithium pool boiled (13474C) after 2.3
minutes and temperatures surpassed 14000C (where thermocouples became
inaccurate). Most (82%) of the residue was Li20 with some Li2C2
detected and 90% of the aerosol being Li2C03. C02 is not an inert
gas with respect to lithium.
/0"111
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5.2.2.5 Li1 Pb83/Gases
There is some data on LiPb reactions with air. At over 500'C in
open air,
"the material melted and smoked vigorously until all of
the lithium had escaped as Li20 and Li3N and only molten
lead was left. Unlike Mg or Li + Mg, however, LiPb would
not flame or ignite even when exposed to the flame of
a gas-air torch," [5.8].
Since Li17Pb83 has less-lithium than LiPb, it would be expected
to be less reactive. Thus Li17Pb83 appears far less reactive with
air than does lithium, although experiments are needed to quantify the
difference.
5.2.3 Static Calculations
For three of the combinations (flibe-concrete, flibe-Li, Li17Pb83-Li)
there is thermodynamic evidence of a potential problem, but no experi-
mental data and insufficient understanding for a detailed dynamic cal-
culation. Some simple static calculations can be performed to further
examine these cases.
The flibe-concrete case was studied by an UCLA group [5.9] as dis-
cussed in section 5.2.2. The actual kinetics would have to be very un-
fortunate, favoring all the exothermic reactions while hindering the
majority of reactions which are endothermic, for a serious problem to
exist. Their static calculation found a maximum temperature of %1200 0C
if only reactions of Na20, CaO, MgO with BeF2 were allowed. Maximum
10l I I 4 IINI 1111 111, .!q 4 14
-295-
over-pressures were always <1OOkPa [5.11]. This calculation is highly
conservative (tending to overpredict temperature rises and pressures)
due to the adiabatic, static nature coupled with pathologically worst
case kinetics. Further, even this value represents only a %300*C
temperature rise of the flibe from its typical operating temperature
in the current reference flibe/TZM blanket. For all these reasons,
flibe-concrete reaction is not deemed very serious. However, if
interest renews in flibe (or other molten salts), simple scoping
tests would be warranted.
The flibe-Li reaction may be more of a problem. The reaction
Li + 1/2(Li2BeF 4) + l/2Be + 2LiF (5.13)
has a substantial heat of reaction, Q = 25 kcal/g-mole-Li reacted. A
maximum temperature rise can be estimated very conservatively by assuming
the heat of reaction is only absorbed by reaction products. This results
in a maximum temperature rise of <800*C. In reality the accident kinetics
would likely keep temperature rises far lower. Grimes [5.18] has also
concluded that the mixture would be troublesome but not a serious safety
concern.
As lithium mixed with LiF - BeF2 the salt composition would shift
to pure LiF. The salt melting temperature would rise gradually from
459C to 848*C. If the initial temperature were low, freezing of the
mixture would be self-limiting. In the present base case, temperature
would be sufficiently high that LiF would not freeze (although Be might
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precipitate out). However, the mixing of low pressure flibe and lithium
would not be very rapid. Further, the high thermal conductivity of
lithium and high convection of the salts would serve to effectively
dissipate the heat of reaction.
The flibe-lithium reaction may be a minimal safety concern, but
appears unlikely to be highly serious.
The lithium-Li17Pb83 reaction is another potential concern, although
at present no reactor design calls for both to be present in the same
blanket. As in the flibe-Li case, the reaction product has an in-
creasing melting temperature. Thus, if the resulting temperatures are
too low, the product will freeze when the lithium content becomes high
enough - self-limiting the reaction.
The maximum temperature rise due to reaction can be conservatively
estimated, as in the flibe-Li case, by assuming that the heat of reaction
is restricted to heating the reaction product. Unlike the flibe-Li
case, the maximum temperature is a function of how far the reaction
proceeds. The reaction can be written
(a )Li + (b)Li.Pb Li(a+04 7b)Pb(a+O.83b) (5.14)
so that the exact product is a function of the varying amounts of reactants.
Furthermore the incremental heat of reaction drops as the lithium content
increases (Table 5.3). For products less than 50 % Li, the heat of
reaction appears fairly constant. The resulting maximum temperature rise
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is given by
AT ni 1860 (l+b/a) for b/a > 1.50 (5.15)(1+0.2 b/a)(1+25 b/a)
when one takes account of the changing composition. As the amount of
lithium to Lil 7Pb83 increases (b/a decreases past 1.50) the heat of
reaction begins to decrease to zero and the freezing temperature rises.
Even given a maximum temperature rise (no heat leaves reaction product)
and an initial Lil 7Pb83 temperature of 500'C, the reaction product would
freeze when the composition reached Li7Pb2 (b/a% 0.50). The temperature
rise in such a case is below 200'C. A more realistic treatment would
not be expected to find the reaction proceeding as far (higher values
of b/a, lower temperature rises). For example, if equal volumes react,
the product is Li0 .64Pb36 and the highest possible temperature rise is
Ml40*C.
Due to the relatively low maximum possible temperatures, the
Li-Lil 7Pb84 reaction does not appear a major concern.
5.2.4 Dynamic Calculations
Given the previous discussion, the potential chemical reactions
can be rank-ordered (Table 5.8). The most important modeling
needs concern Li and Li17Pb83. However, even if other reactions
(e.g., Li + flibe) are not safety problems, they may have the potential
for serious blanket damage (e.g., large amounts of frozen reaction
product formed).
11111 1 IiIIII 1 111  III !;I I hill
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0
TABLE 5.8
Rank-Ordering of Potential Combustion Hazards
Li
4
5
4Concrete
Li17Pb83  LiAlO2  flibe
3 1 1
4
1
0
5 - Known very serious problem, not allowable in design
4 - Known serious problem
3 - Uncertain, significant evidence that a serious problem exists
2 - Uncertain, evidence that only a minimal safety problem exists
1 - No safety problem
0
Air
H20
CO
2
Li
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The LITFIRE code has been developed at MIT to model lithium compound
combustion [5.4-5.6, 5.17] (Table 5.9). The most important and verified
option of the code is lithium-air [5.4,5.5]. Lithium pool temperatures
appear generally limited to 12000C [5.4, 5.5], consistent with experiments.
If a lithium spill occurred in the building not in the torus, it would
be difficult for much heat to be transferred to the blanket. Hence, a
spill in the building is mainly a concern in terms of breaching contain-
ment (a serious safety concern itself.) Maximum over-pressures for
large spills in a STARFIRE size building are of the order of 220kPa [5.4].
If the spilled lithium contacted the concrete floor (presumably protected
by a metal liner), the lithium-concrete reaction could be more serious.
On the other hand, if a lithium spill occurred in the torus, the
potential exists for raising temperatures of the first wall. While
maximum lithium temperatures are insufficient to cause melting, such
a fire might provide a mechanism for wall temperatures to rise sufficiently
for rapid air-wall metal oxidation to occur (see Chapter 6). However,
this requires a second failure, entry of an oxidant into the torus.
Preliminary use of a new feature of LITFIRE indicates that maximum temp-
eratures are lower for a torus spill due to insufficient gas transport
between the torus chamber and the building (through a 0.5m2 area duct
with corresponds to a typical RF heating or vacuum pump duct size) [5.17].
It does appear that lithium temperatures are adequate to reach the rapid
wall oxidation temperatures of V-alloy and TZM (700'C) but not HT-9
(1300*C). The present version of LITFIRE can not model the heat transfer
of a fire in the torus sufficiently to determine if the rapid oxidation
I I I - ------------  T_ ' I I I,, I I I I, I i 1. ! ;
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TABLE 5.9
Capabilities of the LITFIRE Code
Allowable Reactions
Lithium - Air (02, N2, inert)
Lithium - Water
Lithium - Concrete
Li17Pb83 - Air (02, N2, inert) [Planned]
Li17Pb83 - Water
Other Li compounds - Water
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temperature of 316SS (10000C) can be caused by a lithium fire in the
torus. Expansion of the air combustion model to Li 17Pb83 is planned
[5.17].
A simple water-lithium compound option exists [5.6]. At present,
the fundamental assumption is that the supply of water controls the
reaction rate: all water entering the reaction zone is assumed to
react immediately. The reaction zone is taken as an expanding sphere
in a breeder cavity which is penetrated by water-filled coolant tubes.
The current code has a fixed geometry and fixed arrangement of coolant
tubes based on the NUWMAK [5.19] design. Pressure considerations are
not included, thus explosive reactions like water-lithium may not be
adequately modeled. The user must supply the material properties of the
lithium compound and the reaction residue (Pb in the case of Li 7Pb83)'
This code predicts maximum temperatures of about 1100*C for water/lithium,
900 0C for water/Li 17Pb83 and 750*C for water/Li20 from an initial
temperature of 400*C (LiAlO 2 is inert).
5.3 Pressurization
Pressures generated from fluids can cause two different safety
problems, 1) overpressure of the containment building with potential for
containment failure, and 2) increased pressure stresses in the blanket
with potential for blanket damage. As discussed above, these pressures
can result from either combustion or escape of pressurized coolants.
oiqA 11111HW I 14 I w dl-"kil I d I I I'd 1 I, I
-302-
5.3.1 Chemical Combustion Results
Unfortunately, experimental data and analytical modeling is
insufficient to determine resulting pressurization. The worst cases
appear to be lithium/air and liquid metal/concrete. In the former
case, overpressures may reach 220kPa for a 22,000 kg spill in a STARFIRE
size building [5.4]. .The concrete or water cases are pressure concerns
due mainly to the production of hydrogen gas.
5.3.2 Pressurized Coolants
If a low pressure fluid like Li, Li 17Pb83, or flibe were to leak,
there is no direct pressure hazard except those already discussed under
combustion. Thus, for liquid metals or molten salts, lack of combustion
implies lack of pressure problems. Helium and water are more complex
cases.
5.3.2.1 Helium
A helium coolant is typically at high pressures (5.52 MPa for the
present reference case) to obtain adequate heat transfer. Helium
purge streams through solid breeders are typically near atmospheric
pressure and thus do not represent overpressure problems.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are two design approaches to
dealing with the helium coolant pressure. First, one can contain the
pressurized helium in discrete tubes, and not allow pressurization of
the breeder zone. Second, one can design the blanket module to be fully
pressurized such that helium leakage into and pressurizing of the breeder
zone does not lead to failure (e.g., Westinghouse/ORNL [5.20] design).
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These are shown schematically in Figure 5.3.
The former design approach allows more conventional geometries
and larger module sizes. The latter design leads to a larger number of
small modules (because of the need to withstand full pressure). From
the safety viewpoint, the trade-off may be the higher reliability of
fewer, more conventional modules versus modules that can withstand
pressurization from a helium leak to the breeder zone.
Thus, the pressure hazard in a blanket from helium is strongly
dependent on design. In the former case a substantial leak to the breeder
zone would likely result in module rupture at some point. Neither the
module nor the tritium system connected to it would be capable of
surviving pressurization near helium coolant conditions. In the latter
case, little or no damage would occur, provided that the attached
tritium system lines were protected against the higher pressure or
designed to withstand it.
Therefore, unless one pays the design penalty for the module
and connected systems to withstand %5 MPa pressure, a helium coolant
leak into the blanket can be expected to cause damage.
A leak into the building is a different matter due to the large
volume for expansion. The over pressure has been calculated for the
present reference case: STARFIRE size building (2.5 x 105 m 3), one-half
of total coolant released (see Appendix C). For a rapid depressurization,
heat transfer to or from the helium and building atmosphere can be
neglected to obtain a conservative estimate of the maximum temperature
and pressure. Hence the depressurization is modeled as a constant
I 111114111! k1l I 1H 14  14d 4 101 III 604H 1-d I IN i
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large module
external surface
not capable of
handling helium
pressure
Iip I 1I1pi
coolant descrete
tubes
breeder zone
at low pressure
Non-pressurized Module Design Approach (a)
minimal module
external surface
designed for
full helium
pressure
coolant
pressurized
module
breeder zone
Pressurized Module Design Approach (b)
Fig. 5.3: Comparison of Alternative Blanket Concepts in their
Ability to Withstand Pressurization of the Breeder
Zone
0)
0
0
n.0:"4r
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internal energy process.
Treating air and helium as ideal gases the maximum overpressure
following depressurization is r5kPa with a temperature of 2700C. Use of
CO2 (or any other near ideal gas) for the building atmosphere does
not significatnly affect this result. The approximate scaling of over-
pressure is linear with the mass of helium released and inversely
linear with building volume:
AP = 5,kPa(m )( O) (5.16)
M0V
where m0 = 1.2 x 103kgHe
V0 = 2.5 x 105m3
The maximum temperature is only weakly dependent on these variables:
(V/V0) + 0.042(m/m )
T(*K) = 293[ (V/V )+ 0.0174(m/m0 ) ] (5.17)
These pressures and temperatures are less than fission values
due to the large volume of the STARFIRE building. For thereference
case, the potential temperatures and pressures generated in the building
are quite modest.
5.3.2.2 Pressurized Water
A pressurized water coolant runs at pressures 3 times that of
helium (15.5 MPa for the reference case). Whereas helium was on the
I 1 I'd 4 11 !1 iNkiiflk I -,I o14 wi I ] Nf
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border between designs that could or could not withstand leak-induced
pressurization, a pressurized water loop design appears to lie in the
"could not" regime. Attempting to increase pressures in the Westinghouse/
ORNL [5.20] design by 3 would reduce the maximum module radius to
impractically small values (<5 cm). Existing fusion design studies
do not include attempts at blanket designs where the bulk module could
withstand pressurization to near 15 MPa.
For a STARFIRE-type module, any substantial leak of water to the
breeder zone (,0.l MPa design) would likely result in module and/or
tritium purge stream damage and rupture. The higher the breeder zone
temperature (500-850* LiAlO 2 versus 3000 water), the greater the
potential for higher generated pressures. Furthermore, the high
velocity water/steam jet could represent a significant kinetic energy
problem resulting in localized higher stresses.
Building overpressure is also a problem. The precise assumption
of the final thermodynamic state has little ( 2%) impact on calculated
maximum temperatures and pressures [5.21]. For example, assuming
liquid phase separation versus a homogeneous mixture has only a <1%
effect [5.21]. The maximum building overpressure and temperature have
been calculated using a constant internal energy model (that of Ref.
[5.22]). This assumes no heat transfer in the initial depressurization
to allow estimation of the most severe conditions.
For the reference case (STARFIRE building, one-half of the total
coolant inventory) the predicted overpressure is 80 kPa with a temperature
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of 85*C. This agrees with the value given in the STARFIRE study of
70-100 kPa [5.1]. Again, these values are lower than typical fission
designs due to the large building volume.
Due to the two phase nature of water, the scaling is not so simple
as for helium, However, air, behaves as an ideal gas and use of C02 or
another near-ideal gas would have little affect. The two-phase behavior
leads to less than linear scaling since a change in mass or volume can
be partially compensated by change in steam quality.
By varying the parameter (0)(V2) over a range of 0.05 to 10.0 the
maximum overpressure is found to be given by
mV +0.85
AP 80(M O) kPa + 5% (5.18)
Vm0
The variance increases toward the ends of the range as Galli and
Lord found for their fission reactor case [5.22].
The resulting temperature is approximately given by
T(0 C) n 85V( 0 ) +0.30 (5.19)
Vm0
The agreement is 5% in the range 0.20 < ( ) 4.
It should be emphasized that these scaling laws are specific to the
basic case considered. Galli and Lord found slightly different scaling
for a different regime. For their case, they found (there was no
discussion of mass scaling).
r
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AP V ()0.68 (5.20)
T v ( 0)0.21 (5.21)
5.3.3 Superconducting Magnets
The main importance of maximum building pressures lies in the chance
of containment being lost and, hence, the survival requirement for building
design. If some other design-basis accident can result in higher building
pressures, the relevance of a lower result from blanket fluids is minimal.
The most likely source of building pressure other than the blanket cases
described above is the leakage of helium used to cool the superconducting
magnets. To determine the relevance of blanket results, some examination
of magnet helium release effects is useful.
An energy balance on the fluids can be written
mHe uHe + mair Auair = E (5.22)
miHe m air = mass of helium, air
AuHe, AHir = change in internal energy
E = added energy from magnet coil stored energy.
Unlike the coolant depressurization, some energy is likely to be
added to the fluids. The accident envisioned involves the release of
helium from the coil structures due to either 1) a direct leak or
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2) rupture due to magnet quench. In either case, a large amount of stored
field energy may couple to the heating of magnet helium.
There are two major uncertainties. The number of coils losing helium
is unknown, as is the amount of stored energy transfered to the helium/air
mixture. For a one coil accident, mHe = 2.4x10 3 kg, Em 4.17 x 109 3
(reference values), one obtains
T(*C) = 10 0C + E, / 2.2 x 108 (5.23)
AP(kPa) = 2 + E, / 6.2 x 108  (5.24)
where E, = actual amount of energy transfered from one coil. For all
twelve coils, mHe = 28.8 x l03 kg, Emax = 5.0x 1010 J, and one obtains
T(*C) = -67 + E12 / 3.05 x 108  (5.25)
AP(kPa) = 19 + E12 / 5.2 x 108 (5.26)
where E12 = actual amount of energy transfered from all twelve coils. As
seen in Table 5.10, there is a considerable range in possible results.
The UCLA study [5.9] considered E = 1/3 Emax a realistic case. In
reality, the mechanics of various helium/magnet accidents is poorly de-
fined in terms of understanding the consequences. The STARFIRE magnet
protection scheme is to dump all coil energy into external resistors.
If such a scheme effectively minimizes heat input to the containment,
the possible consequences to the building are seen to be slight, even
if all the helium were vented. However, if a significant amount of
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TABLE 5.10
Possible Building Atmosphere Temperatures and Overpressures
Resulting from Release of Cryogenic Helium from Superconducting Coils.
Helium from 1 Coil
(M/M 0 =1)
Helium from all 12 Coils
(m/m0=12)
Overpressure
kPa
Temperature
*C
Overpressure
kPa
Temperature
*C
No energy
transferred
from coil
One-third of
stored magnetic
energy of af-
fected coils
transferred
Two-thirds of
stored magnetic
energy of af-
fected coils
transferred
All Stored
energy of af-
fected coils
transferred
10 19 -67
16.5
2
4.2
6.5
8.7
51 -12 0
23 83
29
42
97115
C
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stored energy were coupled to the helium, the table shows that considerable
pressures could result. For all cases, the overpressure scales approx-
imately as
A P% V (5.27)
as in the helium coolant case
The table does show that magnet accidents could well dominate the
building overpressure design criteria, especially for non-water coolant
cases. For water-cooled designs, however, only very severe magnet
accidents, involving multiple coils, could exceed the 80 kPa overpressure
for a LOCA. Future understanding of magnet helium release consequence
is needed.
5.4 Summary
Although significant data and analytical tools exist concerning
combustion and pressurization leaks, it is not yet possible to quantify
the consequences. Significant programs are on-going at HEDL (experi-
mental) and MIT (analytical) which will greatly clarify the problems.
It is possible to rank the possible cases. One direct concern
is maximum temperatures. The relative subjective consequence index for
TPtemperatures from combustion (RSCITP) is listed in Table 5.11. The
water/lithium case is so violent as to preclude the use of water and
lithium simultaneously in a reactor blanket. The other most worrisome
problems are water/Li Pb83 and air and concrete with lithium and Li Pb83.
Li17Pb83 appears far less reactive than lithium, although the difference
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TABLE 5.11
Relative Subjective Consequence Index for
Maximum Temperatures from Combustion (RSCI T)
Cool ant
Water
Helium
Lithium
Flibe
Water
Helium
Lithium
Li17Pb83
Water
Helium
Breeder.
Lithium
Lithium
Lithium
Lithium
Li17Pb83
Li17Pb83
Li17Pb83
Li Pb83
LiAlO
2
LiA02
Coolant/Breeder
Reaction
With
Airo
Reaction
4
3
I
Breeder
Concretj
Reaction
4
3
1 - No safety problem
2 - Uncertain, evidence that only a minimal safety problem exists
3 - Uncertain, evidence that a serious problem exists
4 - Known serious problem
5 - Known very serious problem, probably not allowable in design.
0
0
I ~ I
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is not yet quantifiable.
The relative subjective consequence index due to pressurization
Pfor either combustion or leakage of pressurized fluids (RSCI TP ) is listed
in Table 5.12. The results are similar to maximum temperatures, although
pressurized water and helium are concerns even without combustion taking
place.
Understanding is not yet adequate to determine the influence of
structural materials on these hazards. One potential difference among
materials is whether the maximum temperatures are adequate to cause rapid
gas-structural wall oxidation (other mchanisms do exist to reach these
temperatures). The relative impact of this oxidation is discussed in
Chapter 6.
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TABLE 5.12
Relative Subjective Consequence Index due to Pressurization from
Combustion or Leakage of Pressurized Coolants (RSCI p)
Coolant/Breeder
Reaction
*Water
Helium
Lithium
Fl i be
*
Water
Helium
Lithium
Li Pb83
Water
Helium
Lithium
Li thi umn
Lithium
Li thi um
Li17Pb83
Li17Pb83
Li Pb17 i 83
Li 17Pb 8
LiAl02
LiA10
2
5
1
1
3
1
'1
Air
Reaction
4
3
1
Concrete
Reaction
4
3
1
Leakage
Water
Helium
Magnet Helium
4
3
4
- No safety Problem
- Uncertain, evicence that only a mininal safety problem exists
- Uncertain, evidence that only serious problem exists
- Known serious problem
- Known very serious problem probably not allowable in design.
*Not including pressurization due to the pressurization of water and helium.
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
1, 1 1 IIw 1 11k l l I I III I , , .
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CHAPTER 6. RAPID STRUCTURAL OXIDATION
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are three possible methods of
mobilizing structural radioactivity: melting, rapid structural oxidation
with volat.ilization, and long term corrosion. Chapters1, 4, "and 5 in-
volve ,pQtntial temperature rises, wIgb-also defines the poteialfor
damage. Chapter 7 concerns corrosion problems. Here, the questions-of
rapid mobilization of structural radioactivity and reactor damage from
oxidation are addressed.
6.1 Problem Identification
Of the seven comparison bases for determining the materials impact
on accident consequences, three pertain to chemical hazards. The pure
fluid cases (Chapter 5) offer the potential for causing temperature and
pressure rises. The structural material response was not included. The
long-term corrosion problem (Chapter 7) serves as a mechanism for
radioactivity mobilization prior to an accident, as well as being an
accident initiator (e.g., coolant tube plugging). This chapter is
concerned with the potential for rapid oxidation of structural material
(gas-metal reactions).
6.1.1 Potential Hazards
A fusion reactor has an unfortunate design aspect in terms of
oxidation. At the center of the device, where the metal temperatures,
stresses, and specific radioactivity are highest, a vacuum exists. If
an oxidant is allowed to enter the plasma chamber, the potential exists
for rapid structural oxidation. In contrast, fission reactors have
no vacuum volume; during an accident, the pressure gradient forces
I dl4l flId,411ii16
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any building atmosphere away from the core (of course the coolant itself
may react with the metal). Thus the basic problem is contact of an oxidant
with structural metal, presumably the first wall.
There are two safety concerns. First, the oxidation may cause severe
reactor damage and loss of structural integrity if sufficient first wall
material oxidizes. Second, the oxidation may produce volatile chemical
species which would serve as a direct means of mobilizing structural
radioactivity. Besides these, there is a worrisome economic concern.
Even if structural integrity is maintained, the oxidation may be sufficient
to affect the vacuum/plasma impurity properties of the first wall, leading
to severe economic losses.
The base accident scenario would be: 1) loss of vacuum boundary
integrity due to failure of some penetration (vacuum pump duct, auxiliary
heating duct, etc.), 2) building atmosphere streaming into torus, and
3) high metal surface temperature (e.g., afterheat or chemical fire).
Thus a model is needed that predicts the reaction rate as a function of
wall, temperature. This is established for materials of interest in
sections 6.2 and 6.3.
6.1.2 Ignition Theory-Source for Uncertainty
If temperatures and oxidant concentrations are high enough, there is
the potential for ignition, self-sustaining reaction. Then, even if the
initiating event which caused the high temperature were to stop, the gas-
metal reaction could continue unabated, consuming the first wall. Unfortu-
nately for the safety analyst, the onset of ignition is highly dependent on
the environment, including metal size and thermal loss mechanisms [6.1, 6.2].
Thus, it is virtually impossible to predict whether the first wall would
f,11 111A 14 l1# hli l.4 jilN I1. ", "
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ignite without conducting experiments representing the geometry involved.
The large heat capacity of the blanket behind the first wall would serve
to prevent ignition by damping the temperature increase of the first wall.
Laurendeau [6.1] examined the potential for ignition of bulk pieces
of metal in oxygen. He defines a variety of relevant temperatures:
Tf - Final temperature, maximum temperature possible for a
given reaction.
T. - Ignition temperature
Tcrit - Critical temperature, allows spontaneous heating to
ignition.
Ttrans- Transition temperature, transition between protective
oxide scales (parabolic reaction rate) and unprotective
scales (linear reaction rate).
T - Oxidation temperature, temperature above which oxidation
oxid
is thermodynamically allowed.
Ignition is seen as a balance between chemical energy input (chem versus
all heat loss mechanisms (q ). The relationships are shown in Fig. 6.1.
The specific geometry involved helps to determine the actual heat loss.
The transition and ignition temperatures are most easily measured
for a given experiment, whereas the critical temperature is of most
concern to the safety analyst. If the temperature exceeds Tcrit, the
metal will simply continue to burn, dependent on the supply of oxygen.
Laurendreau notes that metals divide into those controlled by the
critical temperature and those limited by the transition temperature.
In the former case, the transition temperature is below the critical
temperature for a clean surface. Most metals are critical temperature
controlled. In the latter case, the transition temperature is higher
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Heat Loss
Heat Gain
THeat flame
Transfer
Rate Tignition
T critical1
transition
T.
oxidation
Temperature >
Fig. 6.1: Balance between Heat Loss and Chemical
Energy Gain in Determining Metal
Ignition Temperatures [6.1]
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than the ideal critical temperature for a clean surface. These metals
cannot self-heat to ignition unless the protective oxide scale is lost,
resulting from temperatures above the transition point. For these cases,
the effective critical temperature lies just above the transition tempera-
ture.
Furthermore, the critical and ignition temperatures exhibit sample
size effects. The transition temperature does not, thus it is the only
true reference temperature for assessing ignition danger. Only if temper-
atures reach the transition point is there the theoretical possibility for
ignition. For most cases, even higher temperatures would be required
(depending on geometry, etc.).
For surface burning (rather than vapor phase combustion) metals, the
ignition temperature is within 100 'C of the metal oxide melting point.
These cases include Pb, Fe, and Mo [6.1]. Some temperatures of interest
for some metals are shown in Table 6.1.
Ignition may occur in non-oxygen atmospheres. Rhein L6.3, 6.4]
studied the ignition of various metal powders in N2 and CO2. His results
for some metals of interest are listed in Table 6.2. He placed very
fine powders in flowing gases. The temperature was increased until
the thermocouple output jumped, indicating ignition. Comparing his
results with those of Laurendreau indicates the strong sample size
dependence. Since the first wall will not be in a fine powder form,
Rhein's results are not useful for predictive purposes. They do,
however, demonstrate the potential for ignition of various metals in
various gases.
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TABLE 6.1
Temperatures of Interest for Bulk Metal Ignition
for Selected Metals LRef. 6.lJ (*C)
Transition
Temperature
>1200
550
700
850
>1300
Ignition
Temperature
1315
850
780
1410
%1800
Metal Metal
Oxide
C
FeO
PbO
Fe
Pb
Mo
Ti
Zr
Metal
Oxide
Melting
Point
1420
897
795
1855
2677
Mo03
Ti 02
Zr02
CON1
-4 I
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TABLE 6.2
Ignition Temperatures of Metal Powders in Nitrogen,
Carbon Dioxide, and Air LRef. 6.3, 6.4]*
Ignition Temperatures 'C
Particle Size
<100-p
<0.1 P
1- 51-t
-325 mesh
-325 mesh
N2
388,410
504,527
no ignition
below 1080
830
490,525
no ignition
below 1170
no ignition
below 1316
*Since these results are for fine powders, they are not predictive
of first wall ignition; however, they do demonstrate that metals
can ignite in various reactive gases
Metal
Li
Be
Al
CO
2
330
25
360,420;
655
670
363,366
Ti
Zr
Air
353,393
25
466,410;
585
602,648
193,197;
240
Cr
Mn
870
696
--------------- I Ir-7rTI-7-- 1--r-
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6.1.3 Materials of Interest
Potential reactive gases in the building which may enter the torus
are air (02, N2) and C02 (for example, see the STARFIRE design, [6.5]).
In addition, if water is the coolant, a LOCA could result in steam being
present. If a lithium fire were occurring, various lithium species
(e.g., Li2O) could also be present. Largely due to lack of data for
other gases, the base gas studied was air. Where possible, comments on
the effect of other gases (CO2, water, Li-species) are included.
The four reference metals for the overall study, 316 SS, HT-9,
V-alloy, and TZM (Mo), are included. To indicate how widespread the
problem of structural oxidation is, some comments concerning two
potential first wall coatings, beryllium and graphite, are also included.
6.1.4 Approach
Unfortunately, unlike the fluid combustion problem (Chapter 5), a
thermodynamic screening of the various gas-metal reactant combinations
is not useful. Likewise, simple static calculations are meaningless.
For the gases and metals of interest, kinetics, not static thermodynamics,
determines the severity of the reaction.
The prime focus will be on the determination of the oxidation rate
of each metal as a function of temperature. Where oxide volatility is
significant, the rate of loss of volatile oxides is determined. The
former is a measure of the potential for reactor damage while the latter
is a measure of the potential for radioactivity mobilization. For each
there is typically a transition temperature, above which the problem is
significant. This is referred to as the lowest trouble temperature,
Tet C
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The reference structural materials fall into two different catego-
ries-refractory metals (Mo, V) and steel (316 SS, HT-9). The underlying
mechanisms are somewhat different. The behavior of the first wall
coatings, beryllium and graphite, is similar to the refractory metals
and is included in Section 6.2.
6.2 Refractory Metals
The refractory metals (groups VB, VIB) react readily with oxygen at
high temperatures. As discussed in Chapter 7, the oxidation potentials
of water or helium impurities are generally thought sufficient to preclude
use of these coolants with refractory metal structures. An accident might
allow contact between these metals and reactive gases, principally air.
This section examines in detail the theory and experimental data for these
metals in order to predict oxidation and volatilization rates (results
summarized in Section 6.5).
6.2.1 Mechanism
An overview of the mechanism is given to induce the subject. As dis-
cussed in Section 6.3, the oxidation behavior of steels is largely depen-
dent on the behavior and concentration of alloy constituents, especially
Cr and Mo. This is not true of the present alloys of refractory metals.
For the conditions of interest, protective solid oxide scales do not
form on vanadium and molybdenum. Gulbransen and Jansson [6.6] note that
for Mo (P0 = 0.01 atm), above 7000C, oxidation is limited by a surface
2
chemical process and above 8750C, is limited by gaseous diffusion. For
vanadium, the melting of the surface oxide, V205, at 670'C, indicates
that either liquid phase diffusion or surface processes will dominate.
The cause of rapid oxidation in these metals is tied to either the
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volatility of oxides present or the presence of a liquid phase [6.6 -6.9].
The most important cases are the presence of Mo03 (m.p. 795'C) and V205
(m.p. 6700C) [6.7] which can lead to disastrous effects on alloys which
contain Mo or V. Research on alloying additions has had little effect on
raising the melting point. For additions of -less than 30% of BeO, MgO,
CaO, NiO, MnO, Al203 , Cr203, and Fe203'to V205, the melting point of the
base oxide remains below 8000C and generally below 7000C [6.8]. In molyb-
denum experiments in flowing air at 908*C, reductions of a factor of 100
in the oxidation rate were possible only with additions of 9% Ca, 15% Ni,
or 25% Cr [6.8].
The alloys of molybdenum and vanadium presently being considered do
not contain enough of these additions for the oxide melting point to be
affected. The reference Mo alloy is TZM (99.4% Mo, 0.5 Ti, 0.1 Zr). The
reference V alloys are V-15Cr-5Ti and V-20Ti. Since the behavior of the
critical oxide of the base metal does not appear affected, it is conserva-
tively assumed that the rapid structural oxidation behavior of the alloys
is the same as the base metal. Of course, this does not affect the fact
that alloying additions presently considered may have substantial benefit
in reducing long-term oxidation (corrosion) at lower temperatures. The
possible:beneficial effect of other additions on rapid oxidation would be
useful to study in the alloy development program. Silicon additions are
mentioned by Mrowec and Werber [6.10] as being especially beneficial to
high-temperature oxidation.
6.2.1.1 Chemical Species
The first step is the identification of which oxides may be present.
Based on references [6.6] and [6.9] and data for vanadium discussed in
NIN 4 11 4 IN 14 1441 I P- d, , ,,
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Section 6.2.3, the primary condensed surface and volatile oxide species
can be identified for conditions of interest (see Table 6.3). Subsurface
oxides have not been found to play a significant role for these pressure
and temperature regimes, probably due to the dominating mechanisms of sur-
face reactions or gaseous diffusion [6.7, 6.8]. Unfortunately, Mo (group
VIB-Cr, Mo, W) and V (group VB-V, Nb, Ta) are the worst cases for oxida-
tion in their respective groups of refractory metals. Chromium is of in-
terest because of its inclusion in steels. Besides a possible structural
role, carbon and beryllium may be used as coatings on the first wall.
6.2.1.2 Oxidation below Catastrophic Temperatures
Although not of direct interest to the current task, some mention
should be made of V and Mo oxidation behavior at lower temperatures, since
the vacuum properties of the first wall could be degraded even if the oxi-
dation rate were too slow to be a safety problem. Protective scales
can develop and diffusion takes place by inward oxygen anion diffusion
[6.6- 6.9, 6.11].
Oxidation of Mo and W follows parabolic rate laws (Wagner type diffu-
sion mechanism) until about 475 0C for Mo (PO = 0.10) and 875*C for W (P 0
0.05) where oxide volatility begins to be important [6.9] and the oxidation
becomes paralinear [6.11]. This mixed regime (solid state diffusion and
volatility) continues until volatility becomes dominant. This surface
reaction limited regime has high oxidation rates [6.9]., Molybdenum oxida-
tion is discussed in Section 6.2.2.
The group VB metals have very poorly understood behavior at lower
temperatures. Behavior following rate laws of logarithmic, parabolic, and
paralinear has been seen [6.6, 6.11]. Many transitions exist due to break-
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TABLE 6.3
Major Oxide Species for Reactions at
500 *C<T< Metal Melting Point and Po >10~ atm
2
Condensed Oxide Volatile Oxide
Formula *
CO, CO 2
Cr, Cr03
(Moo 3)3
(WO 3)3
Va
2
Formul a
CO
Cr 2 03
MoO3
WO
3
V2 05
Nb205
Ta20
5
Be 1284
Element
Formula
C
M.P. *C
>3650
M.P. 0C
Cr
Mo
w
V
NbO
2
TaO
2
1900
2617
3377
1917
2468
2997
-207
2280
795
1472
670
1512
1877
Nb
Ta
BeO 2580 BeO
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away behavior and the non-protective nature of the oxide layer. Surface
reactions like oxygen adsorption may be limiting for some cases. Although
the data are sparse, this regime appears to extend to the oxide melting
point without volatility becoming important in contrast to Mo and W. Vana-
dium oxidation is discussed in Section 6.2.3.' For either V or Mo, oxida-
tion is pressure independent for solid state diffusion regimes, as one
would expect for n-type conductors [6.10].
6.2.1.3 Low Pressure Oxidation
Again, although not directly relevant to oxidation at atmospheric lev-
el oxygen partial pressures, a few words are needed about oxygen pressures
below 10~4 atm. Here, different oxide species dominate on the surface
(e.g., Mo02 and V02 ), hence the oxide volatility (for Mo) and oxide melting
(V02 melts at 15450C) criteria do not lead to rapid oxidation at as low
temperatures. Therefore, lower pressures reduce oxidation by direct reduc-
tion in the oxidant and by raising the transition -temperatures.
One study examined the oxidation of refractory metals for tempera-
tures from 1100- 1800 0C and pressures 10-5_- 10~7 atm [6.12]. Oxidation
is generally linearly dependent on P0  in this region, and processes like
2
oxygen adsorption appear important. Due perhaps to the far higher oxy-
gen solubility and diffusion for group VB versus VIB, the group VB metals
show higher rates of oxidation upon exposure to air, pure 02, and water
vapor at these pressures, yet there was only about an order of magnitude
difference among them. For T W 20000C and Pair % 10-6, the rates were
low, about 6- x 1016 atoms reacted/cm2-sec. For T 1400'C, the rates
decreased by about a factor of 20 to about 3 x 10 reactions/cm 2-sec.
None of the samples showed any weight loss, confirming the
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non-existence of important volatility effects.
6.2.2 Molybdenum Oxidation
There are three transitions of interest for rapid oxidation. At some
low pressure, oxide volatility first becomes noticeable. This is also
evidenced by an oxygen pressure dependence and a transition to a paralinear
rate law. Experiments indicate that this occurs for Cr, Mo, and W [6.6]
at about Pvolatle oxide ' 10-8 (Ptotal). Gradually as the temperature
rises, volatility becomes more iniportant. Second, when the volatile spe-
cies pressure becomes 10-2(P0 ), the oxide volatility becomes the rate
controlling step in the oxidation. Here, oxidation is quite rapid.. Third,
the oxide leaving the surface begins to hamper oxygen reaching the surface.
The transition to this gaseous boundary diffusion regime is dependent on
partial pressures, gas flow rates, and specimen size [6.6, 6.7, 6.8].
These processes will now be discussed in more detail.
Thermochemistry has very successfully predicted the onset of
volatility effects [6.6, 6.9j. At PO = 0.10 atm, the volatility of Cr,
Mo, and W oxides has been found to become significant at Pspecies %10-9 atm.
Figure 6.2 shows log P(MO3 versus temperature. For PO2 ?10~4 atm, the
~(o3)3  teprtr. Fr 2
equilibrium surface reaction is expected to be [6.9]:
Moo3 (S,1)-> ( 3 (g) (6.1)
Unlike the case for chromium, the reaction rate is independent of PO2
For oxidation in air, ,volatility should be noticeable at P(Mo03)
10-8 atm which comes at Tr%500 0C. This compares with experimental
observations of 475 0C for P02 = 0.10 atm [6.9] and 525 *C for air [6.13].
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Fig. 6.2: Partial Pressure of (MoO3)3 in Air over
Molybdenum as a Function of Temperature
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As this temperature is, in any case, below that of typical TZM operating
temperatures (%900 0C), one can assume that oxide volatility will be of
interest in any TZM fusion accident.
This first regime of oxide volatility importance is poorly understood
[6.8, 6.13]. The P02 dependence is erratic, varying from none to linear,
indicating a non-protective scale. The regime yields to a completely
volatility-dominated region at P (M03)3 ~, 10-3 for P 02 = total = 0.10 atm
[6.9]. Unfortunately, the experimental evidence in these regimes is
limited. Jones et al. [6.13] have shown that a transition occurs at
659 'C by comparing volatization of Mo with that of pure MoO 3. A decrease
in the observed activation energy from %88 kcal/mole to %52 kcal/mole was
noted. They postulated that this is due to a change in MoO 3 crystal
structure. Gulbransen reports that volatility becomes completely dominant
at 700- 725*C [6.9] and net weight losses occur. Since the transition
temperature must be below the Mo0 3 melting point of 795*C and typical
operating temperatures are higher, the first mechanism is unimportant to
the present case. Thus the precise transition temperature is unimportant.
Therefore, the high operating temperature means that only the latter
two mechanisms are of interest, some surface chemical reaction dominating
volatility and gaseous diffusion. The surface mechanism is now discussed.
Ideally, experiments would be done in Ar-02 mixtures, varying P0
and Ptotal, keeping one constant at a time as in the case for Cr [6.16].
Unfortunately these experiments appear not to have been done. Experiments
with Mo for temperatures above the 700 *C transition point have only been
carried out with air or pure oxygen atmospheres (generally P02= 0.10 atm).
The results of three of these are shown in Fig. 6.3.
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Fig. 6.3: Comparison of Experimental Results and Analytical
Model for the Oxidation Rate of Molybdenum in Air
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Gulbransen [6.9] ran experiments at P0 =0.10 atm with sample sizes
2 2
ranging from 0.12 -1.215 cm (flow conditions not stated). Below the
transition to gaseous diffusion (surface reaction regime), the sample
size had no effect. The points fell well on an Arrhenius plot with
an activation energy of 19.7 kcal/mole. Each'sample showed an abrupt
transition to the gaseous diffusion regime, in which oxidation rates were
nearly temperature independent. Increasing sample size decreased the
temperature (and hence the volatilization rate) required for transition
[6.9]. Presumably this results from decreased effectiveness of vapor
species removal. Decreased gas flow rates also decreases the transition
point temperature [6.7]. Bartlett and Williams [6.15] did not use the
same flow conditions at the various temperatures. The points plotted
in Fig. 6.3 are for the largest sample size (for Gulbransen) and had
flow rates from 12.7 -20.3 cm/second (Bartlett and Williams).
The pressure dependence in the surface reaction regime is quite
uncertain, but is certainly below P03/2 as seen in the surface reaction:
2
Mo + 3/2 02 + MO3 (sZ) (6.2)
At lower pressures, Gulbransen found a linear P0  dependence at 800 OC;
2
Kofstad L6.7] speculates that this could be due to a reaction of the
type:
Mo(s) + 0(physically) + O(chemically) +.Moo3(,Z) (6.3)2 absorbed absorbed MoO3(sul z)m(6.3)
To conservatively scale the P 02 0.10 atm results to atmospheri-c
(Ptotal 1a .1amaP 03/ scaling was assumed. Thus,
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Gulbransen's results have been corrected to atmospheric conditions (of
interest in an accident) and are plotted in Fig. 6.3 with an activation
energy of 20 kcal/mole (solid line). This reaction rate appears generally
conservative in predicting atmospheric results as the line is above most
of the experimental points.
The second problem is predicting where the transition to the third
regime (gaseous diffusion) occurs. There are insufficient data to attempt
a detailed treatment of the problem as there have been in the cases of low
pressure volatilization [6.14] and chromium [6.16], because of lack of
oxidation rate data as a function of temperature, pressure, and flow rate.
Also, the gas flow rate in an accident condition is unknown. Finally,
the volatile species partial pressure is sufficiently high as to invalidate
the assumption in the chromium model (see Ref. [6.16]) that the oxygen
pressure at the surface is the same as the bulk pressure. (For chromium,
PCrO 104 x 2 while for molybdenum, P mo l x P31 2 3 2
A conservative prediction could be obtained by assuming that gaseous
diffusion never becomes limiting, but information is sufficient to conser-
vatively and more realistically estimate the transition. Gulbransen's re-
sults for Mo and W show a transition to occur at or below the point where
the volatile species pressure reaches 0.3 xPO2 for pure 02 experiments.
Graham and Davis [6.16] noted that in the gaseous diffusion regime, the
oxidation rate for chromium scales as
P2 3/4 Ptotal (6.4)
3/2
For molybdenum, the oxygen dependence should be P20  and the oxida-
.2
tion rate for molybdenum in the gaseous diffusion regime should show a
dependence of
! , I I I --- - --- -- - - nI---r-r-r_-I_.--."_F "
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Mo oxidation rate % P 3/2 / al (6.5)
for flowing gases. Thus, results in air and pure 0.10 atm oxygen should
be very similar. Even.a pure oxygen atmosphere (Ptotal =P02 = 1 atm)
would be less than 10 times worse than Gulbransen's 0.1 atm oxygen results.
A conservative approximation of the transition temperature is taken to be
where
P(MoO3)3 "Ptotal (for transition) (6.6)
As seen in Figure 6.2, this occurs at 1200 *C and results in oxidation
rates (fig. 6.3) over an order of magnitude higher than Gulbransen's
results at 0.1 atm oxygen with small sample sizes.
Bartlett and Williams [6.15J calculated that the dependenc iwas 6
kcal/mole fn this third regime. Semmel's results [6.7] show a 7 kcal/mole
activation energy. Thus for present purposes a conservative 7 kcal/mole
value is adopted; the result is plotted (solid line) in Fig. 6.3. The
combined predictive model for the rapid oxidation of molybdenum should
be conservative for the following reasons: 1) no experiment has produced
oxidation rates significantly higher than the model prediction, 2)
experiments have been done on samples orders of magnitude smaller than
the pieces of metal involved in a fusion first-wall indicating possible
earlier transition to gaseous diffusion than expected in a reactor,
3) the experimental evidence examined had high gas flow rates, except for
Gulbransen, whereas the accident flow rates (once atmospheric pressures
were reached in the torus) may not be as high.
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In summary, the oxidation of molybdenum in a fusion accident is
modeled as indicated in Table 6.4. In the surface reaction regime,
little or no oxide film remains on the surface [6.7, 6.8] with the oxide
volatilizing away soon after its formation from Mo:
Mo + 02+io0 3 (s)+ (MoO 3)3 (g) (6.1,
6.2)
In the gaseous diffusion regime, there is no surface oxide film, as the
transport of oxygen to the surface is rate-controlling:
MO + 02  -- (Moo3 3 (g). (6.1)
Ignition and self-heating may occur for temperatures above about 700 0C
[6.1, 6.7, 6.8]. In all cases, the Mo that is oxidized is volatile;
hence, the volatilization rate equals the oxidation rate. For oxidation
and volatilization, the minimum temperature where significant problems
can occur is 700 *C.
6.2.3 Vanadium Oxidation
The rapid oxidation rates for molybdenum have been seen to change
depending on oxide volatility. The oxidation of vanadium is simpler.
Unlike the group VIB metals, V, Nb, and Ta do not exhibit volatility
effects. Rather, the only transition of interest occurs at the oxide
melting point which greatly accelerates oxidation. Calculations of oxide
partial pressure indicate that gaseous diffusion will not become limiting
at any temperature below the melting point of vanadium metal (1917 'C).
This conclusion has also been reached for the cases of niobium and
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TABLE 6.4
Conservative Model to Predict Mo Oxidation Rates
Surface
Reaction
Regime
C
Gaseous
Diffusion
Regime
Pressure Limit
Controlling Transition
Equivalent Transition
Temperature for Air
Reaction
Activation Energy
Log d (atoms/cm2-sec)dt
p (M >3 3 10- 2 2mooO3)3%l x P02
r 700 *C
mo + *2+ Moo3(s,k)
%20 kcal/mole
22.12 - 4.4 x 103 x T(K*)~
(Moo 3)3 total
%1200O C
Mo + 0
2o+~ O2 *~(MO3)3(g)
\7 kcal/mole
20.18 - 1.53 x 103
x T(OK)l
Pressure Dependence P3/2%0 2 02 total
0
0
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tantalum [6.61.
Unfortunately, data on vanadium are sparse, both for the-thermochem-
ical analysis and oxidation rates. Where data do exist, discrepancies do
also. The vali'dity of thermochemical data does, however, appear adequate
to predict the species of interest and the occurrence of transition points
for the pressures and temperatures of interest.
6.2.3.1 Thermochemical Analysis
The JANAF tables [6.17] do not include all relevant V species.
Most compilations of data have only dealt with the equilibrium oxygen
pressures between solid oxides rather than volatile species [6.18-6.21].
The possible species are listed in Table 6.5. The data given by
Kubaschewski and Alcock [6.18] and the other sources has been shown
to be in error by Block-Bolten [6.19] for the calculation of equilibrium
02 pressures for the reaction:
V205 (sZ) 0 + 2V( (6.6)2 ~ 2 2V02(s99')
Thus for temperatures above the melting point of V205, the reaction
equilibrium occurs at P0 'u 10-4 [6.19] rather than %10~9 (%700 *C) or
10~4 (\l200 'C) as would be predicted from earlier data. The result is
that for near atmospheric pressures, V205 is the dominant surface oxide.
This agrees with experiments [6.22], where, in addition, a V204 -V205
mixture sometimes appears present.
Schick L6.20] reports that the equilibrium volatile oxide should
be V02. In the available literature, no direct data has been found for
the reactions
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TABLE 6.5
Possible Vanadium Species
Condensed
V
Vo
V203
V02(V204)
V205
Volatile
V
VO
V0
2
0
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V205(s,)+ 02 + 2V0 2 (g) (6.7)
V02 (s) + V0 2 (9) (6.8)
The AG* for the reaction 6.7 can be calculated from the reactions
V205(s,z)-- 02 + 2V(s) (6.9)
2V(s) + 202-2V0 2(g) (6.10)
This allows the equilibrium partial pressures for V02 over V205 and
V02 (s) to be estimated. The data for Eq. (6.9) is taken from Wicks
and Block [6.21] and for Eq. (6.10) from Schick [6.20]. The equilibrium
pressure for V02 (s)/V 205 can also be determined, providing a check with
experiment, by substituting the reaction
V204+2 02 + 2V(s) (6.11)
for Eq. (6.9). The result for V02 (9) and V205(s) is shown in Fig. 6.4,
for P = 0.21 atm. The calculated values of PV0 indicate that the
02 2
oxygen pressure over a V205/V 204 mixture should be 10~4 atm at 730 *C,
in good agreement with experiments by Block-Bolten.
The results in Fig. 6.4 demonstrate the low volatility of V2 05
If one applied the transition criteria for Mo to V, one would obtain
for exposure to air: start volatility at 1200 *C (departure from
parabolic kinetics), volatility dominant at 2200 *C, and gaseous
-342-
600 700 800 9001000 1200
1.1 1.0 0.9
l/T(OK)
I I
0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
x 3
Partial Pressure of V02 in Air over
Vanadium as a Function of Temperature
1400 1800
0
-2
-4-
-6
-8 -
V205(s) V205(
V melts,
19170C
E
o0
-12
-14
-16
-18
-20
-22-
-24-
1.3 1.2
Fig. 6.4:
*C
I
-343-
diffusion limitation at 2600- *C. However, V205 melts at 670 *C and
vanadium melts at 1917 *C. Thus it appears that for temperatures
between 670 and 1917 'C, there should be no transitions and the
oxidation is dominated by the presence of the liquid oxide. This
prediction for V is in complete agreement with that of Gulbransen [6.9]
for the cases of Nb and Ta at analogous temperatures.
6.2.3.2 Activation Energy and Oxidation Mechanism
Kofstad [6.7] reports that the formation rate of Nb205 over Nb
above the melting point (1512 'C) is proportional to P02, following
a linear kinetic rate law, with an activation energy of 16 kcal/mole.
He suggests that the mechanism is thus controlled by oxygen adsorption
on the surface.
Price and Springer [6.22, 6.23], however, suggest a different
mechanism for V, diffusion through the liquid oxide. They determined
an activation energy fo V205 of 8 ±1 kcal/mole. They noted that the
activation energy for self-diffusion through an ionic liquid should be
[6.23]:
E = 3.74 RTM (6.12)
where R = gas constant, T = oxide melting point (*K). For V205, this
gives Q = 7 kcal and 13.3 kcal for Nb205 compared to 8 ±1 kcal and
16 kcal from experiment. These results suggest that liquid oxide
diffusion may be rate determining.
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6.2.3.3 Experimental Data
An extensive literature search has encountered only one study
of the oxidation of vanadium at high temperatures and near atmospheric
pressures-that of Price and Stringer [6.22] joined later by Kennett
[6.23].
Price and Stringer [6.22] studied the oxidation of vanadium in pure
oxygen (0.13-0.55 atm) at temperatures from 700-1050 *C. At higher
pressures and temperatures, they sometimes encountered burning or
autocatalytic conditions. The following results are for those reactions
where "burning" did not occur.
Three types of experiments were performed: 1) suspension of
specimen in constant pressure oxygen [6.22], 2) suspension of specimen
in constant volume chamber, allowing depletion of oxygen [6.22], and
3) immersion of metal in liquid oxide [6.23]. .The specimens were oriented
in the first two cases so that the liquid oxide dropped off. Surface
preparation was found to have no effect, with the exception that single
crystal vanadium oxidized more rapidly than polycrystalline specimens,
but both followed the same kinetics. In addition, specimen size had
no effect, unlike the case for molybdenum where size affected the transi-
tion point. The initial two sets of experiments provided data that was
fit to the general Eq. [6.23]:
m = const. x exp X P x tm (6.13)
The pressure (n = 0.75) and time (m = 0.70) indices were found to be
independent of temperature [6.22]; however, further analysis indicated a
pressure dependence on n and m. Niobium shows a ,P x t dependence
02
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(n = m = 1) [6.17] and one might expect similar behavior for vanadium.
Price et al. note that for lower pressures (P02 u 0.13 atm), the samples
showed behavior of m near 1 [6.23].
Since the immersad samples led to substantially lower oxidation
and the observed activation energy corresponded well with the prediction
of liquid oxide diffusion, they were led to propose a model of oxidation
rate dependence on the oxide drip off rate (linear) and the oxide layer
thickness (parabolic), hence the steady-state rate is given by
p k /2dL (6.14)
where kp parabolic rate constant
dL = limiting thickness of layer
Experiments show that this steady state was reached in a very short time,
about 3 minutes. The situation is further complicated by the observed
temperature rise due to the exothermic reaction. Even in non-burning
reactions, the specimen temperature rose about 70 *C, then fell to a
steady state value of 30 *C above the original temperature in 3-7
minutes. They concluded that the deviation from linear (m = 1) is likely
due to the non-equilibrium conditions existing during the first few
minutes L6.23]. The deviation was higher at higher temperatures and
pressures and was greatly reduced for the immersed samples. Using
Eq. (6.14) and available data for 700 *C and 0.13 atm (closer to equili-
brium case), they obtain a value for kP of10-8 2/cm4 -sec. Considering
the uncertainties involved, they state that this value is in fair
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agreement with extrapolating solid V205 diffusion rates and adding a
factor of 104 for the phase difference [6.23].
6.2.3.4 Accident Model
Three additions must be made to model behavior in an accident.
First, due to the larger size and thermal capacity of the surrounding
environment and the slower rate of bringing the metal to temperature, the
accident reaction conditions will be closer to equilibrium. Hence, the
reaction should be conservatively taken as linear in time (m=l). Second,
due to the different orientations of vanadium surface in the vacuum vessel
(varying the drop-off rate) around the minor radius of the torus,
oxidations rates would vary. Highest rates would occur at the top;
lowest, at the bottom where accumulated oxide would shield the metal.
Use of experimental data gives the highest rates and will be used to
evaluate accident conditions. Thus the model predicts the rate of metal
loss (leading perhaps to loss of structure integrity at the top) and over
predicts the overall oxidation.
From the experimental data [6.22, 6.23], scaled up for exposure to
air, (P0  = 0.21 atm), one obtains
An/A (kg/m 2 sec) = 0.135 x 10-1.75 x 103/T(OK) (6.15)
with a P0.75 oxygen pressure dependence. It is not possible to account
2
for the presence of nitrogen. However, since oxide volatility is not
important to the reaction rate, there should be no dependence on total
pressure, only on oxygen pressure.
--- - -- - _1.____-__-1_1 - I- __ -1 11 1 __ loop
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A third aspect is the determination of the maximum volatilization
rate. Unlike Mo, the dominating volatile V species, VO2, has a very low
vapor pressure. Furthermore, oxide volatility is not the rate controlling
step. For vanadium, a pool of liquid oxide accumulates. The maximum
rate of volatilization is given by the Hertz-Langmuir equation:
m = PVo2/(2 RT(*K)MVo )l/2 (6.16)
Since this equation represents the maximum vapor loss to a vacuum, it
is likely to overpredict the rate of oxide volatilization. However,
calculated loss rates are still very low. The maximum loss rate for
V02 is then
SVO (atm)
n moles 4= 4.9 x 0  2 (6.17)
m2 -sec (T(OK))l/2
or,
P VO (atm)
meters of V-alloy =.(atm)mK sec )=0.41 T(K1/2  (6.18)
sec T(*K)
For example, at 1000 *C the VO2 pressure (Figure 6.4) is about 10-
atm, then the maximum rate of vanadium volatilization is 1.1 x 10-13 /s
of vanadium. Thus only a very small fraction of vanadium could be
expected to be volatilized due to structural oxidation, although much
reactor damage could occur. Any exposure to air above 700 *C could cause
significant damage.
-348-
Based on the data of Price [6.22], it appears that, above nl000 *C,
vanadium may ignite in air. However, the volatility of the oxides is
not different from the non-ignition case, so that little vanadium
could be volatilized.
6.2.4 First Wall Coatings
First wall coatings may be required for plasma impurity control.
Fortunately, the major candidates tend to have low levels of induced
radioactivity although some are chemically toxic. Unfortunately, many
will oxidize just like the first wall itself, leading to reactor damage.
If a first wall coating were resistant to oxidation, it would tend
to protect the first wall, reducing the rapid structural oxidation
concern. Although the selection and influence of first wall coatings
is beyond the scope of the present study, it is relevant to demonstrate
that the rapid oxidation problem does exist for at least some candidate
first wall materials. Two such candidates are the low atomic number
'elements beryllium and carbon.
6.2.4.1 Beryllium
Gulbransen and Andrew [6.24] report that the oxidation of Be below
about 950 *C is parabolic with a protective oxide scale. The rates are
350< T< 700 0C k = 1.8 x 10-12 exp(-8,500/RT) g 2/cm 4-sec
p
(6.19)
700< T'<950 00 k =.5x1- exp(-50,300/RT) g2/cm -sec
C
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Above about 950 *C, Berry [6.25] notes that the oxide film has become
unprotective and there is a transition to linear kinetics. The oxidation
rate for some temperatures is given in Table 6.6. Thus a 1 mm wall would
oxidize in 17 seconds at 1000 *C.
Finally, ignition of bulk pieces of beryllium has been noted in the
range 1200 - 1300 'C when exposed to a steam/air mixture from a hydrogen-
oxygen flame [6.26]. The specimen temperature rose to about 2750 *C.
6.2.4.2 Carbon (Graphite)
Carbon is unique in that no solid oxide remains on the surface.
Whereas this unfortunately means that any oxidized carbon is also volatilized,
it also means that no residue is left on the surface for clean up. Thus
a carbon coating could perhaps be more easily repaired since no
oxide contamination would have to be removed.
The reaction rate kinetics are always linear. The surface reaction is
C + 02 -C0 2 (g) (6.20)
Therefore, the C02 partial pressure is given by
PCO = k P 0  (6.21)
Thus the oxidation rate is proportional to P02. The rate of graphite
oxidation has been studied in the range of 600- 1500 *C at
P02 = 0.05 atm [6.6]. The results have been scaled to atmospheric
conditions and are plotted in Fig. 6.5. The transition to the gaseous
diffusion regime was noted in the experiment to occur at a reaction
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TABLE 6.6
Beryllium Oxidation Rates [Ref. 6.25]
Temperature (*C) Oxidation Rate (m/sec)
5 x 10- 6%930
1050
1065
1295
6.5 x 10~4
3.2 x 1 -3
5.0 x 10-3
0
0
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rate of 4 x101 atoms/cm -sec for an oxygen pressure of 0.10 atm. One
would expect the transition rate to scale no more than linearly with P02
Thus for atmospheric conditions, the break point was conservatively assumed
to be about 10 atoms/cm2-sec, which corresponds to a 8500C temperature.
Above this transition point, a temperature de'pendence of 7 kcal/mole (same
as for Mo) is assumed, although the data [6.6] show a flatter curve at
P0 = 0.05. Carbon is seen to offer longer protection. For example, about
2.2 hours would be required to oxidize a 1.0 mm coating at 1000*C.
6.2.5 Other Gases
Relatively little is known about the behavior of the refractory metals
in non-oxygen atmospheres. Because these other cases may be present, a
brief discussion is relevant.
6.2.5.1 Carbon Dioxide
Berry [6.25] reports that vanadium is incompatible with CO2 at 5000C
and molybdenum is incompatible with C02 at 6000C. In general, the C02
reaction with metals at high temperatures produces oxides [6.26] rather
than carbonates. Thus the same type of behavior as oxygen would be ex-
pected, except at lower rates.
The situation is complicated by the facts that 1) wet CO2 is far more
reactive than dry C02 (possible if water is the coolant) and 2) radiation
plays a significant role in promoting CO2 reactions -due to the decomposi-
tion of C02 into CO and 0 [6.26].
In general, the presence of C02 would still be expected to pose a
significant oxidation hazard to these metals, although a lower hazard
than oxygen. Detailed experiments in the appropriate radiation envtron-
ment would be needed to quantify the difference.
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6.2.5.2 Steam
As corrosion problems prohibit use of refractory metals with a water
coolant, steam is unlikely to come in contact with vanadium or molybdenum.
Berry's [6.25] discussion of steam oxidation leads to the conclusion that
in these regimes steam is somewhat worse than' oxygen. For example, the
steam reaction has already progressed to rapid linear kinetics at 6500
(versus 9500 in air) for beryllium [6.26].
6.2.5.3 Lithium Species
If lithium alone were present, there would be no problem as the
refractory metals are generally compatible with lithium (Chapter 7). If
graphite were a first wall coating one might expect some trouble with the
exothermic lithium-graphite reaction:
2Li + 2C-+Li 2C2  AH = -55 kcal/mole [6..27] (6.22)
although the reaction rate at high temperatures is unknown.
If oxygen and lithium were both present, a lithium fire would result.
This would result in elevated temperatures in the torus (Chapter 5) and
reactive species like Li20 and Li3N. (LiOH could be present if water
vapor were present). In the case of vanadium, the oxide, V205, is less
stable than Li20. Hence the presence of Li20 (similarly for Li3N) would
not add to the oxygen-vanadium problem. Furthermore, there might be a
beneficial effect of Li20 smoke coating the vanadium wall, inhibiting
oxidation.
Li20 and MoO 3 are known to react. Some ternary compounds have been
identified as a result of the reactions [6.281:
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Li20 + 2Mo03 + Li2Mo2 07 (6.23)
Li20 + 4Mo03+ Li2Mo4 013 (6.24)
However, the products can not be prepared at higher temperatures where
Moo 3 becomes volatile [6.28]. The presence of Li 20 would not be expected
to add to the oxygen-molybdenum problem.
6.3 Steels
The analysis for steels is significantly different from the
preceeding cases because
1) alloying effects are dominant rather than insignificant.
2) a complex oxide scale develops
3) most oxidation products are solid and non-mobile
4) any volatilization could be non-stoichiometric
5) the data base for relevant temperatures is more sparse for the
precise alloy compositions of interest.
6.3.1 Overview
Whereas the refractory metals do not exhibit protective oxide layers
above about 700 *C, steels normally do. The addition of chromium to iron
leads to a surface layer of Cr203. Depending on temperature and alloy
composition a variety of oxides may be present: Fe203, -Fe304, FeO,
NiO, and Cr203.
There are two oxidation regimes of interest. First, the oxide layer
may be protective. Then, only outer surface volatilization of Cr203
can lead to radioactivity mobilization. Second, if protectiveness is lost,
other pathways exist (oxide spalling, liquid oxides, volatilization)
0
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to mobilize and damage the steels.
6.3.2 Protective Scales
The steels in question generally exhibit a Cr203 surface oxide layer
when exposed to oxygen, shown in Fig. 6.6. When this layer remains
protective, only solid state diffusion of the reactants is possible. At
low temperatures this means that the reaction follows a parabolic
kinetic law [6.29]:
dx/dt = kd/x (6.25)
where x = scale thickness
kd = diffusion parabolic rate constant
Unfortunately, Cr203 will volatilize from the surface:
Cr203 (s) + 32 02(g) + 2CrO3(g) (6.26)
and the reaction rate is altered to be [6.29]:
dx/dt = kd/x-ks (6.27)
where, ks = volatilization rate constant
at 1400 *C, volatilization of Cr203 causes a significant deviation from
pure parabolic kinetics for times in excess of one day [6.29]. As seen
in the next section, however, the oxide film on the steels in question
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would be expected to breakdown below this temperature.
Thus, for protective scales, the oxidation rate is parabolic. The
only volatilization is that of Cr203 which proceeds linearly. The
oxidation rate is too slow for these steels to cause significant damage,
if the scales remain protective. The rate of* Cr203 loss has been found
to be [6.30]:
ks = 0.214 exp (-48,000 ±3,000/RT) g/cm 2-s (T<1350 *C) (6.38)
which corresponds to atmospheric pressures and very high gas flow rates.
These rates (see Section 6.4) are very low.
The presence of water vapor could result in a 65% increase in the
volatization rate [6.31]. The presence of Li20 would tend to inhibit
the oxidation rate of the alloy due to the lattice defect effect [6.10].
The volatilization rate would tend to be reduced due to the possible
coating of the wall by Li20. Berry's [6.25] discussion indicates that
C02 exposure is less serious than oxygen.
For all cases, there is unlikely to be a safety problem for
temperatures where the oxide scales are protective. However, any
exposure to oxygen at these temperatures would produce an oxide scale,
altering the surface properties and compositions. This may be an
economic problem due to lowered vacuum/plasma impurity performance.
6.3.3 Catastrophic Oxidation
Unfortunately, the oxide layer does not always remain protective.
A constituent of the scale may reach its melting point which leads to
rapid oxidation and weight loss. For steels, the primary concern is
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the presence of Mo additions [6.32-6.35].
The primary mechanism appears to be melting of the oxide, MoO 3,
which permits a catalyst type effect which increases oxygen transport
and leads to rapid breakdown of the scale and accelerated oxidation
[6.32]. The physical picture is shown in Fig. 6.7.
The critical unknown is the threshold temperature for this beha-
vior. There are a variety of difficulties in answering this question.
First, the transition point is very dependent on alloy content. Seconds
the initial surface condition is important. If a firm scale is already
formed before the temperature rises to critical regimes, higher
temperatures are required for breakdown than if the surfaces were
initially clean. Unfortunately, in the course of an accident, the first
wall could be un-oxidized and already at high temperatures (e.g., from
afterheat) when oxygen entered the torus. Third, higher gas flow rates
may reduce the problem for if the MoO 3 can volatize away before a liquid
layer builds up in the scale, catastropic oxidation is surpressed. This
would tend to be beneficial in a fusion accident, although the precise
impact is impossible to determine at present.
Brenner [6.32] examined catastropic oxidation in Fe-Mo-Cr and
Fe-Mo-Ni alloys. His results are shown in Fig. 6.8. Researchers at
the Climax Molybdenum Co. have also studied the onset of catastropic
oxidation as a function of temperature [6.33-6.35]. Their results
are shown in Fig. 6.9 [6.33].
The compositions of relevant steels are listed in Table 6.7. The
composition of steels are plotted in Fig. 6.8 to show the likely
transition temperatures. As is seen in the figure, the range of Cr and
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TABLE 6.7
Weight Fractions of Alloy Constituents
which Influence Oxidation*
316 SS
2.5
17
14
0.5
PCA SS
2.0
14
16
0.5
*See Appendix B, Material Properties
C
Mo
Cr
Ni
Si
HT-9
1
12
C>
0
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and Mo content for austenitic stainless steels (e.g., 316 SS and PCA)
can significantly alter the transition temperature. The low Mo content
in the ferritic steel (HT-9) indicates that the transition temperature
would be significantly higher.
Additional factors need to be considered. First, small additions
of silicon are beneficial. In the 900-1000 *C range, 1% Si addition was
effective in surpressing oxidation in a 14Cr-4Mo steel L6.35]. The
possible benefit of the 0.5% Si addition in the steels is unknown but
could improve the behavior from that expected from Fig. 6.9.
Second, nickel content (belows25% Ni), which shifts the alloys
from ferritic to austenitic crystal structure, is beneficial. The
effect is highest for 14-18% Cr with 6% Mo where the nickel raises
the transition temperature by about 100 'C based on the data in
references [6.33] and [6.34]. The contribution of nickel to lower
(<2.5% Mo) No content alloys is unknown.
Third, if Mo does not trigger catastrophic oxidation, the melting
of FeO near 1400 IC will trigger oxide breakdown and rapid oxidation
[6.7, 6.8]. Fourth, the reproducibility of the results is not good;
the transition to catastrophic oxidation is somewhat unpredictable and
does not start immediately upon exposure to air [6.33-6.35].
In spite of these uncertainties, it appears that catastrophic
oxidation and volatilization can be expected to begin somewhere between
900 and 1400 *C for the steels in question. The best estimate for the
transition temperature of 316 SS (reference austenitic steel) is 1000
100 *C and of HT-9 (reference ferritic steel) is 1300± 100 *C based on
Fig. 6.9.
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It should be noted that for temperatures where catastrophic oxidation
is not triggered, the addition of Mo may be beneficial. For example,
up to 5-6% Mo is beneficial in the range 500-1000 *C [6.36].
The oxidation rate itself is uncertain and also a function of alloy
content. Based on the results available [6.32-6.36], the oxidation and
volatilization rate is taken to be 2 x10-6 kg/m 2-sec for non-catastrophic
oxidation (TAl000 *C) and 1.5 x10~4 kg/m 2-sec (T %1000 *C) and 2x10-4
kg/m2-sec (Tn1300 *C) for catastrophic cases.
Steam leads to catastrophic oxidation in steels around 1400 'C
[6.37, 6.38]. Whether in steam or air, ignition of the steel is possible
at that temperature [6.1]. The precise behavior of the reference steels
in CO2 is not known, but above 1000 0C oxidation and carburization may
be significant [6.25].
6.4 Summary
6.4.1 Oxidation Rate
The oxidation rate for the reference metals has been estimated for
exposure to air as a function of temperature. These rates are summarized
in Table 6.8. The time required to completely oxidize a 1.0 mm wall is
shown in Fig. 6.10. Below 700 *C none of the metals has an oxidation rate
sufficient to produce structural damage. However, sufficient surface
reaction may occur which would degrade the vacuum/plasma impurity
properties of the first wall. Above about 1400 'C, all of the metals
would deteriorate at extremely fast rates, approaching 1 mm/min,if exposed
to air. Furthermore, all could be expected to ignite by this temperature.
In between 700 and 1400 *C, the oxidation picture is heavily depen-
dent on metal and temperature. The refractory metals represent a
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TABLE 6.8
Oxidation Rates for Reference Metals in Air
Temperature
(*C)
700- 1200
1200-- 2600
700 -1900
<1000
%1000
%1300
<1300
%1300
Oxidation Rate (m/sec)
(T in *K)
2.1 x 10-3 x exp(-10,130/T)
2.4 x 10-5 x exp(-3,530/T)
2.2 x 10-5 x exp(-4,030/T)
<2.5 x 10-10
1.9 x 10-8
%2.5 x 10-8
<2.5 x 10-10
%2.5 x 10- 8
1 mm/day = 1.157 x rn-8 M/s
Metal
Mo
V
316 SS
HT- 9
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significantly worse hazard. The physical picture expected for vanadium
and molybdenum is shown in Fig. 6.11 and the reaction rate is plotted
in Fig. 6.12.
Alternative gases represent a less certain problem. In general,
steam would be somewhat worse and C02 somewhat better than air. Steam
reactions with metals would tend to liberate hydrogen. The presence
of lithium and lithium species resulting from a lithium fire would have
relatively little effect, other than the resulting temperature rise
itself.
First wall coatings, if used, may protect the first wall. However,
some, like Be and graphite, exhibit significant oxidation rates. The
oxidation of most first wall coatings is preferable to oxidation of the
first wall because: 1) coatings tend to be only slightly radioactive,
2) coatings are not structural members, so stress failures are not
threatened, and 3) the coatings may be more easily replaced or repaired
than the first wall.
6.4.2 Volatilization Rate
The volatilization rate represents the rate that material may
become gaseous and very mobile. This rate is summarized for the
reference metals in Table 6.9 for exposure to air. The reaction product
of molybdenum is highly volatile and basically all the molybdenum reacted
will be volatile. The reaction product of vanadium, V205, is liquid
and the volatile species, VO2, has a very low vapor pressure. Thus a
liquid oxide pool will develop and very little metal will be volatilized.
For both refractory metals, the volatilization rate is assumed
independent of alloy constituents. In an actual first wall, many of
l Ill 11101 HIJ: I 1111 ', ll, A 14 4 1 ll l -!I! 'I'll, Wkdl d III d
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TABLE 6.9
Volatilization Rates for Reference Metals in Air
Temperature ('C)
700 - 1200
1200- 2600
700 - 1900
<<1000**
<1000
%1000
%1300
<1 000**
<1300
,0 300
*In units of meters of base alloy per
surface in!:oxide form.
**For temperatures significantly below
volatilization is from Cr203 (see Eq.
Volatilization Rate*
(T in *K, m/sec)
2.1 x10- 3 x exp(-l0,130/T)
2.4 x10-5 xexp(-3,530/T)
<2 x108 x T-1/ 2 x exp(-57,600/T)
2.7 x10-5 xexp(-24,170/T)
<2.5 x 10-10
1.9 x 10-8
2.5 x 10~8
2.7 x 10-5 xexp(-24,170/T)
<2.5 x 10-10
2.5 x 10-8
0
second volatilized away from
1000 *C, the only steel
(6.28)).
C
Metal
Mo
V
316 SS
HT
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the radioisotopes are different chemically from the base metal (Chapter 8).
Thus, although the bulk rate is unaffected by small amounts of different
elements, the volatilization of the various radioisotopes would not
necessarily occur at the same rate as the bulk metal.
In TZM, the Zr and Nb species are less mbbile than MoO 3 ; therefore,
one would expect such radioisotopes to be released from the surfaces
at rates lower than the bulk metal is consumed. The concentration would
tend to increase at the surface. In V-alloys, the Cr203 specie is more
volatile than VO2. Thus, chromium radioisotopes would be expected to
volatilize from the V205 pool faster than the bulk metal rate. Other
oxides, e.g., TiO 2, would be less volatile.
For lower (<10000C) temperatures, only some volatile oxides like
Cr2O3 would escape from a steel. Between 1000 and 1400 'C the rate
would increase dramatically at the onset of catastrophic oxidation.
Experiments have shown that this material is lost from the surface in
gaseous and particulate form.
In all cases, the bulk metal-volatilization rates do not indicate
at what rate all the radioisotopes would be mobilized. The oxidation and
volatilization of the various chemical species can not be expected to be
stochiometric. Experiments are required to determine isotope-specific
volatilization rates. At present, the best approximation would be to
assume that release rates are roughly stochiometric.
6.4.3 Relative Consequence Indices
The relative consequence of oxidation of the reference metals is
extremely dependent on the temperatures involved in an accident.
Nonetheless, it is possible to define three indices to quantify the
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relative effects.
The relative consequence index to avoid temperatures (Tit) where
significant oxidation begins to occur is defined as
RCIT Tit(HT-9) - T0 (HT-9) (6.30)SO Tit - T(
where T = operating temperature.
The temperature margin, Tlt - To, for HT-9 is the highest of the metals
studied, about 950 'C. The temperature for rapid oxidation of Mo
(700 *C) is below that of the typical operating temperature ('x'900 *C).
Thus the RCIT is infinite. This case is particularly troublesome
since a single failure that allows air to enter the torus would have
extremely serious results without the need for any other accident
mechanism to raise temperatures.
The relative consequence index to minimize oxidation is defined as
RCIO = /l mm/day (6.31)
Since the oxidation rate varies with temperature, the RCI has a con-so
siderable range. If temperatures are low, all oxidation rates are nil,
so the index goes to zero. This is why a normalization had to be used.
The value of 1 mm/day is a somewhat arbitrary normalization constant.
The upper bound of the index is established at oxidation rates at about
1300 *C since that is-a typical maximum temperature expected in a lithium
fire (Chapter 5).
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The relative consequence index to minimize volatilization defined as
RCIS3  = om/1 mm/day (6.32)
ox
in similar fashion to RCI SO The only difference is in the case of
V-alloys. The relative consequence indices for structural oxidation are
listed in Table 6.10. Low values are preferred.
( -
41 1[ 11111 [IhN' 414 III,
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TABLE 10
Relative Consequence Indices from Structural Oxidation
RCITROso
Avoid Oxidation
Transition
Temperatures*
1.7
1.0
9.5
00
RCIO .
Minimize
Oxidation
0-2.2
0-2.2
0-147
0-220
RCISO
Minimize
Vol ati 1 i zation
0-2.2
0-2.2
0-0,1
0-220
*Since the typical operating temperature of a TZM wall would be above
the transition temperature, the index becomes infinite.
C
Indices
Purpose
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
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CHAPTER 7. CORROSION PRODUCT FORMATION AND TRANSPORT
Among the materials studied, there are seven coolant/structural
metal combinations. Each of these has some corrosion potential.
Furthermore, the various breeders may also cause corrosion problems.
Whereas corrosion does not present an energy source to drive accidents,
a variety of safety-related concerns do exist.
7.1 Problem Description
In this chapter, the formation and transport of structural corrosion
products are studied. Both corrosion and neutron sputtering are possible
driving mechanisms. Only corrosion rates from correct operation are con-
sidered. Rapid oxidation problems at elevated temperatures are discussed
in Chapter 6. It is assumed that the reactor systems in question are
operated correctly. As discussed in Section 7.2.1, the corrosion perfor-
mance of a reactor is strongly dependent on its appropriate operation.
Thus, the goal is a realistic estimate for each case. Incorrect operation
(poor chemistry control, contaminants from construction) would be expected
to worsen corrosion-related problems.
7.1.1 Possible Corrosion-Related Problems
Over the life of the blanket, structural material will be slowly
removed from coolant tube and breeder zone walls. The mass involved
can cause plugging of tubes, fouling of valves, clogging of filters
and degradation of heat transfer as it moves around loops and deposits
on surfaces. The actual severity of these effects is difficult to
predict as deposition patterns are often irregular, particularly in
complex flow geometries.
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The corrosion products originating in the blanket will be radioactive.
Thus, corrosion provides a means of radioactivity mobilization. The
deposition of this material outside of the blanket may cause a radiation
field throughout coolant and breeder piping, complicating maintenance.
Although the coolant loop inventory represents only a very small fraction
of the total structural inventory, it is already mobile by definition. If
piping integrity is lost, the corrosion products may escape to the build-
ing. Finally, the fluid processing units, impurity control or tritium
processing, may be contaminated with radioactivity, potentially making
operation and maintenance more difficult.
7.1.2 Material Combinations Studied
The eleven combinations of coolant/breeder/structure include seven
coolant/structure and eight breeder/structure combinations. These are
listed in Table 7.1. Coolant-controlled corrosion can be expected
to be more significant than breeder-controlled corrosion because of
1) higher fluid velocities which increase corrosion rates, 2) higher
mass flow rates which make it more difficult to minimize impurities,
3) more metal surface area which causes more material to corrode,
and 4) potentially higher temperature drops around the loop which may
increase mass transfer effects. For these reasons, emphasis was
placed on the coolant-related corrosion case. Comments on the LiA102
(He purge stream) case are included in the helium Section 7.3; comments
on Li and Li17Pb83 are included in Section 7.4.
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TABLE 7.1
Material Combinations for Corrosion Modeling
. Structure Metal
316 SS
HT-9
316 SS
HT-9
316 SS
V-alloy
TZM
Breeder
LiAlO 2 (He purge)
LiAlO 2 (He purge)
Lil 7Pb83
Li17Pb83
Lithium
Lithium
Lithium
Lithium
Structure Metal
316 SS
HT- 9
316 SS
HT-9
316 SS
HT- 9
V-alloy
TZM
Coolant
Water
Water
Helium
Helium
Lithium
Lithium
Flibe
q
(C1
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7.1.3 Approach and Scope of Work
The safety problems related to corrosion are difficult to quantify.
Unlike the other comparison bases, obvious quantitative figures of merit
do not exist.
Understanding is insufficient to reduce 'problems like plugging to
a single quantitative measure. This contrasts with other quantitative
measures like time to melting, oxidation rate, temperature rise, and
latent fatalities. Nonetheless, seven variables were selected for
emphasis, listed in Table 7.2. The easiest parameter to determine for
any system is the corrosion rate itself. However, for many systems
there is significant uncertainty even in this. rate. Since all
other parameters are influenced by the corrosion rate, it is easily seen
that the uncertainty for the other parameters is large, especially for
less-studied combinations. As will be seen, in some cases the lack of
knowledge of system behavior was so severe that certain parameters were
not calculated.
All of the variables in Table 7.2 can be related to some safety con-
cern. The corrosion rate controls the overall problem; no corrosion, no
problem. The corrosion product concentration in the coolant is a measure
of the degree of contamination and may influence the coolant path plugging.
The wall deposit thickness is related to heat transfer fouling and perhaps
plugging. The total activity release rate to the coolant is analogous
to the corrosion rate. The inventory in the coolant is always releasable.
Together the wall and coolant inventory determine the plant system con-
tamination level. Finally, whatever fraction of the wall and coolant
inventory that is releasable represents potential radioactivity
mobilization.
-n FTn-~T---Fw
d II[III i 'do,, I N l"ll 11IN 14 "PI IN, 11.81 +IhOIR) 1 +1 Ill 11 1 d,, , ,
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TABLE 7.2
Corrosion-Related Parameters of Concern
Parameter Symbol
Wall Corrosion Rate
Corrosion Product
Coolant Concentration
Wall Deposition
Thickness
Blanket Radioactivity
Surface Release Rate
Coolant (Fluid)
Activity Inventory
Wall Activity
Inventory
Releasable Activity
Inventory
kg/m 2-sec,
or 1m/yr
kg metal/m 3CT
W
INV
INV c
INV
I NV
r
fluid
kg metal/m2 wall
Ci/yr
Ci
Ci
Ci
Unit
0
C71
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The basic approach will be to first explore the basic fluid/metal
behavior and state of knowledge and operating technology. Then the
corrosion rate is determined. The initial transient behavior is not of
concern; rather, the long-term steady state corrosion behavior will
determine conditions through most of the blanket lifetime. Unfortunately,
relatively little corrosion data exists for fluid flowing tests for long
times (months). This is especially true for the more exotic fluid/metal
systems. Most screening tests of new systems are static and short-time
which do not necessarily indicate quantitative performance in large
reactor systems (although they are useful to eliminate poor or fair
combinations).
Based on available data and modeling understanding, the other six
parameters are estimated where possible. The cases range from 316 SS/
water, which is well understood, to more exotic cases like flibe/TZM and
Li/V, for which little quantitative experimental information exists.
The breeder cases will not be examined in as much detail, for
the reasons outlined above. The primary focus will be on whether a
significant amount of non-tritium radioactivity could be mobile. In
such cases, the operation and design of tritium breeder processing
units may be complicated due to the presence of gamma activity.
7.1.4 Magnetic Effect on Corrosion
The presence of an intense magnetic field in the blanket represents
a potentially significant difference in the corrosion environment from
nuclear fission reactors. In fission systems, the problems from
radioactivity of corroded material have meant that radioactivity released
due to extremely low corrosion rates was significant. Non-nuclear system
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corrosion rates can be higher with less concern. Only in fusion systems
is there concern for low corrosion regimes in an intense magnetic environ-
ment. The possible impact of the magnetic field on corrosion-related
system behavior involves many possible interactions.
7.1.4.1 Results in STARFIRE
A wide range of possible interactions for the 316 SS/water system of
STARFIRE have been examined (Appendix D), which were incorporated into the
STARFIRE design study (Appendix G of reference [7.1]). These were as fol-
lows: 1) change in ion diffusion in water due to vx B force; 2) change in
ion solid-state diffusion due to v xB force; 3) induced film stresses from
magnetostriction; 4) acceleration of corrosion rate by induced currents;
5) increased deposition of coolant particles due to field gradients; 6)
corrosion rate alteration by change of film microstructure; and 7) corro-
sion rate alteration by the presence of ferritic steel produced in auste-
nite steel. An eighth problem (not addressed in Appendix D for water) is
possible galvanic cell behavior, an electrochemical concern. Only the last
three were found to have potential for significant impact on overall cor-
rosion behavior.
As noted in Appendix D, some magnetic films produced in strong
magnetic fields show preferential orientation of domains [7.2], [7.31.
For 316 SS steel, the oxide layer is magnetic while the base alloy is
not. Furthermore, neutron irradiation and/or welding may transform part
of the bulk alloy to a ferritic structure, also magnetic. Thus, there
is the potential for the oxide film microstructure to be altered or for
the bulk alloy to behave differently (ferritic steel corrodes faster).
The magnitude of any effect on corrosion from these concerns can only be
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determined by experiment. If necessary, a mitigating technique for the
oxide film microstructure problem could be to operate the blanket long
enough to provide an initial film before starting the magnetic coils.
The effect of any microstructure or alloy phase can not be incorporated
into the present corrosion examination.
It should be noted that of the alloys studied, if significant, this
problem would be more severe for austenitic steels in oxidizing environ-
ments, like water or helium. For 316 SS, both the oxide film and alloy
effect produce material that is magnetitic, differing from the bulk alloy
(non-magnetitic). For ferritic steel (e.g., HT-9), both alloy and oxide
film are magnetic-corrosion makes little difference. Although
refractory metal behavior in liquid metals and salts is not as well
understood, the alloy surface does not exhibit oxide film formation
(see sections 7.4, 7.5). Rather, the alloy surface becomes depleted
in certain alloy constituents. For TZM and V-alloys, this does not
produce a phase change: alloy and pure bulk metal are both BCC structures.
The field gradient in a blanket may influence the behavior of the
electrically charged corrosion particles in water. Filters using very
high field gradients are effective in removing these particles [7.4.1].
Unfortunately, if field gradients were high enough and flow velocities
sufficiently low, particles would be preferentially deposited. As noted
in reference [7.1], this is unlikely except in very low flow areas. The
remaining potential magnetic effect is electrochemical.
7.1.4.2 Electrochemical Concerns
Even in a steady-state mode fusion device, currents may be induced
due to movement of a conductor. Induced currents in pulsed devices could
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be more significant. As a conducting fluid moves through the blanket,
currents will be induced, see Fig. 7.1. The concern is that this
current (corresponding voltage) may drive electrochemical reactions.
As noted in Reference [7.5], the influence of the apparent voltage
from wall into fluid is given by
RT [Cw1W 
[C IX
V = V- --- x ln w X H (7.1)Lf [C i [CzIZ
where V = apparent voltage in galvanic cell
V* standard voltage based on standard-state half
reaction voltages.
n = number of electrons per reaction
f = Faraday's constant, 96,493.5 coulomb/equivalent
R = gas constant, 8.31470 J/*C equivalent
C= concentration of species I in fluid which is written
for the electrochemical reaction:
yY + zZ ++ wW + xX (7.2)
For V >0, the reaction proceeds spontaneously. The induced voltage has
the effect of lowering the reaction threshold. Thus, for the reaction
ThF4 + 2Ni-+2NiF 2 + Th (7.3)
a 10-fold Ni ion concentration increase is produced by an applied voltage
of 0.0916 volts [7.5]. Moir et al. [7.5] indicate that the critical
-387-
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question is whether the ion concentration is raised above the solubility.
Their resulting design criterion is to keep induced voltages below one volt
in their molten salt coolant [7.5]. Another study suggested 0.2 volts for
flibe [7.6]. McManamy [7.7] has noted that the exact voltage which in-
creases corrosion will likely be determined by experiment. He adopted a
typical value of 0.25 volts. Standard reaction voltages themselves are
typically quoted only within 0.1 volts. Thus, it is concluded that the
threshold voltage which may accelerate corrosion lies somewhere between
0.1- 1.0 volts.
At present it is not possible to adequately determine the actual mag-
nitudes of voltages induced in a fluid. The following is a simple exami-
nation which may not be conservative. It is sufficient to show that in-
duced currents and voltages may be high enough to be a problem, at least
for some fluids. Further experiments are needed in this area. Miley
[7.8] gives equations for the self-consistent induced currents and elec-
tric field in the fluid and wall:
If = 2af r L (vB-E) (7.4)
I14= 2a0 dw L (E) (7.5)
where r = tube radius
d = tube wall thickness
E = electric field
v = fluid velocity
f = fluid properties (subscript)
w = wall properties (subscript)
By defining the MHD parameter
c(.d
C= Gwr (7.6) C
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and by equating If and Iw from Eqs. (7.4) and (T.5), the electric field
is obtained as:
E = vB/(1+c) (7.7)
For a tube of radius r, the voltage drop would be approximated by
V = rvB/ (1-+c) (7.8)
For typical blanket parameters, the possible voltages are calculated.
For water (water chemistry same as STARFIRE), with B < 10 T and
vmax 10 m/s (dl 1mm, r% 1 cm) in the blanket, the voltages are below 10-
volts, i.e., completely insignificant. The conductance of helium is even
lower, hence induced voltages are lower.
For flibe (B < 10 T, vmax = 10 m/s, dl mm, rol cm, wall = TZM),
the voltage is of order 0.5 x 10-3 volts. Although this voltage is
insignificant for these design parameters, it is noted that induced
voltages in the hybrid study molten salt design were higher, about 1 volt.
Thus, for a molten salt, the induced voltage can be a design constraint.
For lithium designs, the conductivity of the fluid is similar to
the metal, and 1 +c approaches 1. Then the induced voltage is simply
V = rvB (7.9)
For parameters typical of the present reference designs (rl cm, v1-l m/s,
B,<10 T), the voltage is about 0.1 volts. Thus, electrochemical corrosionf e-1-
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appears a potentially serious concern in lithium designs. For lithium-
cooled blanket, the magnetic field is seen to cause serious electrochemical
corrosion and MHD pumping losses (Chapter 2). It is anticipated that an
operational design would be forced to have sufficiently low induced
voltages, such that corrosion would not be significantly increased.
7.2 Water Corrosion
Of the systems studied, the water/316 SS combination is best under-
stood. The LWR industry has extensive experience in water corrosion
problems. Based on available data and knowledge of reactor system
behavior, a model was developed for use in the STARFIRE study (see
Appendix D) to determine relevant corrosion results. The model description
is briefly summarized below. The results for water corrosion of
316 SS and HT-9 blankets are described.
7.2.1 STARFIRE Model (Appendix D)
The possible magnetic field interaction with corrosion processes
was discussed in Section 7.1.4. The other primary potential difference
between fission and fusion is in the area of appropriate water chemistry
operation. The reference case is a combination of either 316 SS or HT-9
in the blanket Iwith Inconel steam generators. In the 316 SS case, the
STARFIRE design chose Inconel for the steam~ generator part of the loop as
is common in current PWR's. In the HT-9. case, selection of Inconel has
the advantages of consistency with the 316 SS case and a lower corrosion
rate than HT-9. Unlike most current PWR's, there is no Zircoloy
cladding; rather, the fusion system is more analogous to stainless steel
clad PWR's. The only water chemistry difference from fission was
shown in STARFIRE to possibly be tritium production from LiOH additions
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used to provide high pH. The harder fusion neutron flux will produce
significant tritium from even 7Li. However, for STARFIRE conditions,
the rate of tritium production at desired LiOH concentrations was
tolerable. If power levels were higher or desired tritium production in
the coolant were lower, an alternative corrosion control additive would
be needed; otherwise, optimum fusion water chemistry is taken to be the
same as for fission.
The coolant loop is modeled as consisting of separate compartments.
The mass flows are shown in Fig. 7.2. The rate constants are determined
from experiment and are discussed in Section 7.2.2. For the present
study, the long-term steady state behavior is most important. Water
systems show initially higher corrosion rates for a few months and then
reach a lower steady state rate [7.9, 7.10]. All components in the mass
balance are assumed to reach steady-state conditions.
Therefore, the net production of corrosion products balances the
net sink:
SAi = QsCs + QcCc (7.10)
where d. = corrosion rate for ith surface
Qs = filtration rate of soluble ions
Qc = filtration rate of insoluble crud (term used in this field
for particulates)
Cs = concentration of ions
cc = concentration of crud particles
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Part-(about one-third) of the base corrosion rate is directly released to
the water (ai), the remainder increases the oxide film thickness. The
released metal is in either soluble ion or particulate (typically called
crud) form. The mass balance for the oxide film is written as:
Z Oi + k C + kC = r + r.W.) (7.11)
1 5 s c c 1 1
where ks, kc = deposition rates
r = release rate
W = oxide film thickness
Equation (7.10) determines the concentration levels for each element.
Then, Eq. (7.11) is used to calculate the wall oxide thickness. The
increase in radioactivity follows the same behavior. The sources for
radioactive species in the circulating coolant are 1) corrosion products
from irradiated b'lanket materials, 2) blanket oxide material that has been
transported from outside the blanket and deposited in the radiation zone,
and 3) activation of material in transport in the coolant. The contribu-
tion of the third source was found to be insignificant.
7.2.2 Water Corrosion Model Parameters
The parameters specific to the 316 SS blanket design (areas, flow
rates, etc.) are taken from the STARFIRE design (see Appendix C). The
corrosion model parameters are listed in Table 7.3. Since the surface
oxides in a HT-9 system are basically the same as for 316 SS, the
deposition, release, and ion solubilities rates are assumed the same.
The corrosion rate (;) and corrosion release rate (er) are about three
077===~7T
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Cm'TABLE 7.3
Water Corrosion Transport Rates
Corrosion Rate (kg/m2-sec)*, d
316 SS
HT-9
1.14 x 10-10
3.42 x 10-10
Corrosion Release Rate (kg/m2-sec), dr
316 SS
HT-9
3.8 x 10-11
1.14 x 10-10
Deposition Rate (kg/m2 -s)
Crud Particles, k c
Ions, k s
Release Rate (sec1 )
In-blanket, r
Out-blanket, r out
5 x 10-3
20 x 10-
0
1.8 x 10-6
1 x 10~7
*for steels, 3.8 x 10~1 kg/mr2-sec = 1 mg/dm 2-month = 0.15 pm/yr
0
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times the 316 SS values based on available data [7.11, 7.12]. It should
be emphasized that the corrosion rates assume good achievable water
chemistry control; however, operating reactors can have corrosion rates an
order of magnitude higher if mistakes are made before or during operation.
Water corrosion is heavily dependent on water chemistry. The radioactivity
calculations are based on the average specific radioactivity in STARFIRE
(10 year operation, see Appendix B and Chapter 8).
7.2.3 Steel Results
The concentrations of relevant elements are shown in Table 7.4. Use
of Inconel steam generators reduces the differences between 316 SS and
HT-9. Whereas the HT-9 corrosion rate is three times that of 316 SS, the
resulting total mass coolant concentrations and wall deposit thickness are
only about 1.5 times higher. The overall mass transport results are given
in Table 7.5. For the HT-9/Inconel system, the major source of elemental
cobalt may be transmutation of nickel from Inconel deposited in the blanket.
It is also possible to estimate the amount of metal releasable to
the reactor building in the event of coolant loss and corresponding de-
pressurization. The reference STARFIRE design divided the coolant into
two equivalent loops. Hence, any single failure could only mobilize
contents of one loop. The critical question is the determination of how
much of the wall deposits are loose enough to be removed by the rapid
depressurization of the coolant. As indicated in Reference [7.1],
three cases which.range from optimistic to pessimistic are as follows:
1. The entire coolant from one loop-empties with no material
from the wall.
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TABLE 7.4
Coolant Elemental Concentations
(ppb - jig metal/kg coolant)
316 SS
Cs (ions)
3.8
0.7
0.03
0.003
Ccrud
20.1
9.6
6.0
0.2
0.018
Ctotal
23.9
10.3
6.1
0.51
0.021
0
HT-9
Element
Fe
Ni
Cr
Mn
Co
Ccrud
39.4
7.9
8.2
0.3
low
Ctotal
43.2
8.6
8.3
0.6
low
0
0
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TABLE 7.5
Calculated Mass Deposits from Water Corrosion
316 SS
Design
Total Concentration
in Coolant, CT g water
Deposit Thickness
In-Blanket, W in(g metal/m2
Deposit Thickness
Out-Blanket
W out(g metal/m2
41
0.20
3.6
HT-9
Design
61
0.34
6.0
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2. During crud bursts and shutdown situations in PWR's, the crud
concentration tends to increase by factors of 100-200. Added
conservatism due to the more harsh environment involved might
raise that to a factor of 250.
3. An upper bound on. mobilized material is obtained by assuming
that the entire outer surface oxide layer is removed (equals
one-half of the total oxide depth).
The resulting amounts of mobilized material is shown in Table 7.6.
Again, the HT-9 design is about 1.5 times that- of 316 SS.
Based on calculations with STARFIRE .(316 SS) blanket activity (see
Appendix D), seven isotopes were selected for transport> calculations.
All have been detected-in PWR coolants: 60 58Co, 55Fe, 59Fe, 51Cr, 54Mn,
and 56Mn. These dominate PWR non-fission product coolant activity; except
for 95Zr which would not be present in STARFIRE. They represent 91% of
the blanket activity for STARFIRE at shutdown (the dominant missing
isotope is 99Mo, which has not been previously detected in PWR coolants)
and 96% of the activity ten days after shutdown. These are thus the
most important isotopes for operating contamination and release calculations.
For isotopes of interest, the contribution of activity from coolant dwell
time in the blanket is insignificant. The remaining sources are
release of irradiated blanket material and activation of in-blanket
deposits of material originating out of the blanket. Table 7.7 shows
the ratio of overall wall activity from in-blanket corrosion to activation
of out-blanket material. Most of the activity is seen to originate with
the in-blanket steel. This contrasts to the PWR/zircaloy case where the
Zr oxide is very adherent and does not produce species like 60Co and 58Co.
Of course, the corrosion activity of PWRs does not include the fission
-399-
TABLE 7.6
Mobilizable Water Corrosion Products by Coolant
Loss from One of Two Loops (Mass of Metal)
316 SS
Design
(I) Entrained Coolant Mass
(II) Crud Burst Approximation
(III) Entire Outer Oxide
Layer Removed
8 g
2 kg
44 kg
HT-9
Design
12 g
3 kg
75 kg
-s
III III .lIi' I, . II
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TABLE 7.7
Ratio of Wall Activity from
In-Blanket Material to Activated Out-Blanket Material
Ratio'lIsotope
60Co 5.27y
2. 4y
31 Gd
72d
45.ld
27.8d
2.576h
82
77
25
3.4
3.7
2.0
0.2
55Fe
54Mn
58Co
59 Fe
51Cr
56Mn
0
0
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product activity which is present there but not in fusion reactors. As
seen in Table 7.7, the longer half-life isotopes come primarily from the
original blanket steel. Hence, the corrosion and activity of the
in-blanket material tends to dominate the corrosion loop radioactivity.
The radioactivity levels in the coolant and on the wall are shown
in Table 7.8. The possible radioactivity mobilized can be estimated
for the same three cases as for mass mobilization. First, a simple leak
of water coolant from one loop would involve 12 Ci. Second, for cases
where the wall deposit is disturbed (coolant material increase by a
factor of 250), then 2700 Ci could be mobilized. Third, an upper bound
would be the removal of the entire outer oxide layer (one-half of total
oxide thickness) from one loop, 32 kCi. This corrosponds to<0.001%
of the 316 SS blanket inventory. Although it is difficult to determine
what fraction of the mobilized material could leave the building,
deposition and settling should decrease the material by about 10. Thus,
the maximum water corrosion product release to the environment is
%0.0001% of the 316 SS blanket activity inventory.
The specific radioactivity of an HT-9 design was not obtained
(see Chapter 8); however, a few comments on HT-9 activity can be made.
As indicated in Appendix B, there is very little Ni or Co in HT 9, thus
the in-blanket contribution to 60Co and 58Co activity will be eliminated,
with some contribution still remaining from activation of Ni from the
Inconel corrosion products. The Fe and Mn isotopes will be fractionally
higher in HT-9 due to its composition. Based on Table 7.8, a slight
(<2-fold) decrease in overall specific activity levels could be expected.
However, the amount- of mass' mobilized in HT-9 is higher. Thus the total
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-402-
--
4-3
0
Cj *1C-,
E
10
m
6n
cl~j
c'LC)
r--
00N
coJ
CO N
r-- r-
-J C~
CJ CO 00 C)
'.0 co
CDJN j
"It
C i
co
m.0
CD
C.~j
10C)6 cocy;
0 a) C 0 ) S-L) LL. ! C-) L. C-)
0 LO - C( r-(.0 ") Ul) LO LO U)
C to
E 4-(.0 0LO F
K
LOU
r-) LOe
00)
LOl
r- C*%
0
00
(0)
r-
--
-
--
C
S-
4-
I--
000
j 0
-J -.
4.C
co (
C)ro
4-Jffu
U 0
C
0
uo
C)
0
0
C\i
-)-
01
C-4
o2
CIJ
r-
C
C6
-403-
activity in an HT-9 blanket from corrosion will be roughly the same as
for 316 SS. The major difference will be in the isotope mix. The HT-9
case is preferable due to the reduction of the more hazardous 60Co and
58 Co species.
7.3 Helium Impurity Corrosion and Sputtering
Helium-cooled designs are generally viewed as having no significant
corrosion problems (after elimination of refractory metals), especially
with regards to mass transfer and radioactivity. This is unfortunately
an oversimplification. Whereas the mass transfer is small, a significant
amount of radioactivity may be moved due to sputtering and corrosion.
7.3.1 Combined Corrosion and Sputtering
In any fusion reactor, both corrosion and neutron sputtering of wall
materia.l will mobilize some mass and radioactivity. The physical pictures
of each process separately and the combined case are shown in Fig. 7.3.
The oxide layer (see Section 7.3.3) is up to 0.1 mil (<2.5 pm) in
thickness on steels due to typical impurities in the helium. The oxidized
material can spall or flake off and be transported around the loop.
Bickford has examined the sputtering process and the typical range of the
0
sputtered particles ranges from 400-1300 A (0.04- 0.13 lim)[7.13, 7.14].
Thus, the oxide layer will typically be thicker than the range of
sputtered particles. Although the exact composition of a fusion helium
coolant is unknown, it is expected that the helium environment permits
the oxidation of Al, Ti, Si, Mn, and Cr, but the oxygen partial pressures
are too low for oxides of Fe, Co, Mo, or Ni to form [7.15]. This assumes
the fusion impurity levels are no worse than HTGR conditions, which is
]I,,! II N 1 1 .111114'1 1401411.k'141 4 11141 j I 11
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conservative since the reference fusion designs do not have un-clad
graphite in contact with helium--a major problem in HTGR's. Thus, cor-
rosion provides a means for Mn and Cr mobilization while any species
may be moved by sputtering, see Fig. 7.4.
Because of the non-homogeneity of the sc'ale, an exact calculation
of the movement of non-oxidized sputtered particles through and from the
scale would be extremely difficult. Furthermore, the thickness of the
scale itself is not well-known. The existing studies of the contribution
of sputtering to species transport [e.g., 7.13, 7.14] do not account for
the interaction of corrosion scale and sputtering. Due to limitations
and complexities of oxide layer data, sputtering is assumed to move atoms
directly from bulk material to coolant, ignoring the presence of the
oxide layer. In similar fashion, the corrosion contribution to transport
neglects the presence of non-oxidized sputtered material; thus, the two
processes are separated.
This separation has both possible conservatisms and non-conservatisms
compared to the more complete combined case. The separation is conserva-
tive since all sputtered particles from the base metal are assumed to
reach the coolant, none staying or being delayed in the oxide scale.
In reality, these particles can only reach the coolant due to: 1) repeated
sputtering by more neutrons or 2) eventually the release of the oxide
layer the particles are imbedded in. Thus the separation overestimates
the amount of sputter particles released to the coolant which can then
deposit downstream.
The non-conservatism is due to the possible oxidation of particles
sputtered from the surface. As will be seen, sputtered atoms firmly
re-attached themselves to downstream walls; oxidized metal atoms may be
-406-
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loose. Thus, oxidized atoms are more troublesome than single atoms.
The presence of oxidants may convert sputtered atoms of Cr, Mn, Al,
Ti, or Si to oxide form (only Cr and Mn are of particular concern for
steels). This could occur either while the sputtered atoms were imbedded
in the scale (quite likely) or in-transit in 'the coolant. The effect of
assuming that all sputtered Cr and Mn becomes oxidized is addressed in
Section 7.3.2. In general, it is felt that the separation of corrosion
and sputtering effects is a reasonable approximation.
7.3.2 Sputtering Source Term
The 14 MeV neutrons entering the blanket will precipitate various
adverse structural effects. Bickford [7.13, 7.14] has examlined the
problem of neutron sputtering. The basic problem is that neutron
sputtering of atoms and direct daughter recoil will eject significant
numbers of ions from the wall to the coolant stream. These may then be
transported downstream until the low vapor pressure causes the atoms to
firmly attach themselves to the wall surface. Hence, radioactivity may
migrate around the loop. Tube plugging is not a concern. Furthermore,
the material moved is chemically bound to the wall and seemingly non-
releasable in an accident. Thus, the only concern from material
transported by sputtering is that of contact maintenance.
Bickford [7.13] has calculated the amount of sputtering of activation
products due to lattice dynamic neutron sputtering and direct daughter
recoil ejection. The analysis necessarily includes many uncertainties
such as ion recoil ranges and reaction cross sections. The results are
somewhat dependent on the wall geometry, depth into blanket and surface
orientation, unlike corrosion.
Ill 14 4k I 411111:14 4 I~
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Given the amount of sputtering and a reference design, Bickford
[7.14] calculated the transport of material through the coolant piping.
For a tubular design based on an Oak Ridge design [7.16], he found that
the material tended to firmly deposit on the downstream wall before -
passing back through the blanket. The distribution and contact dose rates
are given in Table 7.9. The material depositing in the blanket is of
relatively little concern since the blanket is already activated. Bick-
ford notes that tube layout and geometry can potentially increase the
amount kept within the blanket. The contact dose rates on the non-blanket
sections are similar to those experienced in fission reactors [7.14].
By assuming that the inventory reaches steady state, Bickford
calculated the entrained and wall inventory, given in Table 7.10. The
only loss rate is radioactive decay unlike the water corrosion case.
The steady state inventory assumption can be relaxed and the sputtering
rates used to calculate the overall inventory for the present study helium
design. The detailed transport calculations were not repeated because
1) a detailed helium flow diagram through pipes, headers, etc. would be
required, 2) only maintenance is affected whereas the current study is
focused on accidental hazards, and 3) the results would likely not be
significantly different.
Analysis of Bickford's results indicate that about 40% of the total
sputtering came from the first wall. In his design, all tubes are
oriented normal to the neutron flux. In the current reference design
(see Chapter 2), only the first wall region is normal to the flux. The
side flow gaps are parallel to the flux, hence little sputtering of those
surfaces is expected. Unfortunately, the design has two coolant surfaces
facing away from the plasma which allow forward sputtering at first wall
'I 14*1H6 IN'41 111 1, ,
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TABLE 7.9
Contact Dose Rates and Distribution of Wall Activity
LRef. 7.14]*
Contact Dose
Rates (mR/hr)_
high
Headers, Manifolds
Hot Leg Pipe
Steam Generator
760-10400
670
%l 00
Cold Leg Pipe and Circulator
Percentage of
Activity on each
Wall Surface
17%
5%
3%
75%
<1%
loading, helium/316 SS design.
Blanket
*3.0 MW/m 2 neutron wall
-410-
TABLE 7.10
Total Steady State Inventory in Helium Design
from Sputtering [Ref. 7.141*
Activity Entrained
in Coolant (Ci)
7.39 x IC-3
1.77 x 10-4
8.07 x 101
2.78 x 10~4
1.11 x 10-3
1.23 x 10- 5
5.36 x TO-4
0.82 Ci
extrapolated
to 3.6 MW/m2 \ 1 Ci
Activity on Walls
(Ci)
4.71 x 103
5.13 x 103
8.05 x 103
6.96 x 103
7.29 x 103
2.18 x 103
1.48 x 102
34,468
o 41 kCI
*3.0 MW/mr2 neutron wall loading, helium/316 SS design.
0
51Cr
54Mn
56Mn
57Co
60 CO
99Mo
Total
0
I 11J1114 1l o l 1 d1,4 1 ,i H dI I' I I
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rates (Fig. 7.5). The equivalent total area experiencing first wall
forward sputtering rates for the reference design is about 2,400 m2.
Both daughter and bulk lattice sputtering were scaled linearly-from a
neutron wall loading of 3.0 MW/m 2 to the reference value of 3.6 MW/m.
If the sputtering rate is h , independert of time, then the number
of atoms in the loop is given by
d N = N - XN (7.12)dt o
Therefore, the rate of charge of loop radioactivity inventory (INV =XN)
is given by
T (INV) = 0N - x (INV) (7.13)
For the isotopes most of interest, only 60Co does not reach near steady
state activity levels in the reference operation period of six years.
The results are shown in Table 7.11. Coincidentally, the total inventory
for this case is very similar to Bickford's case, scaled to the same
neutron wall loading.
Finally, the assumption [7.14] that MHD forces do not affect sput-
tering trajectories was examined. The gyroradius (r) of a particle
with energy E(eV) in a magnetic field is given by
r(m) = 1.5 x10 4 VE e (7.14)
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TABLE 7.11
Calculated Inventory for Reference
Helium/316 SS Design from Sputtering
(
Injection Rate Ci/yr Inventory at 6 yr, Ci
56,800
5,580
2.14 x 10 7
8,680
26,200
399
51Cr
54Mn
56Mn
57Co
5 8 Co
60Co
99Mo
Total 2.15 x 10 7
for 60Co, all isotopes reach steady state in 6 years;
state 60Co inventory would be 3,040 Ci.
Isotope
15,700
r
6,230
6,690
9,080
9,330
7,440
1 ,659*
170
40,599
*Except
steady
the
1 111111 A I !]A Ill I ,l [I I I lq, I.101,111 0 % 1!!
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This can be compared to the range of sputtered particles in metal, about
0.2 pm. For particles with energy as low as 0.025 eV (ambient), the gyro-
radius is still ten times the range. The initial gyroradius for a 1 MeV
particle is about 105 times the range. Thus, the gyromotion of a sput-
tered ion does not significantly alter the range trajectory in the metal.
Low energy particles already in the helium (with higher range) might be
affected, but this would not change the sputtering source term.
If one assumes that the Cr and Mn species were to be oxidized, the
resulting sputtered inventory would not be changed. However, the trans-
port and deposition distribution would be altered. Furthermore, the Mn
and Cr isotopes, if oxidized, would not be expected to be firmly attached
to the wall. Hence, a depressurization could release them to the build-
ing. The assumption that sputtered 51Cr, 54Mn, and 56Mn are oxidized
means that 22 kCi of the 41 kCi inventory may be a form releasable to the
building.
7.3.3 Corrosion Source Term
If helium were completely pure, there would be no corrosion problem,
although helium embrittlement could be of concern. The exact amount of
oxidizing impurities in an operating fusion reactor is unknown. "In large
coolant systems where relatively large helium make-up fractions are re-
quired, it is generally not considered feasible to maintain the oxygen
concentration in helium at levels sufficiently low to prevent oxidation
of the reactive and refractory metals." [7.11].
Bickford [7.13, 7.14] obtained an oxidation rate by linear extrapo-
lation downward from Rosenwasser and Johnson [7.17] results for 316 SS
at 650 and 8000C. At 5500C, this results in a rate of 0.028 im/yr
-415-
penetration rate, assuming steady state spalling of Cr203.
Actually one might tend to expect a temperature dependence of exp
(E/RT) as diffusion is an activated process. Such a dependence results
in an extrapolation of 0.113 pm/yr at 500'C and -0.05 pm/yr at the
reference design temperature of 4500C. It siould be noted that no spal-
ling occurred in Rosenwasser and Johnson's test at 6500C, thus even an
0.05 pm/yr steady state penetration rate could lead to zero oxide mobili-
zation.
Mazandaramy [7.15] has noted that the oxide scale is not pure
Cr203, but is rather Mn and Cr rich. The penetration kinetics did not
show linear behavior, but rather one of form k(t- t0)0.35. The initial
time to any spalling (t0 ) was about 1000 hr.
One may obtain a very conservative estimate of the corrosion contri-
bution as follows. Assume a steady state penetration of the steel (0.05
pm/yr) resulting in mobilization of only Cr and Mn species (since the
present time scales are long, 6 yr, and linear kinetics have been observed
in some tests (e.g., Ref. [7.17]), a steady linear rate is assumed.)
Filtration of the oxide dust is taken to be insignificant since only small
amounts are involved (may be hard to filter) and the material may
deposit quickly. In a water system, filtration is effective partly be-
cause the concentration around the loop is fairly uniform. Thus, diver-
sion of a small (1l%) amount of flow to be filtered can reduce overall
concentration levels and deposition. At present, this can not be assumed
true of helium systems. Note that only a fraction of activity in a fis-
sion helium system is related to corrosion products. The fission products
tend to receive more attention.
Use of this corrosion rate and the alloy composition of steel, a
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release of about 3 kg/yr of Cr and Mn metal is predicted. The total
steady state inventory of 56Mn (17.2 Ci), 54Mn (9362) and 51Cr (2372)
is 12 kCi. The fraction of the material which could be released is
unknown; however, the oxides may act as loose dust so a 100% releasable
fraction is conservatively assumed. To be consistent with the water
case, it is assumed that all the helium is separated into two coolant
loops. Therefore, the maximum release of activity would be 6 kCi.
7.3.4 Implications for Solid Breeders
In most designs incorporating a solid breeder, a helium purge stream
is included to continuously remove tritium from the blanket. Structural
activity (including gammas) may enter this stream and contaminate the
tritium processing loop in one of four ways: 1) sputtering of wall mate-
rial into purge stream, 2) oxidation and release of wall material due to
helium impurities, 3) oxidation and release of wall material due to metal-
breeder interaction, 4) leakage of coolant into the breeder chamber.
The steel enclosing the breeder zone and coolant tubes passing
through it may be a source of sputtering particles. However, this would
be far less of a problem than for the coolant because 1) the neutron flux
is lower and softer than the first wall (especially for LiAIO 2 behind a
neutron multiplier), 2) the low gas flow rates and geometry make redepo-
sition of particles within the zone quite likely. Similarly, the surface
oxidation is likely to be less of a problem than for the coolant because
of lower gas flow rates and lower impurity levels (possibly due to smaller
amounts of helium involved, which is processed for tritium each pass).
Although solid breeders do interact with steel [7.18, 7.19], the
reaction is slight and only possible where breeder and metal come in
I'lA W INII, i, _ 1 I
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close contact. The experiments to date have found the oxide to be very
adherent, thus there may be little or no contribution to transport of
structural activity.
Even if normal operation were not to contaminate the tritium loop,
accidental leakage of a coolant would. Even a small leak of water at
15 MPa or helium at 5 MPa into a 0.1 MPa breeder zone would cause signi-
ficant amount of contamination of the tritium system piping that connects
to the breeder zone. If this part of the tritium facility were not
designed for operation with at least modest contamination of gamma acti-
vity (as opposed to the weak tritium beta), a single blanket accidental
leak could make the tritium processing systems useless.
7.4 Lithium Corrosion
A large body of research has been conducted on liquid metal corrosion
and a variety of survey papers have appeared in literature (see, for
example, Ref. [7.20]). There is no need to repeat these here. Rather,
the quantitative and/or qualitative safety related behavior will be ad-
dressed. The primary focus is on lithium corrosion of the reference
metals, 316 SS, HT-9, V-alloy, and TZM. Some discussion of the behavior
of the liquid Li17Pb83 alloy is included. Although much work has been
done on lithium (some on liquid lead, very little on Li17Pb83) corrosion,
it will be seen that large gaps on knowledge exist which limit the quan-
titative examination.
7.4.1 Liquid Metal Behavior
A liquid metal may have a variety of effects on a structural alloy.
Most severe is liquid penetration and bulk dissolution of the solid.
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Even minor liquid penetration can severely weaken the structure, especially
along grain boundaries. Second, minor constituents/impurities in the
liquid may contaminate and degrade the solid properties. Third, the
solid surface may corrode in the liquid, generally through dissolution
of alloy constituents.
The dissolution of alloy constituents into the liquid is caused by
the relatively high solubility of constituent in the liquid. As the
coolant moves around the loop and temperatures decline, the liquid
becomes supersaturated and the soluble species will deposit on the wall.
This thermal gradient mass transfer is governed by the equation:
= k(Cs - C ) (7.15)
where Cs = equilibrium solubility of ion in liquid
Ci = actual solubility
k = rate constant
Thus the relative levels of Cs and C. determine whether dissolution or
deposition occurs. The rate constant and solubility are all functions of
temperature. The net mass transfer is influenced by the temperature drop
around the loop, AT OP, as this determines the driving solubility
gradient. As discussed later, the general behavior divides into two
time periods. Initially, very soluble alloy constitutents are leached
from the solid forming a depleted zone in the metal [7.20, 7.21]. The
diffusion tends to follow parabolic kinetics. Eventually, a steady state
is reached controlled by the surface dissolution of the base metal.
The release rates of the various elements in the alloy generally become
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stoichiometric [7.21, 7.22].
The steady state inventory can be estimated. Approximating the
buildup of radioisotopes in the bulk structure as follows:
nb (t) = nb()( 1-e-)At)
where nb(co) is the steady state inventory
The buildup of corrosion products is given by
d
nc(t) = r nb(t) - Anc(t)
where r = total dissolution rate in the blanket
nc = atoms of products in coolant or deposited on walls
The solution of Eq.
rn b
nc(t) =
(7.17) is then
[ -- )t
- I [1-et(1+A)
Then at steady state, the concentration of corrosion species is given by
nc (b) b (7.19)
Therefore, use of the corrosion rate and equilibrium isotope concentrations
in blanket material allow estimation of the coolant 'and wall deposit
activity.
(7.16)
(7.17)
(7.18)
i I - --- i 1 - , I !
,HIH 111 4 41-:14414INN
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Implicit in Eq. (7.17) is the neglect of other net sinks for
corrosion species, e.g., filters. The present understanding of lithium
systems does not allow quantifiable estimates of the potential decrease
of coolant corrosion inventory due to filtration. There is evidence
that simply removing soluble ions may actualty increase corrosion.
Borgstedt [7.23] found that gettering of Ni ions by Ti or Zr increased
stainless steel corrosion due to increased Ni leaching: the solubility
gradient had been increased. The impurity control system can decrease
corrosion by reduction of harmful impurities, e.g., C. N. 0, which may
act to increase the solubility of metal ions. Reduction of impurities
may decrease metal ion solubility, as well as potentially reduce
structural changes [7.20, 7.24, 7.25].
Finally, the fraction of inventory that is potentially released to
the reactor building can be roughly estimated. Decontamination studies
[7.26] of steels corroded by sodium showed that two methanol washes
removed between 10 and 40% of the activity. For present purposes, it is
assumed that a maximum of about 25% of the corrosion inventory could be
removed from the piping in the event of complete lithium drainage from
a coolant loop.
7.4.2 Steel Results
Besides radioactivity concerns, there are two major problems in
steel/lithium systems, structural degradation and tube plugging. At high
nitrogen levels (100-2000 pp m N), the fatigue properties of 2 1/2 Cr -
1 Mo, 304 SS [7.27] and HT-9 [7.28] are degraded. At low temperatures
or high frequencies, the normal ductile transgranular crack growth
becomes brittle. At high temperatures or low frequencies, the behavior
shifts to intergranular cracking from grain boundary penetration.
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There is some disagreement over how severe these effects are at lower
(%100 ppm N) nitrogen levels [7.27, 7.28].
The other non-radioactivity concern is tube plugging due to mass
transfer. Occasionally, lithium loop experiments have been stopped due to
plugging of the loop from deposits in the coTder regions [7.29, 7.30].
These deposits are primarily Cr or Ni. In one case, for example, Cr-rich
dendrites formed in the colder regions after. short (<2000 hr) times.
Eventually the deposits were less needle-like and new deposits became
more stoichiometric [7.30]. Thus, the initial transient leaching
of Cr and Ni could pose significant tube plugging hazards. Because
HT-9 (12% Cr, no Ni) has less of these elements than 316 SS (17% Cr,
14% Ni), plugging and mass transfer problems are generally viewed as
more severe for the 316 SS austenitic steel.
Fenici et al, [7.31] has examined the possibility of using a
Cr-Mn austenite steel where Mn not Ni stabilizes the austenite phase.
The results were mixed with continuing problems of carbide precipitation
and~ martri sit i c t ran sformations.
As no experiments have yet been performed at exact reference design
conditions, the available long-term data must be extrapolated to
appropriate temperatures and flow velocity. Over the range of 500-650 *C
a 4.6-fold difference in corrosion rates has been observed [7.22] which
translates to an activation energy of 14.6 kcal/mole (r,61 kJ/mole).
This is in good agreement with heat of formation for iron dissolving
in lithium (%59 kd/mole) confirming that long-term steel corrosion in
lithium is controlled by the base metal iron dissolving [7.32]. Further-
more, the overall mass transfer should be roughly proportional to the
loop temperature drop, because of the change in solubility gradient.
1: i 114 111 ,14 1 !I I i, I I 1,W I 1! 1, 114 4 1 II j 14 , I - 1,
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DeVan [7.33] reports that at 540 *C, the velocity dependence is
VO. 5 while an earlier study found a V0 .8 scaling [7.34]. Therefore,
the overall mass transfer appears to scale as
o v0 .5-0. 8 x AT ,loo x exp(-61 kJ/mold/RT) (7.20)
For an average flow of 0.3 m/s, AT1 l = 220 *C, and
Tblanket = 450 *C, the estimated steady state corrosion rate is 6 pm/yr
based on the available data [7.22, 7.29, 7.30, 7.32]. This compares to
the value of 9 pm/yr (0.60 mg/cm -month) at 450 *C assumed in the
UWMAK-1 corrsion estimate [7.35], and a value of 3.1 urm/yr at 500 'C in
the environmental study [7.21].
It should be noted that investigations continue that explore methods
of reducing this corrosion rate. Addition of 5 wt% aluminum to lithium
reduced the release rate by a factor of 5 [7.22], although it is not
known if the process would work in reactor conditions. Initially
coating the steel with aluminum had some beneficial results [7.36].
The entire in-blanket surface area (12,000 m2 ) is treated as
having a temperature of 450 *C. Thus, 576 kg metal/yr is released from
the blanket. The release of individual isotopes from steel in sodium
is generally stoichiometric [7.37, 7.38], although Ta is preferrentially
retained and Mn preferrentially released. Release of isotopes at long
times from steel in lithium is assumed to be stoichiometric.
The mass loss rates at steady state are similar for HT-9 and
316 SS. Additional mass is lost due to leaching in the initial transient
period (% month), with 316 SS losing about twice that of HT-9 due to
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differing alloy compositions. Since radioactivity buildup is also start-
ing at this time, the initial period has relatively little impact on
long-term radioactivity corrosion levels. For ease in calculation, the
steady state is assumed to begin initially. Whereas this slightly under-
predicts the initial radioactivity release (w hich would be hard to esti-
mate), it allows direct calculation of activity levels using Eq. (7.18).
As seen in Table 7.12, most isotopes reach steady state levels in the
six-year reference time frame. Speci-fically, the 51Cr reaches steady
state, hence the neglect of the initial transient release is justified.
As seen in the reference designs in Chapter 2, about half of the
steel wall area is at or near the first wall. The release of isotopes is
assumed to come from half of the blanket area (6000 m2) at first wall spe-
cific activity levels. The resulting activity levels, using Eq. (7.18),
are shown in Table 7.12. The 13.4 MCi inventory compares well with an
estimate for the UWMAK-I design [7.35], 12 MCi (scaled to 3.6 MW/m2 from
1.25 MW/m 2
By assuming that the lithium is divided into two separate cooling
loops (consistent with the water case) and that 25% of the inventory is
releasable to the building if coolant is lost (see Section 7.4.1), the
maximum releasable inventory is 1.7 MCi.
7.4.3 Vanadium Results
There is very little quantitative information on lithium-vanadium
corrosion rates. Freed [7.39] reported "nil attack" for an early test
(1194 hr) at 870*C, AT o. i= 204*C, v= 4 m/s, but did not quantify the
result. Frye et al., reported no attack for a 100 hr static test at 816*C
[7.40]. DeVan and Klueh [7.411 examined the effect of oxygen on vanadium
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TABLE 7.12
Calculated Activity Inventory for the Reference
316 SS/Lithium Case
Isotope Equilibrium
Release Rate
(Ci/yr)
1.255 x 10 6
7.282 x 10 5
1.916 x 10 6
6.366 x 106
3.678 x 10 5
1.086 x 106
2.405 x 105
9.370 x 10 4
1.2 x 10 7
Equilibrium
Inventory
(Ci)
1.378 x 10 5
8.976 x 10 5
8.018 x 10 2
2.205 x 107
3.952 x 10 5
3.045 x 10 5
1.819 x 10 6
1.018 x 103
2.6 x 10 7
6-year
Inventory
(Ci)
1.378 x 105
8.571 x 105
8.018 x 102
1.139 x 107
3.854 x 105
3.045 x 105
3.435 x 105
1.018 x 103
1.34 x 107
51Cr
54 Mn
56Mn
5 5 Fe
57Co
58Co
60Co
99Mo
Total
r7 '
0
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and V-20%Ti. Their data indicate that less than 10~4 g was lost from a
0.5 in2 specimen (100 hr static test at 815*C). This places an upper
bound on the static flow corrosion rate at 815C of <4.5 mA/hr. The
lower bound would be in the neighborhood of 0.05 um/yr from bulk lattice
sputtering.
Smith [7.42] has recommended a value of 1 pm/yr at 650*C, correspond-
ing to steel/sodium rates at high flow velocity. The temperature for the
reference design was 550*C with relatively low flow rates. A value of 0.5
m/yr is adopted for calculational purposes.
The hazard of dissimilar metal mass transfer problems is indicated by
an experiment of Hoffman [7.43]. He placed vanadium coupons in a steel
container and found high mass transfer (8.4 mg/in2 in 100 hr at 816*C,
equivalent to 190 yim/yr) due to interaction between the steel and vanadium.
As in the case of steel, more soluble alloy constituents like Cr
would be expected to initially leach out before a steady state of vanadium
dissolution would occur. For the reference design, the steady state metal
loss rate would be 27 kg metal/yr from blanket surfaces.
The steady state activity inventory can also be calculated. All iso-
topes of primary interest reach steady state levels within six years. The
result is shown in Table 7.13, assuming a stoichiometric release. It is
not known if release of individual isotopes (e.g., Sc species) deviates
from stoichiometric conditions. The maximum release to the building,
assuming loss of 25% of the inventory of one of two coolant loops, is
about 3 kCi.
7.4.4 Implications for Lithium Breeder
As noted in Section 7.4.2, the corrosion rate is a function of flow
I h 1 A III I 1 '11 4IN N 11111111 . 1'Al 1 41'414 II i
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TABLE 7.13
Calculated Activity Inventory
for the Reference Vanadium-Lithium Design
Equilibrium
Release Rate
(Ci/yr)
1,070
1,567
2,712
21 ,074
12,409
50,512
89,344
Equilibrium Inventory
(Ci)
689
518
36
153
16,170
5,540
23,106
Isotope
45Ca
46Sc
47Sc
51Cr
Total
C71
C
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velocity. Hence, it is generally agreed that a semi-static breeder zone
would result in less corrosion than a flowing system. This would allow
higher temperatures in a lithium breeder zone. However, even if the cor-
rosion rates were several orders of magnitude lower than in flow condi-
tions, a sufficient amount of steel activity'would be mobilized to effec-
tively contaminate the tritium/lithium processing unit. Because of very
low corrosion rates, a refractory metal structure offers more promise. In
either case the temperature drop between breeder zone and processing unit
will be important. If the lithium portion of the processing unit could be
operated at higher temperatures than the breeding zone, movement of radio-
isotopes from blanket to processing unit would be minimized. At the pre-
sent state of knowledge, one should assume that the lithium corrosion will
transfer enough gamma activity to the tritium processing unit to require
shielding.
7.4.5 Implications for Li. 7Pb83 Breeder
Although a variety of reports have examined corrosion in liquid lead
[7.44- 7.48], few have involved liquid Li17Pb83. As discussed in Chapter
5, the activity of lithium in Li17Pb83 is very low, typically 10-4.
Li17Pb83 is 99.3 wt% Pb. Furthermore, the corrosion behavior of materials
exposed to lead have some similarities to behavior in lithium. Unfortu-
nately, most of the data concerning lead corrosion is not quantitative. A
summary of some literature reports is given in Table 7.14. Most reports
were of a screening nature. However, there is sufficient evidence to draw
some general conclusions.
Among the major constituents of steel, nickel is most soluble,
followed by chromium, with iron least soluble [7.49]. Thus austenitic
-71- - i --- -- - --- I- I
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TABLE 7.14
Survey of Reported Results of Relevant
Metals in Liquid Lead
Reference Temperature Time (hr)
Ni-base
Hastelloy
Austenitic Steels
Austenitic Steels
316 SS
316 SS
Ferritic Steels
446 SS
410 SS
2-9% Cr Steel
2-9% Cr Steel
Croloy 2 1/2
Croloy 2 1/2
Molybdenum
Mo, Nb, Ta, W
Mo
Mo
Mo
Mo
Niobium
Nb
Nb-l% Zr
Tantalum
Ta
7.44
7.46
7.47
7.47
7.45
7.48
7.47
7.47
7.44
7.48
7.47
7.47
7.45
7.44
7.44
7.45
7.46
7.45
700
538
600
300
816
655
800
600
700
593
800
1100
982
1000
700
982
760
982
250
1346
5156
250
50
5000
250
severe attack
good resistance
poor resistance
good resistance
slight attack
38 pm/yr
poor resistance
good resistance
severe attack
25 pm/yr
good resistance
good resistance
no attack
nil, <10-3 pm/yr
nil, <10-3pym/yr
no attack
no measurable
attack
no attack
Al 1 oy
0
Result
0
0
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Table 7.14 (continued)
Alloy Reference Temperature Time (hr)
Titanium
Ti
Ti
Zirconium
Zr
Zr
7.45
7.46
7.45
816
538
816
100
100
7.46 538
Resul t
pronounced attack
poor resistance
pronounced attack
poor resistance
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steels would be expected to corrode faster than ferritic steels, as in
the case of lithium. It is not known whether the long term corrosion of
the two types of steel would eventually be dominated by iron dissolution
after initial leaching of Cr and Ni; however, based on the similarities
of Fe, Cr, Ni solubilities in lead and lithiu'm, one could tend to expect
similar long-term corrosion rates between HT-9 and 316 SS. Overall,
the corrosion in lead seems potentially more severe than in lithium.
Weldments of 2 Cr -1 Mo steel were penetrated along grain boundaries4
by Li 17Pb83 at 500 *C [7.50].
As in the case of lithium corrosion of steel, there may be ways to
improve resistence to lead. Nb stabilized 21 Cr - T4o was resistant4
to Li17Pb83 [7.50]. Ti or Zr additions at the ppm level were found
beneficial [7.44].
The refractory metals (Mo, W, V, Nb, Ta) seem generally very resis-
tant to liquid lead (see Table 7.14) as they do to liquid lithium. There
is no evidence on vanadium but there is no reason to suspect its behavior
is significantly worse than Nb and Ta. The major concern with refrac-
tories could be the solubility of some alloying constituents. Titanium
and zirconium corrode rapidly in lead [7.45, 7.46] and are constituents
in TZM (0.5% Ti, 0.08% Zr). Titanium and chromium are often mentioned
as alloying elements in V-alloys. However, the addition of 1% Zr in
Nb - 1% Zr did not lead to any measurable attack in an operating loop, with
AT1 , = 400 *C [7.46].
Overall, a liquid Lil 7Pb83 breeder can be expected to corrode
structural surfaces somewhat similarly as lithium, to a rough first
approximation. Thus, again there is potential for contamination of the
I
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tritium processing system. In general, the refractory metals show
significantly better resistance than do the steels.
7.5 Flibe Corrosion
7.5.1 General Behavior
A variety of research has focused on corrosion in molten salts
[7.51-7.573. Unfortunately, no studies were found for the specific combi-
nation of TZM and flibe (LiF-BeF2). A summary of corrosion studies is
given in Table 7.15. The general type of behavior is similar to liquid
metals, as opposed to water or helium. Primary concerns include
penetration of the solid, leaching of alloy constituents and thermal
gradient mass transfer.
In general the mass transfer problems are less than in liquid
metals [7.52]. The metals most resistent to halogen salts appear to
be nickel and molybdenum with metals like Cr, Ti, Zr being preferentially
leached [7.53, 7.54, 7.56]. Depending on salt and alloy, certain
elements are beneficial if added to the salt. For example, beryllium
additions to LiF-BeF2 significantly help 316 SS resistence [7.56].
Besides compatibility between blanket structure and coolant/breeder, salt
corrosion is also relevant in the molten salt type of tritium processing
unit. Corrosion of 316 SS by LiF-LiCl-LiBr seems acceptable for use in
tritium extraction unit [7.57].
7.5.2 TZM Result
The closest test to the flibe/TZM system appears to be a static test
of a fluoride salt (68% LiF - 20% BeF 2 -11.7% ThF4 - 0.3% UF4 ) with TZM
at 100 *C for 1011 hr. This salt is similar to flibe except for the
,I, i114 H I A I H 141 Wil i4 4114 A I 41' I J4111411 I 141H -
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presence of ThF 4 and UF4. UF4 appears to be one of the more reactive
constituents [7.55], hence flibe behavior would be expected to be
superior to this salt. Mo showed some penetration by UF4 from a
76% LiF - 24% UF4 salt at 700 *C for 420 hrs [7.51].
Furthermore, there is the difference between this static test at
1100 *C and flowing flibe at 800- 900 'C. The net effect of these
differences is unknown. However the latter differences have opposite
effects. The higher test temperature would cause overprediction of flibe
corrosion at 800-900%C while the static nature could lead to underpre-
diction.
The fluoride salt leached Ti and Zr from TZM but did not appear to
attack the base element molybdenum. The leaching was observed to follow
parabolic kinetics as expected in a diffusion process. Koger and
Litman [7.53] found that the mass of each element removed was given by
Am/A = 2C0 /Dt/7r (7.21)
where C0 = original concentration in the alloy
t = time
D = diffusion coefficient
The diffusion coefficients were found to be
DTi = 1.2 x 10-16 m2/s (7.22)
DZr = 2.9 x 10-15 m2/s
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The initial concentrations are
C 0 (Ti) = 0.005 x 10,200 kg/m3 = 51 kg/m3
C0 (Zr) = 0.0008 x 10,200 kg/m3 = 8.2 kg/m 3
Therefore the mass losses are given by
Am/A (Ti) = 6.3 x 10~7 /tTseC)
Am/A (Zr) = 5.0 x 10~ /t(sec)
kg/m 2
kg/m 2
(7.23)
(7.24)
This can be expressed as an equivalent penetration depth:
Ad (Ti) = 0.35 Vt(years) yIm (7.25)
Ad (Zr) = 0.27 /t(years) yam
It is not known when or if, behavior would shift from this
parabolic kinetics leaching regime to a linear steady state case as
for liquid metals. A conservative assumption would be that linear
behavior would begin at 1011 hr., the end of the test. The penetration
rate as a function of time during the test was approximately-.
a = 0.155 (t(years))-1/2 vm/yr (7.26)
III IR 14 1 II I 1 '0 O N i4 1111 "! th 41 :,A 11[4 1 I111] ' 141 -  " I I I
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If the kinetics were to shift to linear at 1011 hr., the steady state
penetration rate would be about 0.5 lm/yr. This value is adopted for
further calculations. A corrosion rate of 0.5 pm/yr for the reference
design implies a mass loss rate from the blanket of 43 kg/yr.
The isotopes of interest reach steady state within the reference
6-year time period so that the steady state inventory can be calculated
from Eq. (7.19) in the manner of V/Li and 316 SS/Li. The results are
shown in Table 7.16. The maximum inventory can be estimated as for
lithium designs by dividing all coolant into two loops and then assuming
25% of a loop's contents may be transferred to the building of all flibe
drained. Then, about 1 kCi would be mobilized.
7.6 Summary and Conclusions
7.6.1 Mass Transport
Perhaps the best overall measure of the hazards associated with
corrosion is the oxidation rate itself. The estimated values for each
system are listed in Table 7.17, not including sputtering. Analysis of
Bickford's values [7.13, 7.14], that the sputtering metal loss rate
averaged over the blanket is of order 0.05 pm/yr for 316 SS. At present,
the neutron sputtering for V and Mo appear lower in this regard than for
316 SS [7.58], so that the sputtering contribution to V and Mo systems
is less important. It should be noted that sputtering does put a lower
bound on the effective corrosion rate. Since direct daughter recoil
tends to dominate the total sputtering yield, radioactive atoms are
preferentially released from the surface. This is why the sputtering
contribution to mass transport is relatively less important than for
radioactivity transport.
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TABLE 7.16
Calculated Inventory for the Reference
TZM/Flibe System
Isotope
89Zr
Corrosion Rate
(Ci/yr)
1.06 x 10 7
2.80 x 103
2.85 x 103
1.17 x 10 4
8.36 x 103
1.32 x 104
5.33 x 103
3.93 x 103
3.80 x 10 5
3.82 x 10 5
1.14 x 107
Steady State
Inventory (Ci)
137
719
700
473
120
1 ,823
21
1
4,127
375
8,500
95Zr
91mNb
92m Nb
95mNb
95Nb
96Nb
97Nb
99Mo
99mTc
Total
HIR-1114 I !I 'I'llakIN I kill, I
lel'-
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TABLE 7.17
Estimated Mass Transport for Reference Coolant Loops*
Al 1 oy
316 SS
HT- 9
316 SS
HT- 9
316 SS
V-alloy
TZM
Steady State
Corrosion Rate
(yim/yr)
0.45
1.35
Metal Loss Rate
from Blanket
(kg/yr)
43
130
0.05
0.05
3
3
6 576
0.5
0.5
27
43
*Not including sputtered mass
C
C
Coolant
Water
Water
Helium
Helium
Li thi um
Lithium
Flibe
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Plugging is not a problem for helium systems. Given the present
knowledge, plugging does not appear to be a significant problem for
water/steel, lithium/V-alloy, or flibe/TZM systems, although this is
highly uncertain for the latter two cases due to the lack of operating
experience. Plugging appears to be a serious operational problem for
lithium/steel systems.
The technology to operate these systems and the understanding to
model them varies considerably. The refractory metal/liquid metal or
salt systems appear attractive from the corrosion viewpoint, but
extensive development of operation equipment is needed. Proper operating
chemistry in all cases is mandatory if corrosion problems are to be kept
to acceptable levels.
7.6.2 Radioactivity Transport
The estimated inventory and maximum inventory releasable to the
building are listed in Table 7.18. Although the corrosion process may
only mobilize a very small fraction of the total structural inventory,
some of that inventory is readily mobilizable in an accident. If a
coolant leak were to occur, some fraction of the coolant loop inventory
could be swept into the building where it could eventually enter the
environment. The high pressure fluids, water and helium, are relatively
worse in this regard. Even if such releases do not occur, the contami-
nation of the loop greatly complicates maintenance.
It is emphasized that all tritium systems connected by flow to the
blanket are likely to become contaminated by gamma activity, although to
a lesser degree than coolant loops.
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TABLE 7.18
Estimated Inventory for Activity in
Reference Coolant Loops
Al 1 oy
316 SS
316 SS --Sputtered
- Corrosion
316 SS
V-alloy
TZM
Total Corrosion
Inventory
128 kCi
41 kCi
12 kCi
13.4 MCi
23 kCi
8.5 kCi
Maximum Inventory
to Building*
32 kCi
11 kCi**
6 kCi
1.7 MCi
3 kCi
1 kCi
*All coolant divided into two loops, one loop drains, along with 100%
of oxide dust in helium system, 50% of oxide layer in water systems,
and 25% of transported particles in lithium and flibe.
**Assumes that Cr and Mn sputtered species are oxidized and are thus
releasable.
0
0
Coolant,
Water
Helium
Lithium
Lithium
Fl i be
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There is not yet a significant difference between the hazards from
use of the breeders Li and Li17Pb83. And, while specific activity
values for HT-9 was unavailable, the lower activity in the structure
would tend to translate into lower contamination of coolant loops.
Continuous filtratfon has not been taken into account in terms of
removal of radioactive species, except in the water systems. Either
continuous filteration or periodic flushing of loops could reduce the
entrained coolant radioactive inventory.
7.6.3 Relative Consequence Indices
Defining and calculating relative consequence indices for corrosion
problems is difficult due to the relative lack of quantization of the
safety problems involved, e.g., plugging. In addition, unlike most other
safety comparison bases, it is not possible to even attempt to separate
metal from coolant. For purposes of comparison, two rough corrosion
product relative consequence indices, RCICP are defined.
The relative consequence index for mass transfer is defined by the
equation,
RCImt - d(pim/yr) (7.27)CP- 1 m/yr
So that the corrosion rate is normalized to 1 Iim/yr. Current systems
with helium or water operating at this corrosion rate are relatively free
of mass transfer problems, so an RCICP of 1.0 is appropriate. The values
for the reference systems are given in Table 7.19.
The relative consequence index for radioactivity release is
defined by the equation
I I
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TABLE 7.19 0
Relative Consequence Index for
Corrosion Problems from Mass Transfer*
316 SS
Water
Helium
Lithium
0.5
0.1
6
xFlibe
HT- 9
1.4
0.1
6
x
V-alloy
x
x
0.5
x
TZM
x
x
x
0.5
0
*X - combination not studied
Values relative to 1 pm/yr mass loss rate, for which mass transfer
problems are low. Hence values less than or equal to 1.0 are for
systems which should show acceptable mass transfer behavior.
0
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INV
RCI r - r (7.28)
1 kCI
The best case TZM/flibe has a releasable inventory of about]l kCI, pro-
viding the normalization. Whereas the damage done by a curie of dif-
ferent isotopes is unequal (see Chapter 8), this provides a rough first
measure of the relative consequence.
In general, the corrosion systems can be rank ordered as shown in
Table 7.21.
Q 11, 1 41 M 14[ 1 ki '1111 A Hli4 I, o hd' 14J MI ,
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TABLE 7.20 0
Relative Consequence Index
for Corrosion Problems of Radioactivity*
316 SS
Water
Hel ium
Lithium
Flibe
%30
%20
%2000
X
V-alloy
x
x
3
x
TZM
x
x
x
1
0
- combination not studied
0
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TABLE 7.21
Rank Order of Reference Corrosion Systems
(Best to Worst)
Hel ium/Steel
V/Li, TZM/flibe
Water/Steel
Lithium/Steel*
*appears significantly worse than the other systems
i F -- rr --- I i
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CHAPTER 8. RADIOACTIVITY INVENTORY AND CONSEQUENCES
The major underlying hazard to the public due to a fusion reactor
accident would be release of radioactivity, either tritium or induced
structural isotopes. The steady state inventory, possible normal
releases, and potential maximum accidental releases of tritium for the
different material combinations are compared. The determination of the
steady state inventory is necessary to determine releases. Although
the focus of this study is on accidental hazards, some analysis of the -
possible normal tritium releases is included since-normal operational
releasesL re a major environmental concern for fusion reactors.
The other safety issues in Chapters 3-7 are concerned with nechanisms
that may lead to mobilization of structural radioactivity. The relative
hazard of the radioactivity induced in different structural materials
is examined here.
8.1 Tritium
For D-T fusion machines, tritium has consistently been identified
as a major safety and environmental concern. The presence of tritium
is unavoidable; however, the choice of coolant/breeder/structure may
influence the potential releases to the environment. Figure 8.1 shows
the interaction of various information in the determination of the
steady state inventory and normal and accidental releases. Note that
the discussion is limited to tritium in or leaving the blanket; tritium
systems external to the blanket (generally unaffected by material choice)
are not considered.
IF-
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8.1.1 Steady State Inventory
The first step in determining relative releases is estimation of
the steady state inventory. Tritium will be present in all parts of
the blanket, in coolant, metal, and breeder. Reactor design studies
tend to envision continuous processing of the breeder in situ in
preference to batch processing, which adversely affects blanket availa-
bility and tritium inventories. The processing technology and the
material properties themselves determines the tritium inventory in the
breeders. Furthermore, the breeder concentration influences the tritium
concentration in the coolant and structure.
8.1.1.1 Lithium Breeder/Coolant Inventory
Of all possible breeding materials, the behavior and required
processing technology of metallic liquid lithium is best known. The
technology exists to keep tritium levels below 2.0 atomic ppm (appm)
(<. 1 wppm) by molten salt extraction [8.1]. Conservatively including
the effects of mass transport in a large blanket system, the ANL blanket
study [8.2] adopted 5 wppm as a reference value. The goal of the
lithium processing program is to demonstrate "steady state inventory of
less than 5 atomic parts per million (appm.)" [8.3]. This value
(=2.1 wppm) is adopted for this study.
As discussed in Appendix C, the reference designs have 600 m3 of
lithium as breeder and 800 m3 of lithium when used as coolant and
breeder. These correspond to 3 x 105 kgLi for breeder only and
4 x 105 kgLi for coolant/breeder. Thus the expected tritium inventories
are 630 g (breeder) and 840 g (coolant/breeder).
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The tritium vapor pressure above the liquid metal is determined
by the relation
N= KP 1/2 (8.1)
where N = concentration (atomic percent,--a/o)
PT= Tritium Partial Pressure (Pa)
Ks = Sievert's Constant (a/o -Pa~%)
In these units, the Sievert's constant for tritium over lithium is
given by [8.4]
lnKs = - 7.005 + 5070/T(0 K) (8.2)
The breeder inventory and tritium partial pressures for the lithium
breeder designs are shown in Table 8.1. The resulting partial pressures
are very low; however, they are higher for the higher temperature
V-alloy and TZM designs.
8.1.1.2 Li17P 83 Breeder Inventory
In many respects considering tritium, Li17Pb83 is similar to lithium.
Both are liquid metals and would be slowly circulated to a processing
unit to remove tritium. However, the data base for Li17Pb83 is far
inferior to that of lithium.
Neglecting mass transfer limitations in a Li17Pb83 loop, the tritium
partial pressures achievable would be the same as in a lithium system
due to the use of similar fused salt processing systems [8.5, 8.6].
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TABLE 8.1
Tritium Inventory and Partial Pressure
in Lithium Breeders
Cool ant
Metal
Lithium
Tritium Concentration
in Lithium (appm)
Tritium inventory (g)
Lithium Minimum
Temperature (*C)
Lithium Maximum
Temperature (*C)
Tritium Pressure at
T (yiPa)
Tritium Pressure at
Tmax (iPa)
Steel
5
840
230
450
Lithium
V-alloy
5
840
350
550
5.4 x 10~ 4 2.6 x 10- 2
2.5 x 10~1 1.4
Helium
Steel
5
630
%400
.500
8.7 x 10-2
6.1 x 10~1
07
Flibe
TZM
5
630
%700
%900
C>
9.1
53.5
0
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Since the concentration, N, is related to the pressure by Eq. (8.1),
then one would expect
Ks(Li17Pb83)
N(Li Pb) N(Li) Ks(Li) (8.3)17 83 )K s(Li)
The single data point for the Sievert's constant is at 767*C for
deuterium; it indicates the ratio of Sievert's constant to be about
0.01 [8.6]. This would translate into a very low tritium inventory,
about 8 g (0.05 appm). A recent estimate [8.7] is that the concentration
would be a few weight ppb for a partial pressure of 1 Pa (note,
0.17 wppb = 1 appm for Li17Pb83)'
Clemmer , et al. [8.7] suggest that "mass-transfer considerations
would make it most difficult to attain tritium levels that low," and
states that a 1/10 reduction in concentration would be a better approxi-
mation. This implies an inventory of 80 g and a hundred-fold increase
in tritium partial pressure relative to lithium.
The above is primarily based on data at one temperature, 767*C.
Two extrapolations to other temperatures have been proposed. Hoffman,
et al. [8.8] first note that lithium.and*lead would tend to show
conflicting temperature scaling. They note that lithium exothermically
forms ionic hydrides; solubility increases as temperature decreases.
However, lead endothermically forms covalent hydrides; solubility
decreases as temperature decreases. One extrapolation trend is that
the Sievert's constant for Lil 7Pb83 is constant with temperature. Then
the ratio of Ks(Lil 7Pb83)/Ks(Li) would be 2 x 10-3 - 3 x 10-4
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depending on temperature, rather than the value of 1 x 10-2 described
above. Their second extrapolation [8.8] is the opposite case, a
stronger temperature dependence. Then the ratio ofSievert's constants
in the temperature range of interest would be 0.1 to 5.0.
The problem, of course, is the very poor data base and the necessity
of extrapolating from other Li - Pb compositions and temperatures. The
above discussion indicates a range of Sievert's constant,
K s(Lil 7Pb83)/Ks(Li) 10-2 (within about a factor of 10) (8.4)
If then, the partial pressures of lithium and Li17Pb83 which are
achievable are the same, then
N(Li17Pb83)/N(Li) o 10-2 (within factor of 10) (8.5)
and
INV(Li 17Pb83)/INV(Li) % 10-2 (within factor of 10) (8.6)
However, as noted above, the lower range of the possible inventory must
be eliminated due to mass-transfer problems. Thus we expect
INV(Lil 7Pb83)/INV(Li) n 10-1 (8.7)
Then working back to the partial pressure, the uncertainty in Sievert's
constant results in an uncertainty in partial pressure of
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PT(Lil 7Pb83)/PT(Li) - 102 (within two orders of (8.8)
magnitude)
The low range (similar partial pressures) corresponds to the high range
of Sievert's constant ratio where mass transfer problems are small.
The high range occurs for the low range of the Sievert's constant for
Li17Pb83 relative to Li. The best estimates are listed in Table 8.2.
8.1.1.3 LiAlO 2 Breeder Inventory
Inventory calculations for solid breeders are also fairly uncertain,
although perhaps less so than Li17Pb83. A variety of processes are
important in determining the breeder inventory. Discussion will be focused
on the solubility and diffusion components.
Mass transfer in the LiAlO 2 particle bed and helium purge stream
limits how low the tritium vapor pressure at the LiAlO 2 surface may be
kept - this is analogous to the limit on liquid breeders due to metal
processing technology. For the reference design of STARFIRE [8.9], the
average partial pressure at the surface was taken at about 10-2 torr
(1.3 Pa). This was determined considering percolation through the
particle bed and the mass transfer out of the blanket in the helium
purge stream. The estimated concentration can then be determined,
see Fig. 8.2 [8.9]. More recent data suggests that the concentration
in Li20 may be significantly lower than that shown in the figure [8.7].
It is interesting to note that the solubility of tritium in
LiAlO2 is fairly temperature independent; this becomes more important
in examining accidental release. A declining solubility with increasing
11111[14% 11 11 11144 jjtj[-4 jjjj j , , 1. , I j 4
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TABLE 8.2
Tritium Inventory and Partial Pressures
For Li17 b83 Design
Coolant
Material
Breeder Minimum Temperature (*C)
Breeder Maximum Temperature (0C)
Tritium concentration (appm)
Inventory (g)
Partial Pressure at Tmin (yiPa)
Partial Pressure at Tmax (ipPa)
Water
Steel
-u350
%500
0.5
80 (ten-fold uncertainty)
3 (at least 100-fold uncertainty)
60 (at least 100-fold uncertainty)
C>1
IjI
I
I
I
I
I
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temperature would result in tritium being released during a thermal
excursion.
The finite diffusion rates in the LiA10 2 particles causes internal
tritium concentrations to be higher than the surface. After start up,
the concentration profiles will approach final values, see Fig. 8.3.
The mean resistance time, tr, is related to the tritium diffusivity,
DT' by the equation [8.9]
DT = 0.16 r 2/tr (8.9)
where rp = particle radius
The stady state inventory due to diffusion is then
INVD(pellet) = 0.5 INV x tr (8.10)
where INV = breeding rate
In terms of diffusivity, the inventory is given by
INVD(pellet) = 1/15 x INV x r2 x DT (8.11)
The STARFIRE study used the diffusivity of hydrogen in A1203:
D = 3.26 x 10~4 x exp[-(57.2 Kcal/mole*K)/RT] m2s (8.12)
The breeding blanket of STARFIRE consists of particles with temperatures
C>
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ranging from about 508 to 8460C. The calculated total diffusion
inventory is 0.14 kg [8.9] for 1 lim grain size.
There are a variety of uncertainties in the analysis. A major
concern is the effect of radiation. The STARFIRE sudy [8.9] estimated
the result of these effects as shown in Table 8.3. As discussed in
the STARFIRE study, radiation damage effects may greatly (- 10-fold)
increase the diffusion-held tritium inventory, and, in fact, determines
this inventory component.
Hanchar [8.10] has examined the dynamics of diffusion, without
radiation effects. The time constant to reach diffusion equilibrium
in LiA10 2 is quite short, about 30 minutes for tritium in a 10 ytm
particle at an average temperature of 650'C. Her analysis used a higher
value of diffusivity, leading to faster equilibrium. Wiswall's data
[8.11] (Fig. 8.4) would indicate a mean tritium residence time of about
an hour for LiA10 2'
The STARFIRE study assumed the solid diffusion path to be the grain
size (% 1 yim radius) rather than the particle size, believing grain
boundary transport to be significantly faster. This is another source
of uncertainty. For comparison purposes, the tritium inventory in
LiA10 2 will be assumed to be predicted by the STARFIRE [8.9] estimates,
10 kg with 8 kg diffusion-held and 2 kg solubility-held. If later
experiments were to indicate a significantly higher value, LiA10 2 would
probably not be used. Other possible ceramics include Li20 and Li 2 iS03
[8.7]. Available evidence suggests that the inventory in ceramic
breeder blankets to be significantly higher than in liquid metal breeder
blankets.
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TABLE 8.3
LiA10 2 Inventory Estimates
from the STARFIRE study [8.91
Diffusion Inventory
Solubility Inventory
Total
Without
Radiation
%0.14 kg
8.1 kg
8.2 kg
Wi;th
Radiation
1.4 - 300 kg
8 kg
10 kg*
*Base case total
I? ! H' lqI , 111 -11141 q Ik 111IN N |il i ,14 mm I ]4,[ Mb1
r,-
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Due to mass transfer effects in the breeder zone, STARFIRE
analysis indicated that the tritium vapor pressure would range from
0.1 to 100 Pa in the blanket. As mentioned above, the tritium solu-
bility in LiAlO2 was calculated based on an average vapor pressure of
1.3 Pa at the particle surface.
8.1.1.4 Flibe Coolant Inventory
The lithium in flibe (LiF -BeF 2) will generate tritium in addition
to any tritium migrating into the coolant. Actually, as seen below, the
tritium partial pressure in flibe may be considerably higher than that
in a lithium breeder, so that tritium would tend to flow from coolant to
breeder. It does appear, then, that the tritium levels in flibe will be
controlled by flibe processing, not by inward migration. The literature
allows two different approaches to estimation of the tritium level in
flibe. Calaway [8.1] notes that reduction of tritium levels below
1 wppm is possible in the LiF - LiCl - LiBr processing salt used for
extracting tritium from lithium. Flibe is itself a similar salt, and
one could assume that processing can keep tritium levels at 1 wppm.
This translates to a tritium inventory of 380 g.
The earlier PPPL [8.12] design using flibe as a breeder also
examined the inventory question. They believed that the partial pressures
of tritium species could be kept low:
PTF o 1 torr - 100 Pa (8.13)
PT2 % 10-2 torr n 1 Pa (8.14)
VIM[ 111 H low jIlIl !!I[ litl1l I +'l !I, 110l] l ,101111 Hjj ] - " , I
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Use of their estimates for the Henry's Law constant leads to an
inventory for the present study of 1 g, 99% of which is in the TF form.
As mentioned in Section 8.1.1.2, mass transfer limitations would tend
to prohibit tritium levels this low. For calculational purposes an
inventory of 10 g is assumed.
8.1.1.5 Water Coolant Inventory
The STARFIRE study examined the possible tritium levels in the
water coolant. Their calculations indicate that the dominant source
of tritium entering the coolant was through the first wall, including
tritium insertion (implantation) directly into the beryllium first
wall coating for the plasma particles striking the surface. They
calculate a steady state inventory of about 0.3 Ci/liter after about
18 years operation (decay being the primary loss mechanism).. To insure
an inventory concentration of under 1 Ci/liter, the STARFIRE design
includes a water processing system to remove tritium from the primary
water coolant. A value of 0.3 Ci/liter leads to about 16 g in the
water (8 g in each of two loops). If tritium inward migration would
increase and raise tritium levels to the 1 Ci/liter level controlled
by processing technology, the inventory would increase to about 55 g.
8.1.1.6 Helium Coolant Inventory
The partial pressures of HT, T2, and HTO in a helium coolant are
largely determined by the oxygen level and impurity control technology.
Maroni [8.12] estimated that the pressures of HT and T2 could be kept
below 10~10 Pa by keeping the oxygen pressure (and HTO pressure) at
about 1 Pa.
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The later UWMAK-II study [8.13] estimated even lower elemental
pressures; HT and T2 pressures about 10- 12 Pa. The required HTO pressure
was about 10-1 Pa. The addition (non-removal of existing impurity) of
oxygen tends to bind the tritium in oxide form. Hence the total
entrained inventory is controlled by the HTO pressure. Even assuming the
higher value of 1 Pa for the HTO pressure, the total coolant inventory
is only about 1 g. The oxide form is easier to remove from the coolant
and permeates less than the elemental form. The disadvantages are
possible corrosion of metal (not a serious problem at these levels, see
Chapter 7) and the higher biological hazard of the HTO form versus HT
and T2. This operational procedure means that tritium released in the
event of a leak would be in the HTO form.
The above discussion implicitly assumes that sufficient tritium
will migrate into the helium coolant to raise the inventory such that
trititum will need to be controlled by some impurity control technology.
In the STARFIRE study, about 10 Ci/day migrated into the water coolant,
mostly from the plasma. A helium loop offers less resistance to inward
flow because of a thinner oxide film and lower hydrogen pressures.
Hence one would tend to expect at least a 10 Ci/day input to the coolant.
Unless losses from the system were very high relative to this, one
would expect a 1 gram level to be reached within a few years, without
processing technology. Hanchar [8.10] calculated the steady state
inventory to be reached in 118 days for the interim Li20/helium version
of STARFIRE [8.14]. She also identified the oxygen level as being
critical to determination of the tritium level. For the interim
STARFIRE design, she estimated the tritium level to be 83 grams in
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the coolant if no oxygen were present. If an oxygen pressure were
established at about 10-11 Pa, the HT or T2 inventory would be about
10~-4 g .
In view of the expected processing technology, it is believed that
the total tritium inventory can be kept below 1 gm. The elemental
tritium partial pressure would be about 10-10 Pa. Again, these estimates
are considerably uncertain.
8.1.1.7 Structural Metal
Having estimated the tritium levels in coolants and breeders, it
is possible to determine how much tritium is in the metal structure.
The partial pressures in the breeders were found to be as high or
higher than that in the coolants. For the lithium breeder cases, the
concentration in metal is easily determined from the concentration in
lithium by use of distribution values of concentration
N (metal) K (metal) (8.15)
N (Li) Ks (Li) Mmetal
where N is in wppm
Mmetal is the atomic mass of the metal
Use of the values presented by Natesan and Smith [8.4] leads to very
low metal inventories. Half of the metal was taken to be at the minimum
breeder temperature and half at the maximum (Table 8.1). The results
are shown in Table 8.4. Even the use of the higher partial pressures
over Li17Pb83 would not result in tritium inventories in steel being
above 1 g.
II dH[R14 V -1A 11 1110 0 O NA I111 ,, 1
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TABLE 8.4
Tritium Inventory in Metal Structure
from Lithium Breeders
Lithium
Steel
Lithium
V-alloy
Tritium concentration
in metal (wppm)
at Maximum
Temperature
at Minimum
Temperature
4 x 10-6
< 10~7
6.5 x 10-3
2 x 10-3
(g) («1 g) 2g g) (
Cool ant
Metal
Helium
Steel
Fl i be
TZM
2 x 10-5
2 x 10-6
2 x 10-5
3 x 10-6
Inventory in Metal (< 1g) (< 1g)
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For the Li17Pb83 and LiA1O 2 cases, the inventory in the steel is
calculated by the Sievert's relation
N = KsP T1/2  (8.1)
where PT = tritium partial pressure over breeder
Ks = 1.26 exp (-1400/RT) appm/Pa1/2  [8.15]
The Sievert's constant used is for 304L SS. The tritium over LiAlO2 is
assumed to be in elemental form for these calculations. This would tend
to overestimate the structural inventory in contact with LiAlO2.
8.1.1.8 Inventory Summary
The estimated steady state inventories in the various materials is
shown in Table 8.5. Although there is considerable uncertainty in these
estimates, general trends are detectable. As one might expect, the
breeder inventory dominates the total. Lil 7Pb83 seems to lead to lower
blanket inventories relative to the most understood lithium, while
LiAlO2 appears to result in the highest inventories and highest tritium
partial pressures.
8.1.2 Normal Releases Through Coolant Loop
Although the present study is concerned with accidental releases,
the choice of material will have an effect on normal operating losses
of tritium through the coolant loop, a primary environmental concern.
Thus, it is important to examine first order effects.
The major concern is tritium releases to the environment. From the
viewpoint of blanket materials, the key pathway will be losses through
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TABLE 8.5
Steady State Tritium Inventory in Components
of Reference Material Combinations
Estimated Tritium
Combination Inventory (g)*
Breeder Coolant Metal
Li
Li
Li
Li
Li17Pb83
LiAlO
2
LiAlO 
2
Li
Li
He
flibe
water
water
He
316 SS
V
steel
TZM
Breeder Coolant Metal
840
-840- 1
630 < 1
630 ), 10
80 - 20steel
steel
steel
< 1
%10,000 % 20
t-l0,000 U 1
% 10
% 10
*1 g of 3H I 104 Ci
g
,J , J[ I! ,, , I I , , I III 11 4, A 11 III d I III H A 011 '111111,  VA NJ tl4il 1,11II-i
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the power cycle, from the primary coolant through the heat exchanger.
Some systems will include an intermediate coolant, others go directly
to a steam (helium turbine?) turbine loop. The important variables
are the heat exchanger permeability and leakage, the primary coolant
tritium pressure, and any systems for the secondary coolant. The
breeder behavior is relatively unimportant (unless the breeder is also
the coolant) in determining tritium releases to the environment. Only
the primary coolant heat exchanger losses cannot be controlled through
use of secondary containment techniques (double jacketed piping, etc.)
(see, for example, reference 8.16).
Early calculations on heat exchanger losses all focused on simple
permeation calculations. However, other factors, pin-hole leaks,
oxide films, secondary coolant, and coolant mass transfer diffusion,
are now seen as relevant. The combinations of power cycles are shown
in Table 8.6.
8.1.2.1 Water Coolant Losses
The STARFIRE report [8.9] identified the expected presence of
pin-hole leaks from the primary water to the steam cycle as totally
dominating over permeation losses. Leaks through the heat exchanger
(steam generator) would have to be kept below 30 liters/day for a
0.3 Ci/liter inventory to cause tritium losses through the power cycle
to be below 10 Ci/day [8.9]. 10 Ci/day is an approximate target for
designers, although it may not be stringent enough [8.16].
The choice of exchange material is relevant only insofar as it
eliminates leaks. As discussed in Chapter 7, the reference material for
00;1,1 Atld I 14 O Nh p1' 11Ht~kW i1 "' ,1
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TABLE 8.6
Possible Power Cycles for Reference
Primary Coolants*
/
Primary
Coolant
Pressurized
water
Helium
Lithium
Flibe
Possible
Intermediate
Coolant
Li, Na, or K
Li, Na, or K**
Possible
Turbine
Fluid
steam
steam or helium
helium or steam
helium or steam
*The secondary loop is the intermediate loop (if included) or the
turbine loop (otherwise)
**If needed
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either 316 SS or HT-9 blankets is Inconel, although a water coolant
would allow use of other
It is important to realize that a pressurized water primary coolant
does not allow an intermediate coolant loop. The low loop temperatures
(, 3000C) and low loop temperature drops (AT100p " 40'C) strongly oppose
use of an intermediate loop. While this is an advantage from the
efficiency and design complexity standpoint, it is a disadvantage from
the tritium release viewpoint. If primary heat exchanger leaks from a
pressurized water coolant were found to be excessive (more than 30
liters/day, higher than 0.3 Ci/liter inventory, or more stringent
criterion than1 OCi/day), no intermediate loop, and tritium processing
therein, could be added to the power cycle.
8.1.2.2 Helium Coolant Losses
Watson [8.17] has estimated the leakage from a helium coolant to
be about 0.01% per day, not all through heat exchanger. This translates
to less than 1 Ci/day. The INTOR study [8.18] has noted that helium
loss rates (total from the loop) are about 15%/yr (0.04% per day), based
on helium-cooled fission reactor experience (Peach Bottom and Fort St.
Vrain). Thus, the leakage expected through the primary heat exchanger
seems possible to keep below 1 Ci/day.
The permeation across a metal wall is given by Richardson's equation
[8.19],
A K (T)[P 1/2  P/2 (8.16)
d p 1C
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where K p(T) = permeation constant
P1 = high side partial pressure
P2 = low side partial pressure
A = area
d = wall thickness
Use of the data in reference [8.4] and design parameters of the reference
cases leads to a permeation rate through the primary heat exchanger of
3 Ci/day, see Table 8.7.
This is likely to overestimate actual losses. At low tritium
partial pressures, permeation does not follow Eq. (8.16). Tritium
is in molecular form in the helium, hence at low enough pressures
where gas phase mass transport is limiting, the partial pressure depen-
dence should shift to linear. If the surface is not clean, a further
decline is expected due to the barrier effectiveness of oxides [8.10,
8.20]. For the pressures expected (see Section 8.1.1.6), metal permea-
tion (Eq. (8.16)) is not controlling, and losses are indeed lower, based
on references 8.10 and 8.20. Although the exact loss rate is uncertain
due to the uncertainties in metal surface conditions, helium purification
technology, tritium species partial pressure, etc., the loss rates
through the primary heat exchanger appear to be under 1 Ci/day which
may be controlled by leakage, not permeation.
8.1.2.3 Lithium-Coolant
The lower operating pressures in a lithium loop tend to reduce
leakage problems. Furthermore, tritium is an ionic form in lithium. Thus,
a PT dependence on permeation is expected even for low tritium partial
la la sli al I i L 11 . ll i 1 . - 1 1 1 I - - "- - - -- i
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TABLE 8.7
Estimated Tritium Losses from Permeation Losses
Through Primary Heat Exchanger to Secondary Coolant*
Coolant
Metal
Wall Thickness (mm)
Heat Exchanger
Area (m2 )
Tritium Partial
Pressure
High Temperature (*C)
(Half of Area at
this temperature)
Losses through Heat
Exchanger (Ci/day)**
Helium
316 SS
2
20,000
0.1 nPa
500
3
Lithium
316 SS
2
5,000
0.25 y.Pa
450
10
Lithium
V-alloy
2
5,000
1.4 yiPa
550
10
Flibe
TZM
2
5,000
1 Pa
800
*No credit taken for permeation barriers or fluid mass transfer
resistance. Permeation data from reference 8.4 (see Fiq. 8.5).
**Losses to secondary coolant; for
this to be an intermediate loop;
secondary coolant is the turbine
lithium and flibe one envisions
for helium and water, the
loop.
0
0
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pressures, and liquid phase mass transfer does not appear limiting
[8.201. The heat exchanger losses are then determined by tritium
partial pressure in the lithium, permeability of the heat exchanger
metal, and metal wall surface condition and/or cladding.
As discussed in Chapter 7, dissimilar metal mass transport problems
appear to prohibit use of a Fe-Cr-Ni alloy throughout the primary cool-
ant loop when ~V-alloy is used as the blanket structural materiat.
The present base case is for V-alloy to-be used-throughout-that loop.
The results for the two lithium cases is shown in Table 8.7 with no
credit for oxide barrier effectiveness. The Li/316 SS case is seen to
be similar to that of water/316 SS. An intermediate coolant loop
tritium tleanup system may not be necessary; however, lithium primary
coolants are seen as having an intermediate loop for other reasons.
Thus, the flexibility of adding a cleanup system to the intermediate
loop does exist, unlike the water coolant case, if needed to reduce
tritium permeation losses..
The high permeability of vanadium and its higher operating
temperature result in exceedingly high tritium loss rates. As suggested
by Natesan and Smith [8.4], such high rates would have to be reduced
by either an intermediate loop detritiation system and/or additional
permeation barrier effectiveness, e.g., tungsten or molybdenum
cladding. They calculate- that these methods can reduce tritium
losses from the intermediate loop to low levels for a Nb/lithium
primary loop. As niobium and vanadium have very similar permeability,
the result holds for the vanadium/lithium case. Thus it is anticipated
that tritium losses through the lithium coolant loops can be kept to
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acceptable levels, although this will be far more difficult for the
vanadium case. The corrosion product film which should be present at the
heat exchanger could be expected to significantly (by 100-1000-fold)
reduce the permeation losses. If mass transfer corrosion problems prohibit
use of Fe-Cr-Ni alloys for out-blanket piping with a V-alloy blanket,
perhaps a TZM or other refractory metal could be used to reduce tritium
permeation losses.
8.1.2.4 Flibe-Coolant Losses
As shown in Table 8.7, the flibe/TZM case exhibits very high permea-
tion losses. This is somewhat surprising since molybdenum (TZM) has low
permeability (Fig. 8.5) compared to other materials considered. However,
the higher operating temperature raises the permeability to about that of
steel at the steel operating temperature. The high partial pressure in
flibe thus causes high permeation losses to the intermediate loop. Because
fluid mass transfer limits and oxide film effects were neglected, the
values of permeation losses is likely to be an overestimate. There is an
insufficient data base to quantify the possible effectiveness of corrosion
films.
The tritium species in flibe are molecular T2 and HF; thus the per-
meation law should shift to a linear partial pressure dependence at low
partial pressures [8.20]. Use of the Zarachy and Axtmann Model [8.20]
would indicate a thousand-fold reduction in permeation rates due to the
limitations of mass transfer within the flibe. Even so, a 100 Ci/day
transfer rate may be expected to the intermediate loop. However, as in
the lithium case, the combination of an improved barrier (tungsten
cladding?) or an intermediate loop detritiation system should be able to
limit losses from the intermediate loop to acceptable levels.
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8.1.2.5 Normal Losses Summary
The conservative estimates for normal operational tritium losses
from primary to secondary coolant loops are summarized in Table 8.8.
Oxide film reduction of permeation is not included. The helium case is
best. Since intermediate loop processing systems could further reduce
rates in the lithium/steel case, it is second, best.
The V-alloy/lithium and TZM/flibe cases could exhibit substantial
losses from the primary loop. Appropriate use of intermediate loop
processing, corrosion films, and claddings will be required to keep
losses to the environment to acceptable rates. The pressurized,' water
case is interesting. The estimated loss rates are probably best known
of all the coolant/metal cases; however, the loss rate is only marginally
acceptable and there is relatively very little design flexibility to
further improve tritium loss rates.
8.1.3 Possible Maximum Accidental Releases
Having estimated the blanket tritium inventory, the possible maximum
accidental releases can be estimated. Of course, tritium may be released
from non-blanket materials. The STARFIRE study [8.9] identified a
variety of tritium system components which could fail and release
tritium to the building atmosphere. They determined that the maximum
release from a single component failure would be-10 g. Generally, in
design studies, the largest amounts of tritium are in the blanket breeder
or the external storage system. The latter is simpler than the blanket,
probably unaffected by reactor blanket accidents, and beyond the scope
of this study. The problem of estimating the blanket tritium release
,II II III114 1 I I I p 1 1 !1: 14 I q I ; 1 ,I,I- I
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can be expressed in terms of release fractions.
8.1.3.1 Fission Experience
The present problem is somewhat analagous to the problem of
determining the release fraction of radioactive species in a fission
reactor, particularly the more mobile ones. The release fractions of
the more mobile species to the environment which were estimated for
the Reactor Safety Study [8.21] are shown in Table 8.9 for some accident
scenarios. The release fraction is a strong function of the accident
scenario. In the wake of the Three Mile Island experience, there is
a general current re-evaluation of these release fractions, which
appear to be overestimates. In other words, as knowledge and experience
grows, over-conservatisms are reduced and estimated release functions
should become more realistic.
Given the present state-of-knowledge in fusion tritium behavior,
it is anticipated that the actual releases would be below the estimates
given below.
6.1.3.2 Blanket Tritium Release Mechanisms
Given the scope of this work and the state-of-knowledge, the
approach used to estimate the possible blanket tritium release will be
to identify the worst potential mechanisms which could result in
tritium'release to the building. Although the governing kinetics of
these mechanisms will be addressed to verify it representing a realistic
accident scenario, calculations will focus on equilibrium results. Four
mechanisms are outlined:
1) Tritium present in fluid form can be directly released to the
building.
| I I I , 1 I' l 1 ! 4
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TABLE 8.9
Some Release Fractions for Mobile Species
From the Reactor Safety Study [8.21]
Chemical Species
Cs,Rb I Xe,Kr
PWR Category I 0.4 0.7 0.9
Meltdown
Containment Fails
PWR Category VIII 5 x 10~ 4  1 x 10~ 4  2 x 10-3
Cladding Failure Gap
(Gap Release)
Containment Fails
PWR Category IX 6 x 10~7 1 x 10~7 3 x 10-6
Cladding Failure
Containment Holds
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2) Tritium present in combustible material can be released to
the building in the form of volatile combustion products.
3) Tritium present in any material may be released to-the building
due to a change in solubility and diffusion parameters due to
a thermal transient in the blanket.
4) Tritium present in a solid material may be released to the
building if a phase change (melting) occurs as the result of
a thermal transient.
8.1.3.3 Helium Coolant
In the event of a helium coolant loop leak, all the tritium could
be released to the building. Hence the release function for the helium
coolant (and helium purge stream) is 1.0 and the maximum release would
be about 1 g.
8.1.3.4 Liquid Metal and Molten Salt
In the event of a leak in the coolant or breeder system containing
lithium, Li17Pb83, or flibe, all the tritium would be released to the
building, The maximum release fraction is 1.0.
However, it is instructive to examine how each of these liquids
could behave. In the absence of combustion, lithium (m.p. 1800C),
Li17Pb83 (m.p. 235 m.p.), and flibe (m.p. 45900) would all tend to
solidify on the building floor, thus locking in much of the tritium.
The solidification process itself can release some gaseous tritium due
to a change in Sievert's constant. This has been observed in the case
of Li17Pb2 solidification [8.22]. The remaining tritium would' be fairly
immobile due to the far lower diffusivity in the solid phase
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at the lower temperatures.
If combustion were to occur, combustion species like LiOT could
be produced in the containment, although many of the combustion
products would be expected to plate out on cooler surfaces in the
building. The role of solubility and diffusion, if fluid tempera-
tures were to rise, is-discussed in the next section. Although
the maximum release function is set at 1.0 for these fluids, it is
emphasized that much of it would not be volatilized.
8.1.3.5 Gaseous Tritium Release from Lithium due to
Solubility
The most worrisome type of tritium release would be tritium in the
gaseous form. A simple calculation can estimate how much tritium may
be released to the building in gaseous form. For any material the
initial inventory, INV0 , is divided into the solubility, INV , and
diffusion, INVod, components. For quasi-equilibrium conditions, the
inventory during the transient must be partitioned amoung solubility,
INVs, diffusion, INVd, and building containment gaseous tritium, INVco
Conservation of mass gives
INVo = INVos + INVod = INVs + INVd + INVc (8.17)
Use of the ideal gas law allows the building containment inventory to
be related to the building temperature and tritium pressure,
INVc (kg) = PT(Pa) (8.18)
11HP111: 1141, 411 dl !Wkk dll!k il I lHAlWlIkIIH1414 -1111i
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The diffusion inventory in liquid lithium is thought to be very low,
with solubility effects completely controlling,
INV = INVod = INVd + K) T(Pa) (8.19)
.Since the initial inventory is 5 appm and the total inventory is 0.84 kg,
use of the Eqs. (8.1) and (8.2) gives an expression for the diffusion
inventory
INVd 5070/Tb)P 1/2Id =(1.524)(e T
where
(8.20)
Tb = blanket lithium temperature (*K)
Then the Eq. (8.19) can be rewritten
0 = 180.4 PT + (1.524)(e 5070/Tb)pT1/2
- 0.84 (8.2,1)
For lithium blanket temperatures, Tb, less than the vaporization point,
1340 0C, the solution to Eq. (8.21) is given within, 1% by
PT(TB) = 0.3 exp(-10140/Tb) (8.22)
Then the inventory of gaseous tritium in the building is given by
INV c (,Tb) = 54.8 exp(-10140/Tb)kgTc
(8.23)
C
C
A1 1,i t'l "I IAI ,11N k l1114'11111110 ,i'
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If the building temperature increases, the tritium is pushed back into
the lithium, whereas higher lithium temperatures result in higher
released gaseous tritium. Clearly Eq. (8.23) neglects important mass
transfer kinetics, but it does indicate an approximate limit on the
amount.of gaseous tritium released from a lithium pool. For lithium
temperatures below vaporization and a room temperature building, less
than 1 g of tritium would be expected to be in the gaseous form,
(release function of 0.001), although all may leave the blanket itself.
The data base for Lil 7Pb83 is insufficient to do a similar analysis
for that case.
8.1.3.6 Pressurized Water
The tritium entrained in the pressurized water coolant would all
be released to the building if a leak occurred. Initially after a water
loop rupture, much of the water would be steam (see Chapter 5) and the
tritium (as HTO, T20) would be very mobile. Unlike the liquid metals/
molten salts, the water would not be expected to freeze in the building,
leaving the tritium highly mobile.
The presently conceived emergency building atmosphere detritiation
systems operate by converting tritium to the HTO form and then absorbing
it on cyropanels. The high volume of tritiated steam caused by a
pressurized water coolant leak could overwhelm such a system. Thus, the
STARFIRE design calls for the detritiation system to be shut off if a
steam environment were caused [8.9]. Adequate handling of a large
volume of heavily tritiated water will not be easy.
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8.1.3.7 LiAlO 2 Breeder
Unlike the previous cases, LiAlO 2 is solid. Some have characterized
the tritium in the LiAlO 2 as "invulnerable" compared to more vulnerable
tritium systems, see ref. 8.9. However, a substantial release is
possible, even though LiAlO2 is fairly non-combustable and solid.
Equation (8.17) holds for the LiA10 2 case as well as lithium.
Unlike lithium, however, the diffusion controlled operating inventory
is not zero, but rather about 2 kg. The solubility component is about
.8 kg (see Section 8.1.1.3). If the elemental form of tritium is assumed,
Eq. (8.18) applies. Then Eqs. (8.17) and (8.18) result in
10 kg =180.4 PT + INVs + INVd (8.24)
c
Since the solubility for LiA10 2 is approximately constant with higher
temperatures (see Fig. 8.2), the solubility inventory is given by
INVs % 8 (P T/T(operation))1/2 (8.25)
The operating solubility was determined using an average partial pressure
of 1.3 Pa. Then Eq. (8.24) can be re-written
0= 180.4 PT + (7.016)PT1/2 - 10 + INVd (8.26)
c
in STARFIRE, the LiA10 2 operating temperature ranges from about
500 to 8500C. The high temperature effect on diffusivity (Eq. (8.12),
Fig. 8.4) causes 19% of the diffusion inventory to be in the coldest 1%
of the blanket, and 98% of the diffusion-limited inventory to be in
NO-- -1
-489-
the coldest 10% of the blanket. If the blanket temperature gradient were
to simply flatten in an accident, over 99% of the original diffusion-
limited inventory would be freed. Any afterheat or continuing plasma
heating after a LOCA (Chapter 3) would further increase LiAlO 2 tempera-
tures. The approximate time for the diffusioni-limited inventory to be
baked-out can be estimated from Eqs. (8.9) and (8.12),
t(Tb - 6 exp (28 ,810/Tb) sec (8.27)
where Tb is the LiAlO 2 temperature (1 -pm grain).
Thus a few hours are required at the average blanket temperature (if the
thermal gradient were to flatten as a result of a LOCA) for the diffusion
limited inventory to be released. However, even a modest further average
100 0C increase to about 775 0C (e.g., due to afterheat) would reduce the
time required to below 10 minutes. Given the thermal transients possible
(Chapter 3), it appears that mechanisms are available to eliminate
diffusion restrictions on the LIA10 2 inventory in relatively short times;
thus INVd can go to zero. Then, Eq. (8.26) can be solved,
P 1/2 = -0.0194(T ) + /(3.78 x 104 )T +0.055(T ) (8.28)T c c c
For the case where the building atmosphere is 20*C, then the partial
pressure would be 1.64 Pa and 1 kg of tritium will have been released
to the building in gaseous form. This is one-half of the original
diffusion-controlled inventory. If the tritium pressure at the LiAlO 2
surface were considered constant at the design value of 1.3 Pa, then
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all the diffusion controlled inventory (2 kg) would be released.
8.1.3.8 Solid Metals
The steady state inventories in the reference materials are low,
below 10 g. The analysis -for other coolant apd breeder components
indicate that the worst tritium release from the breeder would be
large compared to 10 g. The behavior would be qualitatively similar
to that of LiAlO 2'
8.1.3.9 Maximum Tritium Releases to Building
Table 8.10 summarizes the maximum possible tritium releases to the
reactor building from blanket materials. The breeder releases dominate
in quantity, although some coolant releases may be more probable. Even
given the uncertainties mentioned above, the worst breeder material from
the standpoint of the highest amounts of tritium released to the build-
ing is the LiA10 2 case. In the future, a variety of kinetic calculations
and experiments will be required to more precisely determine potential
tritium releases from blanket materials. Realistically, actual releases
to the building can be expected to be lower than that listed in Table
8.10. Accidental releases to the environment would be still lower.
8.2 Structural Radioactivity Inventory and Comparison Bases
In addition to tritium, a fusion reactor based on a neutron
producing reaction will experience substantial amounts of structural
activation. Of the safety comparisons among potential D-T reactor
structural materials, the most obvious and common have been comparisons
of radioactivity hazard. The hazard evaluation is made more difficult
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by the lack of data on various fusion-specific isotopes.
8.2.1 Comparison Bases
8.2.1.1 Radioactivity Problems
Reading through previous works mentioning fusion radioactivity,
a variety of issues become apparent. These can be listed in approximate
order of the time scale involved:
1) Decay afterheat
2) Contact dose rates (maintenance difficulties)
3) Public dose due to acute accidental releases
4) Public dose due to normal operational releases
5) Chronic dose due to accidental releases
6) Material recycling, waste disposal, decommissioning
It is very important to realize that there may be an immense
difference among the isotopes which tend to dominate each of these
problems. Thus, a specific alloy may appear better than others in some
aspects but remain a worst case in another. For example, aluminum
alloys are generally viewed as being "low activation" materials.
However, initially the activity is significant, it simply decays
quickly; the afterheat generated appears to cause more severe problems
for "low activation" aluminum than for the four reference materials of
this study [8.23], see Chapter 3. Thefirst problem, afterheat, is
addressed in Chapter 3.
Contact dose rates from the materials studied are all too high to
prevent direct manned access to the first. wall or blanket. The level
in excess is not so important. However, major effort can and has been
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taken to decrease the dose rates beyond the shield [8.9]. Different
materials than those considered here for the blanket may be used in the
shields and magnets which can significantly alter some maintenance/access
problems. This is beyond the scope of this study as the blanket ma-
terials are not strongly involved.
The third and fifth problems related to accidental public dose are
central to this study and are discussed in the remaining portions of
this chapter.
The fourth problem is that of tritium, discussed above, and
corrosion, the primary method of mobilizing blanket structural radio-
activity under normal operation, see Chapter 7. Tritium will likely
dominate the normal operation hazard. In Chapter 7, the activity
mobilized from corrosion was calculated.
The sixth problem is relatively undefined at present in terms of
what is acceptable. The blanket of STARFIRE contains about 98%
of the activity, but is less than 10% of the structural volume [8.9].
This indicates that from the overall viewpoint of material re-use, the
selection and activity of non-blanket materials is more important
than that of blanket materials.
A decommissioning study [8.24] focused on a vanadium first wall/
blanket. The first wall remained at high level activity (> 10 Ci/liter)
for over 10 years, while the bulk blanket remained high for 5 years.
The steels and molybdenum will be worse. The present study's scope does
not include quantifying the waste/recycling problem. Although none of
the following pathways provide an adequate hazard index for recycling/
waste considerations, it is possible to say that a rough ordering based/
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on long-term activity levels would appear to be V-alloy (best), HT-9,
316 SS, TZM (worst),
8.2.1.2 Relative Comparsion from Accidental Release
A variety of methods have been used to qpantify the relative conse-
quences from different structural materials. These are listed in
Table 8.11. The measures of activity and biological hazard potential
have been most often used. The former, of course, must be the starting
point for more appropriate calculations relating health effects.
The biological hazard potential is defined by
BHP " ACT/MPC (8.29)
where ACT = activity (Ci)
MPC = maximum permissible concentration.
Since the MPC is defined for steady state allowable concentrations in
air or water, so is the BHP. Thus the BHP is actually a measure of how
much dilution is required to reduce activity concentrations to the MPC
level.
The regulatory bodies, ICRP and NCRP, (see ref. 8.25) have
established MPC values for many isotopes by first establishing the
permissible dose to each organ (e.g., < 3 rem/13 weeks to the whole
body) from a steady state body inventory. This determines the maximum
permissible body burden for each organ. When the ratio of total body
burden to individual organ is known, this allows determination of the
maximum permissible total body burden. The organ which causes the
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TABLE 8.11
Bases of Comparison of Release Consequences of Fusion
Structural Radioactivity
I. Radioactivity (Curies)
First Step
Easiest, most often used
Ignores differing effects of isotope activity
II. Biological Hazard Potential (BHP)
Based on the Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC)
Basis - one critical organ per isotope
- steady state intake
- inhalation only
MPC not determined for many isotopes
Often used
III. Dose (rem)
Based on organ specific dose factors
Basis - as many organs per isotope as desired
- inhalation, groundshine, cloudshine, ingestion
Rarely used at present
Used in present study to identify important isotopes
IV. Public Health Effects (FUSECRAC Code)
Based on fission public consequence code, CRAC
Relatively weak data base, quite complex
Developed for use in present study
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lowest value of the total body burden is the critical organ for that
isotope. Thus the MPC measure only considers one organ; effects are
not summed over the body.
The common practice in fusion assessments has been to use the MPC
values for public exposure, rather than occupational, and the most
restrictive value of MPC, whether for an isotope in soluble or insoluble
chemical form. The official list [8.25] stipulates a value of 0.1
Ci/kw ir for half-lives greater than 2 hours and 3,000 Ci/kw 3  forair ai r
half-lives of less than two hours if the specific isotope's value of
MPC is not specified.
The major drawbacks to the BHP measure for comparing accidental
releases can be summarized as follows:
1) There is no accounting for decay and transport in an accidental
situation from reactor to public.
2) Inconsistent treatment of the chemical form of the release (sol-
uble or insoluble, the most restricted form is arbitrarily used).
3) Incomplete data base - MPC not set or only crudely estimated
for several isotopes.
4) Critical organ not established for many isotopes.
5) Only internal intake of air and water considered. Ingestion
of food and external gamma exposure (cloudshine, groundshine)
are ignored.
Because a variety of MPC's are not established for some isotopes
(see Section 8.2.2, Table 8.12), past researchers have either used the
above limit cases or crudely estimated MPC calues. Hence, there may be
a bias against materials containing more isotopes with weak data bases.
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TABLE 8.12
Fusion Related Isotopes for Reference Materials(b)
Radioactive
Name Daughter
Radioactive
Half-Life Name Daughter
3 H
14C
16N
24Na
26AI
2 8 Al
29Al
3 0A1
3Si
4 5Ca
4 7Ca
46Sc
47Sc
48Sc
49Sc
50Sc
4 5 Ti
51Ti
49V
52Vr
49Cr
12.3 y (a)
5730 y (a)
7.1 s
15.0 h
7.4 x 105 y
2.3 m
6.6 m
3.3 s
2.62 h
163 d (a)
4.5 d
83.8 d
3.4 d
44 hr
57.5 m
1.8 m
3.08 h
5.80 m
330 d (a)
3.77 m
42 m
51Cr
53Mn
54Mn
56Mn
57Mn
55Fe
59Fe
57Co
58Co
60Co
60mCo
61Co
57Ni
59Ni
63Ni
65Ni
89Sr
88 Zr
89Zr
93Zr
95Zr
27.8 d
3.7 x 106 y (a)
312 d
2.58 h
1.7 m
2.4 y (a)
45 d
272 d
71 d
5.24 y
10.5 m
1.65 h
36 h
8 x 104 y (a)
92 y (a)
2.56 h
50.6 d (a)
84 d
78.4 h
9.5 x 105 y
65 d
Half-Life
60 Co
57 Co
88Y
95mNb,95Nb
47Sc
49V
OHM 11111114114 I !I 41 IdIIINI d+l 111111 - I - -I
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TABLE 8.12 (Continued)
Name
97Zr
88 Y
90Y
91Y
91mNb
91Nb
92mNb
92Nb
93mNb
94mNb
94 Nb
95mNb
95 Nb
96Nb
97mNb
97Nb
98 Nb
I100Nb
91Mo
93Mo
99Mo
Radioactive
Daughter
97mNb,97Nb
91 Nb
94
95Nb
97 Nb
9lmNb,9l Nb
93mNb
99mTc , 99Tc
Half-Life
17 h
107 d
64.2 h
59 d
62 d
long, %l05 y
10.2 d
3.2 x 107 y
13.6 y
6. 3 m
2 x 104 y
87 h
35 d
23.4 h
1 m
72 m
2.9 s
3.1 s
15.5 m
3. 5 x 103 y
66 h
Radio
Daug
C
Name
101M
99mTc
99Tc
101Tc
182Ta
183Ta
184Ta
185Ta
186Ta
181 W
185W
187W
187Re
18
active
hter Half-Life
1Tc 14.6 m
9Tc 6 h
- 2.1 x 10 5 y (a)
- 14.3 m
- 115 d
- 5.1 d
- 8.7 h
185W 49 m
- 10. 5 m
- 121 d
- 75.1 d
7Re 23.9 h
-
4 x 10 10 y(a)
0
(a) No gamma decay
(b) Data from references 8.28, 8.29
0
185mw
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The most serious drawback is the lack of a kinetic treatment and the
inclusion of only inhalation and water ingestion exposure pathways.
Fission accident consequence calculations and comparisons are not
performed by BHP or MPC measures. Detailed consequence codes like
CRAC - Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences [8.26] are used.
A slightly modified version for fusion with a fusion data base,
FUSECRAC [8.27], has been developed for this study and is the primary
basis of comparison used (Section 8.4).
The CRAC and FUSECRAC codes can only accept data from exposure
pathways for a limited number of isotopes due to calculational and
storage considerations. Thus a preliminary screening of the isotopes
was performed (Section 8.3) to determine the important contributors.
Although MPC and BHP measures are inappropriate for use in accident
assessments, they appear more useful as a measure of waste disposal
hazards.
8.2.2 Fusion Isotopes
Based on the structural radioactivity data discussed in Section
8.2.3, a list of fusion-relevant isotopes was prepared and is shown in
Table 8.12. The isotope data are from references 8.28 and 8.29. These
isotopes are induced in at least one of the reference structural
materials, although they may not be significant contributors to the
total.
Examination of the list indicates that a variety of isotopes may
be present for which the data base is weak, primarily those isotopes
which have not been of interest in fission or medical work. One benefit
of this study, as seen later, is the identification of which isotopes
11011HP1 111111% 1 I !!I1,401104d III klo I
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appear significant contributors to exposure and which require improved
data.
8.2.3 Reference Structural Radioactivity
The radioactivity levels are affected by material choice, elemental
tailoring, isotopic tailoring, neutron wall loading, operation time, and
design geometry. The selection of structural materials is a prime
determinator of the radioactivity inventory. The selection of breeder
and coolant can impact the inventory by either altering the neutron
spectrum, hence the structural material inventory, or containing sub-
stances which themselves activate. Previous studies [8.2, 8.9] show
that the coupling due to the neutron spectrum is fairly minor, especially
at the first wall (see for example Fig. 8.6).
Of the non-structural substances included in this study, only
Li17Pb83 and neutron multipliers appear to have significant activation
potential. The very short-lived isotopes (i sec) caused by oxygen and
fluorine activation are not significant contributors to accident releases.
The multiplier Zr5Pb3 represents about 38% of the total STARFIRE activity
[8.9]. Fortunately, most of the activity is caused by zirconium, not
lead (see Fig. 8.7) so that the Li17Pb83 material appears fairly clean.
The major Pb-related isotopes appear to be 205Pb and 204T1, although- some
isotopes were excluded, like 207Bi, due to lack of data [8.9]. The major
Al-related isotope CLiAl0 2) is the long-lived 26A1 [8.9]. For the
present study, only the structural radioactivity and tri.ti.um will be ex-
amined since they appear to be the overwhelming contributor to the total
(if multipliers like Zr5Pb3 are avoided).
I4N111 ~ I0 jik 41 i I 41[ I 4'I -,
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Elemental tailoring refers to the selection of alloying elements
to reduce activation hazards. Alloying selection is, however, influenced
by a wealth of metallurgical factors. For the present study, the
reference materials were considered fixed with composition as discussed
in Appendix B. The data for 316 SS and vanadium (V -15Cr-5Ti) is from
J. Jung [8.31], performed for the ANL blanket study [8.2] and decommis-
sioning study [8.24]. The data for TZM is from Okula [8.32], performed
for UWMAK-III [8.33]. It should be noted that altering alloy composition
is a complex problem which is easier to specify in safety studies than
accomplish successfully in practice. Furthermore, reasonably expected
impurities and minor elements in metal alloys should not be neglected.
Isotopic tailoring refers to the alteration of the isotopic mix of
the natural composition of an element prior to use. Michaels [8.34]
has examined the economics of controlling iron and nickel isotopes for
LWR applications and found a 14% rate of return on the investment
required. Applying such a model to fusion would require much informa-
tion which is unavailable, including the economics of blanket module
recycling and waste disposal. The potential benefit is not clear,
although Jung [8.9] notes some possibilites. For the present study,
isotopic tailoring will be ignored.
The neutron wall loading level has a linear effect on activity
level to first order. The activity values used to screen isotopes
(Section 8.3) were scaled to a 1 MW/m 2 neutron flux. For -the actual com-
parisons using FUSECRAC (Section 8.4), the radioactivity levels were
based on the reference 3.6 MW/m2 neutron wall loading.
The operation time influences the buildup of the various isotopes
I 1,4111111141 I H I ',III ININ 4 dRi ,4i 141 1104ho[VW ;11111"
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differently. It is often reported that after about a year, the activity
levels of the various materials are fairly constant at saturation levels,
with the exception of 55Fe (T1/ 2 = 2.4 yr) in steels. However, this
refers to the total activity, not the specific isotropic mix.
To first order, the buildup of an isotope, ni, is given by
ni(t) = n.(oo)(1- e-Xit) (8.30)
The actual situation is more complex due to secondary reactions of
product isotopes which can add or subtract to the concentration of a
given isotope. The comparison among alloys should be done on an equal
basis. Unfortunately the best data for TZM is only for 2 years of
operation, whereas V-15Cr- 5Ti and 316 SS data are available for 10
years of operation. The actual operation time of a blanket may fall
in between these limits. For afterheat (Appendix B), the most important
behavior was for times in the first day, primarily determined by the
shorter-lived isotopes which reach saturation within two years. For
public dose consequences, longer term isotopes will be seen to dominate.
Thus, although the short-term thermal transient behavior from afterheat
(Chapter 3) is not strongly dependent on operation time, the public
consequences may be.
Fortunately, only 93Mo (T1/ 2 ' 3,500 y) is the only significant
accident hazard in TZM which does not reach equilibrium within two years.
Thus, the TZM results at 2 years can be extrapolated to 10 years (not
true for waste disposal since even longer-term isotopes dominate that
problem). The difference between 2 and 10 years operation will be
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examined in Section 8.3. To first order the increase in an isotope
concentration from 2 years to 10 is given by
n (10) A 1 - exp(- -10) (8.31)
n(2) 1- exp -A2)
which reaches a maximum of 5 for an infinite half life.
The design can influence the structural metal fraction and the
neutron spectrum. However, compared to the differences among metals,
these effects are minor. The first wall radioactivity, which is fairly
immune to changes in blanket design and selection of breeder and coolant,
represents a large fraction of the total blanket activity, e.g., 59%
of the 316 SS inventory in STARFIRE [8.9]. Furthermore, the first wall
is the part of the blanket most at risk - highest afterheat levels,
proximity to the plasma, highest stresses. Therefore, the comparison
among materials will be made per volume of first wall. The other
comparison bases, Chapters 3 - 7, pertain to the mechanisms for
mobilization of the first wall.
The first wall radioactivity concentration for 316 SS, V-15Cr- 5Ti
and TZM is shown in Table 8.13 for all isotopes with half-lives greater
than 15 minutes. Appropriate data for HT-9 was unavailable. The
restriction and effect of the 15 minute half-life restriction is discussed
in-Section 8.3.
, I lb IN 11111141114 11 !,ill q 14 [ l l im I -I I I
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TABLE 8.13
Radioactivity Levels (Ci/cc of metal) in the First Wall of
Reference Materials at 1 mw/mL Neutron Wall Loading**
Name
14C
45Ca
47Ca
46Sc
4 7 Sc
48Sc
4 9 Sc
45Ti
49v
4 9Cr
51Cr
53Mn
54Mn
56Mn
55 Fe
5 9Fe
57Co
58Co
60Co
61Co
57 Ni
59 Ni
63Ni
65Ni
89 Sr
316 SS
First Wall
6.5 x 10- 6
1.82 x 10- 3
4.47 x 10-5
2.91 x 10- 3
4.00 x 10- 3
6.00 x 10- 3
1.71 x 10-3
2.07 x 10~ 4
1.67 x 10~ 1
5.285 x 10-2
9.681
2.85 x 10- 5
5.619
14.784
49.121
2.12 x 10-2
2.838
8.377
1.856
4.182 x 10-2
5.065 x 10~
2.26 x 10~4
1.77 x 10- 2
1.23 x 10-
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
k
k
k
k
*
*
*
*
V-15Cr-5Ti
First Wall
3.6 x 10-5
1.32 x 10-1
3.3 x 10-3
1.935 x 10~ 1
3.348 x 101
2.602
2.48 x 10-2
1.483 x 10-2
1.532
3.76 x 10-2
6.236
3.5 x 10- 1 0
3.7 x 10~ 4
1.71 x 10-3
5.86 x 10- 3
9.17 x 10~ 7
1.6 x 10~ 4
4.6 x 10~ 4
1.05 x 10~ 4
2.35 x 10-5
2.88 x 10- 5
1.286 x 10~9
9.6 x 10~ 7
7.2 x 10-8
TZM
First Wall
4.183 x 10-2
6.63 x 10- 2
7.3 x 10-2
6.3 x 10- 2
3.25 x 10-3
1.3 x 10-3
7.5 x 10~ 4
C
*
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TABLE 8.13 (Continued)
Name
88Zr
89Zr
93Zr
95Zr
97Zr
88 Y
90Y
91 Y
91mNb
92mNb
92Nb
93mNb
94Nb
95mNb
95Nb
96Nb
97Nb
93Mo,
99Mo,
99M Tc
182Ta
181W
185W
187T
Total
316 SS
First Wall
3.56 x 10~ 4
1.755 x 10- 2
3.27 x 10-8
5.13 x 10- 3
1.03 x 10- 3
3.953 x 10-2
9.206 x 10~ 1
8.969 x 10~4
5.15 x 10-6
7.6 x 10- 3
2.37 x 10 2
1.09 x 10-2
7.78 x 10- 3
4.84 x 10- 3
7.23 x 10 *
94.0
TZM
First Wall
V-15Cr-5Ti
First Wall
2.97 x 10 7
1.46 x 10-
1.3 x 10~9
4.28 x 10- 6
8.59 x 10~7
2.9 x 10 -3
1.52 x 10~9
7.84 x 10 -5
4.27 x 10~7
6.31 x 10-6
1.97 x 10 -5
9.2 x 10- 6
6.5 x 10-6
4.2 x 10-6
6.61 x 10~4
1.19 x 10-2
1. 27 x 10~7
1.0 x 10-3
2.3 x 10~4
11.1
x
x
x
x
x
x
*
101 *
10-2
10-3
10-3
10-31
10~1 *
*
1.389
3.658
7.326
9.67
3.73
1.25
3.733
1.533
1.36
2.6
1.0926
1.723
6.967
5.134
1.5
49.644
50.00
107
x
x
x
10~ 1
10~ 1
10- 2
* Isotope is at least 0.1% of total activity.
**Only half-lives greater than 15 minutes.
x
x
*
*
*
*
*
*
11 111-0, l I H, H 4 ". V I i 1. 11 ,I 'I l1,10 I Ill I 14il NI 4,111 ilk 4 -i'd III 4 1 ilkoiiikIilk !I lllp , 1, 1i
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8.3 Dose Factor Comparison and Screening
Due to FUSECRAC input limitations, the isotopes in each alloy had to
be screened to determine which are important (over 0.1%) contributors to
each dose pathway. This also allows identification of the impact of
operating time.
8.3.1 Elimination of Short-Lived Isotopes
Isotopes with half-lives less than 30 minutes were eliminated from
the Reactor Safety Study [8.21] since they would substantially decay
before exposure to the public. In the present study, isotopes with less
than 15 minute half-lives were eliminated. For 316 SS this reduces the
first wall activity from 100 Ci/cc to 94 Ci/cc. For TZM, the elimination
of isotopes 101Mo and 101Tc causes a reduction from 136 to 107 Ci/cc.
For V-l5Cr-5Ti, a signficant amount of the activity is eliminated
0
(26.4 to 11.1 Ci/cc) due to a variety of isotopes - ' Sc (1.8 m),
51Ti (5.80 m), and 52V (3.77 m).
Where radioactive daughters are produced by decay, care must be
taken in eliminating the parent isotope from consideration. Since the
activity of an isotope is given by
ACT. = X n. (8.32)
then if all the atoms of a parent were instantaneously changed to the
daughter, the resulting daughter activity is given by
'ACT T 2 (p)
ACTd = f ACTP = f ACT (8.33)p (1/2
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where f = fraction of parent decay to that particular daughter
Thus, for very short-lived parents (T1/2 < 15 minutes), the resulting
daughter activity was compared to the steady state daughter activity to
determine if elimination of the parent activity significantly altered
the impact of the daughter isotope. For exam'ple, even if all 6 mgO
activity were transformed to 60Co, the amount is insignificant com-
pared to the 60Co already present. For parents with half-lives less
than 15 minutes for these materials, there is no significant contribu-
tion to the daughter activity.
8.3.2 Data Base
The analysis requires four types of dose factors, cloudshine
(rem/yr per Ci/m3 air), groundshine (rem/yr per Ci/m2 on ground),
ingestion (rem/Ci ingested), and inhalation (rem/Ci inhaled). The dose
factors were taken from references 8.16 (tritium), 8.26 (CRAC health
data), and 8.35 -8.39. This is discussed in more detail in the
seperate FUSECRAC report [8.27] and not repeated here.
For purposes of screening isotopes, only whole body dose factors
were used. Isotopes contributing at least 0.1% of the total dose from
cloudshine, groundshine, and inhalation were used to calculate those
exposure pathways in the FUSECRAC analysis where all organs were
included. For ingestion, the data base is sufficiently weak that only
whole body dose factors were used in FUSECRAC. Due to the storage
limitations, only isotopes contributing at least 1% to the total in-
gestion dose in the screening calculation were included in the FUSECRAC
analysis. It is felt that the present screening technique adequately
14,11114,411 !NiAkNkdi 11:114" 1 I - -
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determine which isotopes require further analysis.
The ingestion pathway also requires the use of environmental
transfer values, CF (Ci ingested/Ci/m 2 deposited on ground). These
had to be determined for all the fusion-specific isotopes. The modeling
used in these calculations and the values obtained are also determined
in the FUSECRAC report [8.27].
The four exposure pathways and the relative time scales are -shown
in Table 8.14. For the screening operation only four cases were direct-
ly studied - acute cloudshine and inhalation and chronic ingestion and
groundshine. The acute cloudshine, inhalation and groundshine are
always automatically calculated for all input isotopes by the code;
hence there is no loss in not screening for acute groundshine isotopes.
The chronic inhalation pathway is due to resuspension of deposited
material. As seen in Section 8.4.4, it is a small contribution to the
total chronic dose. Since only very very long-lived (years) isotopes
tend to contribute significantly to resuspension, the identification of
relevant isotopes was straightforward, as mentioned in Section 8.4.2.
8.3.3 Cloudshine
If the radioactive plume passes over the public as a result of an
accident, the gamma radiation will irradiate people (cloudshine). The
screening parameter was the activity times the cloudshine dose factor,
Relative Cloudshine = ACT(Ci/cc) x DFc . (8.34)
ckfirst wallt cs imp
There are three drawbacks to this index. First, the decay in transport
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TABLE 8.14
Exposure Pathways Included in FUSECRAC Calculations
Early Exposure Pathways
Cloudshine*
Inhalation*
Groundshine
Chronic Exposure Pathways
Ingestion
Inhalation*
Groundshine*
*Isotopes were screened to determine significant
contributors to the total for each pathway marked,
see Sections 8.3.3 - 8.3.6
111HR] IT 141011 14111W11P4,1111111. tIH41!1 dW414:1
11
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is not explicitly -incorporated (except insofar as short-lived isotopes,
T1/2 less than 15 minutes, were ignored). Second, the contribution of a
radioactive daughter is not included. Third, only whole body dose
factors were used in the screening,
The code automatically calculates cloudshine for each organ for
all isotopes in the input file, incorporating in-transit decay and
daughter buildup, thus eliminating the above concerns. Note that non-
gamma emitters do not contribute. The major contributors to cloud-
shine dose are listed in Table 8.15.
Using Eq. (8.31) to compare the 10 year and two year activity
levels for each isotope, the total cloudshine dose rem/yr )
m3 wa /3 air)
from Eq. 8.39 can be calculated (see Table 8.16). The length of
operation has a small influence.
8.3.4 Inhalation
The case of accidental inhalation of radioisotopes is more complex
than cloudshine. Again the concern is the early exposure from the
passing cloud. The additional complexity arises from the fact that the
dose is from internal rather than external exposure. The mechanical and
chemical form of the isotope affects the residence time in the body
which affects the dose factor.
The mechanical question is the particle size. Dose factors are
typically tabulated for particle radii of 0.3, 1, and 5 vim [8.39]. The
sizes which might be expected in a fusion accident plume are unknown,
depending on the details of the release mechanism. A value of 1 Pm is
adopted here; this is the value generally assumed in regulatory docu-
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TABLE 8.15
Major Contributors to Cloudshine Dose*
316 SS
Isotopes
Contributing
Over 10%
Isotopes
Contributing
Between 1-10%
Isotopes
Contributing
Between 0.1-1.0%
56Mn
58Co
54Mn
60Co
57Ni
51Cr
57
99Mo
49Cr
92mNb
V-15Cr-5Ti
48 c
46Sc
51Cr
49Cr
47 S
182 Ta
45 Ti
*Based on activity times whole body dose factor
TZM
99M0
99MTc
96 Nb
92mNb
89Zr
95Nb
97Nb
95Zr
46SC
9 1mNb
101,111 IN 1141 41i 11111 V 11 1111di'll I 6114114NRO 111 I
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TABLE 8.16
Total Cloudshine Dose Screening Parameter*
for Reference Materials
316 SS
Dose Parameter*
2 yr operation
Dose Parameter*
10 yr operation
Ratio of 10 yr
to 2 yr
Relative Dose
Parameter**
267
295
1.1
5
V-15Cr-5Ti
53.7
53.7
1.0
1
0
ACT (Ci/cc DF ( re/y x 0-6 at 1 MW/rn2 wallAT(icfirst wall) x \Ci/m 3 air loading
** Relative to V-15Cr-5Ti
C
C
TZM
128.5
128.5
1.0
2
I III 0111I14 1 ik l k4." I"
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ments. Most dose factors are tabulated using this value. Although
the particle size often has only a few percent effect, there are cases
where the effect is more than a factor of 2, e.g., 89Sr (dose for
0.3 pm = 2.4 times dose for 5 yim).
The chemical form determines the lung clearance class. The three
classes are D -day, W -week, and Y-year, which refers to the time scale
for the isotope to reside in the lung. The dose factor changes by as
much as a factor of two as a function of class. The possible clearance
classes and the corresponding appropriate chemical form for relevant
elements-are listed in Table 8.17. The analysis in the Reactor Safety
Study required assigning clearance classes for the elements involved,
as indicated in Table 8.18. The release form chemistry in fission is
complicated by the presence of the fission products including negatively
charged species (e.g., I-). The analysis in this work indicates that oxida-
tion processes are the primary fusion release mechanisms. Thus released
isotopes are assumed to be in the oxide. or hydroxide form. Tritium is
assigned a class of D, corresponding to its 10 day biological half-life.
Where there is no direct information (Table 8.17) on the appropriate
class for the oxide or hydroxide form, an element is assumed to behave
similar to others in the same periodic table group.
The screening parameter for inhalation is simlar to groundshine,
Relative Inhalation = ACT(Ci/ccfirst wall) xDFih(rem/Ci-inhaled)(8.35)
where again only whole body dose factors were used in the screening
------- 7 11 11
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TABLE 8.17
Elements and Possible Lung Clearance Classes*
Element ,Class Chemical Species
Mn W oxides, hydroxides, halides, nitrates
D all others
Fe Y oxides, hydroxides, halides
W all others
Co Y oxides, hydroxides
W all others
Sr Y SrTiO 2
D all others
Y W all
Zr Y oxides, hydroxides
W all others
Nb Y all
Mo Y oxides
D molybdates
Tc W oxides, hydroxides
D all others
*D-day, W-week, Y-year, based on ref. 8.39.
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TABLE 8.18
Lung Clearance Classes***
Assigned in Assigned in
Elements Reactor Safety Study [8.9] Present Study**
H Li Na D
Ca Sr Ba D D
Sc Y La W W
Ti Zr Y Y
V Nb Ta Y Y
Cr Mo W D (Y*) Y
Mn Tc Re D W
Fe Co Ni Y Y
*Mo assumed present in a mixture of forms, mainly D
**Assume oxide or hydroxide form
***D-day, W-week, Y-year
* dl Ol 0 1 Ill I 'Pill, fili 411 Al 414 ,I'll 4 l 1 41H 4411144ld 41111111, - i -, i I
-518-
but all organs were included in the code calculations. The inhalation
dose factors used include the effects of daughter buildup and transport
within the body. Although the screening parameter does not include
plume transport and decay/buildup effects, CRAC does.
The value of organ specific dose factors' for some isotopes were not
available (45Ca, 46Sc, 47Sc, 48Sc, 45.iq 49V, 49Cr, 51Cr, 93mNb, 96Nb,
and 182Ta). The whole body dose factor for these isotopes was available
except for 49V and 96Nb. A value of 5000 rem/Ci was assumed to perform
screening calculations based on isotopes with roughly similar decay and
chemical behavior. This value is higher than all but 8 of the isotopes
studied and is thought to be conservative. Unfortunately, 49V and 96Nb
were found to be important contributors to V-alloy and TZM (respectively)
inhalation dose. The inhalation calculations in FUSECRAC were adjusted
for this lack of data - see Section 8.4.2.
The screening calculations result in a list of major contributors
to inhalation dose (Table 8.19), there are some different isotopes than
appeared in cloudshine (Table 8.15), including non-gamma emitters like
45Ca. The total inhalation screening parameter as a function of operating
time and metal is listed in Table 8.20. The dose scaling among metals is
not the same as predicted by BHP.air This was not unexpected as discussed
in Section 8.2.1. The cause of the difference can best be demonstrated by
comparing the dominant isotopes in 316 SS and TZM (see Table 8.21). The
relative ranking of the total screening parameter and the BHP from 316 SS
and TZM is largely controlled by one isotope as seen in the table.
Whereas the dose factor time activity of 60Co is higher than 99Mo,
the BHP (activity divided by maximum permissible concentration) of
I~II'I I
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TABLE 8.19
Major Contributors to Inhalation Dose*
316 SS
First Wall
V-1 5Cr-5Ti
First Wall
TZM
First Wall
Isotopes
Contributing
Over 10% of
the Dose
Isotopes
Contributing
Between 1-10%
of the Dose
Isotopes
Contributing
Between 0.1-1.0%
of the Dose
*Based on activity times whole body dose factor
4 9V
48 c
46 Sc
51 Cr
45Ca
182 Ta
49Cr
60Co
58 Co
55Fe
54Mn
57 Co
51Cr
56 Mn
49V
99Mo
57Ni
47Sc
99Mo
96Nb
95Nb
95 Zr
92mNb
89Zr
99M Tc
46Sc
91mNb
95mNb
4 5Ca
88
93mNb
48Sc
93Mo
97Zr
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TABLE 8.20
Total Inhalation Dose Screening Parameter*
For Reference Materials
316 SS
Dose Parameter*
2 yr-Operation
Dose Parameter*
10-yr Operation
Ratio of 10 yr
to 2 yr
Relative Dose
Parameter**
Relative
BHP .i
* = ACI(Ci/ccfirst wall)
**Relative to V-15Cr-5Ti
123
251
2.0
15
15
V-15Cr-5Ti
9.1
15
1.6
1,
1
TZM
37.5
37.7
1.0
3
23
x DF(Rem/Ci-inhaled) x 10-3 at 1 MW/m2
wall loading
C
0
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TABLE 8.21
Comparison of 316 SS and TZM Using Different Measures of
Merit Including Biological Hazard Potential
Metal
Dominant Isotope in Screening Parameter
Percent of Total Screening Parameter
Caused by Dominant Isotope
Relative Screening Parameter of
Dominant Isotope
Relative Total Screening Parameter
Relative BHP of Dominant Isotope
Relative Total BHP
Relative Latent Health Effects due
to Early Exposure
Relative Latent Health Effects
due to Chronic Exposure
316 SS
60Co
TZM
99Mo
61%
6.3
5.0
0.87
0.65
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.04.3
38.9 1.0
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60Co is lower. Summing over all isotopes and all organs with FUSECRAC
results in the early exposure health effects showing similar behavior
as the total screening parameter, not BHP. The higher variance in the
chronic exposure health effects provides a clue to the cause. As
mentioned above, the BHP is based on a steady state intake from a steady
state isotope concentration in the environment. 60Co has a half-life
of 5.24 yr while 99Mo has a 66 hour half-life. The initial decay after
an exposure is built into the dose factor, but the BHP is based on the
assumption that intake is steady state and the body burden reaches
a steady state saturation. The variance between 316 SS and TZM in-
creases for longer term health effects because the interesting
isotopes in 316 SS have longer half-lives than TZM. This aspect is
discussed in more detail later.
8.3.5 Ingestion
The remaining pathways are chronic, long-term exposure - ingestion'
(internal) and groundshine (external). Some BHP measures have been
proposed (see for example, reference 8.30) to compare chronic hazards -
BHPwater, IBHPair, IBHPwater* The integral BHP's are defined as
IBHP = BHP dt -(8. 36)
0
The definition of BHP allows this to be rewritten:
IBHP = MPC 1 f ACT(Ci)e-'tdt =693 T1/2 ACT(t=0)MPG0
= (.693) BHP(t=0) x T1/2 (8.37)
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Again a steady state parameter, MPC, is being used to compare kinetical-
ly controlled hazards. The CRAC code incorporates an input parameter,
CF (Ci ingested/ Ci/m 2 deposited), which accounts for biological trans-
port to man through the ecosystem. It varies by several orders of
magnitude among isotopes. One of the problems with IBHP values is that
very long-term isotopes are linearly weighted (Eq. 8.37). However, for
longer-lived isotopes, environmental transport decay and removal becomes
dominant so that the effective half-life does not increase linearly with
T 1/2. Thus IBHP over-weights the very long-term isotopes, while BHP
over-weights the very-short term isotopes. The environmental half-life
cannot be explicitly extracted from the CF parameter; however, as
discussed in Section 8.3.6, the effective groundshine half-life reaches
a maximum of 34 years.
The CF values for the fusion isotopes had to be determined. The
environmental model, input data, and results are discussed in the
FUSECRAC report [8.27]. The effect of radioactive daughters in the
environment was roughly included. Of those isotopes which are signifi-
cant contributors (over 0.1%), only 95Zr and 95mNb exhibited more than
a few percent increase when daughters were included. For 95Zr (decays
to 95mNb and 95Nb) the increase was a factor of 2.04; for 95mNb (decays
to 95Nb), a factor of 1.24. The screening parameter is given by
Ingestion dose , ACT(Ci/ccfirst wall) x DFig(rem/Ci-ingested)
x CF(Ci-ingested/ Ci/m2 deposited) (8.38)
q'I I III IM I III All 1! 1 Ill[ 111114A ,Ili 141111 Ill, ldlki 'd lCl I I -[
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where the CF factor was summed over all time and exposure pathways
(crops, meat, milk). The major contributors to the ingestion dose
are shown in Table 8.22. The effect of operating time and relative
ranking of materials is shown in Table. 8.23.
8.3.6 Groundshine
The groundshine dose considered here is the chronic, long-term
exposure. The Reactor Safety Study [8.21] modeled the gradual
soaking into the ground of isotopes and gave the fraction remaining
near the surface as
fg (t) = 0.63 exp(-1.13t) + 0.37 exp(-0.0075t) (8.39)
Then the fraction remaining near the surface including radiological
decay is
f(t) = f9(t) exp(-Xt) (8.40)
The resulting effective time on the surface, Teff, is plotted as a
function of radiological half-life in Fig. 8.8. For a radiological
half-life of 1 yr, the effective half-life is reduced to 0.61 yr.
At 10 years half-life, the effective half-life is only 3.7 yr. As the
radiological half-life goes to infinity, the effective half-life
reaches a limit of 34.6 years.
The radioactive daughters were included by analytically accounting
for their buildup and decay on the surface, discussed in the FUSECRAC
I 11 0 1N1 l I I a W1 ,4 I' l 4:1 1 H I; 1,1,.
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TABLE 8.22
Major Contributors to Ingestion Dose*
316 SS
First Wall
V-1 5Cr-5Ti
First Wall
TZM
First Wall
Isotopes Contributing
Over 10% of the dose
Isotopes Contributing
Between 1-10% of the
Dose
Isotopes Contributing
Between 0.1-1.0% of the
Dose
*Based on screening parameter
182Ta
49 v
45Ca
46Sc
99Mo
991m91 m Nb
95Nb
60Co
58 Co
57 Co
55Fe
54Mn
51Cr
9 2 mNb
46Sc
45Ca
95mNb
88y
95Zr
89Zr
48Sc
60Co
96Nb
99mTc
i : -F
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TABLE 8.23
Total Ingestion Dose Screening Parameter*
for Reference Materials
316 SS
Dose Parameter
2 yr-Operation
Dose Parameter
10 yr-Operation
Ratio of 10 yr
to 2 yr
Relative Dose
Parameter**
3.03
7.54
2.5
107
* = ACT(Ci/ccfirst wall) x DF. (Rem/Ci)
V-15Cr-5Ti
0.041
0.054
1.3
1.0
x CF ( jx2)
** Relative to V-15Cr-5Ti
0
TZM
0.039
0.039
1.0
0.8
x 10-6
0
I IIEIi~iI ~ II!
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report [8.27]. The significant cases and the ratio of corrected dose
to parent-only dose are 93Mo (1.20), 99Mo (1.79), 95mNb (57.6), and
95Zr (2.06). The screening parameter is given by
Groundshine chronic dose , ACT(Ci/Ccfirt wan)
x DFem/yr x T (yr)
9\c i /M2,) Tffyr
(8.41)
The major contributors to the total are listed in Table 8.24. The
effects of operating time and material choice are indicated in Table
8.25.
8.3.7 Summary of Interesting Isotopes
The ratio of various measures of hazard for 10 year to 2 year
operating time is summarized in Table 8.26. The most any isotope-could
increase from 2 to 10 years would be 5-fold. The relative comparisons
among materials from screening parameters are summarized in Section 8.5
and compared to the more exact FUSECRAC results.
As a result of the screening calculations, isotopes were selected
for inclusion into the fusion health file, FUSEDOSE, for use with
FUSECRAC. These are listed in Table 8.27. The level of significance
of each isotope for each material is shown; for example, a level 3
indicates thatthe isotope contributes at least 10% of the total ex-
posure in at least one exposure pathway. Ten of these isotopes were
also included in the fission health file, CRACDOSE [8.21, 8.27].
Based on the screening calculations and the available data base,
C
C
C>
i ' 11 I IN111W ,il14.f 4I II ,4 l% d1,l
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TABLE 8.24
Major Contributors to Groundshine Dose*
316 SS
First Wall
V-15Cr-5Ti
First Wall
TZM
First Wall
Isotopes
Contributing
Over 10% of the
Dose
Isotopes
Contributing
Between 1-10%
of the Dose
Isotopes
Contributing
Between 0.1-1.0%
of the Dose
182Ta 46 Sc
89Zr
95MNb
91mNb
88 y
96 Nb
99MTMc
93 Mo
49V
60Co
47Sc
54Mn
*Based on screening parameter
46 Sc
48 c
51Cr
95Nb
99Mo
95Zr
92mNb
60Co
54 Mn
58Co
57 Co
55Fe
51Cr
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TABLE 8.25
Total Groundshine Screening Parameter*
for Reference Materials
316 SS
Dose
2 yr
Parameter*
Operation
Dose Parameter*
10 yr Operation
Ratio of 10 yr
to 2 yr
Relative Dose
Parameter**
735
1528
2.1
70
* = ACT(Ci/ccfirst wall) x DFgs
** Relative to V-15Cr-5Ti
V-1 5Cr-5Ti
16.2
16.3
1.0
1
(rem/yr\ci/Im 2 / x T eff(yr)
TZM
48.6
50.1
1.0
3
0
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TABLE 8.26
Ratio of Hazard for 10 Year Operation to 2 Year
Operation for Each Reference Material *
Radioactivity
Cloudshine
(Eq. 8.34, Table 8.16)
Inhalation
(Eq. 8.35, Table 8.20)
Ingestion
(Eq. 8.38, Table 8.23)
Chronic Groundshine
(Eq. 8.41, Table 8.25)
316 SS
1.48
1.10
2.04
2.49
2.08
V-15Cr-5Ti
1.11
1.00
1.64
1.30
1.00
1.10- 2.49 1.00- 1.64 1.00- 1.03
* Based on simple whole body sc'reening factors
TZM
1.00
1.00
1.01
1.00
1.03
Range
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TABLE 8.27
Isotopes Included in Fusion Health File, FUSEDOSE
Significance Category*
Isotope Name 316 SS.
1. 3H
2. 45Ca
3. 46Sc
4. 47Sc
5. 48Sc
6. 45Ti
7. 49V
8. 49Cr
9. 51Cr
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
3
1
1
1
3
3
3
54Mn
56Mn
55Fe
59Fe
57Co
58Co
60Co
57Ni
63Ni
2
3
3
2
V-1 5Cr-5Ti
3
3
3
31
3
1
3
1
1
TZM,
Also in Fission
Health File, CRACDOSE?
3
2
2
2
Yes
Yes
19. 89Sr
88Y20.
21. 90Y
C
2
Yes
Yes 0
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TABLE 8.27 (Continued)
Significance Category*
316 SS V-15Cr-5Ti TZM
91
8 9 Zr
95Zr
97Zr
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
1
2
3
I
3
3
2
3
3
2
2
3
3
1
Also in Fission
Health File, CRACDOSE?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3
* 3 - Over 10% of the total of (at least) one pathway
2 - Over 1% of the total of (at least) one pathway
1 - Over 0.1% of the total of (at least) one pathway
Isotope Name
91mNb
92mNb
93mNb
95mNb
95Nb
96Nb
9 7Nb
93Mo
99Mo
99mTc
182Ta
, I 14111A I 1N:j1Q l I I ;j[ I jwjjW ,111 111 d,14 I IqdlqRItlql1,1111 l, I , .,
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the important isotopes and important isotope data research needs were
determined. These are listed in Tables 8.28-8.30. The isotopes
marked unknown require more research to determine the dose factor for
the exposure pathway indicated. For ingestion, substantially more data
is also needed for the transient ecological behavior of the elements
indicated, see also reference 8.27. Although not of direct concern in
this study, some isotopes that might need further research for waste
disposal analysis are indicated.
8.4 FUSECRAC Comparison
Ultimately, the comparison among possible blanket materials
should focus on the relative accident risk (consequence times accident
probability). Some implications of this are discussed in Chapter 9.
Although comparing the relative accident probability among materials is
beyond the scope of this study, the relative public consequences can
be compared. The comparative measures discussed before, radioactivity,
BHP, and the various screening parameters are not based on the real
concern, public health consequences from an accidental release. The
CRAC code, developed for fission consequence analysis, has been slight-
ly modified for performing fusion consequence assessments.
8.4.1 FUSECRAC Model
The Reactor Safety Study [8.21] included an investigation of public
health effects from radioactivity release. This information has evolved
into the current CRAC (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences)
code [8.26]. CRAC is continuing to be updated; however, the additional
work has focused on the statistical treatment of detailed aspects of
I P1 I N l I414I Ill N 114 I N l 4 1 1,1',
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site-specific weather, population, and evacuation data, not on the basic
health effects modeling. For the present purpose, the concern is the
relative health effect among materials, not a detailed site-.specific
assessment.
The exposure is divided into early and chronic. The former refers
to the short-time exposure from the passing radioactive plume. The
latter is the long-term exposure from radioactivity deposited on the
ground from the plume. The early exposure can result in acute health
effects within about a month or latent effects (primarily cancer) over
several decades from the accident. Only latent effects can result from
the chronic exposure. The health effects and exposure pathways included
are summarized in Table 8.31.
The actual components of the model, the input data and output are
shown in Fig. 8.9. The inhalation, cloudshine, and groundshine dose
factors are incorporated into a health file. The fission file is
CRACDOSE. A large part of the effort for the fusion assessment was
assembling the fusion health file, FUSEDOSE [8.27]. This expanded
and improved an earlier fusion health file by Sawdye [8.40] which
included 24 isotopes for an assessment of effects from only early
exposure. The 36 isotopes in the current FUSEDOSE file were listed
in Table 8.27. All isotopes representing at least 0.1% of the total
dose for at least one of the four screening calculations (Section 8.4)
were included. Thus the calculated early exposure, which includes
all isotopes in the health file, should include all significant
contributors. The code sums the dose and health effect over body
organs.
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The user must specify which isotopes to include in the three
chronic exposure calculations. The isotopes used in the fission
assessment are listed in Table 8.32; these were determined to be the
significant contributors to each pathway. Based on the screening
calculations, the isotopes incorporated into chronic exposure
calculations for each material were selected, shown in Table 8.33.
The code incorporates two major dose-reduction mechanisms,
evacuation and interdiction. The evacuation model allows the user to
specify a minimum distance from the reactor within which all people
will evacuate. A downwind sector may be specified in which the
evacuation distance is further, see Fig. 8.10. Evacuation is not
instantaneous, but the rate of travel is user specified. Evacuation
only affects the early exposure from the plume. People are assumed
to move back to the area unless interdiction prevents it.
The chronic exposure can be reduced by interdiction. Land inter-
diction prohibits people from living in the specified area for some
period of time, eliminating groundshine and inhalation exposure for
that population. Various levels of food interdiction (crop, milk,
or crop and milk) reduces the ingestion pathway for an area by elimi-
nating contaminated food. The user must specify the criteria for im-
posing the interdiction levels in terms of allowable dose committment.
In addition to the assembling of all the required isotope-specific
data (dose factors and the environmental transfer parameter, CF), there
is one important code change in FUSECRAC from CRAC. The CRAC code
assumes that all ingestion exposure is properly related to the amount
of radioactivity deposited on the ground and movement of radioactive
-542-
TABLE 8.32
Fission Isotopes Contributing to Chronic Dose [8.21]
External
Groundshine
58Co
60Co
9 5 Zr
95 Nb
1.01 Ru
103Ru
131 1
134 Cs
136Cs
137Cs
Resuspension
Inhalation
9 05r
106Ru
137Cs
238Pu
239 Pu
240 Pu
241 Pu
241 Am
242 Cm
244 Cm
C>
Ingestion
1311
1331
8 9Sr
90Sr
134Cs
136Cs
137Cs 0)
0
IP[l IIN1411N dIkI 14 1,1 iIWI 4,ll 'i ,, 1. , .
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TABLE 8.33
Fusion Isotopes Contributing to Chronic Dose
Structural Material
316 SS V-1 5Cr-5Ti TZM
Inhalation
VI
VI
(isotopes over 1% of total)
V _V
VI
VI
VI
VI
V,
3
H
49v
54Mn
55
60Co
63 Ni
93Mo
Ingestion
3H
45Ca
46Sc
49 v
51Cr
55
57Co
58
60Co
88y
95Zr
91mNb
92mNb
9 5mNb
95 Nb
99Mo
182Ta
, , 1 11 1 1 h i
F -I
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TABLE 8.33 (Continued)
Strucitural Material
Groundshine
316 SS V-15Cr-5Ti
(isotopes over 0.1% of total)
46Sc
47Sc
48Sc
49 v
51Cr
54Mn
55Fe
57Co
58Co
60Co
88 y
89Zr
91mNb
92m Nb
95M Nb
95Nb
93Mo
99Mo
182 Ta
TZM
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
0
* 
3H is included (where relevant, there is no groundshine
dose) for cases where tritium is preferentially released.
0
C
-545-
45*
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Fig. 8.10: Evacuation Model
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species among components in the environment is explicitly characterized
by transfer rates, independent of how much of non-radioactive isotopes
of the same element may be present. This is a common assumption in
environmental studies. However, it is not appropriate for 3H and14C
(14C not important in this study). For those isotopes which are very
biologically active, a specific activity (radioactive to non-radioactive
ratio of element) description is used [8.16]. Furthermore, tritium is
directly absorbed into plants during the plume passage. This difference
has been incorporated into FUSECRAC [8.27].
8.4.2 Data Base and Input Data
The total activity for each material was calculated from the first
wall radioactivity concentration (Table 8.13, at 1.0 MW/m2). The
maximum available structural material for purposes of input was the
equivalent of 5 mm of the first wall. Thus the structural input
inventory is given by
36M/n 2 Lic 2
ACT(Ci first wal 3 x 0.5 cm x 774 m2 x 104 cm- (8.42)
1.0 MW/Mm
The resulting activity is listed in Table 8.34. The release fraction
of the structural inventory is specified independently. The tritium
values are those of the highest total blanket tritium inventory (differ-
ent breeders) for each structural material. Again, the release fraction
of the tritium is specified independently, discussed with the results
(Section 8.4.3).
The dose factors and ingestion environmental values are discussed
I d A lI I 111 1 41 I 114 1!41 II I W l4 ,1 A k14 , I I
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TABLE 8.34
Reference Radioactivity Inventory -
Blanket Tritium and 5 mm First Wall
Name
TZM
(Ci)Parent
316 SS
(Ci)
3 H
45Ca
46 Sc
47Sc
48Sc
45Ti
49v
49 Cr
51Cr
54Mn
56Mn
55Fe
59Fe
57Co
58Co
60
Co
57Ni
63Ni
89Sr
88 y
90Y
91Y
89Zr
95Zr
97Zr
91m Nb
49Cr
57Ni
V-15 C'r-5Ti
(Ci)
8.4 x 106
1.84 E6
2.70 E6
4.66 E6
3.62 E7
2.07 E5
2.13 E7
5.24 E5
8.69 E7
5.15 E3
2.38 E4
8.16 E4
1.28 El
2.23 E3
6.41 E3
1.46 E3
4.01 E2
1.34 El
0
0
0
0
2.03 E2
5.96 El
1.20 El
0
1 x 1 08
2.54 E4
4.06 E4
5.57 E4
8.36 E4
2.88 E3.
2.33 E6
7.36 E5
1.35 E8
7.83 E7
2.06 E8
6.84 E8
2.96 E5
3.95 E7
1.17 E8
2.59 E7
7.06 E6
2.47 E5
0
0
0
0
2.45 E5
7.15 E4
1.43 E4
0
6.3 x 106
5.83 E5
9.24 E5
1.02 E6
8.78 E5
1.81 E4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.04 E4
1.35 E5
5.20 E4
1.74 E4
1.94 E7
5.10 E6
1.02 E6
5.20 E6
- --- 777rrR777=r----,,rr- --
TABLE 8.34 (Continued)
V-15 Cr-5Ti
(Ci)
4.04 E4
1.09 E3
8.79 El
2.74 E2
1.28 E2
9.06 El
5.85 El
9.21 E3
0
1.66 E5
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C
Name
92mNb
93mNb
95m Nb
95Nb
96Nb
97Nb
93Mo
99Mo
99mTc
182Ta
Parent
93Mo
95Zr
95mNb
97Zr
99Mo
316 SS
(C)
5.51 E5
1.25 E4
1.06 E5
3.30 E5
1.52 E5
1.08 E5
6.74 E4
1.01 E7
0
0
TZM
(Ci)
2.14 E7
9.47 E5
1.52 E7
2.40 E7
9.71 E6
7.15 E6
1.04 E6
6.92 E8
6.97 E8
0
C
l I IHi l I 4 jjil14, , 14 1 I Il l l
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in the FUSECRAC report [8.27]. There was one significant problem, lack
of certain organ-specific inhalation dose factors (mentioned in
Section 8.3.4). The results presented have been adjusted to account for
the missing dose factors by scaling based on the inhalation screening
calculations. The missing dose factors in the health file represent
differing amounts of the total inhalation dose. Based on the
screening calculations, less than 1% of the inhalation contribution for
316 SS was missing and thus no adjustment was necessary.
For TZM, 12% of the inhalation hazard is missing. One isotope,
96Nb, causes 78% of this loss. The inhalation results from the code
were adjusted upwards by a factor of (1 -0.12)- for each organ. This
is only an approximation due to the varying organ-specific dose factors
being scaled from the screening calculation (whole body only). For
early exposure, the net effect was an upward 6% adjustment. For chronic
exposure, the efect is insignificant because inhalation (from resus-
pension) is a small (% 1%) contributor to chronic dose and the short-term
isotopes (T1/2(96Nb) = 0.975 day) do not tend to contribute to long-term
resuspension. The total effect (early and chronic) is only 1 - 2%.
Unfortunately, virtually all (%99.9%) of the V-alloy inhalation
organ-specific dose factors are missing, hence the inhalation dose
can not be-directly corrected as for TZM. Based on the relative
screening parameters among the structural materials, the V-alloy
inhalation dose for each organ was taken as the average of that scaled
from 316 SS (0.06 times 316 SS) and the corrected TZM (0.40 times TZM)
inhalation dose. Based on the variation among the metals for different
organs, the uncertainty in the inhalation dose from V-alloy for each
TI ITI |Il 'Il
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organ is a factor of several (2- 3?). The fluctuation among organs seems
to suggest that the total inhalation dose is better known. For early
exposure, the correction (from no inhalation to estimated inhalation)
increased the total V-alloy dose by a factor of 2.7. The chronic dose
correction is small, estimated at less than 2% (the isotopes involved
decay quickly). The total exposure (early and chronic) was thus adjus-
ted upwards by about 25%. Even if the estimated inhalation dose were
found to be understated by a factor of several, the effect on the total
V-alloy exposure would be small compared to differences among the
structural materials, hence the conclusions would not change.
The health response to radiation dose had to be specified. The
acute response is taken from the values in the Reactor Safety Study
[8.21], repeated in Table 8.35, assuming average medical efforts to
save life. This is the reference data (in appropriate form) for CRAC.
The sensitivity of organs to dose differs, hence comparison on the
basis of dose along would have ignored an effect.
The latent dose response must be in the form of effects per
man-rem for each exposed organ for various time intervals after an
accident. The latent effects from radiation have been continually
studied after the Reactor Safety Study. Not only have the values
changed, but the BEIR III [8.41] study introduced the linear-quadratic
and quadratic response functions in addition to the pure linear
response model incorporated into CRAC. Because the present study is
primarily a comparative one among materials and not focused on absolute
results, it was not deemed worthwhile to alter the response function
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TABLE 8.35
Acute Dose Response (Effect/Rem to Specific Organ),
Based on Reactor Safety Study L8.9]. (see Fiqure Below)
Lower Wall
Intestine
Orgpans
Whole
I Body
Lower Wall
Lung Intestine
Fatality Fatality Fatality Injury Injury Injury
Dose (Rem) Break Points:
Zero threshold,
DS 
0
First Point, DS1
Second Point, DS*2
100% Point, DS 
3
320
400
510
615
2000
5000
5000
5000
5000
14,800
22,400
24,000
55 3000
150
280
370
Probability Break Points:
First Point, P 1
Second Point, P2
0.03
0.50
1.00
1.00
0.24 0.30
0.73 0.80
DS0 DS 1
Dose (rem)
Figure 8.11: Approximate Dose Response Curve
Bone
Marrow
Effect
3000
6000
6000
1000
1000
2500
2500
0.05
1.00
1.0
P2
0.05
1.00
-
0-
4.-)
0.-
U.J 0
0
I I
DS52 DS 3
16
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from linear to linear-quadratic. Furthermore, the BEIR III study
did not break the data down to the level required (response as a
function of organ and time period after exposure). However, the BEIR
III results do indicate a general lowering of risk. At a 1 rad/year
exposure rate, the predicted number of cancer' deaths per 106 man-rem
is a function of model: 167 (linear), 77 (quadratic-linear), 10 (qua-
dratic), 121 (Reactor Safety Study). The reference model in BEIR
III was the quadratic-linear. The organ and specific values from the
Reactor Safety Study which is part of the reference CRAC data was used
in this study. The comparative results would not appear to be affected
by the BEIR III study. If absolute values were desired, they could be
estimated by a reduction by a factor of 121/77 (Reactor Safety Study to
BEIR III).
The code user must specify the interdiction criteria by specifying
the maximum dose for a given time period for each exposure pathway. If
the predicted exposure is too high, the pathway is interdicted until the
exposure rate drops below the criterion. Interdiction tends to reduce
the difference in health effects among materials. In essence, it shifts
the penalty from public health to economic. For present purposes, the
maximum exposure was set at 5 rem/yr for each pathway. While this is
high (actual procedure would likely be more restrictive), it is
conservative in that calculated doses are higher than would be allowed.
The effects of interdiction on the result are discussed in Section 8.33.
The remaining input parameters are summarized in Table 8.36. The
underlying approach was to select parameters to define an average site
with average characteristics for purposes of the comparison study. The
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TABLE 8.36
Reference Site Data
Release Characteristics
Time before release begins 1 hr
Duration of Release 1 hr
Warning time to public 0.5 hr
Heat release in plume 0
Release (stack) height 100 m
Weather Data
Stability Class Average Wind Speed Probability
A (very unstable) 3.34 m/s 0.12
D (neutral) 3.00 m/s 0.52
F (very stable) 2.06 m/s 0.36
Ceiling Height - unstable 1350.0 m
stable 550.0 m
Evacuation Parameters (see Fig. 8.10)
Maximum distance of evacuation 40 km (25 miles)
Minimum distance of evacuation 8 km (5 miles)
Evacuation 0.536 m/s (1.2 mph)
Angle of downwind sector 450
Time before wind change 2 hr
Cloudshine Shielding Factor with evacuation 1.00
Cloudshine Shielding Factor without evacuation 0.75
Groundshine Shielding Factor with evacuation 0.50
Groundshine Shielding Factor without evacuation 0.33
-I I-PI III 111111,4110" 111[ qJ111 IN '1 !' 111i
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TABLE 8.36 (Continued)
Population and Site Data
Population density
Percent land habitable
Percent land for farming
Percent land for dairy/beef
Growing season
200 people/mi2
100%
40%
25%
May - September
Deposition Data
Deposition velocity 10-2 m/s (10-3 m/s for 3H)
Scavenging Coefficient 10~ sec~ (10-5 sec~1 for 3H)
0 oo"W
0
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release characteristics are somewhat conservative. With the possible
exception of a pure tritium accident, the results of the present study
suggest that the time before release and warning time would be longer
than that input. If so, more radioactive decay and evacuation or
shielding would occur. The STARFIRE design includes a venting system
with a 100 m stack.
The weather data are average values based on the 7 sites in the
Reactor Safety Study [8.21]. The land use and growing season are average
values for the eastern U.S. from the CRAC state-specific input [8.26].
The evacuation parameters, shielding factors, and deposition data (except
tritium) are typical values from the Reactor Safety Study and reference
CRAC input. The tritium deposition values were taken from reference
8.16.
The average 1981 state population density (people per square mile)
varies from 936 (New Jersey) to 33 (Maine) to 4.9 (Wyoming) to 0.7
(Alaska). The average U.S. density is 62 while the average for states
east of the Mississippi is 158. The population data are taken from
the 1981 Hammon Almanac [8.42]. As the population will increase by
the time fusion power plants are built and they will not tend to be
placed in areas of extremely high or low density, the average population
density was fixed at 200 people per square mile.
8.4.3 Radioactivity Results
The percentage of structural inventory which must be released to
cause the first acute effect for the reference release is listed in
Table 8.37. As shown, a fairly high release fraction would be necessary
1,11111 1 4!'1!14'11Nflh61 !I 1
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TABLE 8.37
Percentage of Reference Structural Inventory*
Necessary to Cause One Acute Effect for the Reference Release Case
Fatality
316 SS
V-1 5Cr-5Ti
TZM
Tritium only
, 6%
> 10%
% 6%
> 100%
Injury
> 1%
k> 10%
> 1%
> 100%
*Based on population expulsion radius of 100 m
Structural Inventory is that of 5 mm of first wall
0
0
0
11 i  t 01 4I lN 11 11I Iidh !
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to cause one statistical effect. It should be noted that the acute
fatality/injury dose response is very non-linear so that no consistent
ratio of effect from alloy to alloy is possible. Also, these results
are for an average site with average weather. A calm day with slow
wind speed could be far worse. TZM and 316 SS produce very similar
acute results in terms of fraction released. V-15Cr-5Ti represents
a significantly lower acute hazard. Finally, a pure tritium release
is relatively benign.
The Reactor Safety Study showed that most of the fatalities from a
fission accident would result from latent effects rather than acute
response. This appears even more true for fusion. Use of the code
indicates that the number of latent fatalities would be orders of
magnitude higher than acute ones (if in fact there were any acute effects)
for the same amount of radioactivity released. The conclusion is that
the latent effects are more important for comparison purposes.
The latent effects divide into those from early and chronic expo-
sure. The ratio of latent effects of 316 SS and TZM relative to
V-15Cr-5Ti (no tritium) as a function of percent alloy released is
shown in Fig. 8.12. As more activity is released, the effect of inter-
diction begins to be seen. As the radiation released increases, inter-
diction damps the response below linear. While the appropriate measure
of comparison among materials is without interdiction, it is noted that
interdiction provides society the option to shift the penalty of using
a more hazardous material, e.g., 316 SS, from health to socioeconomic.
The relative hazard of 316 SS and TZM compared to V-15Cr-5Ti for
each exposure pathway and exposure time is listed in Table 8.38.. For
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Fig. 8.12: Latent Effects from 316 SS and TZM Relative
to V-15 Cr-5 Ti as Functions of Percent of
5 mm First Wall Released, Indicating Influence
of Interdiction
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TABLE 8.38
Relative Hazard of 316 SS and TZM Compared to V-15Cr-5Ti*
Pathway
316 SS
Cloudshine
Groundshine
Inhalation
Ingestion
Dose Factors Only**
Short Long
Term Term
5 -
- 70
15 -
- 107
Total
TZM
Cloudshine
Groundshine
Inhalation
Ingestion
Total
2
3
3
0.8
*Ratio of alloy to V-15Cr-5Ti for each individual pathway and exposure
time (early or chronic). Because the pathways do not equally contribute
to the total, the ratio of the total effects does not equal the sum
or direct average of the component pathways.
**Predicted by screening calculations, compare short term to
exposure and long-term to chronic exposure.
early
Latent
Early
3.4
2.9
7.3
5.7
FUSECRAC
Latent
Chronic
42
74
228
147
Latent
Total
117
3.1
3.1
1.7
2.2
5.8
1.9
0.1
2.5 2.4
i-
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example, the latent effects from early cloudshine exposure is 3.4 times
higher for 316 SS than V-15Cr-5Ti. The various pathways do not contribute
equally to the total health effects and dose. Thus, the ratio of total
early and chronic exposure from 316 SS and TZM to V-alloy is not a sum
or linear average of the component pathways. *Similarly, the total latent
effects are dominated by the chronic exposure so that the ratio of total
effects is closer to the chronic ratio than the early effects.
The ratio of effect predicted by the screening calculations is also
shown in Table 8.38. These are seen to have been within about a factor
of 2 of the results from the detailed FUSECRAC calculations for each
pathway and exposure time. The short term screening cases are compared
to early exposure while the long term cases predicted the chronic expo-
sure ratio.
The percent contribution of each exposure pathway to the total
health effect (acute fatality, acute injury, latent effects from early
exposure, and latent effects from chronic exposure) is shown in Table
8.39. The contribution from inhaled resuspended activity is seen to be
quite small for the structural materials. For pure tritium releases,
only internal exposure occurs. As discussed in reference 8.27, the
chronic resuspension model in the code may not be appropriate for tritium.
The breakdown of -contributions has more than an academic interest. For
example, since almost all of the chronic exposure from TZM is due to
groundshine; if interdiction is required to reduce exposure, only the
most severe land interdiction (moving people from the area) would be
effective. The less severe food production interdiction would be far
more effective in reducing 316 SS exposure.
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TABLE 8.39
Percent Contribution to Health Effects
by Exposure Pathway
Health Effect
Exposure Acute Acute Latent Latent
Alloy Pathway Fatalities Injury (Early) (Chronic)
316 SS Cloudshine 12 15 4 -
316 SS Groundshine 26 30 15 12
316 SS Inhalation 62 55 81 1
316 SS Ingestion - - - 87
V-alloy Cloudshine 15 16 7 -
V-alloy Groundshine 43 44 30 42
V-alloy Inhalation 42 40 63 2
V-alloy Ingestion - - - 56
TZM Cloudshine 11 9 10 -
TZM Groundshine 31 26 42 97.5
TZM Inhalation 58 65 48 1.5
TZM Ingestion - - - 1
Tritium Cloudshine 0 0 0 -
Tritium Groundshine 0 0 0 0
Tritium Inhalation 100 100 100 30
Tritium Ingestion - - - 70
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Tritium is relatively benign compared to the structural radioactivity
in terms of latent effects from accidental releases. The required percent
of the reference structural inventory which produces the same approximate
total latent effects as the worst case tritium release (Section 8.1.3) is
listed in Table 8.40. With the sole exception' of lithium/steel corrosion,
the worst possible release of structural corrosion products (Chapter 7) is
below this required amount of structure. Thus mechanisms other than mere
release of entrained corrosion products are required if structural radio-
activity is to dominate health effects. Similarly, tritium is likely
to dominate the normal environmental hazard.
On the other hand, if mechanisms exist which could result in a
large (over 0.1%) amount of the structural radioactivity being released
to the environment, the tritium contribution would be unimportant. Since
V-alloy has lower latent effects, more of it would have to be released
for its radioactivity to produce higher effects than the highest postu-
lated possible tritium release.
To investigate how much 60Co contributes to the 316 SS dose response,
a case was examined where the 60Co was arbitrarily eliminated. The
effect is indicated in Table 8.41. This case gives some idea of the
effects of a HT-9 alloy release since HT-9 has no cobalt and very little
nickel (so that nil 60Co is produced). As seen in the table, even total
elimination of 60Co does not reduce health effects of the steel to that
of the refractory metals, although the reduction is significant. Finally,
the composition of 316 SS (see Appendix B) which produced the amount
of 60Co in the calculations is already nuclear-grade and substantial
further reductions in 60Co in 316 SS-type steel is unlikely.
I'l il I I lol 4 14 1 l 1 !
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TABLE 8.40
Percent of Structural Radioactivity* Required to
Produce the Same Latent Effects as Worst Case Tritium Release
Structure
316 SS
316 SS
V-15Cr-5Ti
TZM
Breeder
LiAlO 
2
Lithium
Lithium
Lithium
Maximum Tritium
Release (Ci)
1 x 10 7
8.4 x 106
8.4 x 106
6.3 x 10 6
Percent
Structure*
'0. 001%
q,0.001%
% 0.04%
*Based on reference radioactivity inventory, 5 mm of first wall
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TABLE 8.41
Effect of Arbitrary Elimination of
60Co from 316 SS on Latent Effects*
Relative Latent Effects
Early
Exposure
Chronic
Exposure
V-15Cr-5Ti
TZM
316 SS 60
with Co
316 SS
without 60Co
*Acute effects are reduced by less than 50%
0
Total
Exposure
1
2
6
1
2.5
150
>3. 5
1
>2
>100
%30, 40 0
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8.5 Conclusions and Discussion
To first order, the breeder selection determines the tritium inventory
and maximum possible tritium release while the structural metal selection
determines the non-tritium radioactivity.
8.5.1 Tritium
A variety of general conclusions are possible:
1) All primary coolant loops will likely operate with tritium
cleanup systems which will be very significant in determining the
steady state tritium levels and partial pressures.
2) The breeder processing technology available for liquid breeders
tends to control the breeder inventory, although the properties
of the breeder influences available technology.
3) The tritium partial pressures present tends to control the
inventory in the metal through Sievert's Law. However, for the
structural materials studied, the tritium inventory is very
small compared to that in the breeder.
4) The coolant partial pressure, and primary heat exchange permea-
bility and leakage, control the important and difficult-to-
control pathway of tritium release to the environment. The
breeder choice tends not to influence the power cycle release path.
5) The breeder inventory and behavior during transients controls
the worst conceivable tritium release to the building under
severe accident conditions.
6) For breeders, the most important selection factor is inventory,
which controls total blanket inventory and largest releases.
7) For coolants, the most important selection factor is the tritium
partial pressure, which tends to control permeation leakage.
_ 7 ____7 = T = 7 ii . 1 , ! I =17I
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8) For structural materials, the most important selection factor
is the permeability.
9) All systems have conceivable releases of at least 10 g of
tritium (10 5 Ci).
Some specific comments about the materials studied are summarized:
1) Among breeders, the order of increasing maximum possible
tritium release is Li17Pb83 , lithium, LiA102'
2) Although the tritium partial pressures over Lil 7Pb83 appears
higher than over lithium, the tritium pressure in LiAlO2 is
still higher, although in LiAlO 2 tritium may be in the
less permeable form, T20.
3) Among coolants, helium is preferred. Lithium appears second
best due to the low partial pressures. Water is similar to
lithium in predicted normal releases but there is not the
flexibility of designing a cleanup system on an intermediate
coolant loop as there is for a lithium primary loop. Flibe
is the worst due to the high partial pressures. A one loop
boiling water system would present severe problems since there
could not be a successful primary detritiation system.
4) Among metals, 316 SS and HT-9 are best, TZM next and V-alloy
the worst due to permeability.
5) The selection of a lithium/V-alloy or flibe/TZM system would
require a secondary coolant loop detritiation system. Helium
systems appear not to require this. Lithium/steel and water/
steel may require additional detritiation to control normal
tritium releases but the water/steel system offers far less
flexibility for improvement.
P IINI II 1141 N~lP ' 1 1 lldM 1j~j*1
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8.5.2 Structural Radioactivity
The results concerning the blanket structural radioactivity can
be summarized by 6 points.
1) Comparison basis - Most previous work has used the activity (Ci.)
or biological hazard potential (BHP) to compare the accidental
hazard of various materials. The BHPair is based on the maximum
permissible concentration (MPC) which was developed for fission
on the basis of one organ per isotope, inhalation exposure only,
and steady state concentrations. The BHPwater is based on
the MPC of isotopes in water on the basis of steady state in-
gestion of water and one organ per isotope. The appropriate
comparison is to use dose factors and transport effects. The
FUSECRAC code [8.27], based on the state-of-the-art fission
accident consequence code, CRAC [8.26], was used to compare
materials.
Recently, Holdren [8.43] used dose factors and one weather
condition to compare 316 SS, TZM, and Nb-Zr with fission. How-
ever, the comparision was based only on the early exposure from
cloudshine and inhalation to one organ, bone marrow. Early
groundshine exposure, shown important in this study, and chronic
exposure, which dominates the total exposure, were not con-
sidered. Important isotopes like 60Co in 316 SS were not in-
cluded. Thus it is not surprising that the relative ranking
of TZM to 316 SS predicted by Holdren (ratio of 2) does not
agree with that of the present study (ratio of 1/3 for latent
effects from early exposure, "- 1 for acute effects from early
. ... [I . I . ll . I. . .I. ...t .. I . I
-568-
exposure, and 1/50 for total latent effects). If very high
release fractions of fusion structural material were possible,
Holden's results do demonstrate that the public consequences
would be serious.
It should be emphasized that the comparative results
presented here for accidental hazards do not extend to other
problems, like waste disposal and recycling. Other comparison
bases would be required.
2) Dominant Effects - Fusion accident analysis, as in the case
of fission, indicates that latent health effects are likely
to overshadow acute dose response. For average weather con-
ditions and site characteristics, a large fraction (1 6 %)
of the structural inventory would have to somehow be eleased
to the environment to produce any acute effects. Among the
dominant latent effects, those resulting from chronic exposure
appear more important than early exposure. This greatly com-
plicates the analysis, increases complexities and possibly
the variation among sites.
3) Comparison to Tritium - If only structural corrosion products
are mobilized, the worst case tritium release would tend to
dominate, except for the lithium/316 SS case. If additional
mechanisms lead to higher release fractions (see Table 8.40),
then the tritium effects become unimportant.
4) Alloy Comparison - The relative hazards of 316 SS, V-15Cr-5Ti,
and TZM are listed in Tables 8.37 and 8.38. Austenitic steel
is significantly worse than the refractory metals. As discussed
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below, a ferritic steel would be expected to fall between the
extremes. About 100 times more V-15Cr-5Ti than 316 SS would
have to be released to cause the same total latent-effect.
5) Causes of Difference. - The consequence of a radiation release
is partially controlled by the half-lives of the individual
isotopes and the chemical behavior of the elements involved.
It also happens that the elements involved in 316 SS (e.g.,
cobalt) are generally more hazardous in terms of ingestion
due to environmental transport.
A very important part of the problem is the half-lives and
decay of the isotopes involved, see Fig. 8.13. Different time
periods qualitatively control the various radiation exposure
effects. As seen in the figure, the metals all have similar
initial activity levels, so it is not suprising that the
acute effects are fairly similar. The latent effects from
early exposure are determined by the external dose from the
plume passage and the inhalation dose over days to years from
the isotopes inhaled from the plume. 316 SS begins to have
higher activity than TZM and V-alloy and likewise shows
significantly higher latent effects from early exposure.
The latent effects from chronic exposure is largely
controlled by activity levels from weeks to a few decades
after the accident. As seen in the figure, it is precisely
that time period where the 316 SS activity is orders of magni-
tude higher than TZM and V-alloy. Unfortunately, isotopes
like 54Mn, 55 Fe, 57 Co, 58Co, 60Co, have half-lives in this
,'I Y 1II !RO A I I Iht l ll,40elll
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range and are largely controlling 316 SS effects. Most of
the isotopes in TZM and V-alloy have decayed after a few
months. Again, the relative health effects show a.similar
behavior - 316 SS is orders of magnitude worse than TZM and
V-alloy in terms of chronic exposure.
Whereas the accidental contributions are not strongly
effected by times over about 50 years after the accident,
waste disposal/recycling is likely to depend strongly on
the long-term activity behavior. Then, TZM does not look so
much better than 316 SS, in fact it may be worse. Based on
the activity behavior, one can qualitatively estimate how
other materials would compare. Aluminum alloys would tend to
be similar or better than V-alloy. The long term behavior of
Al-alloy and V-alloy in the figure may be misleading since the
specific alloying elements and impurities will control the
decay and the behavior graphed may be different from actual
alloys used. Nb-alloys appear worse from the accident stand-
point than V-alloy and TZM, but perhaps better than 316 SS.
Nb may be worse than 316 SS in the waste disposal problem.
The general behavior of HT-9 (nil nickel, no cobalt) is also
likely to be between TZM and 316 SS. Cobalt or nickel
based alloys would be the worst choices, with large amounts
of 58Co and 60Co produced.
6) Future Research - The most important research needs are
i) Improved data base for dose factors, especially for
internal exposure (see Section 8.3.7).
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ii) Improved data base for environmental transfer parameters
which influence ingestion dose.
iii) Extension of the analysis to include other candidate
alloys.
iv) Extension of the analysis to include candidate neutron
multipliers, breeders, and first wall coatings.
v) Experimental study of tritium releases from breeder
materials under accident conditions.
vi) Include chemical toxicity effects, perhaps in FUSECRAC.
vii) Examine pathways between mobilization of radioactive
species in the building and release to the environment;
this includes oxide plate-out on building surfaces.
8.5.3 Relative Consequence Indices
The accidental hazard due to tritium from tritium breeders can be
compared and relative consequence indices assigned. The state-of-
knowledge in calculating the steady state inventory and possible releas-
es is relatively poor. However, the uncertainty does not appear to be
large enough to alter the basic rank ordering: Lil 7Pb83 (best), Lithium,
LiA10 2 (worst). The best available estimates can be used to quantify
the relative hazard. The relative consequence index of tritium inven-
tory, INV, is defined as (from Table 8.5)
RCIt = INV/INV(Li Pb83) (8.43)RC index ma
The relative consequence index of maximum possible tritium mobilized
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in the building is defined as (Table 8.10)
RCI = INVmobilized/INVmobilized(LilPb83) (8.44)
The results are listed in Table 8.42.
The relative consequence from non-tritium radioactivity depends
on the structural material selected. The other relative consequence
indices in chapters 3 - 7 have compared accident mechanisms. Here, the
relative health effects to the public per amount of structural first
wall released (by whatever means) are compared using the FUSECRAC code.
The relative consequence indices for early exposure (RCIGR), chronic
tRC
exposure (RCI e), and total exposure (RCI RC) are defined by
I latent effects from i th exposure (8.45)
latent effects from i th exposure
from V-15Cr-5Ti
where i = ee, ce, te.
The different exposure times are compared separately since the control
implications are different. The latent effects from early exposure are
only reduced by evacuation or shielding. Thus the RCIe can also be
viewed as the relative need that short-term protection means (and cost)
will be necessary. The chronic exposure tends to dominate total
exposure and can be reduced by interdiction (land or food). The total
exposure provides a single value to compare the consequences of
radioactivity release.
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TABLE 8.42
Relative Consequence Indices of Tritium Breeders
due to Tritium**
Steady State
Inventory
RCI tiRC
1
8 - 10
125
Li17Pb83
Lithium*
LiAlO 
2
Maximum Possible
Tritium Mobilized
RCItmRC
8 - 10
12.5
* Range refers
coolant
to lithium as breeder only or also as
**Relative to Li17Pb83 , low values preferred
0
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TABLE 8.43
Relative Consequence Indices of Structural
Materials due to Radioactivity Consequences*
Early
Exposure
(RCIR)
316 SS
HT-9**
V-15Cr-5Ti
TZM
6
2 -6
1
2
Chronic
Exposure
(RCI c)
150
2.5 - 150
1
2.5
*Based on relative latent effects, low values preferred
**HT-9 inventory unavailable, but appears to represent a
hazard between 316 SS and TZM based on composition
Total
Exposure
(RCIt)
100
2 - 100
I
fl fflt| ilbl sil@Wl, 4 I I0 4ill 15 l  if 111,04
---- 7= 7177F -17-7-1 1 111 11111 IIII I I
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The hypothesis, stated in Chapter 1, has been shown to be generally
true - the selection of blanket materials for use as coolant, tritium
breeder, and structure has a demonstrable ard generally quantifiable
influence on various fusion reactor aacident consequences. The influence
on specific problems ranges as much as several orders of magnitude.
The overall conclusions of this study are stated in Table 9.1. This
chapter contains a summary of the relative consequence indices, discussion
of the materials involved, recommendations for material choice and
design, and recommendations for future safety research.
9.1 Relative Consequence Indices
The study included examination of the influence of 11 combinations
of blanket materials (structure, tritium breeder and coolant) on the
severity of 7 different safety problems, This influence was judged via
well-defined safety criteria and quantified by establishing a series
of relative consequence indices (RCI's).
9.1.1 Definitions
The seven safety concerns are listed in Table 9.2 along with the
chapter containing the relevant analysis. The first three are basically
thermal, the second three, chemical; and the final one (and also LOCA-
after heat) neutronic. In the course of the study, it was seen that
the functional dependence on the material choice differed among the
safety areas. The influence in four areas (after heat (LA) plasma.dis-
ruptions (PD), structural oxidation (SO), and radioactivity consequences
1'11 I 1H 111111 111114111"tIT NNN l ill 111,041114 114 il 1111ij1 111 1 j " , 11
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TABLE 9.1
General Conclusions
1. Blanket material selection of structure, tritium breeder and
coolant can significantly influence fusion reactor accident safety.
2. Clear preferences for material choice exist in most of the safety
comparison areas.
3. Conflicting preferences result from examination of the overall
problem. Some of these conflicts may be resolvable by determination
of which problems are easier to solve by design.
4. A methodology for fusion accident risk assessments is most useful
in providing an approach for material selections that minimizes the
overall potential hazards.
I N 111 IIN IlR111 l H Illl i4 ,[1 !I A l i d I |M l N i 1 , I
-581-
TABLE 9.2
Safety Areas Examined in This Study
LP - Thermal transient due to plasma heating following LOCA (Chapter 3).
LA - Thermal transient due to decay afterheat following LOCA (Chapter 3).
PD - Plasma disruption effects (Chapter 4).
TP - Temperature and pressure effects from combustion and pressurized
fluids (Chapter 5).
SO - Rapid structural oxidation hazards (Chapter 6).
CP - Corrosion product problems (Chapter 7)
RC - Radioactivity consequences (Chapter 8)
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(RC)), could be determined for structural materials independent of
coolant and breeder (Figure 9.1). Two of these (afterheat and radio-
activity consequences) were also determined for breeder selection alone.
The influence of structure and coolant was inherently linked in the
areas of corrosion products (CP) and LOCA-plasma heating (LP). Finally,
the temperature/pressure (TP) hazards from combustion and pressurized
fluids are functions of the coolant and breeder choice.
In reality, the design and hence all safety areas are a function
of the selection of all three components. In addition, the summation of
the impacts of the different safety problems should be. assessed (see
Section 9.2.1). It is not yet possible to analyze the problems in
sufficient detail to establish the dependence on all components;
however, the present analysis does examine the major dependences. For
example, the ability of structural materials to withstand a plasma
disruption is likely to be influenced by the choice of coolant and
breeder behind it. However, to first order it was discovered that the
thermal shock and resulting temperature rise were overwhelmingly deter-
mined by the choice of structural material alone. In fact, the decoupling
of the dependence of each of the three components (where possible) has
an important advantage: since not all materials or material combinations
were studied, appropriate decoupling of dependencies allows more direct
emphasis on the individual material properties that are important and
hence offers a higher potential for other candidate materials to be
examined using the same framework
Various safety criteria were used to judge the influence of material
-583-
Structural Materials
LA
PD
so
RC
CP
LP
Design
LA
TP
RC
Coolants Breeders
LP - LOCA-Plasma Heating
LA - LOCA-Afterheat SO - Structural Oxidation
PD - Plasma Disruption CP - Corrosion Products
TP - Combustion and Pressure RC - Radioactivity Consequences
Figure 9.1: Functional Dependence of Blanket Material
Component on Safety Concerns
1 1 %111111111 j Ull lllk iR Al AIN ill i l 111141 W1114d .4 14,10 1,, 1-1
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selection on the safety problems (Table 9.3). These are defined such
that low values are consistently preferred. For example, one would
like the time elapsed in a transient before occurrence of damage or
melting of the structure to occur to be as long as possible to allow
mitigating action. Hence the inverse time to damage or melting is used
to consistently judge materials. The relative scaling of.the dis-
ruption time which causes initial melting or vaporization on the
maximum depth of surface melting was seen to be the same (see pc - phase
change - in Table 9.3).
The appropriate safety criteria for each safety concern were used
to define specific relative consequence indices (Table 9.4), as a
function of safety concern and safety criterion. As indicated in
Figure 9.1, these are varying functions of either structure alone,
breeder alone, coolant and structure, or coolant and breeder. Relative
indices were used since the study was primarily a comparative one.
Furthermore, the absolute level of severity or its implication could
not always be determined.
In most cases, the RCI's were defined relative to the best case,
which was given a value of 1.0. In some cases, the minimum value was-
zero (e.g., the rapid structural volatilization rate for some tempera-
tures), so that a normalization constant had to be used. These were
selected such that values less than or equal to 1.0 (below the normali-
zation constant) appeared "minimal" concerns. In other cases, there was
a range in the best material case. Then the most realistic value was
normalized to 1.0, the other end of the range could therefore be less
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TABLE 9.3
Safety Criteria Defined for Various Safety Areas (a)
d - The inverse of time to damage of structure, damage defined as a
temperature rise of 3000C above operating temperature.
m - The inverse of time to melting of structure.
pc - phase change - (disruption time which causes initial melting) =
(disruption time which causes initial vaporization)~ = (disruption
time which causes the maximum depth of melting)-l
ts - thermal stress
ms - magnetic stress
T - temperature rise
P - overpressure
ox - oxidation rate
v - volatilization rate
mt - corrosion product mass transfer rate
rr - maximum corrosion product radioactivity release
ti - tritium inventory
tr - maximum tritium release
ee - latent effects to public from early exposure
ce - latent effects to public from chronic exposure
te - total latent effects to public
(a) - defined such that low values preferred, symbols are those used with
the RCI's
I .11 I Q I Ill j A ll Hill ift 14W I I'll'] '11114141111 114411114141141 ];116 I , il - - .1L'I I, ,
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TABLE 9.4
Definitions of Relative Consequence Indices(a)
RCI d (Time to Damage)- relative to most realistic TZM/flibe caseLP from plasma heating following LOCA,. defined for structure/
coolant combinations.
RCI m (Time to Melting) relative to most realistic TZM/flibe case
from plasma heating following LOCA, defined for structure/
coolant combinations.
RCILA (Time to Damage)~ relative to best case V-alloy (for structures)
or Li Pb (for breeders) from decay afterheat following LOCA,
definI sgiarately for structures and breeders.
RCI A (Time to Melting)~l relative to best case V-alloy (for structures)
or Li Pb (for breeders) from decay afterheat following LOCA,
definN sgiarately for structures and breeders.
RCIPc (Time for Phase Change)~i (disruption time which produces initialPD melting, maximum depth of melt zone, and initial vaporization)
relative to best case TZM following plasma disruption, defined
for structures.
RCIts Thermal stress relative to best case TZM from plasma disruption,PD defined for structures.
RCI D Magnetic stress relative to best case, 316 SS from plasma dis-
ruption, defined for structures.
T~b
RSCITP Subjective rank ordering of temperature rise problems from com-
bustion, defined for coolant/breeder combinations.
p(b)
RSCITP Subjective rank ordering of overpressure problems from combustion
or pressurized fluids, defined for coolant/breeder combinations.
RCIT (Temperature to rapidly -ixidize wal1 - operating temperature)~
Cso relative to best case HT-9, defined for structures.
RCIdO Oxidation rate of structural wall relative to 1 mm of wall/day,
defined for structures.
RCI v Volatilization rate of structural wall relative to 1 mm of wall/
day, defined for structures.
RCImt Corrosion rate relative to 1 im/yr, defined for coolant/structureCP combinations.
14i14, l A d!4& 1 11
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TABLE 9.4 (continued)
Definitions of Relative Consequence Indices (continued)(a)
RCI r Maximum releasable corrosion product inventory relative to lkCi,
defined for coolant/structure combinations.
RCI Tritium inventory relative to best.case, Li7Pb defined for
breeders.
RCI tr Maximum releasable tritium relative to best case Li 7Pb83,RCdefined for breeders.
RCIee Latent effects to public from early exposure relative to bestIRC case V-alloy, defined for structures (per unit volume of
first wall released).
ceRGIRC Latent effects to public from chronic exposure relative to best
case V-alloy, defined for structures (per unit volume of first
wall released).
RCICte Total latent effects to public relative to best case V-alloy,RC defined for structures (per unit volume of first wall released).
(a)Low values preferred
(b)Subjective rank ordering
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than or greater than 1.0. For example, the range in LOCA-plasma heat
effects for the best case TZM/flibe was caused by the specific scenario
for flibe loss. The most realistic case was to assume loss in 2.5
seconds. The other case was to assume instantaneous loss (see Chapter
3).
In one area, combustion and pressure hazards, it was not possible
to directly quantify the result, hence a subjective rank ordering was
used.
9.1.2 Structural Material Results
The analyses indicated that several structural material properties
influenced safety concerns (Table 9.5). It is not surprising that many
of these are also engineering properties. Likewise, it is not
surprising that the better safety choices are the better engineering
materials. Yu [9.1] found HT-9 and V-alloy to be superior materials
for first wall application. TZIM would have been a good candidate
escept for its very high ductile-brittle transition temperature (DBTT).
The results of Smith et al. [9.2] similarly indicate that V-alloys and
HT-9 have more design flexibility and higher performance than 316 SS.
9.1.2.1 Relative Consequence Indices
The values of the relative consequence indices which are a function
of structural material are listed in Tables 9.6 and 9.7. A detailed
sensitivity analysis was beyond the scope of this study. However, some
idea of the potential range came about naturally in the analysis from
either the assumptions themselves or the definition of the indices.
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TABLE 9.5
Material Properties of Structural Materials which Influence Safety
Property
Volumetric
Specific Heatb)
Thermal Conductivity(b)
Electrical (b
Conductivity -
E' / (1- (a)-(b)y
Ductile Brittle Tran-
sition Temperature
Strength Properties
Operating Temperature
0C
Melting Temperature C
Margin Between Melting
and Operating Temp. *C
Transition to Rapid
Oxidation Temp. *C
Margin Between Oxi-
dation and Operating
Temp. 'C
Corrosion
- water
- helium
- lithium
- flibe
Ideal
Value
high
Relative Value
316 SS . HT-9
0.77
0.19
1.0
3.0
low
fair
450
1430
high
low
1 ow
1 ow
good
high
high
high
high
high
good
good
good
good
980
1000
+550
good
good
poor
poor
1.00
0.26
1.05
1.5
problem
good
450
1420
970
1300
+850
good
good
poor
poor
V-alloy
0.55
0.29
1.9
1.0
low
good
600
1900
1300
700
+100
bad
bad
good
(a) Young's Modulus x linear coefficient
influences thermal stresses.
(b) Relative values.
of expansion x (1-poisson's ratio)-
TZM
0.54
1.0
3.5
1.4
serious
probl em
good
900
2600
1700
700
-200
bad
bad
good
good
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TABLE 9.5 (continued)
Material Properties of Structural Materials which Influence Safety
Property
Overall Oxidation
Rate
Overall Volatil-
ization Rate
Afterheat
Radioactivity
Effects
Tritium Permeability
Relative
316 SS' HT-9
Ideal
Value
low
low
low
1ow
1ow
1ow
1ow
highest average
1ow
1ow
highest
1 ow
high
1 ow
0
(a)Young's Modulus x linear coefficient of expansion x (1-poisson's ratio)~
influences thermal stresses.
C
Value
V-alloy
high
low
low
1 owest
high
TZM
high
high
average
1ow
low
' .I tIId I ~ ' qi 1441% 141
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TABLE 9.6
Relative Consequence Indices for Cases
Dependent Only on Structural Material(d)
Damage,
Afterheat
Melting,
Afterheat
Phase Change,
Plasma Disruption
Thermal Stress,
Plasma Disruption
Magnetic Stress,
Plasma Disruption
Temp. Margin, Struc-
tural Oxidation
Oxidation Rate of
Structure
Volatilization Rate
of Structure
Latent Effects,
Early Exposure
Latent Effects,
Chronic Exposure
All Latent Effects
316 SS
RCId 6-11
LA
RCI A 7-12
RCI PC 8.3PD
RCIts 10.0PD
RCI ms
RCIT
S(c)
RCIso
R (c)
RCIso
RCI R
RCIce
RC
RCI teRC
1.0
1.7
0-2.2
0-2.2
HT-9
3-8
3-8
4.7
4.0
1.0-1.1 1.0-1.9 1.0-3.6
0-2.2 0-147
0-2.2 0-0.1
6
150
100
2.5-150(d)
2-100 (d)
(a) low values preferred, see Table 9.4 for RCI definitions
(b) since the rapid oxidation temperature for TZM was below the operating
temperature, the temperature margin against oxidation was non-existent,
resulting in a value of o for this index - see text.
(c) the oxidation and volatilization rates are a strong function of temp-
erature. The range indicated is for about 500-15000C, normalized to
a rate of 1 mm of metal/day.
(d) Radioactivity values of HT-9 not available, effects judged between
316 SS and TZM on basis of composition (Chapter 8).
V-alloy
1.0
1.0
4.9
2.3
TZM
5-9
3-8
1.0
1.0
1.0 9.5
0-220
0-220
2
2.5
2
1.0
1.0
1.0
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TABLE 9.7
Relative Consequence Indices for Cases
Dependent on Structure and Coolant (a)
316 SS Water
316 SS Helium
316 SS Lithium
HT-9
HT-9
Water
Hel ium
V-alloy Lithium
TZM Flibe
Damage
LOCA
RCI C)RCLP
2.0-2.3
2.0-2.3
0.7-2.0
1.5-1.6
1.5-1.6
0.6-1.4
1.0-4.0
Melting,
LOCA
CI(c)
RCLP
10.2-13.5
10.2-13.5
1.9-12.6
5.8-9.0
5.8-9.0
1.3-6.2
0.4-1.0
Corrosion
Mass Transfer
RCICP
0.5
6
1.4
0.1
0.5
0.5
Corrosion,
Radio-
activity
RCIr
30
20
2000
(b)
(b)
3
1
Low values preferred, see Table 9.4 for definitions.
The specific radioactivity of HT-9 was unavailable.
The range for LOCA-plasma heat cases was caused by the loss rate
scenario. For non-TZM/flibe cases, the higher value is for an
instantaneous coolant loss. For water or helium cases, the lower
value is for a 0.1 second depressurization. For lithium, the lower
value is for the case where MHD forces prevent lithium drainage
but the flow stops instantaneously (May not be conservative).
For TZM/flibe, the values of 1.0 refer to the most realistic
2.5 sec. drainage case, the other value assumes instantaneous
flibe loss.
0
(a)
(b)
(c)
0
0
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These are generally discussed in the table footnotes. The possible
sources of error or uncertainty and relevant assumptions for each of the
analyses were indicated in the relevant chapter and are not repeated
here. It is felt that the differences Among inaterials in most cases
are larger than any reasonable uncertainty. This is especially true
since the values are relative. Many uncertainties (time of the disrup-
tion, for example) tend to cancel and would not affect the relative
values. Further discussion of the sensitivity of the values to material
choice and design is included in section 9.2. The following discussion
focusses on the implication of the indices for the various structural
materials.
9.1.2.2 316 SS
Austenitic stainless steels have received considerable attention
for fusion reactor blankets primarily due to the considerable data
base and experience which exists. This aspect tends to force its use
for near-term experiments like INTOR and the Fusion Engineering Device.
However, it is clear that better alternatives exist for potential ap-
plication as commercial fusion reactors.
The only safety advantage of 316 SS over HT-9 is the slightly
better corrosion resistance to water. Besides the relatively poor
thermo-mechanical properties of 316 SS, many other problems can be
directly traced to its composition. The higher molybdenum content of
316 SS versus HT-9 significantly increases the rapid oxidation potential.
Serious problems arise from the use of nickel as an alloying agent and
presence of cobalt impurity. The nickel is leached by liquid metals,
I lid: l] 1) 11, 11 lifi I H LO ilk I 41W 41 !1! 4! 0 1 4ill,41114'A I Ill I I , , ,, I
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e.g., lithium and lead, lowering its corrosion resistance to lithium and
Li17Pb83. Worse, nickel and cobalt lead to the presence of 60 
58Co and
57Co which worsen radioactivity and afterheat problems as they are
most hazardous from the public accident consequence standpoint.
9.1.2.3 HT-9
It was somewhat surprising that the two steels differed so signifi-
cantly, but ferritic HT-9 was seen clearly superior to austenitic 316 SS.
9.1.2.4 V-alloy
Vanadium is superior to HT-9 in the very important areas of higher
operating temperatures, afterheat, and radioactivity. These advantages
make it appear a very promising candidate. However, there are two
serious problems. The tritium permeability is very high, requiring far
more effort to control tritium migration within the reactor. Secondary
containment and tritium barrier technologies would be vital. The oxida-
tion potential is high, probably preventing its use with either water
and helium. Above 7000C (only about 1000 above typical operating temper-
atures), the oxidation rate is very rapid forming the liquid oxide, V205.
Unlike TZM, however, the volatile oxide partial pressures are very low
so that the volatilization rate is minimal. For vanadium, then, oxidation
is a serious mechanism to cause damage but far less serious in terms
of mobilizing radioactivity. In general V-alloy and HT-9 are good
safety candidates; however, V-alloy has potentially more significant
advantages and disadvantages.
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9.1.2.5 TZM
In many respects TZM is similar to V-alloy. Advantages include
high temperature performance and thermal conductivity. These result in
TZM's superior ability to survive the thermal effects of disruptions
and longer periods of plasma heating without 'cooling. Disadvantages
include afterheat, radioactivity, and oxidation. The afterheat and radio-
activity problems are better than or equal to the steels but inferior to
vanadium. Although not examined in this report, the very long-term radio-
activity levels are high (see for example Ref. 9.3), the DBTT is very
high (see Chapter 1), and waste disposal recycling/decommissioning prob-
lems would appear to be worse- for TZM than for the other materials.
Although the oxidation rate for TZM is similar to vanadium, the product
oxide MoO 3 is far more volatile. Hence, radioactivity mobilization due
to rapid oxidation is a very serious concern for TZM, especially since
its other high temperature properties would encourage its use at temper-
atures above 7000C, the threshold oxidation temperature.
9.1.2.6- Other Structural Materials
Although the actual calculations of the indices were limited to
four materials, the identification of critical properties makes possible
some generic comments on other materials.
As seen by the difference between 316 SS and HT-9 in nickel and
cobalt content, use of superalloys based on nickel or cobalt should be
discouraged. The poor high temperature performance of aluminum not only
limits its operating temperature but appears to significantly reduce the
temperature margin between operation and damage or melting. Niobium
is somewhat superior to vanadium in tLermomechanical properties and the
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threshold oxidation temperature is far higher (%15000C); however, after-
heat, radioactivity and long-term waste disposal problems are signifi-
cantly worse.
A promising approach might be a ceramic structure, using such mate-
rials as SiC which exhibit extremely low levels of afterheat and radio-
activity. Use of such materials depends on very significant advances in
the engineering of large, complex, brittle ceramic structures as well as
the understanding of radiation effects (in a fusion environment).
9.1.2.7 Comparison of Materials
The key advantages and disadvantages of the structural materials
are listed in Table 9.8. HT-9 and V-alloy appear the most promising.
If alloy development produces a high performance V-based alloy, it
could well be the material-of-choice. Another promising alternative,
dependent on material science advances, could be a low activation
ceramic. For the more near-term question, HT-9 appears promising. In
all cases, however, it should be emphasized that significant problems
do exist.
9.1.3 Coolant Results
Of the three components of the blanket, the specific effects of
coolants were the least adequately modeled. The specifics of LOCA-
transients are difficult to determine. The focus of the present study
was on a very pessimistic case which results in very rapid coolant loss.
However, the analysis does indicate which properties are important and
gives some quantification to the impact.- The coolant properties that
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TABLE 9.8
Key Safety Advantages and Disadvantages of
Reference Structural Materials
Advantages
High margin between
oxidation and operat-
ing temperatures.
Low afterheat
Low radioactivity
Disadvantages
Poor thermo-mechanical
-properties
Low temperatures
High afterheat
High radioactivity
Low operating tempera-
tures
High oxidation potential
High tritium permeability
High oxidation potential
Alloy
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
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were found to be important are summarized in Table 9.9. If the coolant
is to be used as a liquid, a high boiling point is desired to provide
more of a temperature margin during transients and operation.
9.1,3.1 Relative Consequence Indices
The indices dependent on coolant and structural material were given
in Table 9.7. The indices dependent on coolant and breeder are listed
in Table 9.10. Between the two tables, the influence of coolant choice,
coupled with the other components, can be determined. The influence and
implication of the internal/external difference (Table 9.10) is discussed
in Section 9.2.
9.1.3.2 Pressurized Water
The prime disadvantages of water include its very high operating
pressure (>15 MPa), chemical reactivity, and dilution of tritium. The
high pressure could cause overpressurization of either the blanket module
or contaihment building. Unlike fissithn, it does not appear possible to
-design a water-cooled'blanket that can operate with minor internal
failures. In fission, the reactor can continue to operate if a few fuel
rods experience minor cladding failures. Furthermore, the entire
system is designed to withstand operating pressures. In fusion, it
does not appear possible to design the breeder zone to withstand 15 MPa
(see Chapter 2). Thus, any leakage of the pressurized water to either
the breeding zone or plasma chamber prevents operation and represents
a safety problem.
-599-
TABLE 9.9
Coolant Properties of Reference Coolants
which Influence Safety
Water Helium Lithium Flibe
Volumetric Heat Capacity*
Thermal Conductivity*
Electrical Conductivity
Operating Pressure*
Melting Point, OC
Boiling Point, *C
(if liquid)
Combustivity
Corrosion Resistance
steels
refractory alloys
Ability to remove
tritium
high
high
low
1 ow
low
high
low
good
good
high
u2
(10.01
nil
%l 50
0
100
high
good
fair
1 ow
0.01
0.007
nil
%50
-273
-273
1 ow
1.0
1.0
high
-,10
181
1340,
high
good poor
fair good
high high
*Relative values.
2.5
0.02
low
1
459
1 ow
poor
good
high
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TABLE 9.10
Relative Subjective Consequence Indices for Cases
Dependent on Coolant and Breeder Choice (a)
LiAl 02
Li 17Pb 83
LiAlO
2
Lithium
Lithium
Lithium
Combustion,
Temperature
RSCITTP
Internal (b) External (c)
1 1
1 3
1 1
1 4
1 4
2 4
Combustion,
Pressure
RSCI P
Internal External
3
3
3
3
4
4
3
4
4
4
1
1
1 - No safety problem
2 - Evidence that only a mininal safety problem exists
3 - Evidence that serious problem exists
4 - Known serious problem
(a) Low_ values preferred, see Table 9.4 for definitions.
(b) Internal accident refers to scenario where only blanket breeders and
coolants mix, no external oxidants. Then the only hazards are pressure
problems from water or helium use and (potentially) flibe-lithium
reaction.
(c) External accident refers to a scenario where blanket fluids may come in
contact with external combustants like air or concrete. Then only temp-
erature problems from LiA10 2 can be ignored. Even though LiAl0 does
not combust, the use of pressurized coolants with it would stil cause
overpressure concerns in the containment.
S
0
Water
Water
Hel ium
Helium
Lithium
Flibe
0
e
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If reactive metals like beryllium, vanadium, niobium, or molybdenum
are present in the blanket, water reactions would be a serious concern
during accidents. As discussed in Chapter 5, even steels will rapidly
deteriorate in steam below their melting temperatures. Furthermore,
if even steel did not experience a rapid reaction with steam, any
oxidation of the first wall resulting from a steam leakage to the
torus could seriously and rapidly degrade the plasma impurity/vacuum
properties of the wall - a very serious economic concern.
Finally, elemental tritium entering water becomes HTO which is
far more biologically hazardous. It appears very difficult to extract
tritium from water, compared to the alternative coolants.
9.1.3.3 Pressurized Helium
Relative to water, helium has the safety advantages of no signifi-
cant chemical reactivity, easier tritium extraction, and lower pressure.
Although the pressure is still very high (>5 MPa-, it may be possible to
design a breeding zone which could survive accidental pressurization.
Compared to (still lower pressure) liquid metals and salts, another
disadvantage is the poor performance if flow stops. Stagnant helium
is a very poor heat transfer medium or heat sink.
9.1.3.4 Lithium
The primary safety problem with lithium is chemical combustivity.
If lithium is used only as a breeder, the solution is basically to keep
oxidants out of the blanket: only a small stream of breeder lithium
would leave the blanket. If lithium is used as a coolant, the avail-
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ability of oxidants to the lithium would appear to be increased.
9.1.3.5 Flibe
The molten salt flibe (2LiF-BeF2) has some interesting differences.
The pressure and combustion problems are bot.h very small. It is also
a good heat sink. The disadvantages are the relatively high tritium
partial pressures, low thermal conductivity (which can thermally
isolate the first wall in the event of a loss of flow), and its high
melting temperature.
9.1.3.6 Other Coolants
Having identified the relevant material properties and quantified
their influence, some general comments are possible on other potential
coolants.
If a D-T fuel cycle is used, there is little incentive to use a
liquid metal coolant in the blanket other than lithium or lithium-alloy.
In any case, other liquid metals (e.g., Na, K) are qualitatively
similar to lithium. Boiling water has two distinct safety differences
from pressurized water - lower operating pressure and worse tritium
problems. Pressurized water power systems have two loops - primary and
steam turbine. Even though tritium which has migrated to the steam loop
is generally considered released to the environment, these is still one
barrier to tritium release. For boiling water, however, a single
coolant loop tends to be used, thus removing a very important barrier
to tritium release.
lbIN1 1 14 4 ,1111 Io H' 11j 14114 11 11; 4 , , I I
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Molten salts other than flibe have been mentioned as coolants
[9.4, 9.5]. LiF would be promising except for its high melting
temperature, 8480C [9.4]. Another promising candidate is NaNO 2-NaNO3 ~
KNO 3, which has the disadvantage of thermal decomposition at high temp-
eratures (r'54 0*C) and chemical reactivity with lithium, graphite, and
refractory metals [9.5]. If a suitable salt could be found, it might
offer attractive safety properties.
9.1.3.7 Comparison of Coolants
Table 9.11 is a list of the key safety advantages and disadvantages
of the reference coolants.
9.1.4 Breeder Results
The properties that were found to influence the breeder effect on
safety are.summarized in Table 9.12. If the breeder is to be used as a
liquid, a low melting point is preferred to ease startup/shut down phase
change difficulties as well as alleviate any tube plugging due to
freezing.
The indices dependent on coolant and breeder were shown in Table
9.10. Additional indices dependent only on the breeder are listed in
Table 9.13. The afterheat results are seen to be a strong function of
accident scenario - whether or not the fluid breeder drains. This aspect
is further discussed in Section 9.2. The following discussion focusses
on the implications of the indices for the various materials.
11 ] P ,
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TABLE 9.11
Key Safety Advantages and Disadvantages of Reference COolants
Advantages Disadvantages
Pressurized
Water
Pressurized
Helium
Lithium
Low Chemical
Combustivity
Good Heat Sink
(even if stagnant)
Lowest Pressure
(good heat sink)
Flibe
Chemical Reactivity
High Pressure
Difficult to Extract
Tritium
High Pressure
Gaseous Phase (poor
stagnant heat sink)
High Chemical
Combustivity
High Tritium Pressures
Low Thermal Conductivity
Coolant
0MM.
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TABLE 9.12
Material Properties of Reference Breeders
Which Influence
Ideal
Value
Safety Concerns
LiAlO
2
Volumetric
Specific Heat*
Thermal Con-
ductivity*
Electrical
Conductivity
Melting Point, *C
high
high
low
solid-high
liquid-low
Boiling Point, 'C
Combustivity
Compatabi 1 i ty
- Steels
- Refractory
Metals
Tritium In-
ventory*
Tritium Partial
Pressures
Maximum Tritium
Releases*
Radioactivity
Requires a Neu-
tron Multiplier
high
low
good
good
low
1ow
1ow
1ow
No
? decompose
very low
good
fair
125
high
%l 2.5
1 ow
Yes
*Relative values.
Lithium
1.0 0.270.41
0.09
nil
1610
0.44
high
1.0
235
highest
181
modest
1340
high
fair
good
fair
good
1.0
higher
1.0
1 ow
1 ow
1 ow
No No
--------- 7 ------- F-7 I I ---------- 7 - ----------- r-
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TABLE 9.13
Relative Consequence Indices for
Cases Dependent'Only on Breeder(a)
LiAl02 /Be(c) Lithium
Damage
Afterheat
Melting
Afterheat
Tritium
Inven-
tory
Tritium
Release
R d(b)RC IdLA
-breeders drain
-breeders do
not drain
(b)
RC ImLA
-breeders drain
-breeders do
not drain
RCI tiRC
RCIRC C
2.7
300
1.0
5
1-5
150
1.0
5
125
12.5
8-10
8-10
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
(a) Low values preferred, see Table 9.4 for definitions.
(b) The effect of breeders on afterheat transients was critically
dependent on whether it was possible for the fluid breeders to
drain out of the blanket in time to affect heat transport.
The two cases refer to 1) breeder drains instantaneously,
2) breeder does not drain but stays stagnant.
(c) Beryllium was used as a neutron multiplier. Here this is the best
case since beryllium does not add any afterheat.
C
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9.1.4.2 LiAlO 2
Major problems of LiA1O 2 include the need for a neutron multiplier,
low thermal conductivity and higher tritium inventories. The engineering
complexity due to the required presence of a neutron multiplier has pre-
viously been identified [9.4]. This is also a safety problem.
Any neutron multiplier increases complexity (potentially lowering
reliability and increasing accident frequency) but also may cause its own
safety problems. The two prime candidates in STARFIRE [9.4] are good
examples. Zr5Pb3 is a major contributor to afterheat and radioactivity
in the STARFIRE design. The present LiAlO 2 results are based on beryl-
lium not Zr5Pb3. Although beryllium would not add to afterheat or
radioactivity problems, it does represent a serious chemical toxicity
problem.
The poor thermal conductivity makes designs more difficult and
worsens performance during thermal transient accidents. The tritium
inventory and partial pressures are higher than the liquid breeders
(although the mobile tritium is probably in the less mobile and more
biologically hazardous HTO form rather than HT or T2 ). Although the
tritium inventory may be less vulnerable than the liquid breeders, it is
not invulnerable. Credible mechanisms exist for release of significant
fractions of the tritium inventory.
9.1.4.3 Lithium
The only major safety problem with use of lithium is combustivity.
Combustion with air appears capable of generating combustion zone
1101111 Ill All I IIN14pild !;'Id 111141 ,I,! R WH[111 4111j,] 'I",
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temperatures of about 12000C and overpressures in excess of one atmo-
sphere (Chapter 5).
9.1.4.4 Li 1 7Pb 83
Li17Pb83 has some slightly superior thermo-mechanical properties
than lithium does. The major- differences from lithium are lower chemical
reactivity and tritium inventories but higher tritium partial pressures.
The data base is inadequate to quantify the differences sufficient to
determine preference between lithium and Lil 7Pb83
9.1.4.5 Other Breeders
Again, given the analysis, some general comments can be made con-
cerning other breeders.
Other ceramic breeders appear qualitatively similar to LiAlO 2.
One slight exception would be Li20 which does not seemto require a neu-
tron multiplier. However., Li20 has some chemical reaction concerns not
present for LiAlO2. Other liquid metal alloys, e.g., Li-Al appear
qualitatively similar to lithium and lithium-lead. Solid metal alloys
like Li7Pb2 do not appear promising since they show some tendency to
combine some of the disadvantages of the ceramics (difficult tritium
removal) with liquid metal alloys (chemical combustivity). For example,
water reacts with lithium and Li7Pb2 with similar results (Chapter 5).
Salt breeders could have some advantages, specifically lower com-
bustivity. However, examination of potential salts [9.4, 9.5j have not
identified a promising candidate that could make the advantages reality
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while still performing the essential function of breeding. Pure LiF
would adequately breed f9.4, 9.51, but its melting point (8480C) dis-
courages use. It is too low to allow use as a solid and probably too
high to use as a liquid.
9.1.4.6 Comparison of Breeders
The key advantages and disadvantages of the reference breeder
materials are listed in Table 9.14. The use of LiA10 2 or other ceramics
depends on demonstration of adequate tritium breeding and removal.
The use of liquid lithium or lithium-metal alloys depends on a design
minimizing combustion or development of a candidate with low combustivity
(Lil 7Pb83?).
9.2 Relative Importance of Safety Problems and Recommendations
It is apparent that some conflicting preferences arise among the
various possible materials. Some of the conflicts can be resolved by
changing the relative weighting pertaining to each of the safety areas.
This then leads to recommendations for blanket design and identification
of the most promising materials.
9.2.1 Conflict Resolution
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the analytical tool of probabilistic
risk assessment (PRA) proved useful in estimation of the overall risk of
fission reactors and other technologies. Due to several limitations,
it is not possible to perform a detailed probabilistic fusion
risk assessment to compare materials. However, some discussion of the
dfii 11111 I I Olt 141114:14 ji k I " !I
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TABLE 9.14
Key Safety Advantages and Disadvantages
of Reference Breeder Materials
Advantages
Low chemical
combusti vi ty
High volumetric
specific heat
High thermal
comductivity
Di sadvantages
Needs neutron
multiplier
High tritium in-
ventory, release
& partial pressures
Higher tritium
partial pressures
High chemical
combus ti vi ty
0k(
Breeder
LiA102
Li17Pb83
Lithium 0
C
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technique allows identification of two ways to change the importance given
to the various relative consequence indices.
The risk (public safety and economic) of fusion is a function of
both consequence and frequency of all events. Risk is often portrayed
on a frequency-consequence diagram (see Figure 1.1, 1.2). To first order,
the risk can be expressed as
Risk = (frequency x consequence) (9.1)
accidents
Sometimes there may be trade-offs between frequency and consequence.
The total risk may not be reduced by decisions that lower consequences
at the expense of reactor reliability and accident frequency.
It is often extremely difficult to show that an undesired event
is completely impossible. Instead, efforts can be made to show that the
frequency (or consequence) of a certain event occurring is insignificantly
low. This leads to analysis of realistic accident scenarios and mechanisms.
For example, one can not strictly prove that a lithium-air fire tempera-
ture cannot reach the statically-calculated adiabatic flame temperatures
of 2100-22000 C. However, there is sufficient experimental and analytical
evidence to suggest that maximum temperatures are of the order of 1200*C
(Chapter 5) and that due to kinetic limitations, the probability of
lithium-air reactions producing 20000C temperatures is insignificantly
low.
The information available is not perfect; the uncertainty is not zero.
The Level 2 definition of risk [9.7] directly incorporates uncertainty
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into the risk estimate. For fusion, a variety of important data are
not available at present.
By viewing safety from the PRA perspective, one can see. that the
relative consequence indices (RCI's) are not the complete picture.
Equation (9.1) can be rewritten in terms of these indices. For the state-
of knowledge in fusion research, the relative risk of different materials
can be approximated by:
Relative Risk = [(function of RCI's pertaining (9.2)
accidents to each accident) x accident
likelihood]
If the RCI's for a problem are not highly sensitive to material choice
and the accident likelihood is independent of material choice (e.g.,
plasma disruption), then the risk sensitivity to material choice is small.
Likewise, if the accident frequency is low (either because of an inherent
fusion advantage or added design feature), then the importance of that
problem to the overall risk sensitivity is small. These two aspects will
now be addressed.
9.2.2 Sensitivity of Safety Problems to Material Choice
Based on the values for the relative consequence indices (Tables 9.6,
9.7, 9.10 and 9.13), the sensitivity of the safety problems to material
choice can be roughly characterized (Table 9.15)'. Radioactivity
consequences per unit material released and structural oxidation problems
differ by at least two orders of magnitude among materials. Although the
indices for combustion/pressure hazards (Table 9.10) do not quantify the
differences, the discussion in Chapter 5 clearly indicates that these
problems have at least a two-order-of-magnitude range dependency on the
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TABLE 9.15
Sensitivity of Safety Problems to Material Choice
Most Sensitive (Several Orders of Magnitude)'
Radioactivity Consequences
Structural Oxidation
Combustion/Pressure Hazards
Significantly Sensitive (About One Order of Magnitude)
Afterheat-LOCA
Plasma Disruptions
Corrosion
(Thermal Only)
Least Sensitive
Plasma Heating-LOCA
Plasms Disruptions (Electromagnetic Effects)
1Id N 11 14 , 1 i li '1 11 1 W i k l 1( I r I ' +] l11 1 1 I r~I ' [ '- |', t , |,| , h 1, - H IO.
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material. The sensitivity of problems of afterheat, thermal effects
from plasma disruptions and corrosion is generally one order of magnitude.
A major exception is the corrosion problem of lithium and steel.
Certain problems are qualitatively far less important in viewing
material choice even though the problem itself'may be serious. The sensiti-
vity of the problems of continued heating from the plasma during a LOCA and
the electromagnetic effects of plasma disruptions is relatively low. In
fact, the uncertainties in these analyses may well be larger than the range
of the values of the indices themselves. The relative consequence indices
pertaining to these latter two problems should be weighted less in comparing
the overall relative risk of different materials.
9.2.3 Feasibility of Safety Solutions by Design
Design features can influence the risk in several ways, either to reduce
accident frequency or mitigate the consequences. Here the focus is primarily
on ways that design can influence the comparison among materials. Table 9.16
is a list of specific safety problems, some possible passive design solutions
and judgement on their feasibility. Passive design solutions are strongly
preferred over active ones on the basis of probability. Whereas the state-
of-knowledge does not allow quantification of accident likelihood, it is
clear that a passive design solution to a safety problem could significantly
reduce the likelihood of that accident, hence reduce its importance to
material choice. Similarly, a passive consequence mitigation technique
would reduce the accident severity, and hence is important to material choice.
Design solutions may be either internal .or external to the blanket
and plasma chamber. Internal ones that place specific requirements on
the blanket design are less feasible and/or less desired since they further
IHI )I4 A A o d lllH " . I H1
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TABLE 9.16
Safety Problems and Comments on the Feasibility
of Possible Passive Design Solutions
Passive Design Solution Feasibility
Rapid Wall
Oxidation
Combustion
of Lithium
Corrosion
High Coolant
Pressure
Afterheat
Removal
Radioactivity
Hazards
Tritium
Control
Prevent Presence of Oxidants
Prevent Presence of Oxidants
Select Very Compatible Coolant
and Structure
Stronger Blanket, Use Discrete
Tubes to Contain Pressure
1) Use low activation material,
e.g., V-alloy
2) Auxiliary emergency cooling
3) Use low pressure coolants
which are more slowly lost
4) Use a sector-size tank to
increase likelihood that
fluid breeders do not drain
1) Use low activation material,
e.g., V-alloy
2) Minimize release mechanisms
Several, Beyond Scope of Study
Good, design penalties
are externalto blanket
Good, design penalties
are externalto blanket
Varies, reduces material
choice options
Poor, makes difficult
blanket design problem
more difficult
Good, depends on other
problems, trade-offs
Poor, complicates blanket
design,not really passive
Good, depends on other
problems, trade-offs
Good, simplifies design
if fluid breeders/coolant
used
Good, depends on other
problems, trade-offs
Fairly complex task
Unknown, beyond scope of
study
Probl em
----= F 1111 1.1111 =77-7
look**"
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complicate the task of engineering the blanket and reduce blanket design
options. Possible examples are having to design a blanket module to
withstand high coolant pressures or to include dual coolant loops within
a sector to provide cooling even if one loop were lost. These may well
be possible, but make the blanket design task'more difficult and probably
entails penalties due to lower design flexibility.
On the other hand, passive design solutions that are external to
the blanket do not add to blanket design problems. They may add to
building design problems, but that task is far simpler than that of the
blanket. An example is keeping oxidants away from the blanket and
plasma chamber. These and other design recommendations are discussed in
the next subsection.
9.2.4 Design Recommendations
Three specific design recommendations are listed in Table 9.17.
These will be seen to directly influence certain safety areas.
Adoption of the first should significantly reduce the likelihood of
structural oxidation and combustion. Thus, the importance of the
relative consequence indices pertaining to these problems should be
lowered. Adoption of the second recommendation decreases the likelihood
that a fluid breeder could drain, increasing the importance of the fluid-
breeder-doesnot-drain scenario in Table 9.13. This, in turn, greatly
increases the advantage of fluid breeders versus LiA10 2 for afterheat
removal. Adoption of the third, employing first wall coatings to enhance
safety, would decrease the difference among materials of thermal effects
of disruptions. A coating would shield the stress-carrying first wall.
This reduces the significance of the relative consequence indices
, 1- I , c ' I HA IN 11 14IIIIl II A illt 111:Jll 11:k] I I 111- 1
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TABLE 9.17
Design Recommendations
1) Keep oxidants away from the blanket and vacuum chamber.
This includes air, water (steam) and C02,
2) Limit the number of discrete blanket modules to a
reasonable value and minimize system complexity.
3) Incorporate safety into the design and choice of the
first wall coating, if possible.
1-77- 7
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concerning thermal effects of disruptions. The three recommendations will
now be discussed in more detail.
9.2.4.1 Removal of Oxidants
The stored chemical energy in lithium due to potential lithium-air,
lithium-water, or lithium-concrete reactions has long been identified as a
serious potential safety problem. There are three options. First, allow
lithium and reactants in the blanket. This is not preferable due to the
potential serious consequences. Second, remove the lithium (if non D-T
fuel cycle) or use it in an incombustible form. Third, remove the possible
reactants. The trade-offs between the latter options are listed in
Table 9.18.
Removal of oxidants can be accomplished to varying degrees. The first
step is to not use oxidizing agents in the blanket. The second step is to
guard against accidental intrusion of an oxidizing building atmosphere into
the blanket or vacuum chamber by high reliability design of vacuum boundary
and/or secondary containment measures. A third step would be to keep
oxidizing gases out of the building -- use an inert building atmosphere.
The reliability of the solution depends partly on how far the process is
taken.
There are disadvantages to this approach. The most important would
be the potential economic cost due to the acquisition of the inert gas and
re-design of equipment. However, the mass of gaseous helium required to
fill a STARFIRE building is only a few percent of the liquid helium required
for the superconducting coils. Second, maintenance access might be affected.
However, the high possibility of tritium being present in a mobile form
appears to make it unlikely that a maintenance person would enter the con-
tainment building without an air supply anyway. Third, there may be
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TABLE 9.18
Comparison of Advantages of Alternative Solutions
to the Lithium Combustion Hazard
Keep oxidants away from the
blanket and vacuum chamber-
Keeps blanket design and material
choice options open
Simultaneously and passively
solves problems of combustion
and rapid structural wall
oxidation within the blanket
Does not complicate blanket
module design
Tritium more likely kept
less hazardous HT form
rather than HTO
Use lithium in
non-combustible form
Totally eliminates
combustion hazards
out of the blanket
lithium
in or
Does not complicate
reactor building design
in
Also solves the air activation
probl em
h-11 d" 1- , , '. Hl- '
-620-
a remaining problem of lithium-concrete reaction if lithium were to spill
onto the floor and the floor metal liner were to be breached. However,
a lithium-concrete reaction is far less serious than a lithium fire in
or near the blanket. The former is unlikely to raise temperatures in
the blanket with potential for mobilizing rad'loactivity as would the
latter.
There are numerous advantages to this design solution. By one
design choice, the problems of structural wall oxidation and lithium
combustion in the blanket are very significantly reduced. Even if
lithium were not present, the potential for structural wall oxidation
to cause damage or release radioactivity is serious. In fact, it
appears potentially more likely than melting as a mechanism to release
radioactivity. This is especially true if refractory metals are used,
since the melting temperatures are so high. Even if structural oxidation
were not a safety problem, accidental entrance of an oxidant to the plasma
chamber while wall temperatures were fairly high could seriously degrade
the vacuum/plasma impurity properties of the first wall or wall coating
due to formation of an oxide layer.
In addition, removal of oxidants would tend to keep tritium in the
less biologically hazardous T2 or HT form rather than HTO or T20. There
may be a maintenance advantage - the potential for already having an
inert cover gas for welding purposes. Finally, there is an air activation
advantage. The STARFIRE study [9.4] found that nitrogen activation of
air (leading to 14C) was a serious problem and selected CO2 as a replace-
ment building atmosphere for that reason. Unfortunately, C02 does not
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appear sufficiently inert with respect to reactive metals like lithium
and beryllium. An inert gas, like helium, surrounding the reactor would
solve the air activation problem as well as the other problems mentioned.
9.2.4.2 Fewer, Simpler Modules
Other things being equal, reliability is generally increased as the
number of components (if all are needed for total system operation) and
their complexity decrease. A more reliable blanket would tend to be a
safer blanket due to lower accident frequency.
Past fusion reactor blanket concepts have incorporated as many as
10,000-100,000 individual blanket modules. Leakage of any to the plasma
chamber prevents operation and may be a safety hazard. Failure internal
to the module may also be an engineering or safety concern, especially
if pressurized fluids are present. Even after decades of experience, the
failure rate of fuel rods in fission reactors is non-zero. However,
cladding leakage of a fuel rod does not prevent operation or constitute
a serious safety problem - as is true of many fusion module concepts.
Furthermore, such fusion module concepts are more complex than a fission
fuel rod. When module size gets too small, this means that all the coolant
and breeder connections in and out of the blanket are within very close
(< 2 meters) proximity. One then worries more about common cause failures
(seismic events, magnet quenches) that could result in simultaneous
breakage of all such tubes, especially if the module were to shift
relative to its support (see Chapter 3).
In apparent recognition of these problems, some recent studies 19.9,
9.10] have focussed on blanket designs with fewer, simpler modules
C
, j 1,11,11 N111  H 11111 1110 11 ! 'im I w I l I 1411 1 I h will III AH J I I ll." I I , , I , ,,I
-622-
(see Chapters 2, 3). To date, there has been inadequate examination of
the sector-sized tank concept, filled with a liquid metal or salt.
Obvious concerns pertain to MHD problems which could severely res-
trict fluid flow and lead to large forces during magnetic field tran-
sients. However, there are several significahnt potential advantages.
First, the concept is fairly simple. Second, a modest number of sectors
would be used. For example, for STARFIRE with 12 magnet coils, one
might use 24 sector-sized tanks to allow removal of each in-between
magnet coils. Third, the penetrations in and out of the tank are at the
top. Thus, if the more vulnerable coolant lines were to break, fluid
would not empty from the tank. Analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that
afterheat removal problems are extremely alleviated if fluid breeders
are present as they provide a very good heat sink. This is especially
true if a low afterheat material like V-alloy is used. For example, a
vanadium tank offers the potential for being able to "walk away" from
a LOCA without concern for afterheat or operation of an active safety
system. Thus the sector-tank concept with vanadium and lithium appears
inherently safe with respect to afterheat transients. The safety viabi-
lity of the concept clearly depends on keeping oxidants away (-design
recommendation #1).
9.2.4.3 Design Safety in the First Wall Coating
Although the problems of first wall coatings were not directly in-
corporated into this study, various portions of the analyses indicated
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ways that the design and selection of first wall coatings would influence
safety (Table 9.19). This discussion is not intended to attempt
solution of the first wall coating questions, but rather to provide some
insight on safety-related issues involved. The primary purposes of the
coating (if required) must be to allow operation of the plasma (minimize
impurities from the wall) and protection of the wall from plasma
particles. Any safety decisions cannot interfere with these prime
functions. In addition, any candidate coating is unlikely to satisfy
all advantages and avoid all disadvantages. For example, beryllium
would seem to process many good safety qualities but has serious
chemical toxicity concerns and can rapidly oxidize.
9.2.5 Most Important Safety Concerns to Material Choice
By attaching less importance to the safety areas which are not very
sensitive to material choice and those for which passive design solution
have been identified (Table 9.20), the material choice problem is greatly
simplified. The most important safety problems to consider when selecting
materials are radioactivity, afterheat, presence of highly pressurized
fluids, and corrosion (compatability). These are all fairly sensitive
to material choice (Table 9.21) and less likely to be solved by effective,
passive design solutions.
The severity of radioactivity is largely determined by choice of
structural material. Design only influences this by controlling the
amount and placement of structure, with relatively small influence on the
problem. If anything, design makes the worst material from the radio-
activity standpoint, 316 SS, look even worse since its structural fraction
tends to be as high or higher (Chapter 2, Appendix C).
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TABLE 9.19
Some Potential Safety Influences of First Wall Coatings
Potential Advantages:
o Provide passive mechanism for shut down of the plasma if wall
temperatures rise.
o Act as a heat sink for afterheat. If the coating does not
generate afterheat itself, it may provide some benefit as a
heat sink.
o Protect first wall from the thermal effects of a plasma dis-
ruption. This would somewhat de-couple the compound which
suffers the worst thermal shock (coating) from that carrying
the structural stress (underlying wall).
o Protect the first wall from oxidants in the vacuum. If the
coating is adherent to the wall instead of separate plates,
then it would tend to isolate the wall from any oxidants. This
is of less value if the coating itself would rapidly oxidize.
Potential Disadvantages:
o Act as a source of radioactivity toxicity.
o Act as a source of chemical toxicity.
o Generate decay afterheat.
o Decrease reliability if added engineering complexity exceeds
engineering and plasma benefits.
o Getter tritium from the plasma.
o Act as a source of plasma impurities which could trigger disrup-
tions.
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TABLE 9.20
Relative Importance of Different Safety Problems
to Material Choice, Including the Impact of
Suggested Design Solutions
Most Important
Radioactivity Consequences
Afterheat Removal
Pressurized Fluids
Corrosion
Less Important Because of Identified Design Solution
Structural Oxidation
Combustion
Thermal Effects of Plasma Disruptions
Less Important Because Problem Not Highly Sensitive to Material Choice
Plasma Heating - LOCA
Electromagnetic Effects of Plasma Disruptions
K
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TABLE 9.21
Summary of Relative Consequence Indices Pertainin, to
Safety Problems Most Important to Material Choice
Structure 316 SS HT-9 V-alloy TZM
Melting, RCIm 7-12 '3-8 1.0 3-8
Afterheat LA
All latent effects RCIte 100 2-100(b) 1.0 2RC
Breeder LiAlO2 Be(c) Lithium Li 3
Melting, RCIMd)
Afterheat LA
- fluid breeders drain 2.7 1.0 1.0
- breeder does not drain 300 5 1.0
Tritium te(e) 125 8-10 1.0
Inventory RCIRC
Coolant water Helium Lithium flibe
Pressure RCITP 4 3 1 1
(a) Low values preferred, see Table 2 for definitions. Selection of
materials is also dependent on compatability (corrosion) concerns.
(b) Radioactivity values of HT-9 not available; effects judged between
316 SS and TZM on basis of composition.
(c) Beryllium was used as a neutron multiplier. Here this is the best
case since beryllium does not add any afterheat.
(d) The effect of breeders on afterheat transients was critically
dependent on whether it was possible for fluid breeders to drain
out of the blanket in time to affect heat transport. The two
cases refer to 1) breeder drains instantaneously, 2) breeder does
not drain but stays stagnant.
(e) Maximum conceivable releases of tritium are less certain, analysis sug-
gests that at least one tenth of the LiAIO 2 tritium would become mobile.
(f) Subjective ranking for leakage of pressurized fluids: 1) no safety
problem, 2) evidence that only a minimal safety problem exists, 3)
Evidence that a serious problem exists, 4) known serious problem.
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The second problem, afterheat, is controlled by structural (source
of afterheat) and breeder choice (heat sink) as reflected in Tables 9.6
and 9.13. The relative consequence indices for materials for afterheat
and radioactivity all show 316 SS to be the worst choice. The liquid
metal breeders (Table 9.13) are far superior to the ceramic breeder.
Although systems can be designed to remove afterheat from a blanket
after a LOCA, this would greatly complicate blanket module design.
The third problem is the accidental pressurization of either blanket
or building due to release of pressurized fluids. As discussed in
Chapter 2, it does not appear possible to design a module to survive
the accidental leakage of pressurized water (15.5 MPa) into the breeder
zone. Designs have been proposed for helium that would survive such an
accident, although this greatly reduces the flexibility of the designer.
Corrosion is likely to be both a safety and normal operation problem.
Among the combinations studied, only the steel/flowing-lithium-coolant
combination is significantly (several orders of magnitude, see Table 9.7)
worse. To the extent of knowledge, the refractory metals appear highly
compatible with liquid metals. The steels are very compatible with helium
and fairly compatible with stagnant (breeder-only) liquid metals.
9.2.6 Material Choice Recommendations
Given the identification and discussion of the most important safety
areas, specific materials can be recommended.
There are numerous perspectives to view the material choice question.
One dichotomy is between near-term and long-term options. Exotic and
1,11,1411111111 41kllkh 14 11iti'd 11 14 I , - -1
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advanced materials cannot be used in current experiments; the data base
and relevant technology do not exist.-, Thus, the options for near-term
applications are inherently more limited.
If, however, one examines possible options for commercial application,
exotic and advanced materials should be incltided. To limit commercial
fusion options to 316 SS and pressurized water would be to build a 21st
century application from 1950's technology. There may be compelling
reasons to select such options, but safety concerns do not appear to be
among them. Although there is extensive operating experience with
pressurized water fission reactors that could be beneficial to reducing
accident frequency relative to the alternatives, it is felt that the dis-
advantages discussed make pressurized water a poor safety selection for
fusion.
Attractive candidates as an approximate function of development and
evolution are listed in Table 9.22. It is recognized that very serious
development problems exist, especially for the exotic materials. Further-
more, actual advantages may not match the potential. For example, the
afterheat and radioactivity advantages of vanadium or the ceramics could
be impaired if less attractive alloying elements or impurities were found
to be necessary from material science developments. A very critical
assumption underlying these selections is that combustion and rapid
structural oxidation problems are controlled by keeping oxidants away from
the vacuum chamber and blanket. Failure of that assumption/design option
would significantly reduce the attractiveness of such materials as vanadium,
combustible ceramics like graphite, lithium, and beryllium.
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TABLE 9.22
Possible Evolution of Candidates
for Structural Material, Coolant and Tritium Breeder,
Viewed from the Safety Perspective(a)
Structural
Material Coolant
Tri1ium
Breeder
Near Term
More Established Data
Base
Fewer Development
Problems
Ferritic Steels
e.g., HT-9
Helium Liquid Lithium
or Li17Pb83
Advanced(c)
Significant Develop-
ment Problems to
be Overcome
Severe Data Base Gaps
Vanadium-based
alloys
Liquid metals
e.g., lithium
or Li17Pb83
Liquid metals
e.g., lithium
or Li17Pb83
Exotic(c)
Appropriate Candi-
date May Not Be
Identifiable
Low Activation
Ceramic, SiC
Molten Salts(b) Lithium(b)
bearing molten
salts
(a) Subject to compatibility constraints, choices for the three
components do not have to come from the same level of development,
e.g., an HT-9/lithium/lithium combination may be warranted.
(b) May not be possible to identify appropriate molten salts, but
salts may have some generic advantages.
(c) It is likely that selection of more advanced or exotic materials
would entail significantly higher materials development costs.
r
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Subject to material compatability constraints, choices for structure,
coolant, and tritium breeder do not necessarily need to come from the same
level of development. Combinations like HT-9/lithium/lithium or V-alloy/
salt/Lil 7Pb83 may be desired. It is recommended that more attention be
given to these materials (Table 9.22) in design studies, alloy develop-
ment program, and blanket technology experiments.
9.3 Future Research
It has been shown that material choice is a significant factor in
determining how safe a fusion reactor may be. Besides the
continuing research and development in plasma physics, fusion reactor
engineering, alloy development, plasma-wall interactions, etc., there are
some specific safety/environmental research needs that should be
addressed:
o Focus alloy development on the materials in Table 9.22.
o Develop specific design options to keep oxidants away from
the plasma chamber and blanket.
o Develop blanket concepts that reduce the number and complexity
of modules. This should include ways to use the attractive
cooling characteristics of liquid metals or salts in a sector-
sized tank geometry.
o Continue to examine the electromagnetic effects of plasma dis-
ruptions and uncontrolled magnet quenches on the blanket.
o Materials other than structure, coolant and breeder can influence
safety. This study has identified some important safety in-
fluences of first wall coatings and neutron multipliers.
C
0
0
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Further research is needed to quantify these aspects.
o Add chemical toxicity effects to accident consequence calcu-
lations, e.g., FUSECRAC. This is more important as lower
radioactivity materials are considered.
o Improve the data base for accident 'assessments, primarily
isotope-specific dose factors and element-specific biological/
environmental behavior. See Chapter 8 for detailed needs.
o Continue examination of normal behavior of tritium in fusion
systems, including measures to reduce permeation losses
(barrier films, cladding, etc.)
o Expand examination of off-normal tritium behavior, focussing
on credible release-pathways and mechanisms.
o Determine experimentally the degree that corrosion and rapid
structural wall oxidation material release mechanisms defer from
stoichiometric composition.
o Examine experimentally the potential magnetic effects on
corrosion processes. See Chapter 7 for specific lists of
possible interactions.
o Examine the scope and criteria for the waste/recycling/decommis-
sioning issues, focussing on the influence of different material
selections.
i[ 7--7-77,
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APPENDIX A. FUSION SUBSYSTEMS AND INTERACTIONS
A fusion reactor will consist of a variety of subsystems, some
primarily devoted to safety problems. To clarify fusion safety issues
addressed in this study, a brief description is included of the likely
reactor subsystems and their interactions. This allows some discussion
of possible accident initiators and event trees.
A.1 Safety Systems
The most important safety systems/functions in a fission reactor
include EP (electric power), SD (reactor shutdown), ECCS (emergency core
coolant system), PAHR (post accident heat removal), PARR (post accident
radiation removal), and CI (containment integrity) [A.]. The need for
auxiliary electric power during an accident was emphasized by the
reactor safety study [A.l], since other systems are dependent on elec-
tric power. A variety of actual systems are involved in ensuring
shutdown of the fission reactor core. The emergency cooling function
is divided into relatively short time ECCS which must cool the core
and the long term PAHR function which keeps the building cool. Radio-
activity released into the building is partially removed by PARR and
hopefully contained within the building (CI). A variety of actual com-
ponents is responsible for each function.
A fusion reactor will likely have functions similar to those in
fission reactors (although the goal and importance may differ) and
functions specifically fusion-related and not analogous to fission.
These are listed in Table A.l. Electric power is still necessary.
7-777=Tr'T" 777=i: I
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TABLE A.1
Possible Fusion Safety Functions
Electric Power (EP)a-provide auxiliary power on demand.
Plasma Shut Down (PSD)a-shut down plasma on 'demand, e.g., after a loss-
of-blanket coolant.
Auxiliary Heating Shut Down (AXSD)- shut down whatever auxiliary
plasma heating system exists whenever the plasma is terminated.
Emergency Blanket Cooling (EBC)ab-provide blanket cooling if primary
system unavailable.
Emergency Shield Cooling (ESC)b-provide shield cooling if normal system
unavailable.
Magnetic System (MS)-prevent significant damage from a magnetic quench.
Vacuum Boundary Integrity (VBI)-provide a boundary between torus and
oxidizing agents.
Post Accident Heat Removal (PAHR)a b-provide cooling of containment
building.
Post Accident Radioactivity Removal (PARR)a-remove radioactivity in
building.
Containment Integrity (CI)a-prevent radioactivity and chemical toxic
agents from being released to the environment.
aAnalogous system exists in a fission reactor.
bLess likely to be required in a fusion reactor.
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Not only will a plasma shutdown (PSD) system be required, but also an
auxiliary heating shutdown (AXSD). If the plasma terminates, one still
needs to terminate any RF or neutral beam heating. It is anticipated that
the plasma shutdown be considerably easier and/or more reliable than the
fission core shutdown. For example in STARFIRE [A.2], stopping either the
RF auxiliary heating or fuel supply will terminate the plasma. If other
methods fail and wall temperatures rise, the beryllium coating vaporizes and
terminates the plasma without any detection or active system (this may only
trade the plasma shutdown problem for a plasma disruption problem).
A containment building (CI) will likely be needed. In addition, the
integrity of the torus vacuum boundary (VBI) is needed to prevent leakage of
fuel and exposure of the hot, radioactive first wall to oxidizing agents
(see Chapter 6). Unlike fission, a vacuum exists at the center and most
vulnerable part of a fusion reactor which could draw in oxidants from the
building atmosphere. For economic and safety reasons it will be very impor-
tant to prevent any oxidizing agents from entering the torus. Such an event
could lead to oxidation of the first wall, which could result in radio-
activity mobilization and/or reactor damage. Thus the VBI function will be
very important.
Some emergency cooling of the blanket and shield may be necessary. As
discussed in Chapter 3, there are significant advantages to selecting
materials and designing the blanket such that emergency cooling of the
blanket (EBC) and shield (ESC) is not necessary. The same is true of the
building cooling (PAHR).
The presence of magnets necessitates some additional features. Some
sort of emergency magnet protection, magnetic cooling, and/or emergency
energy dump system will be required to prevent damage to either the
i - _ -1 r - F T I
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magnets or surrounding reactor structure in the event that normal opera-
tion of the magnets is disrupted. Most hazardous would be large magnetic
forces from an uncontrolled magnet quench.
Some type of radioactivity cleanup system in the building will be
necessary. Past design studies specify this as a detritiation system,
although a more general system may be required to clean the building
atmosphere of other radioactive species, e.g., those corrosion products
from a coolant leak.
Finally, it should be emphasized that all these systems will require
reliable instrumentation and detection circuits. This may be made more
difficult by the possible presence of transient magnetic fields.
A.2 Subsystem Interaction
For purposes of examining possible generic interaction among fusion
reactor subsystems, the plant can be thought of as having discrete com-
ponents, listed in Table A.2. The most significant difference in a
fusion plant is the presence of large magnetic fields which offer the
potential for interaction at a distance. Some of these interactions
are shown in Figure A.l.
Within the blanket or shield, loss of cooling may lead to loss of
component integrity and support or vice versa, Loss of blanket integrity
could directly lead to a loss of the torus vacuum boundary, depending
on where the vacuum boundary is located. Loss of torus integrity would
cause plasma termination.
1 A plasma disruption could result in large forces and damage to the
blanket (Chapter 4). Loss of either blanket or shield cooling could
result in a significant increase in neutron heat load in the magnet,
with potential for causing a quench, as noted in Reference A.3. A
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TABLE A.2
Fusion Reactor Components
Plasma
Plasma Fueling
Plasma Heating
Blanket Cooling
Blanket Support
Vacuum Boundary Integrity
Shield Cooling
Shield Support
Magnet Cooling
Magnet Support and Integrity
Building Containment
-77-77
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Plasma Quench/Di sruption
Uncontrolled
Magnet Quench
Vacuum Boundary
Integrity
Blanket Support
Blanket Cooling
Shield Cooling
Shield Support
Fig. A.1: Some Possible Interactions among System
Arrows Indicate that One System Failure
Failure in Another System
Components.
May Induce
0")
0
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loss of coolant would increase the void function in the blanket, reducing
neutron attenuation.
Finally, an uncontrolled magnet quench with release of magnet stored
energy could lead to widespread reactor damage. The potential forces
are large (see for example Reference A.2). Most worrisome to the safety
systems analyst is the potential for such a failure leading to multiple
failures throughout the reactor. In the extreme, this would be analogous
to serious external common cause initiators like earthquakes.
A.3 Accident Initiators
The possible external accident initiators (earthquake, wind, flood,
etc.) are not different from a fission reactor and do not need to be
discussed here. Possible initial failures are listed in Table A.3 as
indicated; most of these are discussed in terms of the various safety
comparison bases. Indeed, this examination helped to select those
bases. The analysis of magnet failures was not included in this study.
A.4 Preliminary Event Trees
Identification of relevant subsystems, accident initiators, and
possible interactions among subsystems helps to draw event trees (see
Reference A.1 for a more complete discussion). The event tree metho-
dology (see Figures A.2 - A.5) help to identify what system operation
depends on which other (e.g., electric power). The consequences of any
given subsystem failure is not explicitly indicated; rather, the possible
relevant combinations of failures are shown. For example, if electric
power is lost, most other systems automatically fail. If other systems
operate, the safety consequences of a given failure should be minimal.
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TABLE A.3
Some Possible Initial Subsystem Failures
Plasma Disruption
-Chapter 4
Blanket Loss of Cooling
-Thermal transients-Chapter 3
-Combustion and pressure hazards-Chapter 5
-Mobilization of corrosion products-Chapter 7
-Tritium release mechanisms-Chapter 8
Shield Loss of Cooling
Magnet Loss of Cooling
Magnet Quench
Vacuum Containment Boundary Loss
-Combustion in torus-Chapter 5
-Rapid wall oxidation-Chapter 6
-Wall radioactivity effects-Chapter 8
Tritium System Integrity Loss
-Tritium release mechanisms-Chapter 8
0
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EP SC PARR Ci
0
0
10
0
Tritium System 2
Containment Cost 0
2
SC-Secondary tritium containment, if exists.
See Table A.1 for other function definitions.
0-no tritium release.
1-small tritium release.
2-large tritium release.
Fig. A.2: Tritium System Event Tree
(no other primary failures)
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EP
LOCA
PSD,
AXSD
EBC PAHR PARR CI
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
2,3
3
States: 0-no release
1-very low release, little damage (e.g., activated corrosion
products)
2-modest structural damage and release
3-more severe damage, higher release
See Table A.1 for definitions.
Fig. A.3: LOCA Event Tree
C)
0
C
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BI
Pl a sma
Disruption
VBI EP PARR CI
- Go to LOCA event tree.
BI = Blanket Integrity
See Table A.1 for other definitions.
States: 0-no release
1-minor release
2-major release
Fig. A.4: Plasma Disruption Event Tree
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BI VBI TSC
EP,
PARR
K /
CI
C)
tritium tree (Fig. A.2)
0
0
2
tritium tree (Fig. A.2)
with structural oxidation
LOCA tree (Fig. A.3)
LOCA tree with more first wall oxidation
BI = Blanket Integrity
TSC = Tritium System Containment
See Table A.1 for other definitions.
States: 0-no release
1-minor structural activity release
2-major structural activity release
Fig. A.5: Uncontrolled Magnet Quench Event Tree
Magnet
Quench
C>
0
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Establishment of failure probabilities of various sytems dependent on
the state of the other components allows calculation of the probabilities
of various end-states (magnitude of consequences). The state-of-
knowledge does not allow calculation of probabilities, but event trees
(even without probability values) do allow a 'qualitative sense of what
accident sequences are most undesirable.
Some event trees for fusion accidents and systems are shown in
Figures A.2 - A.5. These are not meant to be complete, but rather indi-
cative and illustrative of some possible accident consequences.
Figure A.2 shows a simple tritium system event tree. Branches
upward indicate successful system operation. If either the secondary
containment or building containment work, there is no tritium release.
If the emergency detritiation system works, the magnitude of a possible
tritium release is reduced. The diagram is drawn with the assumption
that building integrity (CI) depends on electric power to isolate valves,
doors, etc. This is not necessarily the case in an actual design.
Figure A.3 shows a sample LOCA event tree. If the shutdown mechan-
isms fail, damage would be more severe. If the plasma shutdown (or any
other device) could operate passively, then failure is eliminated.
Functions like EBC, PAHR, PARR, and CI are likely to be dependent on
electric power. If the blanket cooling (EBC) is adequate, PAHR is not
likely to be needed.
Figure A.4 shows a sample plasma disruption tree. If a LOCA is
triggered, branch to the previous LOCA event tree. If VBI fails, rapid
structural oxidation and radioactivity mobilization can take place. If
neither a LOCA is triggered nor VBI fails, the safety consequences are
IIIH P P 1( 1491111 HI 111111 IN, 14,11 l 'I! III I II IvAil mW 44,11"111 , 1', d., ..,
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nil, although damage may be incurred.
Figure A.5 shows a magnet quench event tree. If a LOCA is trig-
gered, branch to the LOCA tree. If VBI has also failed, more first wall
oxidation (hence radioactivity mobilization) is possible and consequences
more severe. If a LOCA is not triggered, either VBI or the tritium
system containment may still be affected. If tritium system containment
is breached, branch to the tritium event tree. VBI failure would agai.n
have potential for oxidation of the first wall.
A.5 Conclusion
The brief examination of a fusion reactor's safety functions, in
the framework of risk assessment methodology, helped place subsystems,
interactions, and accident scenarios in perspective and helped the
selection of safety comparison bases in this study. The number of rele-
vant subsystems and their interactions are higher than in fission systems,
although the severity of failure is likely to be less.
The most notable differences from fission include the greater com-
plexity, and potential for failures of the vacuum boundary and magnet
systems. These are indicated in the event trees. The failure of the
vacuum boundary could cause rapid gas-wall oxidation (Chapter 6). Magnet
system failures have the potential for inducing multiple failures through-
out the reactor.
14 ~ 4 j
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APPENDIX B. MATERIAL PROPERTIES
A variety of material property data is necessary for the analysis.
The materials of interest are listed in Table B.l. The physical proper-
ties of the solids and fluids are discussed in Sections B.1 and B.2
respectively, while nuclear properties (breeding and nuclear heating)
are discussed in Section B.3.
B.1 Solid Materials
As seen in Table B.1, there are eight solids of interest, four
structural metal alloys and four non-structural materials. The reference
austenitic steel alloy is 316 SS. The STARFIRE study [B.1] selected an
advanced version called "PCA".. The different composition makes a slight
impact on rapid gas-metal reactions (see Chapter 6). The reference
ferritic steel is HT-9. The appropriate vanadium alloy is uncertain.
Three vanadium alloys have been mentioned [B.1 - B.4]. Finally, the
reference molybdenum alloy is TZM. The composition of these alloys is
given in Table 8.2. Unless otherwise specified, the reference austenitic
steel is taken to be 316 SS and the reference vanadium alloy is V-15Cr-
Ti. In the latter case, the data base is sufficiently uncertain for
many parameters that the precise composition of the vanadium alloy is
not critical.
B.1.1 Thermo-Mechanical Properties
The temperature independent properties are listed in Table B.3 with
the corresponding references. The melting point and density are fairly
well known (within 5%?) but the other parameters are often not. The
I I I I l fi $ I.I1 ,1 ,  ,:1 t !i
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TABLE B.1
List of Materials
Material
316 SS
HT- 9
V-alloy
TZM
Graphite
Beryllium
Zr5 Pb3
LiAlO
2
Li17 Pb893
Lithium
Fl i be
Water
Helium
Air
Co2
Phase
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
Use
metal
metal
metal
metal
non-metal
solid metal
solid metal
solid ceramic
liquid metal
liquid metal
molten salt
liquid
gas
gas
gas
structure
structure
structure
structure
reflector,
first wall coating
neutron multiplier,
first wall coating
neutron multiplier
tritium breeder
tritium breeder
tritium breeder
coolant
coolant
coolant,
breeder zone purge gas,
magnet coolant
building atmosphere
building atmosphere
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TABLE B.2
Composition of Structural Alloys (weight %)
Alloy PCA 316 SS HT-9 V-20Ti V-5Cr- V2r TZM
B 0.001 - - -- - -
C 0.05 0.06 .0.20 0.02 0.02 - 0.01
N 0.01 0.007 - 0.05 0.05 - -
0 - - - 0.05 0.05 - 0.005
Al 0.03 - - 0.004 0.004 - -
Si 0.5 0.46 0.4 0.03 0.03 -
P 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 - -
S 0.005 0.01 0.02 - - -
Ti 0.3 0.04 - 20.0 5.0 - 0.5
V 0.04 - 0.3 79.79 79.79 74.2 -
Cr 14.0 16.7 11.5 - 15.0 25.0 -
Mn 1.8 1.43 0.55 - - - -
Fe 64.68 64.44 85.0 0.01 0.01 - 0.02
Co 0.03 0.03 - - - - -
Ni 16.0 13.9 0.5 - 0.001 0.01
Cu 0.02 0.06 - - - - -
As 0.02 - -- - - -
Zr 0.02 - - - - 0.8 0.08
Nb 0.03 - - - 0.0025 -
Mo 2.0 2.84 1.0 0.008 0.008 - 99.4
Ta 0.01 - - 0.003 0.003 - -
W - - 0.5 0.01 0.0075 - -
Reference B.1 B.1 B.1 B.1 B.4 B.3 B.1
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TABLE B.3
Temperature Independent Properties of Solidsa
Mel ting
Point(*C)
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
Graphite
Beryllium
Zr5Pb3
LiAl0 2
1430
[B.1]
1420
[B.2]
1900
[B.2,B.5,B. 61
2620
[B.2,B.5,B.6]
1284
[B.1 ,B.81
%1400
[B.l]1
1610
[B. 11
Boiling bPoint(*C)
2900
[B. 5, B..6]
2900
[B. 5, B. 6]
3370
[B.5,B.6]
4630
[B.5,B.6]
,4000
[B. 6 ,B. 71
2484
[B. 8]
aReference numbers in brackets, may include averaging of values given by
different sources.
bFairly uncertain, values used are for pure metal
c100% dense, used at 70% was a multiplier [B.1].
d60% dense, alpha phase.
eEstimated from Trouton's Law, see text.
(Fe, V, Mo).
Heat of
Melting
(kJ/kg)
260
[B.5,B. 61
260
[B.5,B. 61
310
[B. 5 ,B. 61
330
[B.5,B. 61
1083
[B. 11
Heat of
Boiling
(kJ/kg)
6090
[B.5,B. 61
6090
[B.5,B.6]
7900 e
[B.5,B. 61
6150
[B.5,B.6]
24,790
[B. ]
Solid
Density
(kg/m 3 )
8000
[B.11
7800
[B. 11
6100
[B.2,B.6]
10,200
[B.2,B.61
1850
[B.71
1800c
[B.1]
8900
[B.l]
2040d
[B. I]
(
; 7 ---
HIPIN I IP I I'VINIIIII I U11111411-11
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boiling point, heat of melting, and heat of boiling for the alloys are
for the pure base metal. Even then variations among sources were as
large as 15%. The heat of boiling for vanadium was estimated using
Trouton's Law [B.9]:
H /T ~ AS 22 cal/*K-mole (2.1)
where H = heat of vaporization
Tv = boiling point (*K)
ASg = entropy of vaporization.
The entropy of vaporization, Trouton's Law constant, is fairly constant
among materials. It was estimated for vanadium by averaging the values
for 316 SS (25.6 cal/*K-mole) and Mo (28.8 cal/*K-mole). This then
allows estimation of the heat of boiling. Neutron multipliers and solid
breeders may not be used at 100% theoretical density, as indicated in
Table B.3.
The temperature dependent properties were fit to linear relation-
ships for ease in use and compatibility with computer input. Any loss
of accuracy due to this approximation appears small compared to the un-
certainty in the original data. In some cases the data were insufficient
for temperature variations to be accounted for. In addition, the
available property values above 800% were generally sparse. It was
decided to limit the temperature variation of properties to this temper-
ature. Hence, there is some loss of accuracy since the variation of
properties at higher temperatures during transients were not accounted
for. The values used are indicated in Tables B.4 - B.10. These rela-
H ill Iil l f II l lH II llIIN 1 IH I I l il , I I,11 j , I
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TABLE B.4
316 SS Temperature Dependent Properties*
Relation
Temperature
Range(*C)
Thermal
Conductivity
(W/m*K)
Heat Capacity
(J/kg*C)
Linear
Coefficient
of Expansion
(Pm/m* C)
Young's
Modulus
(GPa)
Poisson's
Ratio
Electrical
Resistivity
(vi-cm)
k = 20.0 + 0.013(T-450)
c p 555 + 0.16(T-400)
= 21.0 + 0.006(T-450)
22.0 + 0.005(T-700)
E = 160 - 0.09(T-500)
v = 0.361 + 0.00035(T-450)
1/a = 100 + 0.06(T-450)
*T in *C.
Property
Based on
Data in
Reference
100-800
100-800
<600
600-800
100-800
100-800
100-800
B.1 ,B.3
B.1
B.3
B.1,B. 3
B.3
B.2
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TABLE B.5
HT-9 Temperature Dependent Properties*
Temperature
Range(0C)Relation
Thermal
Conductivity
(W/m*K)
Heat Capacity
(J/kg*C)
Linear
Coefficient
of Expansion
(w/m*C)
Young's
Modulus
(GPa)
Poisson's
Ratio
Electrical
Resistivity
(4 -cm)
k = 28 + 0.003(T-500)
C = 660 + 0.60(T-300)
= 11.60 + 0.003(T-450)
Ey 180 - 0.06(T-400)
v= 0.27
1/a = 100 + 0.10(T-500)
*T in *C.
C>
Property
Based on
Data in
Reference
8.1
B.1
B.1,B.3
B. 1
100-800
100-800
100-800
100-800
100-800
0B.1
B.2
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TABLE B.6
V-alloy Temperature Dependent Properties*
Temperature
Range(*C)'Relation
Based on
Data in
Reference
Thermal
Conducti vi ty
(W/m*K)
Heat Capacity
(J/kg*C)
Linear
Coefficient
of Expansion
(ym/m*C)
Young's
Modulus
(GPa)
Poisson's
Ratio
Electrical
Resistivity
(vs-cm)
k = 30 + 0.01 (T-500)
c = 505 + 0.21(T-500)
= 10.2 + 0.0013(T-650)
E = 119 - 0.03(T-500)
119 - 0.04(T-500)
= 0.36
1/a = 50 + 0.06(T-500)
50 + 0.04(T-500)
*T in *C.
Property
100-800
100-800
100-800
100-500
500-800
B.1
B.1
B. 3
B.1
B.1,B.3
100-500
500-900
B.2
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TABLE B.7
TZM Temperature Dependent Properties*
Temperature
Range(*C)
Based on
Data in
Reference
Thermal
Conducti vi ty
(W/m*K)
Heat Capacity
(J/kg*C)
Linear
Coefficient
of Expansion
(Pm/m*C)
Young's
Modulus
(GPa)
Poisson's
Ratio
Electrical
Resistivity
(PO-cm)
k = 108 - 0.007(T-600)
c = 300 + 0.07(T-800)
S = 6.35 + 0.0014(T-700)
E = 284 - 0.05(T-500)
284 - 0.08(T-500)
v = 0.32
1/a = 20 + 0.025(T-500)
*T in 'C.
0
Property Relation
0
B. 1
B. 1
B.3
B.1 ,B.3
100-800
100-800
100-1000
100-500
500-1000
100-900
0B.3
B.2
I1 I$ 1 1 1 11 11 i N N 11 'I I 1: I, - 1
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TABLE B.8
Graphite Material Properties
Property
Thermal
Conductivity
(W/m*K)
Heat Capacity
(J/kg*C)
Temperature
(*C)Relation
k j 60
c - 710
P 1890
220
1000 C
Based on
Data in
Reference
B.7
B.7
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TABLE B.9
Beryllium Temperature Dependent Properties*
Property
Thermal
Conductivity
(W/m* K)
Heat Capacity
(J/kg*C)
Linear
Coefficient
of Expansion
(jim/m*K)
Young's
Modulus
(GPa)
Electrical
Resistivity
(,,Q-cm)
Relation
k = 139 -
100 -
100 -
76 -
0.29(T-200)
0.13(T-500)
0.08(T-500)
0.04(T-800)
c = 2750 + 1.2(T-500)
3305 + 0.18(T-1750)
= 16.2 + 0.006(T-500)
E y 290
l/a = 22 + 0.03(T-700)
22 + 0.04(T-700)
26 + 0.05(T-800)
Temperature
Range(*C)
0-200
200-500
500-800
800-1000
100-1283
1284-2000
100-1000
0
100-700
700-800
800-1100
*T in *C.
0
0
Based on
Data in
Reference
B. 5
B. 8
B.1 ,B.8
B.8
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TABLE B.10
LiA1O 2 Temperature Dependent Properties*
Temperature
Range(*C)Relation
Based on
Data in
Reference
Thermal
Conductivity
(W/m*K)
Heat Capacity
(J/kg*C)
Linear
Coefficient
of Expansion
(pm/m*C)
k = 4.7 - 0.004(T-500)
c = 1600
= 12.4
*T in *C.
Property
500-800 B. 1
B. 1
B.1
''b"'I 4 ,,
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tions accurate to within a few percent compared to the values given or
plotted in the references cited.
As seen in Tables B.3 - B.10, some properties were not evaluated.
These were not necessary for any analysis. Some properties are included
in the tables that were not needed in the calculations, but were in-
cluded for comparison purposes, e.g., heat of vaporization.
B.1.2 Stress Limits
The strength of the structural materials was needed for design pur-
poses (Chapter 2, Appendix C). These values and the data sources are
listed in Table B.11. As discussed in Chapter 2, the design basis was
105 hr (11 years) and 103 cycles (average of 1 cycle/week for steady
state mode of operation). It is recognized that the design process and
required data base is far more complex than presented here; however, the
design parameters are representative of those from detailed fusion reac-
tor design studies and hence are appropriate for a material comparison
study.
A further question arises as to the material response to temperature
and stress transients during an accident. The required material data
base and corresponding design analysis are even more complex than for
operating design parameters. A large number of different criteria are
possible. A few of these will be briefly discussed here. The data base
is too uncertain and calculational complexity (highly dependent on design
specifics) too high to allow a more detailed treatment.
Figures B.1 and B.2 show the temperature dependence of the yield
strength and ultimate tensile strength. A general weakening of the
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TABLE B.ll
Strength of Materials, Unirradiated
Operating
Temper-
ature
(*C)
Yielda
Stress
0.2%
Sy
(MPa)
Ultimate a
Tensile
Strength
(MPa)
Allowableb
Stress
Intensity
Values,,
Smt
(MPa)
Allowableb
Thermal
Strain
(xl0-2)
316 SS
(20% Cold-Work)
316 SS
(annealed)
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
aReferences B.1,
r
bReference B.3, for 105 hr. lifetime, 103 cycles.
cEstimated, based on value of 1.247 for pure V at room temperature.
Alloy
450
450
450
600
800
520
120
350
350
600
650
450
520
620
660
108
160
173
223
0.655
0.581
0.0455
B.10.
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Figure B.l: Tensile strength of structural materials,
0.2% yield strength [B.1].
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Figure B.2: Tensile strength of materials, ultimate tensile strength [B.1]
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alloys occurs with increasing temperature. Figure B.3 shows the ex-
pected stress to rupture at 1 and 10 hr. which is relevant in an accident
transient. Sze [B.12] indicated that 316 SS wall failure could occur
with a temperature between 600 and 800'C (see Section 3.2.4).
A further problem in transients is the question of microstructure
alteration. Alloys typically are subjected to finely tuned heat treat-
ment prior to use. A temperature
the alloy, destroying the desired
grading the material performance.
at later times in the accident or
tor.
As one example, consider 316
range from 1010 - 1120*C [B.13].
minute anneal at 10500C. Judging
transient would significantly alter
microstructure and significantly de-
This degradation would prove serious
prevent future operation of the reac-
SS. Typical annealing temperatures
The INTOR study [B.10] quoted a 30
from the UTS curves (Fig. B.2), the
beneficial cold work is significantly reduced at temperatures around
7000C. The cold-worked treated 316 SS is far stronger than the
annealed below such temperatures.
For HT-9, temperature transients may be more damaging. A typical
heat treatment [B.10] consists of full austenitizing at 1050*C for an
hour, followed by an air or oil quench. The resulting martensite micro-
structure is very brittle, so a tempering treatment is used to decompose
some martensite to ferritic or cementite structure [B.14] to improve
ductility. A typical temper treatment is 600 - 7500C for an hour,
followed by air cooling.
The relevant heat treatment and resulting microstructure suscepta-
bility is not known for the V-alloy or TZM, especially the former, and 0
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an optimum composition is not determined. TZM tends to be used in a
stress-relief annealed condition, while Ta and Nb alloys (same group as
V) tend to be used in a re-crystallized state [B.13].
The failure of a structural material is thus seen to be dependent
on failure criteria (rupture, deformation, microstructure alteration),
temperature, stress, and the time of transient. These are discussed in
Chapters 3 and 4. For longer time transients (>minutes, Chapter 3) a
semi-arbitrary value of a 3000C temperature rise above operation is
established as predictive of damage for the structure. Considering the
above data and discussion, an HT-9 structure is probably more susceptable
to thermal excursions while the refractory alloys, V and TZM, appear less
susceptable. For very short (,second) transients of disruptions (Chap-
ter 4), there is insufficient time for microstructure alteration to occur
at temperature rises of 3000C. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, if
temperatures are high enough (e.g., if melting is reached) the micro-
structure will be changed. A possible strength comparison among mate-
rials is the yield stress.
B.1.3 Surface Emissivities
The surface emissivity of the structural metals determines the
amount for radiation heat transfer (see Chapter 3). The value of emis-
sivity depends on the metal, the temperature, and surface condition, as
seen in Figure B.4. Generally, polished, clean surfaces have low emis-
sivity, while degraded surfaces have increased emissivities [B.15- B.19].
As seen in the figure, steel which has been repeatedly heated and cooled
will have emissivities between 0.25 and 0.7. Oxidized metal appears to
very high emissivities, approaching 0.9.
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For the present analysis, the surfaces experiencing radiation heat
transfer are internal, exposed to blanket fluids, as discussed in
Chapter 7. These surfaces are generally oxidized and roughened. Based
on Figure B.4, the emissivity of Mo is set at 0.82; 316 SS, at 0.88.
Ideally, materials exposed to blanket fluids as part of corrosion
studies could be tested for emissivity.
Direct data on wavelength integrated emissivity of vanadium were
not found. However, the spectral reflectance appears to fall between
Mo and steel, based on meager data in Reference B.19. Thus the emissi-
vity of vanadium is estimated to be the average of Mo and 316 SS values,
0.85.
If the precise value of emissivity in a specific design were found
to be important, designers may wish to consider material surface prepar-
ation techniques that appropriately influence the emissivity.
B.2 Fluid Materials
As seen in Table B.1, a variety of fluids may be present. The
relevant material properties include density, thermal conductivity, heat
capacity, gas constant (for gases), electrical resistance, and viscosity.
The data base is fairly complete for these fluids with the exception of
Lil 7Pb83. The Sieverts constant is discussed in Chapter 8.
B.2.1 LiU Pb 3 Estimation
The data base for Li17Pb83 properties is very meager, forcing esti-
mation of most values. Hoffman, et al [B.20] have examined the avail-
able data base for Li-Pb alloys. The specific alloy in this study is
Li Pb83 (99.3 weight % Pb). They conclude that,
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"in general, the properties of Pb-Li solutions are not appro-
ximated by taking the properties of the pure elements and
interpolating linearly with atom fraction. A maxima or minima
generally occurs at %20 a/o Pb and approximations can be made
by interpolating between 0-20 a/o Pb and 20-100 a/o Pb
values."
In such manner, they obtain an estimation of.the density as [B.20]
p(T*C) = 9,500 - 0.7(T-300*C) kg/m 3  (B.2)
The electrical resistence at 800*C is estimated as 130 po-cm from their
data (interpolation between 20 a/o Pb and 100 a/o Pb). Unfortunately,
the other properties have not been evaluated for Pb-Li binary composi-
tions, yet values for thermal conductivity and heat capacity are
required.
These properties were estimated using linear interpolation in ato-
mic percent between pure lithium and lead. The uncertainties are too
large to justify temperature dependent values. Using pure lithium and
lead data [B.21 - B.23], then the heat capacity is estimated to be 850
J/kg0C and the thermal conductivity, 22 W/m0 K. As one test of this pro-
cedure, the density was similarly estimated. Interpolation between
lithium and lead resulted in a density of about 8,700 kg/m 3 at 5000C
compared to the more accurate value of 9,360 kg/m 3 (equation B.2), an 8%
variation. A second indirect test is discussed in Section 5.2.1. Use
of atomic percent interpolation of heat capacity for LiPb, one obtains
a value of 2190 J/kg*C. Use of the estimated heat of reaction between
lead and lithium and this heat capacity leads to a temperature rise due
to preparation-of LiPb of about 116 0C. An experimental value was 1930C
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(see Section 5.2.1), 60% variation. Considering that lead and lithium
values for density and heat capacity differ by over an order of magni-
tude (see Table B.12) and the required data do not exist, it is felt
that the estimated values are reasonable approximations. The melting
point of Li 17Pb83 is 235*C from the Li-Pb phase diagram [B.20].
B.2.2 Liquids and Helium Coolant
The material properties for pressurized water, pressurized helium,
flibe, and lithium are taken from reference B.21. The values are gener-
ally accurate within 20% [B.21]. Thermodynamic data for the calcula-
tions in Section 5.3.2 are taken from steam tables, Reference B.24.
B.2.3 Gases
Three gases are of interest; air, carbon dioxide, and helium. All
may be used as the building atmosphere. In addition, liquid helium is
used to cool the superconducting magnets and may be released to the
building atmosphere (see Chapter 5). The values of gas constant and
heat capacity are taken from Reference B.25, listed in Table B.13. In
addition, the boiling point of helium is 4.20'K [B.25] at atmospheric
pressure with a heat of vaporization of 23.3 kJ/kg.
B.3 Nuclear Properties
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, detailed neutronics calculations
were not performed as part of this study. Thus, relevant nuclear re-
lated parameters were estimated from previous design studies.
B.3.1 Breeding and Energy Multiplication
The reactor blanket must provide adequate tritium breeding. Based
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TABLE B.12
Properties of Li17Pb83, Lithium, and Lead
Lithiumb Leadc Li17Pb83
Density a 513 10,390 9360d
(kg/m 3)
Heat Capacitya 4220 155 850e
(J/kg*C)
Thermal Conductivitya 49.7 15.5 22e
(W/m*C)
Electrical Resistance 35.3 103 130d
(N-cm)
Melting Point 180 327 235d
(OC)
Boiling Point 1340 1737
(*C)
aAt 5000C.
bReference B.21.
cReferences B.22, B.23.
dReference B.20.
eEstimated from lithium and lead.
111-1-1 HIIHVI I IP11,10 ]A Q14i 1411,14,11 ddh+ I I - , ,,I
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TABLE B.13
Gas Properties*
Atomic Mass Air CO2  Helium
Gas Constant, R 287 189 2077
(J/kg*C)
Heat Capacity, cp1005 876 5188
(J/kg*C)
y = Cp/Cv 1.40 1.30 1.66
Heat Capacity, c 718 680 3120
(J/kg*C)
*Reference B.25
r0
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on References B.1 and B.2, the required depth of the breeding zone
assumed for this study was determined (see Table B.14). Based on the
values in Reference B.1, which is the reference plasma condition for
this study, the total thermal output from the blanket is approximated
by
P(MWth) = 700 + 2800 x M (B.3)
The 700 MW incident on the first wall is fixed by the plasma operation.
The total heating in the blanket is determined by the blanket energy
multiplication, M. Equation B.3 is used in Appendix C to estimate the
required total coolant flow through the blanket. The values used are
listed in Table B.14.
It is recognized that the breeding depth and energy multiplication
are determined by the complete detailed blanket design and materials
therein. However, to first order, the choice of breeder dictates both.
The values obtained do not play a major role in the analysis in this
work; hence, the uncertainty involved in this procedure is acceptable.
B.3.2 Nuclear Heating
As discussed in Section 3.2.2.3, for purposes of this study the
nuclear heating during operation is represented by
q'.j(r) MW/M 2 = q' x QPi x exp(-Ba x Ar) (B.4)
where = volumetric nuclear heat generation in material i
T77 7 1-
I fl'llii III I I ISH I 1111,111 ]IN] IIIIIII'll 101+111"fi 4,111411 1, 1- ,
where
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TABLE B.14
Breeding Zone Depth and Energy Multiplication
Breeding Zone Depth Reference Valuesa
LiA10 2 % 0.45 m Lil 7Pb 8 3 \ 0.5 m Li , 0.6 m
Blanket Energy Multiplication Values, M
LiAl0 2
Breeder Reference
1.28 B.27
1.19 (Li20) B.2
1.14 8.1
1.15 Present Studyb
aBased on References B.1,
bEstimated values adopted
Li-Pb
Breeder Reference
1.22 (Li62Pb38 ) B.29
1.22 (Li7Pb2) B.2
1.37 B.30
1.25 Present Studyb
B.2.
for the present study.
Lithium
Breeder Reference
1.33 B.35"
1.29 B.28
1.17 B.26
1.20 Present Studyb
0>
0
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q' = incident neutron wall loading, 3.6 MW/m2
QPi = plasma heat parameter for material i
Ba = blanket attenuation factor for specific choice of coolant
and breeder
Ar = depth into blanket.
From Equation B.4, the plasma heat parameter can be determined as
q'''(first wall)QPi n,I (B.5)
A variety of studies were examined to determine appropriate values of QPi,
listed in Table B.15. The values for the structural materials are the
most important, especially the relative values among them. Given that
HT-9 differs from 316 SS in having less nickel while Inconel has more
nickel and that the heating in Inconel is higher than 316 SS, the value
of QPHT-9 was estimated at 9.5 m~'. As discussed in the next section,
care had to be used to result in both operational heating and decay heat
matching available results. The product QP x QD determines the initial
afterheat generation rate.
The blanket attenuation factor, Ba, was estimated by fitting the
exponential curve, exp(-Ba x Ar), to available nuclear heating profiles
in the literature. As Chao [B.34] has noted, the agreement is quite
good, except at the reflector zone. Since the critical volume is the
first wall vicinity, and parameters QP and Ba are chosen to maximize
agreement at the first wall, the relevant heating results should be ade-
quate. The values used and those estimated from other studies are shown
in Table B.16.
-T71= 11 77 11 117 7111111, III I i III I I I
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TABLE B.15
Plasma Heat Parameter Values
From Data in Reference
QP(m~)
'10
>5.1
6.1
12
4.6
3.1, 3.8, 4.0
3.4, 4.0
4.5
15, 20
v 10
5.8
6.7
7.6, 10.4
9.4
8.7, 9.9
Reference
B.26,B.34 ,B.35,B.36
B.26
B.28
B.38
B.29
B.36
B.35
B.33,B.34
B.36
B.31
B. 38
B.32
B.36
B.29
C
Value Adopted
for this Study
QP(m1)
10
9.5*
6.0
6.5
4.0I 018.0
0
8.0*
I
I
B. 36
9.0
10.0
9.0
*See text.
Material
316 SS
HT-9
V-alloy
TZM
Inconel
Titanium
Lithium
Water
Helium
Flibe
Li 20
LiAl02
Li62Pb38
Li 17Pb83
Be
Pon
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TABLE B.16
Values of Blanket Attenuation Factor
Coolant
Lithium
Helium
Fl i be
boiling
water
pressurized
water
Helium
Water
Helium
Water
From Data
Ba(m-I)
4.3
4.0
3.6
4.0
3.7
3.5
4.8
8.0
in Reference
Refe.rence
Adopted for
this Study
Ba(m~ 1)
'I
I
*1
B. 34
B.33
B. 26
B. 34
B.36
B.35
B. 34
B.29
4.0
3.7
4.5
9.0
6.3
6.0
8.5
9.5
B. 38
B.32
B.36
B.36
I8.0
9.0
Breeder
Lithium
Li 62Pb 38
Li 17Pb 83
Li20
LiAl02
|H| tHIM l 1111AW HI 4 A 41PH 1[ i ~I! l 14 I-Hllill 4 1|T1r -I, | , -I
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B.3.3 Afterheat Decay
As discussed in Section 3.2.2.3, the local volumetric heat genera-
tional rate was approximated by the Equation
q'j(r,t) = q'x QPi x QD. x exp(-*Ba x Ar) x DE(t) (B.6)
The initial volumetric heat generation rate in the rirst wall at shut
down is then
qW(first wall,t) = q' x QPi x QD. (B.7)
The initial fractional afterheat, FP, is defined as the ratio of
afterheat power to the operational power level. Use of Equations 8.5
and B.7 indicate that the local value of the initial fractional after-
heat in the first wall is simply
FP(first wall) = QD. (B.8)
Where afterheat levels are mentioned in most previous studies, the total
blanket initial fractional afterheat is given. In the present termino-
logy, this is given by
f. QP x QD x exp(-Bax Ar)dr
FP(total blanket) = i,r 1 1 (B.9)
fir QP. x exp(-Ba x Ar)dr
Since there is more than one material in the blanket, the two defini-
tions of FP are not equivalent. Considering that 1) most of the opera-
H- I
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tional heat is generated in non-structural parts of the blanket, 2) the
total operational heat is not strongly influenced by structural material,
and 3) the dominant afterheat is produced by the structural material,
then Equation B.9 can be re-written as
FP(total blanket) QP m x.QDm x fexp(-Ba x Ar)dr (B.10)
Operational Power
where the subscript m denotes structural metal.
Thus the total fractional afterheat scales among structural materials as
QPx QD, whereas the localized fractional afterheat scales as QD.
The total initial fractional afterheat, expressed as a percentage of
operating power, tends to be about 1% independent of material, judging
from data in Reference B.40. Thus the product QP x QD is fairly con-
stant among materials. Based on the initial afterheat values in Refer-
ences B.38 - B.41, the values of QDi x QP were determined for the struc-
tural materials. Given QPi previously, the value of QDi is determined.
The values of these parameters are listed in Table B.17. The resulting
values of the afterheat parameter are listed in Table B.18. The values
for the non-structural materials was generally estimated directly from
Equation B.8.
Having specified QP, QD, and Ba in Equation B.6, the decay heat,
time behavior, DE(t), must be determined. The other parameters are de-
fined such that
DE(shutdown,t=O) = 1.0
Mil, Ili 111114V III [!,I IldkIIIII11,11 101 014 11411 J11,41III [I! I I - ",
(B.11 )
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TABLE B.17
Total Initial Fractional Afterheat (= QDx QP(m ))
Material QD(%)Qp(m QD x QP(m)
316 SS 4.0 10.0 0.040
HT-9 4.0 9.5 0.038
V-alloy 5.0 6.0 0.030
TZM 6.0 6.5 0.039
'IF"1 11 I II I M I II. , II!IIA 41141  11 +11 l O F! ilbH I I , ' "
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TABLE B.18
Values of Afterheat Parameter
Afterheat
Parameter, From Data in
Material QD(%)' Reference
316 4.0 Current study*
HT-9 4.0 Current study
V-alloy 5.0 Current study
TZM 6.0 Current study
Lithium 0.6 B.36
Water %0 B.36
Helium %0 B.36
Flibe 6.2 B.31
LiA10 2  1.9 B.36
Lil 7Pb83  1.0 Current study
Be 0.5 B.36
*See text.
~rnm
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so that results of the literature can be compared on a normalized basis.
The time behavior for 316 SS, V-20Ti, and TZM is shown in Figures B.5 -
8.7 based on data in the references cited. For 316 SS, the detailed
time and spatial data in reference B.36 were used for the 316 SS case.
For V-alloy and TZM, an average of the previ6us results was used. The
decay function for HT-9 was estimated from references B.39 and B.41. All
four are shown in Figure 3.3. The rate of decay of HT-9 and 316 SS is
initially the same with differences growing in time.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, afterheat computer calculations were termi-
nated at t=1 day due to computer time constraints. The temperature rate
of change with time at 24 hours was used to conservatively extrapolate to
longer times. The length of blanket operation would influence the decay
rate of afterheat. One example is UWMAK-I where decay rates DE(t) for 2
and 10 year operation were shown in Figure 8.5. The variation between
them is less than among design studies. This is not unexpected since the
decline in the first day is dominated by shorter-lived isotopes. It is
precisely these isotopes which tend to reach saturation levels soonest
under operation. The values of DE(t) for flibe, beryllium, LiA10 2 , Li,
and Li17Pb83 were estimated from References B.1, 8.31, and B.37. These
were not found to add significantly to blanket afterheat, either because
the decay was very rapid or the initial level was low. Had Zr5Pb3 been
used as a neutron multiplier, it would have significantly added to the
afterheat based on STARFIRE results [B.11.
The separation of space and time in Equation B.6 was checked gra-
phically with results plotted in References B.26 and 8.28. The different
parts of the blankets showed similar time behavior. The various 316 SS
I 111, k1 i H I H il 14 0! 940141,4 -
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0.8
0.6
DE (t)
b
0.4--
c
0.2-e
0.1- a - [B.261 10 yr operation
b - [B.40] 2 yr operation
c - [B.36] 2 yr operation adopted for this study
0.08- d - [B.26] 2 yr operation
e - [B.27] 2 yr operation
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Figure B.5: Comparison of decay heat functions, DE(t), for 316 SS
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cases in Reference B.36 which were performed for Merrill's study [B.37]
were able to be examined numerically. For times in the first day after
shutdown, the 316 SS in first wall and blanket with different coolants
was found to show the same time afterheat behavior (DE(t)), generally
within 10%. The 316 SS first walls for the different cases showed the
same time behavior within 2%. The first wall is the most critical con-
tributor to the afterheat problem since the concentration of afterheat
and metal is the highest. Thus the approximations in the analysis are
thought to be adequate.
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APPENDIX C. REFERENCE DESIGN PARAMETERS
The goal and criteria for establishing design parameters for the
eleven combinations of materials are discussed in Chapter 2. Some of
the details of these calculations are presented here. Material Proper-
ties are discussed in Appendix B.
C.1 Water-Cooled Designs
The reference water-cooled designs are based on the STARFIRE [C.1]
blanket concept. The pressure is taken to be 15.2 MPa and the tempera-
ture drop around the coolant loop (AT100 ) is 40'C. The total coolant
mass flow rate required for a blanket is given by
Q (m3/s) = [700 + 2800 x M] x 106 watts/MW (C.1)
AT lp x p x cp
where LiA10 2 is the breeder, M= 1.15 and the mass flow rate is 24 m3/s.
For Li17Pb83, the energy multiplication is higher (1.25) and the flow
rate is 25.5 m3/s.
The stress limits were discussed in Chapter 2 which identified the
first wall thickness. The maximum first wall thickness due to fatigue is
given by (see Chapter 2):
Imax 2k(- ET (103 cycles) (C.2)
For 316 SS, this results in 8.9 mm. For HT-9, the maximum first wall
thickness is 22.3 mm for a heat flux of 9x105 W/m2 and 103 operating
cycles. Thus fatigue considerations do not limit the first wall thick- cm
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ness. The reference design concept for the water/LiAlO 2 and water/
Li17Pb83 cases are shown in Figures 2.1, 2.2. For the pressure stress
calculations, the first wall panel was taken to represent an
equivalent tube radius of 10 mm.
Use of Li 7Pb83 in place of LiA102 changes the in-blanket wetted
surface area by elimination of the second wall and reduction in the wall
area directly cooling the breeder zone. The resulting component areas
are listed in Table C.l.
For loss-of-coolant and disruption analysis, the water cooled blan-
kets were represented as shown in Figures C.l and C.2. The periodic
nature of the first wall panel allows use of a small portion of the blan-
ket and periodic boundary conditions as was used in the STARFIRE [C.1]
study. By terminating the nodes at the thickest and thinnest parts of
the panel, symmetry is preserved and adiabatic side conditions are im-
posed.
From the STARFIRE study, it is seen that the water volume in the
blanket modules is about 20 m3 whereas the total volume of water is 550
m3. The volume of the LiAlO 2 is 340 m3. The calculation of volumes for
all liquid breeders is discussed in Section C.3.
For LOCA analysis, the ratio of tube break area to draining fluid
volume (Ab/V) is required. This can be related to the total flow rates
by the equation,
Ab/V (C.3)
v x V
where v = design velocity through the section of piping.
,1111 MI; R I IAll NIHIII1111l 141111-11 1+411HN Q'I'llIkill"I I R11 l- !I I,
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4 0 mm
3,0 mm
50.0 mm beryllium
3.5 mm
40mm water
450.0 mm LiAlO2
10.0 mm
1Ti.O mm Graphite
Fig. C.1: Geometry of Water/LiAl02 Combination Used
for Computer Thermal Analysis0
P IH; 1111 *l6 Il0 1HIN , - '-
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1.5 mm
i.m
3. 5 mm
500.0 mm
10.0 mm
100.0 mm Graphite
Fig. C.2: Geometry of Water/LiA10 2 Combination Used
for Computer Thermal Analysis
Li 7Pb 83
V7//// /////////////// ////1
water
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TABLE C.1
In-blanket Wetted Surface Areas
LiAl02
Breeder*.
First Wall 2,100
Second Wall,
Breeder Zone
Side Wall
Mani fol ds
Total
and Frame
2,100 6
4,800 f 6,900
4,800
1,200
1,400
11,600
*From Reference C.1, STARFIRE.
0
(m2)
Li 17Pb83
Breeder
2,100
4,600
1 ,200
1,400
9,300
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For water designs, a conservative (upper estimate) of Ab/V is 0.25
m~f. For 240 modules, this corresponds to a break area for an indivi-
dual module of 0.02 m2. Note that since both inlet and outlet pipes are
assumed severed (see Chapter 3), the relevant volume is 20 m3 (in-blan-
ket) rather than the total (550 m3). If only inlet pipes were to break,
then the entire loop inventory would have to empty. For the double
break, the out-blanket coolant is immediately separated from the blanket.
C.2 Helium-Cooled Designs
The reference helium-cooled designs are based on the Westinghouse/
ORNL design concept [C.2, C.3]. The pressure is fixed at 5.5 MPa and the
coolant loop temperature drop is 235*C. Using Equation C.1, the coolant
flow rates for the two breeder cases are 700 m3/s for a LiAlO 2 breeder
(M = 1.15) and 720 m3/s for a lithium breeder (M = 1.20), using helium
properties and the average temperature of 318'C. The first wall stress
limits were discussed in Chapter 2 and led to a selection of a 1.6 mm
thickness for both 316 SS and HT-9 cases.
The reference designs for the helium/lithium and helium/LiAl0 2 cases
are shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. Unless otherwise stated (here or
Chapter 2), design values are taken from References C.2 and C.3. The
total helium volume in the loop was estimated at 600 m3 , with about 30 m3
in the blanket modules.
The use of LiA10 2 breeder requires the incorporation of a neutron
multiplier and its structural support. Of the eleven reference concepts
in this study, the helium/LiAlO cases (316 SS and HT-9) appear the
least believable.
l Ill HUI I 111111M, IN I 5,10M lHIHIPIPAJIjill 4 [11141 1 -1
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Based on the reference concepts, the in-blanket surface areas are
determined and listed in Table C.2. The longer length of the lithium
module is responsible for more surface area than that caused by the
neutron multiplier and the coolant tubes in the poor thermal conductivity
LiA10 2. Because the first wall hemisphere and module cylinder have four
metal surfaces that face the .helium coolant, the total area for the
helium designs is high.
For sputtering purposes, forward sputtering over-shadows backward
sputtering (see Chapter 7). Thus the relevant area at the first wall is
half of the total since two of the four surfaces face away from the
plasma.
Using Equation C.3 and typical blanket values, the ratio of tube
break area to blanket coolant is found to be about 0.25 m~. Again, both
inlet and outlet pipes are assumed severed, which immediately isolates
the blanket from much of the total coolant volume.
The blanket model for the computer analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 is
illustrated in Figures C.3 and C.4. Connections across the flow gap were
assumed as indicated, but these proved to have no effect on results.
C.3 Lithium-Cooled Designs
The reference lithium cooled designs are based on the recent ANL
concept [C.4, C.5]. The pressure is set at the recommended value of 2.8
MPa to allow for MHD pumping losses. The inlet and outlet temperatures
for the 316 SS and V-alloy cases are those from Reference C.4, summarized
in Table 2.7. Thus the loop temperature drops are 220C for the 316 SS
design and 250C for the V-alloy case. Based on Equation C.1, the total
coolant flow rates are 8.4 m3/s (3.6 SS) and 7.6 mr3/s (V-alloy), with
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TABLE C.2
In-blanket Coolant Surface Areas for Helium-Cooled Designs (m2 )
First Wall Hemisphere Surfaces
(four surfaces facing helium)
Cylinder Wall Surfaces
(four surfaces facing helium)
Tubes through the Breeder Zone
(five tubes, 5 mm radius)
Plenum around Multiplier
Lithium
Breeder
4,800
49,500
LiA1O
2
Breeder
4,800
37,600
4,700
1,300
%54,000
-7
PP 1. 1tlll. l@ il l M llR M 4 I llia ~ e ,,
Total ,\,48,300 0
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C
helium 2 x 20 mm
1. 6 mm
2 0 mm
1.6 mm
600. 0 mm
graphite
Geometry of Helium/Lithium Combination Used
for Computer Thermal Analysis
lithium
10.0 mm
100.0 mm
Fig. C.3:
Kcm
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Geometry of Helium/LiA10 2 Combination Used for
Computer Thermal Analysis
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lithium properties evaluated at the average temperature for each case
with a blanket energy multiplication (M) of 1.20.
The basic blanket concept is shown in Figure 2.7. The average
module length is 1.83 as for STARFIRE so that the average sector (com-
posed of several modules in the poloidal direction) length is the same
(see Figure C.5). The module width is four times the first wall cy-
linder radius.
Three cases were examined, widths of 0.60, 0.40, and 0.30 m. As
seen in Table C.3, the larger modules have advantages of lower wetted
surface areas and lower number of modules. The largest module width is
that used in the ANL studies [C.4, C.5].
Using the methodology outlined in Chapter 2, the constraints on
first wall thickness can be determined. As shown in Table C.4, it is
not possible to design a 0.60 m wide module due to the conflict between
pressure and thermal stresses. A large radius requires a high thick
first wall, but the low thermal conductivity of the steel leads to high
temperature drops and thermal stresses. The 0.40 m case is marginal,
with only a 0.7 mm margin between the pressure and yielding criteria. In
view of the simple nature of the analysis, this design margin is too low.
If a somewhat arbitrary maximum first wall temperature gradient of 1000C
is imposed, the design margin for the 0.40 m case is eliminated. The
0.30 m case is adopted for 316 SS with a 2.0 mm first wall thickness (as
close to "optimum" as the pressure criteria allow). For V-alloy and
2.
316 SS, an out-blanket surface area of 20,000 m is assumed, based on
reference C.4.
The superior material properties of the V-alloy make the design
-701-
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Fig. C.5: Schematic of Lithium/Lithium Combination Geometry
(see Fig. 2.7)
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TABLE, C.3
Comparison of Module Widths for Lithium-Cooled Designs
Module Width (m)
First Wall Cylinder Width (m)
Number of Modules
Modules per Sector
Surface Areas (m2)
First Wall
(3 surfaces exposed to lithium)
Module Bottom
Modules Sides (incl. front and
back, inlet baffle)
Manifolding outside Module
Tta %9,000 %10,400
C
0.60
'.
0 .15
720
30
3,700
800
3,500
1,000
0.40
0.10
1,080
45
3,700
800
4,900
1,000
0.30
0.075
1,440
60
3,700
800
6,300
1 9000
, ,11,800Total
4I~ lI ill 11 91111 11 iid - llld 14 1,0 1: Ildk I, I , II
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TABLE C.4
Constraints on 316 SS First Wall for Lithium Design
Module Width (m) 0.60 0.40 0.30
Minimum Thickness due to 3.9 2.6 1.9
Pressure (mm) (Equation 2.2)
"Optimum" Thickness (mm) 1.8 1.5 1.3
(Equation 2.6)
Maximum Thickness due to 2.9 3.3 3.5
Yielding (mm) (Equation 2.5)
Maximum Thickness due to 8.9 8.9 8.9
Fatigue (mm) (Equation 2.8)
Maximum Thickness to Keep 2.2 2.2 2.2
Temperature Drop Through First
Wall below 1000C (Equation 2.7)
I'll I , t-I ", I I , I , I , " , , [0 1, .
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process easier. As seen in Table C.5, yielding and fatigue criteria
allow very thick first walls (over 10 mm). The maximum thickness is
limited by the value of the temperature drop through the wall. An arbi-
trary limit of 1000C would not allow a thickness which would minimize
total stress. A design value of 3.8 mm was selected to minimize stresses
which corresponds to a 1104C temperature drop through the wall.
The model used for the computer analysis for Chapters 3 and 4 is
shown in Figure C.6. As is the case for the helium design, a connection
was included between first wall and flow guide. This proved to have no
effect.
The volumes of fluids must be determined. In most design studies,
the total volume of fluid is not specified. For STARFIRE [C.11, the
3 3total volume of water is about 550 m and of LiA1O 2 is about 300 m
Most of the water is out of the blanket. Based on the geometries speci-
fied in this appendix and Chapter 2, the other volumes have been esti-
mated (see Table C.6).
Using Equation C.3, a conservative estimate for the maximum ratio
of break area to draining coolant volume (Ab/V) is 0.15 m 1. For a typi-
cal individual module, the break area is taken to be 0.10 m2. For a
liquid breeder, the flow rates are lower. For Li17Pb83, the estimates
are volume = 500 m3, linear flow velocity = 0.10 m/s, and total flow
rate of 0.1 m3/s, which results in a value of Ab/V of 0.002 m~.
C.4 Flibe-Cooled Design
The reference flibe-cooled design is based on the work of McManamy
[C.6] with a STARFIRE-type first wall. Use of Equation C.1 for a lithium
breeder (M = 1.20) results in a total mass flow rate of 9.1 m3/s. The
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TABLE C.5
Constraints on V-alloy First Wall for Lithium Design
Module Width (m) 0.60 0.40 0.30
Minimum Thickness due to 2.4 1.6 1.2
Pressure (mm) (Equation 2.2)
Optimum Thickness (mm) 3.8 3.1 2.7
(Equation 2.6)
Maximum Thickness due to 10.7 11.2 11.4
Yielding (mm) (Equation 2.5)
Maximum Thickness due to 22 22 22
Fatigue (mm) (Equation 2.8)
Maximum Thickness to Keep 3.4 3.4 3.4
Temperature Drop Through First
Wall below 100 0C (Equation 2.7)
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TABLE C.6
Total Volumes of Non-structural Materials
Used as
Coolant
550
600
200
200
(m 3)
Used as
Breeder
600*
340
500
*For a design with lithium as coolant and breeder, the total
volume is approximately 800 m3 .
Water
Helium
Lithium
Flibe
Li Al02
Li17Pb83
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reference concept is shown in Figure 2.9.. The coolant tubes in the
breeder zone make three passes through the lithium to keep the tempera-
ture rise the same as the first wall. McManamy recommended limiting the
value of velocity time tube diameter as [C.61
vD < 0.25 volts o 0.025 m2/s (C.4)B
to prevent decomposition of the flibe due to induced voltages in the
salt.
The constraints on the first wall thickness are listed in Table
C.7. The pressure and yield stress criteria are not limiting. Of the
materials combinations studies, the flibe/TZM case exhibits the most
flexibilty. The first wall thickness was fixed at 1 mm. A higher value
would be used if desired, perhaps up to about 10 mm.
Use of McManamy's [C.6] design approach resulted in the parameters
listed in Table C.8. The low pressure drop allows the low operating pres-
sure of 0.2 MPa. The maximum structural temperature was set at 9000C.
The relatively high film temperature drops lead to a maximum flibe outlet
temperature of 8004C.
The model used for the LOCA and disruption analysis (Chapters 3, 4)
is shown in Figure C.7. The first wall panel design is seen as the same
as STARFIRE [C.1]. 'Use of Equation C.3 allows estimation of the ratio of
break area to blanket coolant volume:
Ab/V %V Q(2m/s)E(0Om)
I. RM I I WIN 1 -1 - -- II I - I
H 4~ 4 H U
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TABLE C.7
Constraints on TZM First Wall Thickness for a Flibe Design
Minimum Thickness due to Pressure (mm)
(Equation 2.2)
Maximum Thickness due to Yielding (mm)
(Equation 2.5)
Maximum Thickness due to Fatigue (mm)
(Equation 2.8)
Maximum Thickness to Keep First Wall Temperature
Drop below 100'C (mm) (Equation 2.7)
Optimum Thickness to Minimize the Stresses (mm)
(Equation 2.6)
<0.1
>50
11.0
11.8
r
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TABLE C.8
Flibe/TZM Blanket Parameters Using Method of McManamy [C.6]
Reynolds Number
Nusselt Number
Prandlt Number
Loop Pressure Drop
Loop Temperature Difference
Wetted In-blanket Area
First Wall
First Wall Thickness
Flibe Velocity
Film Temperature Drop
Tube Diameter
Wall Temperature Drop
1 mm
2.5 m/s
870C
10 mm
90C
10,400
105
13.1
0.05 MPa
500*C
8,500 m
Blanket Coolant Tubes
Coolant Tube Thickness
Flibe Velocity
Film Temperature Drop
Tube Diameter
Wall Temperature Drop
1 mm
2 m/s
620C
12.5 mm
5*C
C
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Fig. C.7: Geometry of Flibe/Lithium Combination Used
for Computer Thermal Analysis
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APPENDIX D. WATER CORROSION MODEL
A detailed water corrosion product formation and transport model
was developed which has been used as part of the STARFIRE study [D.1].
The following discussion is a description and'justification of the
model which was used to obtain the results presented in Chapter 7.
D.1 Potential Magnetic Field Effects
Several possibilities exist for interaction of strong magnetic
fields and corrosion relevant processes as follows: (1) change in ion
diffusion in water due to V x B force; (2) change in ion solid-state
diffusion due to V x B force; (3) induced film stresses from magneto-
striction; (4) acceleration of corrosion rate by induced current;
(5) increased deposition of coolant particles due to field gradients;
(6) corrosion rate alteration by change of film microstructure; and
(7) corrosion rate alteration by presence of ferritic steel produced
in austenite steel. Such effects need to be addressed to determine
influence on optimum water chemistry, transport modeling, and altera-
tion of relevant parameters.
D.l.1 V x B Force
The force on a charged particle in an electromagnetic field is
given by
F = q(E + V x B). (D.1)
According to the electrokinetic theory of coolant particle deposition,
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[D.2, 0.3] interparticle and particle-wall electric fields are responsible
for agglomeration and deposition of particles. Although the net charge on
coolant particles is not known directly, typical inter-particle potential
drops are %50 mVolts (or higher in reference water conditions) [D.2].
Since particle sizes are in othe 1-yim range, the field is %5 T, and velo-
city is nl0 m/s, the ratio of magnetic-to-electric force can be calculated,
V x B vB o 1-3 (0.2)
E A$/Ax
and the possible Vx B force in the coolant is negligible compared to elec-
trostatic forces. As the velocities of ions in solid-state diffusion are
far slower, the V xB force should also be neglected in oxide film diffu-
sion.
D.1.2 Magnetostriction
The application of high-strength fields causes magnetic materials to
constrict and induce stresses similar to thermal stresses [D.4, D.5]'.
Since the oxide film is magnetic and the base alloy is not, magnetostric-
tion could cause stresses in the oxide film sufficient to disrupt it. The
saturation value of Xs (magnetostriction change of length per unit length)
for all materials of interest is less than 50 yim/m with Fe304 highest at
41 [D.4]. Taking Xs= 50 vim/m and comparing this to the stainless steel
value for thermal expansion (20 vm/m-4K), one finds that the maximum mag-
netostriction corresponds to a AT of 2.50C. Hence it is small enough to
be neglected.
D.1.3 Induced Currents
As water corrosion is basically an electrochemical process with
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very small currents, the possibility exists that any induced currents
could alter the corrosion rate. Since STARFIRE operates steady state, the
coolant tubes should not experience currents except during startup/shut-
down of the magnets. The process may be a concern in pulsed machines,
although the thermal shock to the oxide film 'could dominate). The conduc-
tivity of water may be sufficient for MHD interactions to result in volt-
ages and currents in the water, leading to increased corrosion (see Chapter
7 for discussion of electrochemical concerns).
D.1.4 Field Gradients
Filters with high-gradient magnetic fields are very effective in trap-
ping magnetic particles [D.6 -D.8]. The concern here is the possibility
that the blanket could act as one large filter with increased particle de-
position rates. The potential magnitude of the effect can be determined by
1) comparison of magnetic force (Fm) to drag force (Fd); and 2) comparison
of STARFIRE parameters of interest to those of effective high flow rate
magnetic filters.
The force on a particle of saturation field magnetization strength,
Ms (volume basis) and radius r can be written [D.7, D.8]:
Fm = } irr 3 Ms d (D.3)
in a field gradient dB/dx. The crucial factor in the analysis is the
determination of dB/dx. Typical high-flow filters have dB/dx'210 4 T/m
[D.7, D.8].
The overall blanket has gradients of order 1 T/m due to toroidal ef-
fects. However, this field could be disturbed due to either magnetic
ferritic steel produced in the stainless steel matrix or a magnetic oxide
EI I II IR fII MI " R I l'ql 1 [ 'IIN ~IV , ' HIIIII II 
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film lining the coolant tubes. The former should be negligible as any
disturbances do not occur in the coolant. The latter case is more diffi-
cult to treat.
A uniform layer of magnetite on a tube inner wall in a previously
homogeneous field does not produce any gradients inside the tubes. This
contrasts strongly with the very high gradients in filters which are
produced on the outside of a filament matrix. There are two concerns.
First, very localized variations in the oxide layer depth may produce
relatively high localized gradients. However, any increased deposition
would be self-correcting, tending to smooth any variations. This effect
also tends to limit the loading of a magnetic filter; as the thickness
of deposit increases, the gradient is reduced [D.7, D.8].
The second problem is the presence of nonsymmetric geometries, for
example, the first-wall baffle and tube junctions. Precise determination
of the field gradient in the vicinity of the wall for these cases is very
difficult. For comparison purposes a figure of 10 T/m is adopted.
Then the ratio of Fm to Fd is given by:
F 4/3 r3 M (dB/dx)
-m_ , s(0.4)
Fd 6 iry(v 
- u)
where r = particle radius x 10-6 m
Ms= 0.46 T at 300*C
dB/dx = 10 T/m
11 = viscosity = 9.2x 10- 5 N-s/m 2
(v-u) = particle velocity relative to coolant velocity in
stopping 2 1 m/s
l I 0 1 II lI l Ml I ' 1 ! 16 41
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then Fm/Fd = 9 x 0-3 and the magnetic force is < 1% of the drag force.
To compare STARFIRE parameters with those of a high flow filter,
one notes that the effectiveness varies as u(Fm/Fd)L (L = length of
passage), or for identical materials, %(dB/dx)(L/v), with a dB/dx ratio
of 103 and L/v ratio of 1/10, then STARFIRE is about 1% as effective as
the better high flow filters. Thus the magnetic force should not have
a significant effect on the overall value of the deposition rate. How-
ever, in very low flow areas, the potential clearly exists for increased
deposition.
The magnetic quality of the particles can also have a benefit. An
EPRI study [D.6] on using magnetic filters on PWR primary loops concluded
that high temperature filters with flow of %46 kg/s and 90% efficiency
were available and warranted. Placing two filters on each line around
the pumps would give an effective removal filtration rate of 166 kg/s
equal to i,% of the total flow rate. Such a system is adopted for
filtration of crud.
The possibility exists to place such filters directly in the
STARFIRE magnetic field. However, the power (%80 kW total) and equip-
ment savings would likely be far outweighed by several disadvantages:
(1) restrictions on space inside the toroidal field coils; (2) increased
complexity of incorporating filters into design; (3) very limited
access; and (4) filter operation tied to operation of the TF coils.
Thus the filters are placed outside the torus, and must depend on their
own coils. for field production. Another potential benefit of the field
would be a tendency to reduce crud bursts.-
-7 l1~T ----- T 777 = = 7 7 771 1-- _
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0.1.5 Microstructure and Composition
Some magnetic films grown in strong fields show preferential
orientation of domains [D.4, D.5]. As note previously, the-outer oxide
layer of the steel will be quite magnetic; hence, there is the possi-
bility of preferential orientations in the oxide film. However, the
inner layer is far less magnetic. The magnitude and effect of any such
orientation on corrosion films appears unknown and could only be
determined by experiment.
Although the bulk of the metal alloy is stainless steel, neutron
irradiation and/or welding will transform some small percentage to a
ferritic structure. Depending on the distribution, such a structure
could lead to increased corrosion (ferritic steel corrodes faster).
For example, ferritic structure at grain boundaries could lead to
preferential grain boundary attack. Any effect due to phase transfor-
mation is unknown at present.
D.1.6 Conclusions on Magnetic Effects
The main concerns of magnetic interaction are the increased
deposition of particles in very low flow areas and alteration of the
microstructure of the oxide film. The advantages of a magnetic filter
may provide incentive to maximize the magnetization potential of coolant
particles. This suggests an advantage to having Fe304 rather than
Fe203 as the stable phase (the chemical, hence magnetic, form of the
coolant is controllable by water chemistry conditions). The concern of
possible induced currents and voltages increasing the corrosion rate is
unresolved (see Chapter 7).
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D.2 Water Chemistry
There are several constraints on the water chemistry, some
are in conflict. Existing data strongly indicates appropriate 02
levels for pressurized water conditions. The H2 level is determined
by radiolysis considerations to keep 02 levels to that required.
The various constraints on additive additions and optimum pH data
determine the remaining variables.
D.2.1 Constraints
The appropriate constraints on water chemistry are: (1) minimize
corrosion rate; (2) minimize corrosion product inventory; (3) maintain
adherent oxide film to reduce corrosion and tritium permeation;
(4) avoid stress corrosion cracking; (5) limit tritium production in
coolant to 1 Ci/day from 7Li additive burnup; (6) allow for boric acid
additions for tritium breeding ratio control; (7) minimize crud depo-
sition; (8) optimize magnetic qualities of corrosion products; and
(9) avoid chemical additives which activate. The available variables
for control are the concentrations of 02, H2 , any additives, and pH.
Although the data base for water corrosion of reactor materials
is generally more extensive than for any other potential fusion reactor
coolant, some information is still lacking. Available data for rele-
vant parameters typically show large variations, especially among
operating LWRs. Also, there is often significant discrepancy between
laboratory experiments and operating values for corrosion rates. The
difference is sometimes attributed to lack of appropriate chemistry
control, poor startup procedures, and oxygen leaks (the latter is
-720-
unlikely for STARFIRE due to inert reactor building atmosphere) [D.10].
D.2.2 Gas Concentrations
Pressurized water reactors tend to operate at the _5 ppb 02 level
(4 x 10-3 cc/kg H20), whereas boiling water reactors operate between
0.2 - 0.3 ppm 02 (set by steel and Inconel considerations, not by
Zircaloy) [D.11 - D.13]. Lowering BWR 02 levels significantly decreases
the protectiveness of the oxide layer; increasing it adds more oxidant,
hence higher corrosion rates. The same appears true for PWR conditions;
early Russian data show increasing corrosion at higher.02 levels [D.141.
As STARFIRE operates as a pressurized system (temperature and pressure
virtually the same as PWR's) the data suggests specifying < 5 ppb 02*
Hyrdogen gas is added to PWR's to maintain such low oxygen levels
in the face of radiolysis of water. For example, Babcock and Wilcox
specify 15- 40 cc H2/kg H20 (1.5 -4 ppm) [D.15] and Combustion Engineer-
ing specifies 10- 50 cc/kg (1-5 ppm) [D.16]. Although STARFIRE will
operate at lower heat deposition levels to the coolant (average n 10
kW/kg) than PWRs, the neutron energy spectrum is harder. Without complex,
detailed calculations, it is anticipated that the two effects will
generally cancel, indicating r 5 ppm (55 cc H2/kg H20) as an approximate
H2 level. More detailed calculations will be warranted in the future to
determine the hydrogen level more accurately. These 02 and H2 conditions
result in Fe304 being the stable iron oxide phase.
D.2.3 Additives
Various chemicals are added to the PWR primary loop to serve three
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functions: (1) getter 02 at startup; (2) pH control; and (3) reac-
tivity control. All three functions are also included in STARFIRE,
the last being the desire to control the tritium production rate
(tritium breeding ratio) rather than reactivity.
Hydrazine (N2H) is generally added to the system during startup
to remove initial 02. Typical amounts are 50 ppm [D.16]. After coming
up in power, the hydrazine thermally decomposes to ammonia and tends to
control pH, although plants may shift to other additives (e.g., LiOH)
to control pH [D.15, D.16].
Addition of small amounts (%1500 ppm B as boric acid) may be an
easy way to "fine tune" the tritium production, and the water chemistry
should allow for this.
Possible compounds for pH control include LiOH, NaOH, KOH, and
NH40H. Among the alkali hydroxides, LiOH is preferred over NaOH and
KOH because of fewer stress corrosion cracking problems [D.17] and no
activation [D.9]. Between NiOH and NH40H, there are several tradeoffs
[D.9, D.18]. Each has advantages:
LiOH NH40H
Very strong base, No tritium production
Stable under irradiation Less stress corrosion cracking
Non-volatile Product of hydrazine thermal decompo-
sition
Based on tritium levels already present in the coolant, a limit of 1
Ci/day production due to LiOH additions is adopted. 7 Li rather than
6 Li is used in PWRs to minimize tritium production; however, the harder
III I'll ,I .I . j ,I , 1, 1 1, - k4ld'-t I I kh I IIII ill, I 141111111111 lill W IIIIN 4 1111 H114, i Okillll I NklI, I I - -I
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fusion neutron spectrum will cause even 7Li to produce significant
amounts ot tritium. Taking conservative values of 20 m3 of water in
the breeder zone and a 1% 7Li burnup over module lifetime, the 1
Ci/day limit becomes < 2.25 ppm 7 Li. Current PWR operation allows up
to \ 2.5 ppm 7Li largely due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC)
considerations [D.12, D.16]. In STARFIRE, some nucleate boiling is
allowed and cold-worked structure is used; both are known to increase
SCC problems. Without experimental data, a limit of ) 2 ppm 7Li
(10~4 M LiOH) is adopted. Such a concentration is also typical of PWR
operating conditions with stainless steel fuel cladding [D.16]. While
firm NH4OH limits are also not well known for stainless steel/Inconel
systems, a limit of 10 ppm NH3 is inferred from Combustion Engineering
limits on feedwater in the absence of copper alloys [D.16].
Without SCC constraints, several authors maintain that a pH250C of
MO0 is optimum for corrosion minimization [D.9, D.20, D.21]. This
corresponds to pH300 0C % 7 for LiOH dosing. Sawochka's data [D.19]
suggests there is little incentive for pH3000C z 6.9. (The pH of a
solution varies with temperature, e.g., pH3000C of pure water is 5.7.)
Furthermore, to avoid electrokinetic deposition, one wishes to maintain
conditions away from the point of zero change (PZC) [D.2, D.3]. Tomlin-
son [D.3, D.26] reports that no relevant materials have a PZC between
pH25oC 6.8 - 11.2. Finally, the solubility fo Fe304 is minimum around
pH25 C % 9.5.
To obtain pH300*C = 7 requires 0.4 ppm Li (pH25*C = 9.75) or 50 -
100 ppm NH3 (pH254C - 12- 13). Furthermore, if boric acid is used, the
situation is even worse. To obtain pH300*C % 7 with 1000 ppm boron
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(as boric acid) requires > 2 ppm lithium or very large amounts of
NH4OH. Allowance of boric acid additions tend to favor use of LiOH
over NH40H. The reference conditions are then pH250C , 9.5
(pH3000C ru 6.75) with 0.22 -2.2 ppm 7 (LiOH) and 0- 1500 ppm boron
(boric acid). Given the constraints imposed, it is not suprising that
STARFIRE optimum conditions are the same as those for PWRs.
The concentrations of other elements must generally be kept to
very low levels. For example, chlorine, fluorine, and lead concentra-
tions should all be kept < 0.1 ppm [D.9, D.16, 0.18]. The only special
concern for STARFIRE might be lead impurities from the zirconium-lead
multiplier. However, calculations show that to reach 0.1 ppm (steady
state) would require lead diffusion into the coolant through the first
and second coolant walls at a rate of 10-100 times faster than the iron
release rate which already dominates dissolution into the coolant. A
level of 0.1 ppm lead could be reached for a short time if z 40 g lead
quickly dissolved due to some sort of leak. Neither case seems likely.
In summary, the operating conditions are: pH25*C % 9.5; 02 N 5
ppb; H2 '- 5 ppm; LiOH 1 0.22- 2.2 ppm 7Li; and boric acid r\ 0- 1500 ppm
boron.
D.3 Transport Modeling
The modeling of corrosion product transport generally divides into
two phases [D.13, D.20, D.22]. First, the physical amount of each ele-
ment by location (coolant, wall deposit) is calculated by mass balance.
Second, the level of radioactivity is determined by balancing the rates
of production and removal. All parameters appear to reach steady state
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within the 6-yr lifetime of a module, except perhaps long-lived species
like, 60Co.
Figure D.1 shows the basic movement of mass throughout the system.
The corrosion rate of the alloys is the net source term; the removal
rate of the filters, the net sink term. The important resulting para-
meters are the coolant concentrations and amount of wall deposits.
Activation of the coolant system is dependent upon (1) dwell time of
particles in blanket during coolant passage; (2) deposition of
particles to wall in blanket, then release; and (3) corrosion and release
of activated stainless steel in the blanket. The last one is a funda-
mental difference from LWRs with Zircaloy cladding on the fuel. Zircaloy
does not form products like 60Co and 58Co, and the Zircaloy oxide film
tends to be very adherent and does not release products to the coolant
(except for crud bursts) [D.20]. Thus the STARFIRE case is closer to
that of reactors with stainless steel cladded fuel which have greater
corrosion problems than Zircaloy-cladded ones [D.9]. LWR activity
transport modeling has been done for Zircaloy-cladded fuel reactors, so
that the potential dominant effect of in-blanket steel corrosion needs
to be added.
D.3.1 Assumptions
To reduce such a complex situation to the level appropriate for this
study requires many assumptions and simplifications. Current models
[D.13, D.20, D.22, 0.23] divide the coolant into soluble (ion) and in-
soluble (crud) species and divide the wall deposits into inner and outer
layers (generally of equal depth) [D.23].
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Deposition of both coolant species (ion and crud) is proportional
to coolant concentrations. Thus, the deposition rate = ks C + kcCc
where k and kc are the deposition rate constants, and Cs and Cc are the
ion and crud concentrations. Solubility limits CS [D.9, D.20], and
mass balance determines Cc. Ion species deposition appears tied to the
corrosion rate as ions incorporate directly into the growing inner film
and crystallize on the outer film surface [D.23]. The crud particles
deposit directly on the outer film surface. Avoiding the point of zero
charge (PZC) for rel-evant particles keeps the crud deposition rate to a
minimum by maintaining electrostatic repulsion between wall and particle
[D.2, D.24]. Above pH254C NJ 9, all species are electronegative and will
tend not to agglomerate [D.24]. Al chemical species tend to deposit
at the same rate [D.20]. The available data base will be used to deter-
mine values for ks and k c for conditions most similar to the reference
case.
The oxide film releases both ions and particulates back to the cool-
ant. The crud release is a surface process tied to the corrosion rate,
whereas the dissolution rate is given by rW, where W = total wall
thickness (g/m ) and r = release rate (1/s) (r is a function of solu-
bility gradients) [0.22]. Again, all chemical species are assumed to
release at the same rate, r [D.20]. The residence time of a particle
on the wall is then T = 1/r at steady state. Values for r are to be
determined for the literature. W is fixed by mass balance.
The corrosion of the base alloy (if stainless steel or Inconel)
results in some fraction directly released to the coolant and some
adding to the oxide film [D.9, D.23]. The release of trace cobalt is
U
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proportional to its relative alloy composition [D.20, D.25]. Further-
more, existing models assume all element release is proportional to
alloy composition [D.9, D.20, D.25]. One exception is iron and nickel
release from Inconel. Apparently iron is released twice as fast as
nickel [D.21]. This explains why Inconel/Zircaloy systems show more
iron in the coolant than nickel.
D.3.2 Mass Balance
There are three models for overall system mass balance; a reference
case and two alternatives:
(1) All components reach steady state. Then the net production
of corrosive products must balance the net sink:
d A = QsCs + QcCc (D.5)
The wall film grows by the corrosion rate itself and by
deposition. Release occurs by direct release from corrosion
and from crud and ion dissolution. For each surface we have:
d + ksCs + kc c = dr + rW (D.6)
Note that in models (1) and (2), the deposit layer is divided
into inner and outer, where
Winner = Wouter = 1/2 W (D. 7)
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(2) Same as (1) except all release is assumed to be accounted
for by deposit layer release (rW):
d + ksCs + kC = rW (D.8)
(3) The inner oxide layer does not reach steady state. Then the
balance must occur between filtration and the net amount
released from corrosion:
drA = Qs s + Q cc (D.9)
Only the outer layer directly interacts with the coolant:
outer ksCs + kc c (D.10)
D.3.3 Activity Transport
STha basic model for determining activity levels is that of Kennedy
[D.13] with alteration for the corrosion of activated stainless steel.
At steady state one writes the specific amount of radionuclide in the
alloy,
Cssap
C = , (0.11)
where = number of atoms of given isotope/kg steel
Css = number of target atoms/kg steel
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a$ = transmutation rate (s~ )
X = decay constant (s )
for each nuclide. For present purposes only seven isotopes-will be
examined: 58Co, 60 Co, 5 1Cr, 54Mn, 56Mn, 59Fe, 55Fe as these are
dominant (see Sec. . D.5.2). Although more than one reaction may con-
tribute to the formation of these isotopes, the model will assume that
the total amount can be approximated by focusing on one production
reaction each. Thus, the detailed neutron runs for STARFIRE provide
values for X (specific activity) for each isotope and zone of blanket.
Use of Css determines o$ values for the model. This approximation
generally cancels from the final calculation as ac is re-multiplied by
either ss or Wi to obtain the amounts of radioisotopes.
The balance for the coolant is then for each radioisotope
V d UCTV a - kAy + rAw - AVy + drA - Qy (D.12)
surfaces
where UCTV a$ represents isotope production due to dwell time
U = fraction of coolant in blanket
CT = Cs + Cc
V = total volume of coolant
(kA + XV + Q)y represent removal by deposition, decay, and
filtration
y = number of atoms/m3 coolant
rAw = the addition due to nuclides releasing from wall
w = number of atoms/m2 wall
411140 11 H W I IIIPI PHNIA11:11"I I M 0110 [1101,1'111: IhIPP
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drA = the addition due to direct release of corrosion products.
Rearranging and substituting for 3 gives
0 = V y = [UCTV + 8rAC ss] -
The balance for the in-blanket wall is
dw.
= Wiap + ky - rjwj - Xwi +
W.1a4 is the production of isotopes in the
thickness); and (d - dr)3 is the addition
product remaining on the wall.
Rearranging,
(Q+ kA+ VX)y + ZrAw . (D.13)
(d - dr), (D.4)
wall deposit (in blanket wall
due to activated corrosion
d0 . i (d dr)C
0 = -i= ss + WJ a$ + ky - (r. + x)o.
0
(D.15)
The out of blanket wall is then (steel not activated, wall deposits not
irradiated)
-dw 
k0 y - (r 0 + X)O . (D.16)
Solving wo, wi for y gives
(D. 17)
0
0
o0 = + X
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ki -)dr)C +
i r + A +ss+ Wi] (r+ 
Substituting w0 'Mi in the term I rAw and solving for y
(D.18)
gives
UCTV + (drA C/) + ri/(ri+ X) (d-dr)A Cs/A + W A
cy T ss$ (D.19)
Q + XV + Ak IA0 /(r0 + X) + Ai/(r + )
These values will be compared to a simple model based on the observation
that in stainless steel clad PWR cores the specific activity throughout
the system (longer-lived species) is equal to that of the stainless steel
times the ratio (area in core/total area) [D.9]. For this simple, very
conservative model, one obtains,
Y C~ss
C j
ss
0 x
C a$(C Sc x
A AA
A
A + A0)
SA 0
C 
,
W ,
WO 
.
(D.20)
(D.21)
(D.22)
D.4 Data Base
The transport model requires STARFIRE data for the following
parameters:
ill; I MA ll I i All Ild I lil I I M il I ! ll I I 11!1 ill iA 11 A1,411! 14 1 kk , , , I
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A (m2) wetted surface areas
V (m3) coolant volume
Qs (kg/s) soluble ion filter rate
Qc (kg/s) crud filter rate
QT (m3/s) total mass (or volume) flow rate
The relevant calculated surface areas are shown in Table D.l. In addi-
tion, a linear scale-up of the amount of Stellite (cobalt alloy used in
valves) alloy from CANDU reactors [D.12] indicates %7.5 m2 . The water
3 3
volumes are 20 m3 (in-blanket) and 550 m (total).
The total mass flow rate is QT = 1.66 x 104 kg/s. As mentioned in
Section D.l, the crud will be removed by four magnetic filters with an
effective filtration rate of 1% of flow, hence Q= 166 kg/s. The
reference case assumes the same rate (Qs = 166 kg/s) for solubles.
Use of the model requires estimates of relevant transport parameters.
The reference values are shown in Table D.2 as discussed below. These
low corrosion rates pose no hazard to structural integrity.
There have been several reports of PWR experience with steady-state
corrosion rates and material release rates for materials of interest as
shown in Table 0.3.
The required deposition rate constants are averages over the entire
system. Taylor [0.21] reports that LiOH controlled systems have exhi-
bited fairly uniform deposition throughout the circuit with deposition
being higher on the cooler surfaces. The opposite is true of NH40H
systems. For high flow rate systems, the deposition is independent of
the flow rate [D.23]. Balakrizhvan and Allison [D.20] report a crud
0
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TABLE D
STARFIRE Primary Coolant Loop Surface Areas (m)
LRef D.1]
In-Blanket Out-of-Blanket Total
Stainless steel 12,000 3,000 15,000
Inconel 0 45,000 45,000
Total 12,000 48,000 60,000
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TABLE D.2
Reference Transport Parameters
Corrosion rate, d (mg/dm2-month)
Surface release rate, dr (mg/dm2-month)
Deposition rate (g/m2-s)
Crud, kc
Iron, k s
Release rate/s
In-blanket, r.
Out-blanket, 
r0
Solubility (ppb)
Iron, CFe
Nickel, CNi
Chromium, CCr
Manganese, CMn
Cobalt, CCo
Total ion solubility, C s
3
1
5
20
1.8 x 10-6
107
K
3.8
0.7
0.1
0.3
0.1
5
0
0
0
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TABLE D.3
Steady State Corrosion and Release Rates
Dillon &
Johnson
[D.12]
Sawochka
[D.19]
Assumed for
Present Study
Corrosion Rates (mg/dm2-mo)
1.0- 1.5
1.5 -4.0
2
5
3
3
55 - 25
Release Rates (mg/dm2-mo)
10.2- 1.0
0.5 - 2.0 1
55
Material
Taylor
[D.211
316 SS
Inconel
Stellite
2.0- 5.0
2.5
5 - 25
316 SS
Inconel
Stellite
0.6- 1.5
1.0- 1.5
5 - 25
ME 1141; Ill I AHIN M 1101411 lN '11111,411101, 11 ANII I, I I
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deposition rate of 4.5 x 10-3 kg/m 2 -s. A value of 5 x 10-3 kg/m 2 -s
is adopted here. They also report a range of 1- 2 x 10-2 kg/m2 - s for
deposition of solubles (Burrill [D.22] uses 1 x 10-2 kg/m2 -s).
Scaling to the present higher corrosion rates gives a reference value
of ks = 2 x 10-2 kg/m 2 _S.
The release rates and residence times for in-core surfaces are
reported to be
Reference D.20 Reference D.21
r (1/s) 1 - 1.8 x 10-6 1.9- 2.3 x 10-6
T (day) 6 - 11 5 - 6
A value of r. = 1.8 x 10 /s is adopted here. Such values are determined
from specific activity considerations. Typical values of the same re-
lease parameters for out of core surfaces are 8 x 10-8/s [D.20] and
2.3- 2.7 x 10 /s [D.9, D.18], the latter being for the entire system.
-7
The present reference value is r0 = 10 ~/s (116 days out of core
residence time). Note, if particles deposit/release more than once in
a given pass through the circuit, then the value of r will increase
(and calculated deposit thickness decreases). Hence, the present values
are considered to be conservative. Balakrizhvan and Allison [D.20]
found that the Co/Fe ratio was equal for soluble and insoluble species,
and suggest that Co simply follows Fe in species transport. The value
for CFe (as Fe304 ) is in good agreement with minimum measured values
of n 3 ppb [D.18, D.20, D.26].
D.5 Results
Given the models and available data, the mass balances and activity
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levels are calculated.
D.5.1 Mass Balance
The solutions for each of the three models are shown in Table D.4
and compared to observed values for LWRs. The observed concentrations
of crud range from \l0 ppb (pH of 10.5) to ,100 ppb (pH \7) [D.21].
Using the assumption that the outer film depth equals one-half the total
depth, then Cohen's data [D.9] indicates an in-blanket outer film
2thickness between 0.1 and 25 g/m
By assuming that the release products are the same as the base
alloy composition (except for the preferential iron release from
Inconel), the values for the total crud elemental concentrations are
calculated and shown in Table D.5.
As STARFIRE is a stainless-steel/Inconel system the elemental
balance in the crud should be intermediate between current Zircaloy/
Inconel PWRs (very little steel) and all steel LWRs (no Inconel). This
is indeed the case as shown in Table D.6. Thus, the calculated
concentrations for STARFIRE are, as expected, intermediate between pure
steel and Zircaloy/Inconel systems. The compo'ition ranges for Zircaloy-
clad PWRs again indicate that iron is preferentially released from
Inconel.
The total potentially releasable corrosion products from a loss
of coolant accident (LOCA) can be estimated for three cases:
LOCA-I: If the entire coolant from one loop leaked out, this
would release 8 g of metal to the reactor building.
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TABLE D.4
Calculated Outer Layer Film Deposit Thickness
C
C In-Blanket, Out-Blanket
Model (ppb) W (g/m2 W 2/m2
la 36 0.10 1.78
2 36 0.11 2.00
3 9 0.08 1.44
Observed 10- 100 0.1 - 25
aReference model for this study.
0
[iIIR 4 I 1111b IIi I I 'l rl 11b111.1A o l. I
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TABLE D.5
Coolant Elemental Concentrations
PPB (g metal-/kg water)
Element CT Cs CC
Fe 23.9 3.8 20.1
Ni 10.3 0.7 9.6
Cr 6.1 0.1 6.0
Mn 0.51 0.3 0.2
Co 0.021 0.003 0.018
Total 41. 5. 36.
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TABLE D.6
Elemental Crud Concentrations in LWRs and
STARFIRE Primary Coolants (wt-%)
Reactor STARFIRE PWRb b
Type a (Stainless (Carbon and BWR
(Alloy PWR Steel Stainless (Stainless
System) (Zr/Inconel) Inconel) Steel) Steel)
Fe 39- 51 56 75- 87 80
Ni 22-43 27 4-8 7
Cr 15- 29 17 9- 15 0.4
[D.13]
[D.211
e
a Ref.
b Ref. 0
0
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LOCA-II: D'uring crud bursts and shutdown situations in PWRs the
crud composition tends to increase by factors of 100-200. Added con-
servation due to the more harsh environment involved might raise that
to a factor of 250. Then 2 kg of metal would be released.
LOCA-III: An upper bound on released material is obtained by
assuming that the entire outer surface oxide layer is removed (equals
one-half total oxide depth). This would result in 44 kg (one loop)
released to the reactor building.
0.5.2 Activity
The following nuclides have been detected in PWR coolants [D.13]:
58Co, 60 Co, 5 1Cr, 54Mn, 56Mn, 55 Fe, 57Co, 59 Fe, 65Ni, 95Zr, 95Nb, 97Zr,
and 187W. Based on calculations on STARFIRE blanket activity, seven
isotopes were selected for transport calculations: 6f0Co, 58Co, 55Fe,
59Fe, 51Cr, 54Mn, 56Mn. These totally dominate PWR coolant activity
(except for the absence of 95Zr from the Zircaloy) and represent
91% of the blanket activity for STARFIRE at shutdown (the dominant
missing isotope is 99Mo , which has not been previously detected in
PWR coolants) and 96% of the activity after 10 days. These are thus
the dominant isotopes for operating contamination and release calcu-
lations. The long-term disposal contamination levels would be
dominated by a different isotope mix as discussed later.
For the isotopes of interest, the activity equations can be simpli-
fied by noting that UCTV << AiWi (production due to coolant dwell time is
always insignificant compared to activation of wall deposits) and;
Ill'! I'All 11 4l'i
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XV << r0 + + r0 +
(decay of isotopes while suspended in coolant can be neglected). Then
the number of atoms of each radioisotopes is given by:
y(#/m 3 = 1/3(dA Css/X) + Ir/(ri + X)1 2/3(dAicss/X)+Ai wil
Q + kX {A0 '(r0 + X)]+ [Ai/(ri + X)
where Css (number of target isotope atoms/kg of stainless steel) and Wi
(number of target isotope atoms/m2 of in-blanket deposit) are calculated
from the mass balance results.
Using the values of shutdown specific activity (Ci/kg stainless
steel) in the blanket weighted by surface area location, one obtains
values of a$. The relevant parameters for the seven isotopes are shown
in Table D.7. The total activity is about 9.5 kCi/kg steel. The
assumption that each isotope is produced from a single target isotope
(giving a$ values) can cause error only when the relative isotopic
distributions of W differs from Css (the basis for specific activity
calculations). For isotopes of interest, these differences are slight;
furthermore, the stainless steel release contribution to coolant
activity dominates the wall deposit activation except for the short-lived
isotope, 56Mn.
The relative contributions of in-blanket steel release to oxide
film acitivity is shown in Table D.8. The longer-lived isotopes are seen
to be totally dependent on the steel activity. Note that the direct
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TABLE D.7
Isotope Parameters for Activity Model
Parent
Main Abundance T Ci/kg
Isotope Parent (%) 1/2  Steel
60Co 59Co 100 5.27 y 171
55Fe 54Fe 5.82 2.6 y 4690
54Mn 54Fe 5.82 303 d 447
58Co 58 Ni 67.88 72 d 732
59Fe 58 Fe 0.33 45.1 d 18
51Cr 50Cr 4.35 27.8 d 1200
56Mn 55Mn 100 2.576 h 2250(10
RI'll,1411 Ilk 41HINI I '114141111!'H flilijil, [144 11 dIP I I ilk -I l , I , l , ,,
11 iii: 1 11 m ill 11 7 , ill, I I 1 11 i " , i ll I
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TABLE D.8
Ratio of Contribution from Steel
Release Activity to Wall Deposit Activity
Isotope Ratio T1/2
60Co 82 5.27 y
55Fe 77 2.6 y
54Mn 25 303 d
58Co 3.4 72 d
59 Fe 3.7 45.1 d
51Cr 2.0 27.8 d
56Mn 0.2 2.576 h 0
0
I I in I -- '' -
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steel release pathway does not exist for Zircaloy-clad PWRs. The
additional pathway contributes about forty times (weighted over Ci/kg
steel levels) more activity to the coolant activity levels than does
activation of wall deposits.
The coolant and wall deposit activity levels are now calculated
and shown in Table D.9. Results are also shown for the simple specific
activity model (coolant specific activity = steel activity x surface
area ratio - see Sec. D.3.3). The crude surface area model overpredicts
coolant levels relative to the reference model by not taking into
account decay and filtering losses. As expected, the overprediction
generally increases as half-life decreases. The alternative model
overpredicts out-of-blanket surface levels, but underestimates in-
blanket amounts as it assumes that specific activity levels everywhere
are equal. Again, the discrepancies tend to increase with decreasing
half-life. In the extreme case of 56Mn, there is very little activity
in out-blanket surfaces due to rapid decay. The activity levels of
very long-lived isotopes could be easily calculated using either the
simple specific activity model or the reference model (eliminating the
wall deposit pathway). The total calculated shutdown levels are then
42 mCi/m2 H20, 800 mCi/m2 in-blanket, and 2500 mCi/m2 out-of-blanket.
The decay ten days after shutdown is almost entirely due to 56Mn.
D.5.3 Releases
Releases can be either normal or off-normal. Assuming 100 liters
H20/day leakage from primary to secondary coolant loops (as in the
tritium case), a normal activity release can be calculated of < 3.3
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TABLE D.9
Coolant and Wall Deposit Activity Levels
Isotopes, 60Co 55Fe 54Mn 58Co 59Fe 51Cr 56Mn
Reference Model
mCi/m3 H20 0.96 23.3 2.02 2.64 0.06 3.87 8.81
Ci/kg crud 32 784 68 89 2 130 297
mCi/m2 in-blanket 12.3 322 31 55 1.2 96 278
mCi/m2 out-of-blanket 86 2020 152 118 2 94 1
Surface Area Model
Ci/kg crud 34 940 89 146 3.5 240 450
mCi/m2 in-blanket 7 190 18 30 <1 48 90
mCi/m2 out-of-blanket 123 3400 322 531 13 864 1620
0
0
0
HI 41 N IN [% 11 414,1!!!1hk 11-41,1 -1
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mCi/day (assuming a 1.0-day decay before release from the secondary).
As seen in Table D.10, the primary coolant water could be released
to unrestricted areas if diluted by a factor of 100 (assuming adequate
time for 56Mn decay).
Accidental releases can be determined for the three LOCA cases
discussed in Sec. D.5.1. A simple (one loop) coolant leak would involve
12 Ci (LOCA-I). For cases where the wall deposit is disturbed (coolant
material increase by a factor of 250, coming from all loop surfaces),
then 2700 Ci could be released (LOCA-II). An upper bound due to the
total activity in the outer depth of the oxide layer through one loop
is 32,000 Ci (LOCA-III). As seen in Table D.10, such a release would
have a BHP of %7200 km3 in air. Any releases would be to the reactor
building, rather than directly to the environment; hence, any releases
to the environment would be much less than the values presented here.
Compared to fission, the harder neutron spectrum causes increased
amounts of 55Fe and 54Mn; however, they have far lower relative toxicity.
Although in terms of BHP, 60Co is still a dominant hazard, the relative
importance of minimizing cobalt in the out-of-blanket portion of the
system is significantly decreased. Since > 98.5% of the 60Co activity
comes from trace cobalt in the blanket steel (rather than other parts
of the system), the only significant method of reducing 60Co is reduction
of 59Co in the stainless steel.
The maximum corrosion product release to the reactor building
(32,000 Ci for CASE LOCA-III) corresponds to < 0.001% of the total
blanket activity inventory. It is difficult to determine what fraction
of the mobilized material could reach the environment by leaking from
I J I j , "
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TABLE D.10
Coolant Biological Hazard Potential Levelsa
MPC MPC BHP
Water Required Air Air
Isotope (Ci/m 3) Dilution (Ci/m 3) (km3)
60Co 3 x 10-5 32 3 x 10-10 3560
55 Fe 2 x 10-3 12 3 x 10-8 830
54Mn 1 x 10~4 20 1 x 10~9 1920
58Co 9 x 10-5  29 2 x 10~9 790
59 Fe 5 x 10-5 1.2 2 x 10~9 14
51Cr 2 x 10-3 1.9 8 x 10-8 18
56Mn 1 x 10~4 88.1 2 x 10-8 42
aMPC (maximum permissible concentrations) are for insoluble species
released to unrestricted areas (see Ref. D.27); required dilution =
dilution required to reduce coolant levels to MPCwater; BHP listed is
for the maximum release to the atmosphere (Case LOCA-III).
0
0
C>
~
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the reactor building; however, deposition and settling should decrease
the material by about ten. Thus, the maximum corrosion product
release to the environment is %0.0001% of the blanket activity inven-
tory.
-750-
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